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PREFACE
Pleas for the introduction of family courts in South Africa
have been made frequently in recent years in the press, on
television and in journal articles. Enthusiastic support for
the family court concept has often been accompanied by a
misconception as to the true nature and function of a family
court. On the other hand, the idea of a family court is also
often branded as being too revolutionary and socialistic a
concept for it to be accepted as part of the South African
judicial scene.
It is hoped that this work will help to dispel some of the
misconceptions at both ends of this broad spectrum of opinion on
family courts.
As inestimable debt of g~atitude is owed to my wife, Lenore,
for her constant encouragement of, and support for, my endeavours
and to my sons, Lawrence and Crqig, for their patience.
I would also like to thank my supervisor, Michael Olmesdahl,
for his willing and helpful assistance.
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SUMMARY
South African family law is at the cross-roads of its
development. In recent times important changes have been effected
to the substantive family law, particularly the divorce laws, and
the appointment of the Hoexter Commission of Inquiry heralds the
restructuring of our courts with the faint possibility of the
introduction of a family court system.
In one's research on family courts one is immediately struck
by the widely differing definitions of a family court. In effect,
a family court means what one wants it to mean. It is, accordingly,
not surprising that at one end of the scale there are those who .
regard the establishment of a family court as the panacea of all
our social ills such as the unacceptably high divorce rate,
battered and neglected children as well as battered and abandoned
wives. At the other end of the scale there are those who regard
the concept of a family court as being too revolutionary for the
South African judicial scene. This work attempts to steer a .
course midway between these two extremes. In this regard, an
examination and assessment of the structure and philosophy of three
different examples of family courts has been undertaken; viz the
Los Angeles Conciliation Court, the Family Court of the First
Judicial Circuit of Hawaii, and the Family Court of Australia.
I Family courts have their origin in the American juvenile courtmovement. Numerous countries and states have adapted the
( American system of family courts to their own particular needs.
This, in itself, however, is not a good enough reason for similar
development to take place in South Africa. The justification for
the establishment of a family court in Sou~h Africa has to be
convincingly argued on other grounds. It is believed that such
grounds do exist. For example, the bitterness, distress and
humiliation of the divorce action of yester-year is still very
much part of the modern divorce proceeding; there is an inability
to give adequate expression to the best interests of the many
thousands of children of divorce; there is a lack of appreciation
and awareness of the contribution that modern psychology, psychiatry
and social work can make to the resolution of the many problems of
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family law; existing court procedures are cumbersome, unwieldy
and costly; and jurisdiction over family law matters is
unnecessarily split up amongst the various courts of our country.
Tne proposal for a family court in South Africa is seen as an
attempt to remedy these problems and, accordingly, the following
definition of a family court is proffered:
'A family court may be defined as a supreme court
of law having jurisdiction over all family law
matters which are to be adjudicated upon in an
informal and confidential manner so that
emphasis may be placed on the resolution of
problems rather than the settlement of disputes.'
The establishment of a family court is not, however, capable
of easy achievement. Difficulties and obstacles would have to be
overcome and, not least of all, there would have to be an adjustment
of attitude towards the resolution of the many problems that are




1. Purpose of Thesis
It may be broadly stated that the two-fold purpose of this thesis
is:
(a) to examine the concept of family courts in certain countries
of the Western World; and
(b) to consider, in the light of the experience in those countries,
whether the family court system would be a viable proposition
in the South African context.
Insofar as the second purpose is concerned, it must be conceded
at the outset that the main emphasis will lie on an attempt to show
that for any meaningful changes to be effected to South African family
law, especially to the divorce laws,l) very serious consideration will
have to be given to the establishment of family courts.
2. The Need to Examine the Family Court System in South Africa
The need to examine the family court system is, in the main,
motivated by a number of considerations, some of which may be briefly
stated as follows:
(a) it is trite that we are now living in an age of specialisation.
The family court system is essentially designed to utilize the
specialist skills of various experts 'in tne legal, social, mental
(and even spiritual)2) fields;
(b) the behavioural sciences, as a discipline, have been firmly
established as a recognized force. 3) One cannot cont~nue for much
longer to ignore the meaningful role that behavioural scientists
have to play in the field of family law;
1) The 1ivorce Act, 70 of 1979, which came into force on 1.7.1979, has
effected a number of radical and far-reaching changes to the South
African divorce laws which will be dealt with below at Chap 5.
2) As to the spiritual or religious problems that may be encountered in
the marriage relationship see, for example, Vermaak 1965 (1) SA 341 (T)·
Hill 1969 (3) SA 544 (R AD); Holland 1975 (3) SA 553 (AD). '
3) See generally the Golden Jubilee Report Vols 1 - 4 (1974).
2
Cc) society has, over the past centuries, been the unfortunate
'punchbag' in the conflict between Church and State over the
right to make and administer the laws governing the problems of
society that fall within the realm of family law - more specifically,
such problems that fall within the area of divorce law. In this
regard it is pertinent to remind ourselves of the various phases
in the development of the marriage and divorce laws.
l
) Marriage
was initially seen as a contract between two families though, later,
it came to be regarded as a private contract between the two parties
concerned with the result that divorce by mutual consent gradually
became possible. 2) Under the influence of Church dogma, however,
the marriage contract was elevated to the status of a sacrament so
that divorce came to be abolished. But the secularization of the
marriage laws became inevitable in view of the Church's abor~ive
attempt to spell out 'in minute detail ••• ;the7 circumstances in
which a man-woman relationship was indissoluble in the sense of
rendering every other sex relationship of one of the partners non-
marital and thus sinful. ,3) This secularization gathered
momentum during the period of the Protestant Reformation,4)
the effect of which was that divorce a vinculo was again permitted
but only on the grounds of adultery and malicious desertion. 5 )
1) For a brief historical survey of the South African marri~ge and
divorce laws see Hahlo Husband and Wife 1-14. ~or general surveys of
the historical evolution of the law of marriage and divorce see
International Encyclopedia (Max Rheinstein) 3-19; Glendon 304-320.
For the position in the United States see Clark 32-35. As to the
historical development in Eng~and see Jackson 7-77; Rayden 1-15.
2) Cf van Leeuwen Commentaries 119 who cites Seneca as deploring 'the
corruption of morals, as several women no longer counted the years
by the consuls but by the number of their divorced husbands.' In
the Civil Law divorce Was initially granted on the ground of adultery.
Later on, a divorce could be obtained on the ground of 'disagreement
or discord.'
3) Max Rheinstein International Encyclopedia 6.
4) As Rheinstein International Encyclopedia 7 puts it: 'The door was
opened for increasing secularization /Of the marriage laws7 when
Christian tradition was subjected to the critique of Enlightenment.'
5) Brouwer 2.33.7. The secularization of the marriage and divorce laws in
England proceeded at a slower pace. Until 1857 a private Act of
Parliament was required before a marriage could be dissolved. The
Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857 (20 and 21 Vict. c85;--
permitted divorce in a very discriminatory way; ie on the ground of
adultery on the part of the wife, but on the ground of adultery plus
incest, or bigamy, or rape, or sodomy, or cruelty, or desertion on the
part of the husband.
3
/
The main result of the secularization of the marriage and divorce
laws was that the administration of these laws fell exclusively
onto the shoulders of the lawyer - the judge, the advocate,· the
attorney, the magistrate and other lesser officials principally
concerned with the administration of justice. The lawyer now
takes it upon himself to be involved in the various fields of
human conflict experienced in the breakdown of marriage - fields
in which the lawyer is more often than not neither qualified nor
experienced. The st~ge has now surely been reached when it may
be asked whether the time has not arrived for the specialist
to be encouraged to play a more meaningful role in the administration,
at least, of family law in South Africa;
(d) in the application of his assumed right to administer
family law, the lawyer has seen fit, with the connivance of the
legislature, to create a court structure which is unwieldy and
badly designed to encourage the specialist to play his proper
role in the administration of family law. The personnel of the
presently constituted court structure occupy positions of widely
differing status and rank, requiring different qualifications
and experience. Multiple jurisdictions have been created and there
is a discernible lack of consistency in the approach of the various
courts of differing jurisdictions to the same or similar family
law problems.
In order to justify the need to examine the concept of family
courts in South Africa it is proposed to focus attention on the
origin of the family court movement in the United States of America,




THE ORIGIN OF FAMILY COURTS
Family courts have their origin in the American juvenile court
system which was introduced at the end of the last century. The
first State to adopt the juvenile court system was Illinois.
l
)
The philosophy behind the establishment of the juvenile court system
is explained by Fortas J in Kent v United States2) as follows:
'The theory of the ••• Juvenile Court ••• is rooted in social
welfare philosophy rather than in the Corpus Juris. Its
proceedings are designated as civil rather than criminal.
The Juvenile Court is theoretically engaged in determining the
needs of the child and of society rather than adjudicating
criminal conduct. The objectives are to provide measures of
guidance and rehabilitation for the child and protection for
society, not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt and
punishment. The State is parens patriae rather than prosecuting
attorney and judge.'
It is clear that the establishment of the juvenile court system has
led to a 'wedding of the legal science and some of the other social
sciences. ,3)
1) See the judgments of Fortas J in Kent v United States 383 US
542 (1966) 542 - 554 and Re Gault~ JS '1 (1967) 14 - 17. For
excellent short historical surveys of the juvenile court movement
in Illinois see Nicholas 'History, Philosophy and Procedures of
Juvenile Courts' (1961) 1 J Fam Law 151, and Parker 'The Juvenile
Court Movement: The Illinois Experience' (1976) 26 Univ Tor LJ
253. See also Brown 'The Legal Background to the Family Court'
1966 Br Journ of Criminology 139.
2) 383 US 542 (1966) 554 - 555.
3) Per Alexander 'Legal Science and the Social Sciences: The Family
Court' (1956) 21 Miss LR 105, 106. 'The writer (at 105) quotes
Pound as having publicly stated that 'it was the establishment of
the juvenile court movement that was the most forward-looking
development in Anglo-American jurisprudence since Magna Charta.'




In recent years it has been seriously doubted in America whether
the juvenile court system has achieved, or is capable of achieving,




'While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose
of juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise
serious questions as to whether actual performance measures
well enough against" theoretical purpose to make tolerable the
immunity of the process from the reach of constitutional
guaranties applicable to adults. There is much evidence that
some juvenile courts ••• lack the personnel, facilities and
techniques to perform adequately as representatives of the
state in a parens patriae capacity, at least with respect to
children charged with law violation. There is evidence, in
fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the child
gets the worst of both worlds; he gets neither the protection
accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative
treatment postulated for children.'
So also in the case of Re Gault3) the same judge had the following to say:
'The early conception of the juvenile court proceeding was
one in which a fatherly judge touched the heart and conscience
of the erring youth by talking over his problems, by paternal
advice a~d admonition; and in which, in extreme situations,
benevolent and wise institutions of the State provided
guidance and help to save him from a downward career. Then,
as now, goodwill and compassion were admirably prevalent.
But recent studies haye, with surprising unanimity, entered
sharp dissent as to the validity of this gentle conception.
They suggest that the appearance as well as the actuality
of fairness, impartiality and orderliness - in short,
the essentials of due process - may be a more impressive an1 more
1) This would account for the initial lukewarm reception that family
courts generally received.
2) 383 US 542 (1966) 555-556.
3) 387 US "1 (1867) 26.
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1)
therapeutic attitude so far as the juvenile is concerned.'
Although the above comments are particularly apposite to the
criminal functions of a juvenile court,2) it must be pointed out that
further serious criticisms can be levelled at the American system.
3)
For present purposes, these are best summed up by Dyson and Dyson
as follows:
'The therapeutic promises of juvenile court theory are often
belied by the realities with which juvenile courts deal.
Many courts lack trained probation officers and competent
specialized judges. Dispositional alternatives may be limited
by serious inadequacies in local community resources. Probation
services may be permitted to deteriorate into "mere watchful
supervision or routine reporting" because of heavy probation
caseloads. The broad powers given judges to act in the best
interests of children are often abused, notably in the areas of
prolonged detention of children and lax treatment of procedural
rights.'
v
1) For a trenchant criticism of the juvenile court system see Paulsen
'Juvenile Courts, Family Courts and the Poor Man' (1966) 54 Calif
LR 694 esp 713 - 716. The writer, however, does conclude by
suggesting that to abandon the juvenile court system is not the
correct approach since juvenile courts have it in their capacity
to 'avoid harsh regimens of treatment' (716) which would otherwise
not be possible if children were dealt with as adult criminals.
See also Kay 'A Family Court: The California Proposal' (1968)
56 Calif LR 1203. See generally AlIen 43 - 61.
2) Juvenile courts in America have both a criminal and a civil juris-
diction to deal with neglected children and children in need of
care: Paulsen supra n 1 at 699 - 701; Dyson and Dyson 512. It
may be mentioned in parenthesis that the Children's Court in
South Africa (which was first created by the Children's Act, 33 of
1960), unlike the American Juvenile Court, has no jurisdiction to
try juvenile criminal offenders. Juvenile criminal offenders are
ordinarily dealt with by the criminal courts except that s 254
of the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977, permits any criminal court
to refer any person under the age of 18 years to the Children's
Court to be dealt with as a child allegedly in need of care: see
below at Chap 8 (Minors) where this procedure is fully dealt with.
3) At 514.
7
Despite the criticisms that have been levelled at the American
juvenile court system it still continues to flourish there, as well as
in other countries. In the words of Alexanderl ) 'the fact remains
that by its wedding of legal science and some of the other social
sciences, the ~uvenil~7 court has been able to point the way, and
grow and develop.'
It is this phenomenon of linking legal science with the social
sciences (medicine, psychology, psychiatry, social work, religion,
sociology, education etc) that is also a characteristic feature of a
family court. The first American family court was established in
Cincinnati, Ohio, in 1914 and its official title was the 'Division of
Domestic Relations of the Court of Common Pleas,.2) The transition
from juvenile court to family court can be seen as a natural one
taking in its stride the idea that inasmuch as the proper treatment
of the delinquent child involves the whole family, so also 'delinquency,
child neglect and matrimonial difficulties may be simply different
facets of a larger. family problem. ,3) In short, the Cincinnati court
was the first family court to acquire an integrated jurisdiction over
both divorce and problems of juvenile delinquency.
Tne idea of an integrated jurisdiction over divorce and juvenile
delinquency spread to other states and family courts in one form or
another are to be found in most American States. The term 'family
court,4) is used consistently throughout this thesis for the sake of
convenience though, in reality, two types of court structure have
evolved. These are best described by Fayne5 ) as follows:
1) 'Legal Science and the Social Sciences: The Family Court' (1956)
21 Miss LR 105, 106.
2) Alexander 'What is a Family Court Anyway?' (1952) 26 Conn BJ 243,
250-252; Chute 'Divorce and the Family Court' (1953) 18 Law and
.Contemp Problems 49,51-52; Alexander 'Legal Science and the So~ia1
Sciences: The Family Court.' (1956) 21 Miss LR 105, 106.
3) Erown 'The Legal Background to the Family Court' 1966 Br Journ of
Criminology 139, 140. .
4) Other terms frequently encountered are 'conciliation courts' and
'courts of domestic relations.'
5) At 423-424.
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'First, Family Courts have been established with an extensive, but
not comprehensive, jurisdiction in matrimonial and familial
proceedings, and these courts provide specialized investigatory
facilities in an attempt to provide to a greater or lesser degree
counselling and conciliation services. In the event that
counselling and conciliation services provide no solution, a trial
takes place before the judge in order to secure a disposition of
the conflicting or competing claims. The second type of court
is the Conciliation Court that is established as a department
or division of the Superior Court. Inter-spousal conciliation
proceedings are instituted in the Conciliation Court and, if
ineffectual, the issues are referred to the trial division of
the Superior Court for judicial determination and disposition.
The judge of the Conciliation Court, unlike the judge in the
Family Court, discharges ~7 supervisory and supportive role in
promoting conciliation between the spouses.'
Quite apart from the two types of court structure just described there
would also appear to be no consistency in the application of the ideas
and philosophy behind the family court movement,l) presumably because
each family court seeks to take account of local conditions and
requirements. Differences in court structure are particularly
noticeable in the jurisdiction of the various family courts. 2)
For example, in their comprehensive analysis of the Family Courts of
Hawaii, Rhode Island and New York Dyson and Dyson3) list a number of
essential differences in the jurisdiction of each of these courts.
Thus, New York has no jurisdic~ion over divorce and annulment cases
whereas the FSmily Courts of Rhode Island and Hawaii do. llieN~
York Family Court shares jurisdiction with the ordinary criminal courts
1) Dyson and Dyson 517.
2) It would be beyond the scope of this thesis to list all the family
courts in the United States with a view to indicating the differences
in the jurisdiction of each. These differences are highlighted
in the descriptions of the Los Angeles Conciliation Court and the
Family Courts of Hawaii and Australia given below in Chap 3.
3) At 525-531. For a brief description of other family courts see
Foster 'Conciliation and Counselling in the Courts in Family Law
Cases' (1966) 41 NYULR 351.
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over delinquent children: it also has concurrent ju~isdiction with the
state Supreme Court over maintenance and child custody cases. This
inevitably gives rise to jurisdictional disputes. The New York Family
Court does, however, have jurisdiction over adoptions and the committal
of mentally ill persons to institutions. By way of contrast, the Family
Court of Hawaii has exclusive jurisdiction over all matters affecting
children. This also applies to criminal Cases except where the family
court waives its jurisdiction in certain cases in respect of children
between IB and 21 years. The Family Court of Rhode Island also has
exclusive jurisdiction over children except in the case of guardian-
/
ship disputes. In Hawaii the Family Court would appear to have
complete jurisdiction over adult cases such as maintenance, divorce,
paternity, annulment and the committal of mentally ill persons. The
position seems to be the same in Rhode Island except that the Family
Court there has not jurisdiction over mentally ill persons or in respect
of offences alleged to have been committed by parents against their
children.
Notwithstanding the fact that a 'family court means different
things to different people,l) the general idea of family courts has
spread to other continents. Thus, for example, family courts are to
be found as far afield as Japan, Taiwan, Australia and Canada.
In 1974 the Finer Report2) recommended the establishment of such courts
in England as a matter of urgency and independently of, and in advance
of, any change in the English matrimonial and family law. 3) It is
1) Corbett and King 'The Family Court of Hawaii' (196B) 2 Fam LQ
32, 35.
2) The committee responsible for the Report on One-Parent ~amilies
sat under the chairmanship of the late Sir Morris Finer who was
once described as "a lawyer with sociological training' - per Sir
Jocelyn Simon PC in the 1970 Riddell lecture entitled 'Recent
Developments in the Matrimonial Law' and which is cited by Rayden
3227, 3239.
3) This recommendation, although it has been accepted in principle, has
yet to be implemented in England, mainly because of the parlous
economic situation in which it finds itself today: Glendon 201 and
see the editorial comments in (1975) 125 NLJ 53 and (1979) 129 NLJ
305; Freeman 'When Marriage Fails - Some Legal Responses to Marriage
Breakdown' 1978 eLF 109, 110.
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also pertinent to note that Canada and Australia are common law
countries which operate under a cumbersome federal constitutional
framework. Accordingly, there is, from the South African standpoint,





EXA~LES OF FAMILY COURTS IN ACTION
1. Introduction
In South Africa, there is a dearth of literature in the legal
journals and periodicals on the subject of family courts.
l
) Such
comment as there is" is generally characterised by its brevity and
lack of clarity such as a failure to indicate precisely what is meant
by a family court. As has been pointed out above,2) 'a family court
means different things to different people.' It is, accordingly,
clear that for any meaningful suggestions to be made regarding family
courts in the South African context, there must first be an
understanding of the family court system in other countries. With
this end in mind, it is proposed to examine the Conciliation Court
of Los Angeles, the Family Court of the First Circuit of Hawaii and the
Family Court of Australia.
1) The only references to family courts in South African legal
journals and periodicals are Labuschagne 'Kindermishandeling:
'n Juridiese Perspektief' 1976 DJ 189, 210-211; Labuschagne
'Strafregtelike Aanspreeklikheid-Van Kinders' (1978) 3 TSAR
250, 267; Rosen 'The Need for a Counselling Service for P~rents
on Divorce' (1978)95 SALJ 117; Barnard 'Enkele Opmerkings oor
die Voorgestelde Nuwe Suid-Afrikaanse Egskeidingsreg' (1978)
41 THR-HR 263, 272-274; Barnard 'Nog 'n Stap Nader aan 'n Nuwe
Egskeidingsreg' 1979 DR 11. ,See also the Golden Jubilee Report
(1974) Vol 111 at 81 for the plea for a family court by Magistrate
Fourie. Pleas for the establishment of family courts in
South Africa have also come from other quarters such as the South
African National Council for Child and Family Welfare, the Women's
Legal Status Committee, Members of Parliament (Eastern Province
Herald, Tuesday 16.5.1978), religious organizations, social welfare
and marriage guidance societies. The South African Law Commission
in its Divorce Report (1978) refers, not insignificantly to 'a
strong feeling in favour of family courts' (§ 13.1), but hastens
to add 'that those in favour of family courts have a rather
vague idea of what the character and modus operandi of such courts
should be.' See also Barnard Thesis (1979) 437 and Barnard
(Divorce) 86-88.
2) See above 9 n 1.
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The choice as to which family courts to examine is purely an
arbitrary one but among the factors motivating the chcice made are:
(a) with regard to the Conciliation Court of Los Angeles, this
is one of the older and more firmly established family courts in
the United States and its particular strength lies in its con-
ciliation services. It is certainly one of the best known family
courts outside of the United States and much has been written
about it. It is an example of the second type of family court
structure described by Paynel ) and it is the prototype of sub-
sequently established family courts in the United States and
2)
elsewhere;
(b) with regard to the Family Court of the First Judicial
Circuit of Hawaii, which was established in July 1966, the
founders sought, after much inquiry, to overcome the juris-
dictional difficulties experienced by older and more established
family courts by modelling itself on the Standard Family Court
A~1959.3) This Act is the product of the American National
Probation and Parole Association,4) which co-operated in this
venture with the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges
and the United States Children's Bureau. This so-called Act
1) At 423-424: see above 7-8.
2) 1977 Conciliation Court Report 6. According to Elkin Position
Paper 40 n 16 there are 16 conciliation courts in the various
counties of California which represent about 75% of California's
population. There are 14 conciliation courts in other States
in America as well as in Canada /See the Directory of conciliation
courts in (1978) 16 Concil Cts Rev 50-567. The conciliation
court movement has also influenced family law legislation in
Australia, New Zealand and Japan.
3) The full text of this Act, and a commentary thereon, is to be
found in (1959) 5 NPPA Journ 99-160.
4) Now superseded by the National Council on Children and Youth.
See also Evavold 'Family Courts in North Dakota' (1968-69)
45 North Pak LR 281, 286-287.
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has no legislative force and has been produced to serve only
as a draft model or guide. Its draftsmen believe that
it contains all the characteristics of a true family court in
that it makes provision for an integrated jursidistion, an
investigatory staff and counsellors trained in social work. l )
Apart from being modelled on the Standard Family Court Act, the
Hawaii Family Court is an excellent example of the first type
of family court structure described by Payne2);
Cc) with regard to the Australian Family Court, which was
established in January 1976, this is one of the most recently
L/
established in a Commonwealth country. Apart from the fact
that it operates under a federal consti tutiona1 frame'~iork,
Australia, like South Africa, covers a vast and sparse area.
The Australian endeavour to bring the family court within the
reach of all sections of the population scattered over such
wide areas is, accordingly, of significance to South Africa.
The Australian population, like South Africa's, is largely
cosmopolitan.
------------ ..... a_ ot=
1) Dyson and Dyson 517.





The Conciliation Court of 10s Angeles.
Background and Purpose
In 1939 the California Code of Civil Procedure was amended to
enable any county in California to establish a conciliation court.
The county of Los Angeles was the first to take advantage of this and
in the same year it established its Conciliation Court which is
described as a 'special department of the Superior Court system of
2)
10s Angeles.'
1) The writer is indebted to Meyer Elkin, the former director of
Family Counselling Services of the 10s Angeles Conciliation
Court, who is now in private practice in Beverley Hills,
California, for much of the material and information upon which
this account of the Conciliation Court is based. As far as
possible, however, the writer has relied on the official annual
Conciliation Court reports. A comprehensive description of the
10s Angeles Conciliation Court is given by Elkin 'Family 1aw
Reform: California's Constructive Break with 1egal Tradition' (1971)
9 Concil Cts Rev 1, 10-12 ;Cited in extenso by Payne 428-4357.
For further descriptions of the Conciliation Court see Howard
'Matrimonial Conciliation' (1962) 36 ALJ 148; Foster 'Conciliation
and Counselling in the Courts in Family 1aw Cases' (1966) 41 NYU1R
351, 364-367; Finlay 'Family Courts - Gimmick or Panacea?'
(1967) 43 ALJ 602, 603-603; Reagh 'The. Need for a Comprehensive
Family Court System' (1970) 5 UBC1R 13, 22-24; Maddi 'The Effect
of Conciliation Court Proceedings on Petitions for Dissolution of
Marriage' (1973-74) 13 J Fam Law 495, 553-566; Elkin 'Conciliation
Courts: The Reintegration of Lisintegrating Families' (1973)
22 Fam Coordinator 63; Manchester and'Whetton 'Marital Conciliation
in England and Wales' (1974) 23 ICLQ 339, 363-366.
2) Elkin 'Conciliation Courts: The Reintegration of Disintegrating
Families' (1973) 22 Fam Coordinator 63.
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Collectively, the provlslons governing the Conciliation Court are
known as Conciliation Court Law. l )
According to section 1730 of the Code of Civil Procedure the
purpose of the Los Angeles Conciliation Court is given a legal
definition; namely,
'To protect the rights of children and to promote the public
welfare by preserving, promoting and protecting family life
and the institution of matrimony, and to provide means for the
reconciliation of spouses and the amicable settlement of
domestic and family controversies. ,2)
The establishment of the Los Angeles Conciliation Court met with
little initial success and it was not greeted with much enthusiasm
by either the judiciary or practising members of the legal profession,
or even by members of the public. The turning point in its development
was reached in 1954 when Judge Louis H. Burke was appointed the presiding
judge. Prior to that, no professionally trained marriage counsellors
had been employed by the court. Judge Burke soon realized that the
lack of trained and experienced personnel tended to destroy the whole
purpose of conciliation courts. Largely as a result of his endeavours
conciliat.ion court personnel now require 'a minimum of a Master's degree
in one of the behavioural sciences, and at least 5 years post-Master's
degree supervised clinical counseling experience of a diverse nature. ,3)
'rhe conciliation court personnel are under the supervision and control
f D· t f F ·1 C 1· S . 4) Th It f B k 'o a lrec or 0 aml y ounse lng erVlces. e resu 0 ur e s
efforts is that most of the connsellors have at least a Master's
1) Elkin supra 14 n 2. The relevant provlslons of the California
Code of Civil Procedure are ss 1730-1772.
2) 1974 Conciliation Court Report 1. This is also the stated purpose
of other conciliation courts such as those in Nebraska and Mon~ana:
1977 Nebraska Conciliation Court Report 4.
3) Elkin supra 14 n 2 at 67.
4) The present director of Family Counseling Services is H~gh McIsaac
who succeeded Meyer Eklin in 1977. Elkin had served in this
capacity for 22 years.
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1)
degree and some of them even have Ph D degrees.
That Judge Burke had some measure of success with the employment
of better trained and qualified personnel seems to be supported by the
statistical data for the period 1954-1959. Thus, Judge Burke was
able to report 2) that for this period reconciliations were effected
in 3581 cases, which is a success rate of 45%. The number of
children involved in the 3581 cases amounted to over 7700 children.3)
Furthermore, the legal profession itself has now recognized the value
of the work of the Conciliation Court in that about 50% of the matters
dealt with by the Conciliation Court were initially referred to the
court by attorneys who felt 'that there was no real cause for divorce. ,4)
CB) Legislative Changes Enhancing the Status of the Los Angeles
Conciliation Court
The functions and status of the Conciliation Court were enhanced
by two innovative pieces of legislation in 1970; namely, the Family
Law Act of 1970, and the amendment to section 4101 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure which introduced pre-marital counselling.
(i) The Family Law Act, 19705)
This Act abolished the erstwhile fault-orientated grounds for
divorce and substituted therefor 'irreconcilable differences which have
1) Immediately prior to 1976 there were 16 counsellors on the staff of
the Conciliation Court: 1976 Conciliation Court Report 1. Owing
to a serious financial crisis the number of counsellors was reduced
to 8. Although 1976 was a crisis year in the history of the Los
Angeles Conciliation Court it must be stressed that this must not
be seen as an 'anti conciliation court move.' The position has,
however, again improved and there are presently 11 counsellors,
plus 4 part-time 'interns' doing similar work: 1977 Conciliation
Court Report 3.
2) Burke 'The Role of Conciliation in Divorce Cases' (1961) 1 J Fam Law 209
3) Burke op cit 212.
4) Burke op cit 210; Elkin 'Conciliation Courts: The Reintegration of
Disintegrating Families' (1973) 22 Fam Coordinator 63.
5) For the events leading up to the promulgation of the Family Law Act of
1970 and the effects thereof see 1977 Conciliation Court Report 10-12.
The account that follows is largely based on that given in this Report.
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caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage as being the sole
ground upon which a marriage could be dissolved. At the same time
Two exceptions, however, are permitted
the word 'divorce' was replaced by the words 'dissolution ~f marriage.'
Not only were the fault orientated grounds for divorce abolished, but
it was also provided that no evidence of specific acts of matrimonial
misconduct could be led in any matrimonial action as this would be
'improper and inadmissible.'
to this rule; namely,
(a) where the custody of the child of the marriage is in issue
and evidence of misconduct is relevant to that issue; and,
(b) where the court considers it is necessary for such evidence to
be led to establish the existence of irreconcilable differences.
l
)
(ii) Pre-marita1 Counse11ing. 2)
Section 4101 of the California Code of Civil Procedure has the
effect of fostering even· further the co-operation that exists between
the Law, on the one hand, and the behavioural and social scientists, on
the other hand. Section 4101 empowers the Superior Courts of California
1) The Family Law Act also effected major changes to the law of
maintenance (or alimony - which is referred to in the Act as
'spousa1 support.') The sole criterion upon which maintenance
will be ordered to either spouse is the need of the claimant spouse
and the ability of the paying spouse to pay. With this criterion
in mind the court, in awarding maintenance, is enjoined to have
regard to the duration of the marriage, and the ability of the
supported spouse to engage in gainful employment without interfering
with or prejudicing the interests of the children in the custody of
such spouse. With a view to giving proper effect to the interests
of minor children, the court is empowered to grant the custody of
such children to any of the following, in the following order of
preference: (a) to either parent, or Cb) to any personCs) in whose
home the child has been living in a wholesome and stable environment,
or Cc) to any personCs) deemed by the court to be suitable and able
to provide adequate and proper care and guidance to the child.
But before the court can make an order under Cb) or Cc), it must
first find as a fact that it would be detrimental to the child's
best interests to place it in the custody of either of the parents.
The final significant change to be effected by the Family Law Act
was that upon the dissolution of a marriage all the community
property (inclUding community debts) are to be divided equally: the
court is given no discretion in the matter.
2) S 4101 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. Elkin 'Premarital
Counseling of Minors: The Los Angeles Experience' (1977) 26 Fam
Coordinator 429.
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to require the pre-marital counselling of any couple wishing to marry
if either party is under the age of 18 years and if the court considers
that such counselling is necessary.




'(a) Any unmarried person of the age of 18 years or upwards, and
not otherwise disqualified, is capable of consenting to and
consummating marriage.
(b) Any person under the age of 18 is capable of consenting to
and consummating marriage if each of the following documents is
filed with the clerk issuing the marriage license
(1) The consent in writing of the parents of each person
who is under age, or of one of such parents, or of his
or her guardian•.
(2) After such showing as the Superior Court may require, an
order of such court granting permission to such underage
person to marry.
(c) As part of the order under subdivision (b), the court shall
require the parties to such prospective marriage of a person under
the age of 18 years to participate in pre-marital counseling
concerning social, economic, and personal responsibilities
incident to marriage, if it deems such counseling necessary. Such
parties shall not be required, without their consent, to confer
with counsellors provided by religious organizations of any
denomination. In determining whether to order the parties to
participate in such pre-marital counseling, the court shall consider
among other factors, the ability of the parties to pay for the
I " ,2)counse lng.
1) Supra 17 n 2.
2) Paragraph (c) of s 4101 seems to give the court a discretion as
to whether to order pre-marital counselling. The Los Angeles
Superior Court has, hbwever, interpreted this paragraph to mean that
the onus is on the parties to prove that pre-marital counselling
is not necessary and that a failure to discharge that burden means
that the court is left with no option but to order pre-marital
counselling: Elkin supra 17 n 2.
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The pre-marital counselling procedure is fully described in the
1977 Conciliation Court Report l ) as follows:
'1. Upon contacting the Marriage License Bureau, the couple is
advised in writing about all the requirements for obtaining a
marriage license, including the pre-marital counseling requirement.
This information is contained in a pamphlet entitled 'A Message
to Minors Needing Judicial Consent ~o Obtain a Marriage License.'
••• This pamphlet is part of a 'Kit' handed to all minor couples
at the Marriage License Bureau. The 'Kit' also includes a 'List
of Pre-marital Counseling Services' for couples who need help in
locating a qualified pre-marital counseling service In
addition, the 'Kit' contains an 'Application for Order Consenting
and for Granting Permission to Marry.' This is a confidential
questionnaire developed by the Consiliation Court and is designed
for research purposes. The questions ask for background informatio:
regarding the couple and the parents. All questionnaires are
returned to the Conciliation Court by the Marriage License Bureau
and are stored in the Conciliation Court for research purposes.
Attached to each questionnaire is a letter from the counselor who
provided the pre-marital counseling.
2. After obtaining the pre-marital counseling, the parties are
required to obtain a written statement on the counselor's
letterhead verifying the counseling.2)
3. Par~ies return to the Marriage License Bureau with all
necessary documents including the counselor's letter.
4. If the judge grants consent,3) the parties are then eligible
1) At 8-9. Cf Appendix 'C' below at 340.
2) The number of pre-marital counselling interviews in the years 1974
to 1977 were as follows:
1974 1975 1976
2268 2467 2053
In 1977 members of the clergJ were responsible
interviews conducted: 1977 Conciliation Court
1977
1692
for 68,8% of the
Report 9.
3) In 1977 consent was granted in 86,7% of the cases, denied in 8,6%
of the cases, while 15,2% of the cases were postponed (deferred):
1977 Conciliation Court Report 9.
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to obtain a marriage license.'
In his comprehensive review of section 4101 Elkin
l
) sets out
what he considers to be the main purposes of pre-marital counselling,
namely,
'1. It is not the purpose of such counseling to talk a couple
out of marriage;
2. To assist the couple to assess their emotional, economic, and
social readiness,for marriage;
3. To provide them with the opportunity to further evaluate the
decision to marry at this time;
4. To enhance a couple's ability to establish the kind of
marriage relationship that will help them grow as individuals,
as well as a family;
5. To begin a dialogue that will continue for life;
6. To stimulate a system of communication which will encompass
communication with self, communication with each other, and
communication with the community;
7. To familiarize the couple with the nature of marriage as well
as the realities, responsibilities and problems common to most
marriages;
8. To explore the motivation of the parties to marry now;
9. When indicated, to discuss alternatives to marrying now.
To create an awareness that there are alternatives;
10. To create an awareness of the strengths and weaknesses the
couple brings into the marriage and their potential for coping
with the weaknesses;
11. To explore and clarify their role expectations of each other;
12. To explore and evaluate their decision making process;
13. When indicated, to make appropriate referrals for whatever
help the couple needs;
1) 'Premarital Counseling for Minors: The Los Angeles Experience'
(1977) 26 Fam Coordinator 429, 437-438. Cf Appendix 'C' below.
21
14. To provide sex information that seems relevant to the couple's
needs;
15. To explore any special circumstances surrounding the marriage,
such as racial/ethnic differences, religious differences,
pregnancy, physical and emotional handicaps, parental pressure etc;
16. To build a relationship of trust and confidence between
counselor and Lth~7 couple so that the couple will think in




With the above background in mind.it is easier to appreciate the
services offered by the Conciliation Court. Broadly speaking, these
fall into three basic categories; namely,
(i) pre-marital counselling;
(ii) reconciliation counselling, separation counselling (where
reconciliation is not possible) and custody / access
counselling;
(iii) post-dissolution counselling, especially in respect of
t d / d
o t 2)cus 0 y access 1SpU es.
With regard to the Conciliation Court's acquisition of jurisdiction,
section 1760 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that -
'Whenever any controversy exists between the spouses which may,
unless a reconciliation is achieved, result in the dissolution or
annulment of the marriage or in the disruption of the household,
and there is any minor child of the spouses or of either of them
whose welfare might be affected thereby, the Conciliation Court
shall have jurisdiction over the controversy and over the parties
thereto and all persons having any relation to the controversy
Accordingly, the Conciliation Court may acquire its jurisdiction in
1) An evaluation of the Los Angeles pre-marital counselling procedure
is undertaken below at 96-97 and 110.
2) Post-dissolution counselling is dealt with below at 31-33.
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anyone of the following ways:
(i) where the Superior Court itself has referred a matter to the
Conciliation Court: ie a matter in which minor children
are involved and where it appears to the Superior Court that
there is a reasonable possibility of a reconciliation being
1)
effected;
(ii) where the parties are engaged in any proceedings against 'each
other under the Family Law Act of 1970 and they have responded
to an invitation by the Conciliation Court to use its services;2)
(iii) where either or both of the parties are referred to the
Conciliation Court by their attorneys;3)
1) S 1771 Code of Civil Procedure. This accounts for about 20% of the
'Petitions for Conciliation': Eklin 'Conciliation Courts: The
Reintegration of Disintegrated Families' (1973) Fam Coordinator
63, 68.
2) The Family Law Act provides for the completion and filing by the
petitioner of a confidential questionnaire at the same time that
proceedings are initiated for the dissolution of a marriage.
Provision is also made for the respondent to complete and submit
a confidential questionnaire. ~he questionnaire is filed in the
Conciliation Court and its purpose is two-fold: (i) it enables
the conciliation court counsellor to determine the viability of
the marriage and, (ii), it enables the Conciliation Court itself
to determine which families might respond to an invitation to make
use of the services offered by' the court. Among the various
questions asked is: 'Would you like counseling?' A positive answer
immediately results in a letter from the presiding judge of the
Conciliation Court enclosing a blank 'Petition for Conciliation',
together with an invitation to utilize the court's services.
This procedure accounts for about 2ry~ of the annual total of
petitions filed: Elkin ibid.
3) In former years the legal profession was reluctant to use the
services of the Conciliation Court on the ground that they
constituted a 'meddling' in their cases. There was also the
suspicion that this would have an adverse affect on attorneys'
fees. This feeling of antipathy has, however, proved to be
unfounded since it has been shown that clients who have become
reconciled are either able or more willing to pay the attorneys'
fees incurred. Furthermore, happily reconciled clients are more
likely to return to their attorneys with further legal work, such
as drafting of wills. In any event, even if reconciliation
proves unlikely or unsuccessful, the parties concerned will more
than likely return to their attorneys. The position now is that
by far the largest source of referral to the Conciliation Court
is the legal profession itself; ie about 50% of the annual total
of petitions filed: Elkin ibid.
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(iv) where either or both of the parties are referred to the
Conciliation Court by members of the clergy, doctors,
. f· d 1)other family service agenc~es, or even r~en s.
In short, it would not be incorrect to say that the Conciliation
Court's services are available to anyone who walks in off the street
and asks for them. It is not even necessary for any matrimonial
action to be pending between the spouses and neither do there have to
be any minor children involved. But where there are no minor children
involved the Conciliation Court's jurisdiction would appear to be
limited to those cases where application for assistance has been made
(as opposed to an invitation to use the court's services), and then
only if the work of the court in cases involving minors is not
'seriously impeded,.2)
(D) Counselling Procedure and Pleadings.3)
Proceedings are initiated in the Conciliation Court by the filing
of a 'Petition for Conciliation' which is a form provided for by the
Code of Civil Procedure. The petition, which is accompanied by an
affidavit, sets out general information regarding the parties involved
and their background. The petition can only be filed by either of
the parties to the matrimonial dispute and it is done voluntarily without
any pressure being brought to bear upon the parties. In this way the
Conciliation Court is able to devote its resources to those marriages
where one or both of the parties desire counselling. There are
no filing fees or charges for services rendered by the Conciliation Court.
1) This method of reference accounts for about lry~ of the 'Petitions
for Conciliation' Elkin ibid.
2) Roward 'Matrimonial Conciliation' (1962) 36 ALJ 148, 149. About
12% of the 'Petitions for Conciliation' are filed by couples
without children: Elkin 'Conciliation Courts: The Reintegration
of Disintegrated Families' (1973) 22 Fam Coordinator 63, 65.
3) See the references cited above at 14 n 1.
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If urgent or immediate interim relief is sought, this must be
mentioned in the accompanying affidavit. If the court is satisfied
f th 11 t · made,l) l·t wl·ll l·mmedl·atelyas to the substance 0 e a ega lons
. . f ht 2)grant the interlm relle soug •
Where a petition has been filed then neither party may commence
action for the dissolution or nullity of the marriage, or for
maintenance, for a period of 30 days from the filing of the petition.
This, however, only applies where proceedings between the parties have
not yet actually commBnced. But where proceedings between the parties
have already been commenced then the filing of the petition will be
d · 3)no bar to further procee lngs.
As soon as the petition has been filed a date, time and place
is fixed for the 'hearing of the petition'. As Elkin
4) points out
'An effort is made to schedule the conference (hearing) as quickly
as possible since these clients are usually at a point of crisis.
The need to wait for counseling can be harmful to both parites.'
The respondent is then notified by means of an informal letter to
attend the conference at the appointed date, time and place. Should
it be necessary, however, a citation (summons) may be issued to compel
the respondent's attendance. The reasoning behind the issue of the
citation is explained by Elkin5) as follows:
1) Eg the threatened removal of children, or the disposal of money
or property, or interference with the marital relationship.
2) Burke 'The Role of Conciliation in Divorce Cases' (1961) 1 J Fam
law 209, 215.
3) Burke op cit 220.
4) 'Conciliation Courts: The Reintegration of Disintegrated Families'
(1973) 22 Fam Coordinator 63, 64.
5) 'Short Contact Counseling in a Conciliation Court' (1962) Social
Casework - cited by Payne 451 n 433. See also the 1961 Report
of the Subcommittee on Conciliation, Family Law Section, American Bar
Association, which is comprehensively cited by Payne at 424-428,
where it is pointed out that 'Considerable controversy exists in the
field of reconciliation procedures as to the desirability or
propriety of the use of any coercion whatever in the conciliation
process. Many social workers find the use of coercion repugnant
or ineffective. However, experience has proved what might be termed
"Contle judicial coercion" plays an important role in effecting
reconciliations. '
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'Our experience has shown that the use of authority can facilitate
the process of short contact marital counseling. In some instances
the respondent seems to have backed himself into a corner from which
he cannot escape without further injury to his pride and an increase
in his guilt feelings. A citation to appear for a counseling
conference can then become a face-saving device that permits him to
keep the appointment and get help. ,1)
In practice, the citation is only issued when it is felt that some
constructive purpose in the interests of the welfare of the family may
be served by securing the attendance of the respondent. 2). Furthermore,
any third parties3 ) named in the petition and the accompanying affidavit
may also have a citation served upon them to attend a conference.
It must be stressed that the hearing of the petition and other
conferences are governed by strict rules of secrecy. The characteristic
feature of the 10s Angeles counselling services is that it only operates
on an intensive short-contact basis which can mean anything from one to
six conferences, each one lasting approximately one and a half hours.
If further counselling is required the parties will be referred to outside
community counselling resources such as family service agencies, private
non profit agencies·, private practitioners and others on the court's list.
In this way, on-going counselling can be maintained where it is felt
that this would be beneficial to the parties. 4 )
1) Help or relief need not necessarily come in the form of reconciliation.
Thus, as was pointed out by 1ester E Olscn The Conciliation Court of
Los Angeles County 6ed (1970), which is cited by Payne at 451, 'Even
though no reconciliation is effected, these friendly and helpful
conferences result in beneficial byproducts to both parties and
particularly their children. Tensions are eased, hostilities reduced,
common grounds of understanding created enabling the parties to
amicably adjust their differences, such as harmonious visitation
arrangements. ~~ny times it promotes the settlement of controversial
property rights and the elimination of a bitterly contested dissolution
of marriage case.'
2) Elkin 'Conciliation Courts: The Reintegration of Disintegrated
Families' (1973) 22 Fam Coordinator 73, 66: Maddi 'The Effect of
Conciliation Court Proceedings on Petitions for Dissolution of
Marriage' (1973-74) 13 J Fam Law 495, 505.
3) Eg the 'other' woman or interfering mothers-in-law.
4) Burke 'The Role of Conciliation in Divorce Cases' (1961) 1 J Fam Law
209, 213-214. It is patently clear that the Los Angeles Conciliation
Court lacks the resources to provide on-going therapeutic treatment
to the thousands of couples who approach it each year: see also 16
n 1 above.
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At the first hearing or conference the counsellor assigned to the
case will initially interview the parties together and will outline
to them the main functions of the conciliation court. He will also
stress to the parties that they will not be coerced into doing,
or agreeing to, anything against their will. It will also be
emphasized to the parties that the counsellor's role is an impartial
one. l ) The parties are thereafter interviewed and counselled
separately and then jointly.
While one of the parties is being separately interviewed or
2) t h·l ·t· hO h t .counselled the other par y, w ~ e wa~ ~ng ~s or er urn, ~s
given a 'Husband and Wife Agreement,3) in blank form to read.
This document, and its function, is described by Elkin
4
) as follows:
'/It7 consists of approximately 25 pages, which covers
practically every facet of married life and common marital
problems5 ) ••• It fosters communication between the partners
as they attempt to pinpoint the problems they are having and
the actions each will take in order ,to correct the problems.
It enables both the husband and wife to redefine their
1) Burke supra 25 n 4 at 215-216: Elkin 'Conciliation Courts: The
Reintegration of Disintegrated Families' (1973) 22 Faro Coordinator
63, 65.
2) This takes place in an informal way in a private office.
3) The 'Husband and Wife Agreement' is described by Manchester and
Whetton' 'Marital Conciliation in England and Wales' (1974)
23 ICLQ 339, 364 as 'bizarre'. See also Finlay 'Family Courts -
Gimmick or Panacea?' (1969) ALJ 602, 606.
4) 'Conciliation Courts: The Reintegration of Disintegrated Families'
(1973) 22 Fam Coordinator 63, 67.
5) Howard 'Matrimonial Conciliation' (1962) 36 ALJ 148, 150 lists some
of the main headings appearing in this remarkable document; namely,
forgetting the past, husband's role in the family, where wife works
outside the home, religion, shared interests, mutual friends, social
activities, recognition of accomplishments, falling out of love,
speaking in normal tone of voice, bearing grudges, late hours, privacy,
the importance of talking things over, personal appearance, meal times,
children, parents' conduct towards child, sexual intercourse, the
importance of love making, earnings, the family budget, family prayers,
charge accounts, third persons in the home, alcoholic beverages,
stepchildren. Foote, Levy and Sander at 1093 n 79 cite the following
example of a clause in the 'Husband and Wife Agreement,' viz, 'The
wife agrees to respond to the husband's efforts in lovemaking and not
to act like a patient undergoing a physical examination. For the
husband to acquire proficiency in making intercourse pleasurable to
the wife, he must learn to relax physically and to take his time.'
Cf Appendix 'C' below.
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respective roles and responsibilities in the marriage.
The agreement becomes a blueprint for a successful marriage,
tailored to meet the needs of each family. Since the
agreement mentions most of the problems commonly encountered
in marriage, the partners usually find relief in the discovery
that others have problems similar to theirs. This discovery
gives them emotional support and hope.,l)
If the parties should indicate a willingness to enter into the
'Husband and Wife Agreement' only those portions of the document apposite
to their particular needs will constitute the final agreement. An
amendment in 1955 to section 1769 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure gives a judge of the Conciliation Court the power to grant
an order compelling compliance with the provisions of the agreement.
Wilful failure to comply with the court order is then punishable as
a contempt of court. In practice, however, contempt proceedings are
rarely invoked. It is, nevertheless, a power that the court has, not
only insofar as the respondent is concerned, but also in respect of
any named co-respondent such as a mother-in-law or paramour.
The rationale behind the reduction of this agreement to writing is
explained by Burke2) as follows:
'1. Memory may be short concerning the promises that one may
make to bring about a reconciliation.
2. Having brought their troubles to the court the parties'
promises to one another should be dignified by a formal court
order requiring them to comply fully with such promises
under penalty of being found in contempt of court for any
wilful violation.
1) According to Manchester and Whetton 'Marital Conciliation in England
and Wales' (1974) 23 ICLQ 339, 365, it is alleged by some that the
'Hus'band and Wife Agreement' is psychologically sound ••• and
entirely in keeping with the most advanced thinking in the
psychiatric fields.'
2) Burke 'The Role of Conciliation in Divorce Ca,ses' (1961) 1 J Fam
Law 209, 217.
3. Having in mind that it is only by the mutual consent of
the parties that the 30 day limitation upon the duration
of orders of the conciliation court may be extended, a
/Husband and Wif~7 agreement in writing serves as the means
. of securing the consent of the parties that the orders of
the court shall remain in full force and effect until further
order of the court.'
Of course, the parties may not wish to enter into the 'Husband and
Wife Agreement'. Furthermore, either party is at liberty to request
the court to terminate the agreement if the reconciliation has failed.
In either of these events the role of the counsellor does not come to
an end. The position is explained in the 1977 Conciliation Court
Reportl ) as follows:
'A conciliation court is more than a reconciliation court. A
conciliation court serves families. If, in the course of such
service, a family does not reconcile, this does not mean that
the counselor's concern and responsibility to the family is at
an end. In such cases, we still offer a very important and
worthwhile service in our counseling efforts to help the family
terminate the marriage with dignity and minimal trauma, without
the need to strike back - a need which is often responsible for
post-divorce litigation. Conciliation court counselors recognize
that a divorce decree cannot and does not end parental responsibility
to the children - for the children are forever. Nor do problems
stop when the divorce decree is final. Our goal with unreconciled
families is to assist the husband and wife to focus feelings and
decisions so they can effectively deal with the issues of
separation, such as custody, support, visitation, division of
property and also to continue their joint responsibilities to
their children (and to themselves) in a constructive way. This
makes it possible for couples to use the crisis of divorce as an
opportunity for personal growth and fulfilment, rather than a
vehicle for self-defeating, disabling behaviour.'
1) At 4.
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Over the years the Los Angeles Conciliation Court has reported
a remarkable degree of success. This alleged success is of particular
significance to South Africa inasmuch as Los Angeles is a city comprising
about 10 million people made up of many ethnic/racial groups. The
Conciliation Court has strived to break down these natural barriers
by making its services available to all. Accordingly, over the years
its services were extended by the establishment of 'Neighborhood Service
Centers,l) which operate in a non-court setting. The idea was to make
the Conciliation Court's facilities more readily accessible to those
who could not 'afford the cost of a bus fare, or parking, or telephoning
the Conciliation Cburt ••• or the price of gasoline. ,2) In this
regard, for example, the counsellor in charge of the 'East Los Angeles
Neighborhood Service Center' was of Mexican ancestry and spoke Spanish
so that he was 'tuned in to the cultural background and values of the
clientele he would serve.,3) So also, the counsellor in charge of
the 'South Central Los Angeles Neighborhood Service Center' was 'Black
and sensitive to Black clients' culture and values. 4) It may also be
mentioned that court interpreters are provided for couples speaking
any language: two of the counsellors are Spanish speaking and one
counsellor can communicate with the deaf.5 )
1) Elkin 'Conciliation Courts: The Reintegration of Disintegrated
Families' (1973) 22 Fam Coordinator 63, 67.
2) 1977 Conciliation Court Report 13-14.
3) 1976 Conciliation Court Re?)rt 12-14.
4) 1976 Conciliation Court Report 14. Regrettably, since September
1976 the 'Neighborhood Ser'lice Centers' in East Los Angeles and
South Central Los Angeles have been suspended from operations because
of a financial crisis: see 16 n 1 above. Strenuous efforts are,
however, being made to revive these services: see McIsaac
'Crisis Intervention Techniques in Insuring Conciliation Court
Survival' (1977) 15 Concil Cts Rev - also reprinted in 1976
Conciliation Court Report 29-32.
5) 1977 Conciliation Court Report 4.
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(E) The Judge of the Conciliation Court
It is apposite to point out that the Conciliation
Court is a court of law in every sense and it is not just an adminis-
trative organ. The court is presided over by a judge who is legally
qualified in the same way as any judge. He is not just a mere
figurehead. Of course, he takes no part whatsoever in the counselling
of couples for the simple reason that he is not a trained counsellor.
l
)
Although the judge's functions are generally supervisory in nature, he
does perform a number of important judicial functions. Thus, for
example, he reviews all 'Husband and Wife Agreements' and imposes
thereon his imprimatur giving them the effect of court orders in much
the same way as a South African judge makes a consent paper an order of
court in a divorce action. He also presides over contempt proceedinp,s
and has the power to impose penalties for failure to comply with court
orders: in practice, though, this power is sparingly used. He also
grants the necessary orders where urgent interim relief is sought, such
as restraining orders. It is through the judge of the Conciliation
Court that the State maintains its interest in every matrimonial dispute.
Apart from his purely legal functions the judge supervises the
staff of the court and through numerous meetings and conferences he is
able to discuss and review the practices, proceedings and policies of
the court. He also performs an important public relations function
in that he makes frequent public appearances to publicise the functions
and achievements of the court. Moreover, he engages in follow-up operation
by communicating with couples who have reconciled. So far as possible,
the judge will try to see all minor children involved in domestic
disputes privately and informally in his chambers, especially where
questions of custody and access are at issue. 2)
1) Elkin 'Conciliation Courts: The Reintegration of Disintegrated
Families' (1973) 22 Fam Coordinator 63, 67.
2) Further on the status and function of a judge of the Conciliation
Court see Elkin sUrra at 67 and Burke 'The Role of Conciliation
in Divorce Cases' 1961) 1 J Fam Law 209, 224-225.
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In keeping with the legal atmosphere of the Conciliation Court,
legal representation is permitted and never discouraged •. In fact, where
clients have been referred to the Conciliation Court, every effort is
made to keep their lawyers fully informed of the progress made.
l
)
(F) Post-Divorce counselling2 )
An extremely valuable service offered by the Los Angeles Conciliation
Court is its post-divorce counselling which was first introduced in 1974.
In this respect, an important distinction is made between 'legal divorce'
and 'emotional divorce'. Elkin3) explains the difference as follows:
'The divorce decree merely indicates that the legal aspects of
the divorce may be over. But, more important than the legal
divorce is the emotional divorce, which is a process that
invariably continues beyond the legal experience.'
Thus, while a legal divorce puts an end to the marriage it does not
necessarily end a family. The aims of the services offered by the
Conciliation Court in this respect are succintly set out in the 1977
Conciliation Court Report4) as follows:
'1. To help the natural parents reach an amicable agreement to
insure that the best interests of the child are served.
2. When such an agreement is reached, to incorporate the mutually
acceptable decisions into a written agreement which, when
signed by the referring bench, becomes an order of court.
3· To open up channels of communication which have been clogged
with unresolved anger and the need to strike back. These
1) There does not seem to be any evidence of hostility on the part of
the legal profession in Hawaii to the family court system. For the
position in Los Angeles see above at 22 and for the position in
Australia see below at 108-109.
2) For a full discussion on the post-divorce counselling services see
Elkin 'Postdivorce Counseling in a Conciliation Court' (1977)




are usually carry-over problems that existed at the time the
parties were married and were reinforced by the divorce itself.
4. To ascertain at what levels the natural parents are still
emotionally connected in a self-defeating, destructive way.
We are finding that the parties are often connected by bonds
of anger that have never been broken and these bonds impede
communication which in turn makes it exceedingly difficult
for the natural parents to resolve problems that need
resolution, if the best interest of the child is to be served.
5. To help the parties accept the reality that a divorce ends a
marriage, but never ends the family where there are children,
nor does the role of the parent end, for parents are forever.
6. Where there are step-parents due to re-marriage, to involve
the step-parents in the total family system in a constructive
7. To help the parties become more aware of the destructive impact
of their conflicts on the children.
8. When indicated and accepted by the parties, to make a referral
to another community counseling resource for an ongoing
type of counseling for the parents and/or the children.
9. To provide the children with an opportunity to discuss matters
which are pressing them and to provide an opportunity for the
parents and children to discuss matters of mutual concern.'
Since 1974, whenever it has been seised of a post-divorce case
involving custody and/or access disputes, the Los Angeles Superior Court
has adopted the practice of referring the parties to the Conciliation
Court. Once the parties have been referred to the Conciliation Court
for post-divorce counselling, the custody or access dispute is postponed
for 60 days. The Conciliation Court thereafter interviews the parties
on a short contact basis of between one to six sessions during which other
parties involved, such as children an1 step-parents, are also interviewed.
If the parties desire long-term, or ongoing, counselling, they will be
referred to the community counselling services.
Post-divorce counselling is conducted on a confidential basis and
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the counsellors do not submit reports to the court. To do so would
mean that the counsellor would be placed in the same position as an
investigator so that he will be seen to be part of the adversary process.
As Elkin observesl ) 'This would be inconsistent with his role, which is
to diminish the impact of the adversary procedure rather than to increase
its destructive impact'. The counsellor simply advises the referring
court of the outcome of the counselling by placing a notice in the
divorce file indicating whether an amicable agreement has been worked
out or not. If an amicable agreement has been arrived at a copy of
the agreement, which is placed in the court file, will be signed by
the referring court giving it the effect of an order of court. The
attorneys, if any, are then advised by post.
The rationale behind post-divorce counselling is to afford the
parties in a custody and/or access dispute the opportunity of working
out for themselves, in a non-adversary atmosphere, their own order. 2)
As it is neatly expressed in the 1977 Conciliation Court Report3)
'This is consistent with a basic principle in counseling that when
crucial decisions are made for people and not with then, the
likelihood of compliance is diminished.'
1) 'Postdivorce Counseling in a Conciliation Court' (1977) 1 Journ of
Divorce 55, 60.
2) Post-divorce counselling in custody disputes can lead to a more
ready acceptance of the final placement order. The parents
themselves are generally incapable of being wholly objective with
regard to the custody of their children 'because of the emotional
state in which most domestic disputes occur': Galligan 'Protection
of Children in Family Disputes' (1973) 4 Can BJ 10. In any event,
when called upon to resolve a custody dispute the court is often
confronted with choosing between alternatives in order to give
effect to the best interests ofa child: Mnookin 'Child-Custody
AdjQdication : JUdicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy'
(1975) 39 Law and Contemp Problems 226, 255. It is clear that each
case depends on its own facts: Mnookin op cit 253. Very often
all the facts are not before the court: Mnookin op cit 257-8.
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. J.. 1 C· . t f H ..1)The Family Court of the F1rst ud1c1a 1rCU1 0 awa11
Introduction
Of all the American family courts, the Hawaii Family court
2
) is
probably the most ambitious in that it seeks to amalgamate within its
jurisdiction all legal issues relating to the family. The Hawaii
Family Court owes its existence to the passing of the Family Court Act
in 1965,3) which is based on the Standard Family Court Act of 1959.
4)
Arising out of its enthusiastic interest in the Standard Family
Court Act of 1959 the Hawaii Commission on Children and Youth5) set up
a committee 'to study the present structur~.of legal services affecting
children and families to determine whether such services could be
improved by the establishment of a family court such as is outlined
in the Standard Family Court Act.' The work of this committee, which was
comprised of members of the legal profession, the medical profession,
the clergy, the police force and the behavioural sciences such as social
workers and psychiatrists, resulted in ~ 'Proposal for the
1) The writer is particularly indebted to Mary Jane Lee, the director
of the Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Hawaii, for much
of the material and information upon which this account is based.
One of the family courts comprehensively analysed by Dyson and Dyson
is the Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Hawaii -
hereafter referred to as the Hawaii Family Court. See also Corbett
and King 'The Family Court of Hawaii' (1968) 2 Fam L Q 32.
2) The State of Hawaii, which comprises several islands, is divided
into five judicial circuits. Family courts have been established
in four of these circuits; viz, the First, Second, Third and
Fifth Judicial Circuits: s 8 Hawaii Revised Statutes (Chap 571).
Of these, the Family Court of the First JUdicial Circuit, which
serves the city and county of Honolulu, is the most important.
Seventy-six percent of all family court cases are disposed of in
the First JUdicial Circuit, in which an estimated 886,600 persons
live: 1977 Hawaii Report 37.
3) This Act came into force in July 1965: Hawaii Session Laws
(Chap 232). Minor amendments have been effected to this Act.
But all the legislative provisions relating to family courts have
been consolidated by the Hawaii Revised Statutes '(Chap 571).
4) Supra at 12-13.
5) The Commission on Children and Youth is a creation of statute and
was first established in 1949: Corbett and King 'The Family Court
of Hawaii' (1968) Fam LQ 32, 33.
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. t C· ·t f H .. ,1)Establishment of a Family Court in the F~rs. ~rcu~ 0 awa~~.
In proposing the establishment of a family court the committee
generally followed the recommendations contained in the Standard Family
Court Act of 1959, subject to minor modifications which took into
account local needs and conditions.
The Hawaii Family Court is created by section 1 of the Hawaii
Revised Statutes which states, inter alia, that -
v
'This chapter creates within this State a system of family
courts and it shall be a policy and a purpose of the said cou=ts
to conduct all proceedings to the end that no adjudication by
the court of the status of any child under this chapter shall be
deemed a conviction; no such adjudication shall impose any 'civil
disability ordinarily resulting from conviction; no child shall
be found guilty or be deemed a criminal by reason of such
adjudication; and no child ,shall be charged with crime or be
convicted in any court except /Where jursidiction is waived by the
court7' •
Section 1 also states that -
'This chapter shall be liberally construed to the end that
children and families whose rights and well being are jeopardized
shall be assisted and protected, and secured in those right5 through
action by the court; that the court may formulate a plan adapted
to the requirements of the child and his family and the necessary
protection of the community, and may utilize all State and Community
t th t t .bl . . t . 1 t t· ,2)resources 0 e ex en poss~ e ln ~ s ~mp emen a ~on.
As pointed out above3), Hawaii is divided into 5 judicial circuits,
of which the largest is the First Judicial Circuit. The Family Court of
the First JUdicial Circuit is a division of the Circuit Court System of
H
' .. 4) H
awa~~ • owever in moments of urgency or when the volume of cases so
1) Report No 28 of 1964. The committee also comprised of members of
both sexes and was, in fact, chaired by a female, Mrs Kinji Kanazawa.
2) ef s 1 Standard Family Court Act. It has been claimed that the
Hawaii Family Court 'incorporates the essential intent and spirit
of the Standard Act and of modern thinking in the fields of family
law and the behavioural sciences.' Corbett and King 'The Family Court
of Hawaii' (1968) 2 Fam L Q 32, 35.
3) See 34 n 2 above.
4) S 3 Hawaii Revised Statutes. The Circuit Court of Hawaii approximates
the South African Supreme Court.
/
V
requires, the Chief Judge of the Supreme Court of Hawaii
1
) may appoint
one or more District Family Court Judges to preside over a District
Family Court2). It is important to note that a District Family Court
has the same status as a Circuit Family Court3). For practical purposes,
there is in effect no difference at all between a Circuit Family Court
and a District Family Court and appeals from both lie to the Supreme
Court of Hawaii.
(B) Jurisdiction
The Hawaii Family Court, unlike the Conciliation Court of Los
Angeles, is more recognizable as a court of law. It assumes jurisdiction
over both children and adults. With regard to children
4) it has -
'exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings:
(1) concerning any person who is alleged to have committed an
act prior to ~chieving 18 years of age which would constitute
a violation of a~y federal, state or local law or municipal
ordinance ••• ;
(2) concerning any child living or found within the circuit,
(A) who is neglected as to proper or necessary support,
or as to medical or other care necessary for his well-
being, or who is abandoned by his parent or other
custodian; or
CB) who is subjected to physical or emotional deprivation
or abuse as a result of the failure of any person or
agency to exercise that degree of care for which he or
it is legally responsible; or
CC) who is beyond the control of his parent or other
custodian or whose behavior is injurious to his own
or other's welfare; or
CD) who is neither attending school nor receiving educational
'services required by law whether through his own
misbehavior or nonattendance or otherwise.
(3) to determine the custody of any child or appoint a guardian
of the person of any child;
1) The Supreme Court of Hawaii approximates the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of South Africa.
2) 58 Hawaii Revised Statutes. For the broad differences between the
jurisdiction of the Circuit Court and the jurisdiction of the District
Court see below at 39 nn 2 and 3.
3) s 3 as read with the definition of 'Court' in s 2 Hawaii Revised Statute~
see also 35 n 4 above.
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(4) for the adoption of a person ••• ,
(5) for termination of parental rights ••• ,
(6) for the judicial consent to the marriage, employment, or
enlistment of a child, when such consent is required by
l~;
(7) for the treatment or commitment of a mentally defective,
mentally retarded or mentally ill child
With regard to section 11 (i) of the Hawaii Revised Statutes, which is
cited immediately above, the family court may waive its jurisdiction,
after full investigation, over any minor who is older than 16 years
and who is alleged to have committed a serious criminal offence.
l
)
The family court thereafter ceases to have jurisdiction over that minor
in respect of that, or any subsequent, offence. 2) This prov1s10n is
clearly designed for those minors3) who, notwithstanding the fact that
they are only aged between 16 years and 18 years, allegedly commit a
serious offence warranting the attention of the ordinary adult criminal
court or who have had previous contact with the family court and have
not responded to the special treatment ordered for them by that court.
It would seem that a minor under the age of 16 years is never referred
to the ordinary criminal court.
In order to protect the jurisdiction the family court has over
minors, section 12 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes provides that -
'If, during the pendencyof a criminal charge against a minor in
another court, it is ascertained that he was less than eighteen
years old whc~ he allegedly committed the offence, such other court
shall forthwith transfer the case to the family court ,4)
It is clear from this provision that the ordinary criminal court has no
jurisdiction over minors under the age of 18 years, unless the family
court has waived its jurisdiction over minors between the ages of 16
and 18 years. This provision, which is couched in peremptory terms,
makes it obligatory for the ordinary criminal court to rectify any
1) S 22 (a) Hawaii Revised Statutes. There is no similar provision
in the Standard Family Court Act of 1959. Such a provision was,
however, recommended by the American Children's Bureau: (1959) 5
NPPA Journ 99, 147-148. A serious crime is defined as 'an act which
constitutes a felony if committed by an adultl
2) S 22 (b) Hawaii Revised Statutes.
3) A minor is defined by s 2 (5) as la person less than eighteen years
of age' whereas a adult /s 2 (6)7 is defined as 'a person eighteen
years of age or older.' - -
4) Cf s 9 Standard Family Court Act.
error where a minor under 18 years of age, or where a person over the
age of 18 years is alleged to have committed a criminal offence while
still under 18 years of age, has been erroneously arraigned before it.
With regard to adultsl ) the Hawaii Family Court has -
'exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) to try any offense committed against a child by his parent
or guardian or by any other person having his legal or
physical custody ••• ,
(2) to try any adult charged with:
(a) deserting, abandoning, or failing to provide support
for any person in violation of law;
(b) any offense, other than a felony, against the person
of the defendant's husband or wife. 2)
In any case within paragraphs (1) or (2) of this section the
court may, in its discretion, waive its jurisdiction over the
offense charged.
(3) in all proceedings ifor divorce and annulment, as well as
paternity proceeding~7 ••• ;
(4) in proceedings ifor the granting of, enforcement of, and
reciprocal enforcement of, maintenance orders7 ••• ;
(5) for the commitment of an adult alleged to be mentally
defective or mentally ill;
(6) in all proceedings for support between parent and child or
between husband and wife, and in all proceedings to appoint
a guardian of the person of an adult;
(7) in all proceedings for waiver of jurisdiction over an adult
who was a child at the time of an alleged criminal act
It would seem that the main effect of consolidating jurisdiction in
family law matters has been the elimination of jurisdictional disputes. 3)
1) S 14 Hawaii Revised statutes: cf s 11 Standard Family Court Act.
2) The offences provided for in s 14 (2) are generally termed 'family
offences' which would constitute 'disorderly conduct or an assault
between members of the same family or household.' Cases of this
sort not suitable for handling in the family court are transferred
to a criminal court : Dyson and Dyson 530.
3) Dyson and Dyson 91.
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(c) The Officers and status of the Family Court
There are presently 2 circuit court judges and 5 district court
judges of the Hawaii Family Court, one of the circuit court judges
th . . d 1) C· . t t· db€ing described as e senlor JU gee lrCUl cour JU ges are
appointed for 10-year terms and they must have practised as attorneys
for at least 10 years. 2) District court judges are appointed for
6-year terms and they must have practised as attorneys in Hawaii for
3)at least 5 years.
Provision is also made for the appointment of a director of the
family court whose functions shall be to -
'(1) prepare an annual budget ••• ;
(2) formulate procedures governing" the routine administration
of court services;
(3) make recommendations to the court for improvement in court
services;
(4) make recommendations to the senior judge or the judge for
the appointment of administrative, supervisory, consultant,
and necessary professional clerical an1 other personnel to
perform the duties assigned to the court and the director;
(5) collect necessary statistics and prepare an annual report
of the work of the court;
1) 1977 Hawaii Report 37. Since January 1976 the salary of a family
court judge has been $ 40.000 p.a.- s 8 (2) Hawaii Revised Statutes.
2) 1977 Hawaii Eeport 16: 'The circuit courts have exclusive juris-
diction in all felony cases, civil suits involving more than $ 5000,
probate proceedings, and conduct all jury trials, including criminal
misdemeanor and traffic cases from the district court when a jury
trial is requested. Circuit courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction
with district courts in civil matters involving less than $ 5000 but
more than $ 500. Appeals go directly to the Supreme Court.' (ibid.)
3) 1977 Hawaii Report 25. District courts have limited civil and
criminal jurisdiction. They have exclusive jurisdiction in cases
involving $ 500 or less, but have concurrent jurisdiction with the
circuit court in respect of civil cases involving amounts between
$ 500 and $ 5000. Their criminal jurisdiction is limited to cases
in which the maximum prison sentence provided for is one year. They
have no jurisdiction over jury trials. All appeals from the district
court ~o direct to the Supreme Court. S 54 Hawaii Revised Statutes.
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(6) provide supervision and consultation to the administrative
and supervisory staff regarding the administration of court
services, recruitment of personnel, in-service training,
and fiscal and office management;
(7) perform such other duties as the senior judge or the judge
shall specify.,l)
To assist the judges of the family court and the director in the
performance of their duties provision is made2) for the appointment
of probation officers, social workers, marital counsellors, physicians,
psychologists, psychiatrists3 ) and 'other professionally co~petent
persons,.4) The judges and the director are assisted by a staff of
143 persons.5 )
1) S 6 (a) Hawaii Revised statutes. Cf s 6 (1) Standard Family
Court Act.
2) By s 6 (b) Hawaii Revised Statutes. Cf s 6 (2) Standard
Family Court Act.
3) As to physicians, psychologists and psychiatrists see Dyson and
Dyson at 557. It would appear that psychiatrists are, in fact,
only appointed to assist the family court on an ad hoc basis.
A psychologist is, however, appointed on a full-time basis and he
is stationed in the court buildings so that he is accessible for
consultation at all times. The functions of the psychologist
are described by pyson and Dyson at 28-29.
4) Legally qualified persons to assist family court judges in their
legal work (a type of assessor), intake workers and Etaff to
assist in the collection of maintenance money would appear to fall
within the ambit of the general description 'other professionally
competent persons': pyson and Dyson 562-563; 565-568. Thus, for
example, 'Overworked judges may need help in researching legal
issues ••• In doubtful cases, intake· workers may need legal
advice on such questions as whether certain facts constitute
probable jursidiction or whether the evidence seems sufficient to
establish that an act was committed. A lawyer may be necessary to
prepare and present the case against a respondent, especially if
the respondent is represented by counsel.' (ibid)
5) 1977 Hawaii Report 37.
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statutory effect is given to the status of the Hawaii Family
Court by section 3 of the Hawaii Revised statutesl ) which states,
inter alia, that 'The family courts shall be divisions of the circuit
courts of the state and shall not be deemed to be inferior courts ••• '
Dyson and Dyson report2) that practical effect appear to have been
given to this statutory sentiment in that
'The family court is housed in the general judiciary building, .
both in the first circuit and on the outer islands; it shares
physical advantages available to all circuit judges, such as air
conditioning ••• and access to the well stocked library of the
supreme court. ,3)
1) Cf s 3 Standard Family Court Act.
2) At 521.
3) This state of affairs is in direct contrast with that prevailing
in New York and Rhode Island in respect of which it is alleged
that 'dignity may be sacrificed if the family court is not set
up as a division of the highest trial court.' (Dyson and Dyson
522). In both New York and Rhode Island, unlike Hawaii, their
family courts operate as separate specialized courts rather than
as divisions of the supreme court. Both of these courts
accordingly lack the facilities and advantages that are enjoyed
by their respective supreme courts, such as common library and
common room facilities. With regard to the Rhode Island Family
Court, for example, Dyson and Dyson (ibid) report that the
business of the ~ourt is conducted in 'an antiquated, poorly
heated, former school building ••• The building lacks a library
for the judges; personnel offices are noisy and crowded; there
are no conference rooms and lawyers must confer with their clients
while standing in busy corridors. The building has been called a
firetrap, potentially dangerous for employees and for court records
stored in non-fireproof vaults.' Dyson and Dyson Cat 523) describe
the New York Family Court as 'poor man's court - lawyers are rare,
court rooms are bare, toilet walls are defaced. The court's
waiting rooms resemble those at. hospital clinics.' On the New
York Family Court see also Paulsen 'Juvenile Courts, Family Courts
and the Poor Man' (1966) 54 Calif LR 694.
J
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(D) Procedure Applicable to Children
Insofar as the acquisition of jurisdiction over children, or the
initiation of cases involving children, is concerned the Hawaii
Revised statutes distinguish between a 'violation of a law or
" ,1 ) fall"" th"th ". f t " 11 2)ord~nance and cases ~ng w~ ~n e prov~s~ons 0 sec ~on •
In the former case, the family court automatically assumes jurisdiction
when a citation or summons is issued without the need to conduct a
preliminary investigation or to file a petition. In the latter case,
if it is alleged, or brought to the notice of the family court, that
a minor falls within the-scope of section 11, then the 'court shall
make a preliminary investigation to determine whether the interests
of the public or of the minor require that further action be taken. ,3)
The purpose of this preliminary investigation is to afford the intake
workers the opportunity of processing those cases which should be
dealt with in the family court in the normal cou~se. Where further
action is decided upon the court will order the filing of a 'journal
petition to commence proceedings. ,4) In this regard it must be
noted that section 44 of the Hawaii Revised statutes states, inter
alia, that:
v
1) S 21 (b). Cf s 12 (2) Standard Family Court Act.
2) S 11 is cited in full above at 36-37.
3) S 21 (a) Hawaii Revised Statutes. Cf s 12 (1) Standard Family
Court Act.
4) Dyson and Dyson (at 4) remark that 'the law calls for a thorough
investigation of complaints relative to juvenile matters before
la7 formal petition is filed.' But in a comment on the
equivalent section of the Standard Family Court Act of 1959 (ie
s 12) in the (1959) 5 N P P A Journ; 99, 124-125, it is pointed
out that this 'non-judicial' or 'unofficial' way of handling
cases is open to abuse. This reservation clearly has been
supported by the criticisms of the American Supreme Court in Kent
383 US 541 and Gault 387 US 1. --
'No child under the age of twelve shall be adjudged to come
within section 11 (1) without the written recommendation of
a psychiatrist or other physician duly qualified by special
training and experience in the practice of child psychiatry.'
In respect of those cases where it is decided that no further action
is required they are disposed of on an informal basis. But, 'efforts
to effect informal adjustments may be continued not longer than 3
months without review by the judge ••• ,1)
Where the filing of a 'journal petition' is authorized, this
becomes the responsibility of the person making the initial complaint.
The petition, supported by verified statements, shall contain the
following information:
'(1) the facts which bring the child within the purview of
this chapter;
(2) the name, age and residence of the child;
(3) the names and residences of his parents;
(4) the name and residence of his legal guardian if there
be one, of the person or persons having custody or control
of the child, or of the nearest known relative if no
parent or guardian can be found. ,2)
A summons is thereafter issued and served on the person or persons
having the custody or control of the minor to appear personally and to
bring the minor before the court at the stated time and place. If
the custodian is not the parent or guardian of the minor, then the
parent or guardian is also notified by personal service of the time
and place of the hear~ng.3) Failure to comply with the summons may
result in a contempt of court charge. 4)
1) S 21 (a) Hawa~i Revised Statutes.
2) S 21 Cd). Cf s 12 (4) Standard Family Court Act.
3) S 23· Cf s 14 Standard Family Court Act.
4) S 24. Cf s 15 Standard Family Court Act.
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The hearing itself is characterized by a lack of formality.l)
Hearings involving adults are heard separately from cases involving
children. A record of the proceedings is kept unless the right
to a record is waiv~d or the court orders otherwise. The general
public are excluded from attending the hearings. The parents,
legal custodian or guardian or the minor are advised of the right
to be legally represented. 2) Significantly, the Hawaii Revised
Statutes are silent on the question of the right or otherwise to
legal representation at the intake or processing stage.3) Any
person making or filing a written report, study or examination is
liable to direct and cross examination on request. 4) Where a ruling
is given or a finding is made which is adverse to a parent or
guardian, and such parent or guardian is without legal representation,
the court must inform them of their right to appeal to the Hawaii
Supreme Court. If an appeal is noted the 'record on appeal shall
be given a fictitious title to safeguard against publication of the
names of the children or minors involved. ,5)
If at the conclusion of the hearing a minor is found to fall
within the provisions of section 11 (1) of the Hawaii Revised Statutes
in that he has contravened or attempted to contravene any federal,
state or local law, or municipal ordinance, the court may deal with
such minor in the manner prescribed by section 48 (1) in terms of
which the court may -
'Ca) place the child on probation in his own house, or in the
custody of a suitable person elsewhere, upon conditions
determined by the court, or.
Cb) ••• vest legal custody of the child, after prior consultation
with the agency or institution in the Hawaii youth.correctional
facility in a local public agency or institution; or in any
1) S 41 states, inter alia, that 'The hearings may be conducted in an
informal manner and may be adjourned from time to time.' Cf s 19
Standard Family Court Act. The judges of the family court do not
wear robes: Dyson and Dyson 65. .
2) Ibid.
3) Dyson and Dyson 5-7.
4) S 41 Hawaii Revised statutes.
5) s 54. See also s 84. Cf s 28 Standard Family Court Act.
private institution or agency authorized by the court to care
. 1 h" . t h ,1)for chlldren; or pace lm ln a prlva e ome •••
It will be noted that the above powers of the court are so framed
that a minor is never committed to a prison or correctional
institution for adult offenders. But, in respect of a child between
16 and 18 years of age who commits a crime falling within the
description of a 'felony' and in respect of whom the court finds
'is not treatable in any available institution or facility
designed for the care and treatment of children, or that the safety
of the community requires that the person continue under judicial
restraint for a period extending beyond his minority', the cour~ may
waive its jursidiction. 2) If jurisdiction is waived, such minor
thereafter falls within the jurisdiction of the ordinary criminal
courts. Thus, apart from the situation where jurisdiction is waived,
every effort is made to give effect to the best interests and welfare
of every minor before the court so that the interests of the community
generally take second place.
With regard to minors who fall within the ambit of section 11 (2)
of the Hawaii Revised Statutes3) the court is given a number of
discretionary powers. For example, the court may 'place the child
under protective supervision ••• in his own home, or in the custody
of a suitable person or agency elsewhere, upon conditions determined
by the court. ,4) Alt t' 1 th t t th t derna lve y, e cour may gran e cus 0 y
of the child to an 'agency- or institution licensed or approved by
the state to care for children. ,5) The court may also order
'whatever care or treatment is authorized by law,.6) In this
1) Cf s 24 (1) Standard Family Court Act.
2) S 22 (a) Hawaii Revised Statutes: see above at 37.
3) See above at 36 for s 11 (2).
4) S 48 (2) (a). Cf s 24 (2) (a) Standard Family Court Act.
5), S 48 (2) Cb). Cf s 24 (2) Cb) Standard Family Court Act.
6) S 48 (5). Cf s 24 (5) Standard Family Court Act and see Dyson
and Dyson 82.
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respect, section 441 ) gives the court the power 'to order that a
child or minor ••• shall be examined by a physician, surgeon,
psychiatrist, or psychologist, ani it may order treatment by them
of a child or minor who has been adjudicated by the court.' Finally,
'the court may dismiss the petition or otherwise terminate its
. . d" t" t t" ,2)
Jur~s ~c ~on a any ~me.
(E) Procedure Applicable to Adults
As to adults, a distinction is made between criminal and non-
criminal matters. The procedure applicable to criminal cases falling
within the jurisdiction of the Hawaii Family Court is exactly the
same as that applied in the ordinary criminal courts except that
before a criminal case is prosecuted in the family court a preliminary
investigation may be conducted if the 'defendant or the parties in
interest' give their consent.3) The purpose of the preliminary
investigation is to try and resolve on an amicable basis any complaints
of a criminal nature, particularly where the accused and the complainant
have a close relationship. This does not mean to say that the family
court will automatically always try to resolve on an amicable basis all
criminal cases, especially where children are the complainants. The
court may, for example, terminate the offending parent's parental
rights. 4) But before taking such a drastic step the safety valve
of a preliminary hearing is available if necessary. Where it is
necessary 'to protect the welfare of the- persons before the court'
the case may be heard in chambers and persons having no direct interest
in the case may be excluded.5) Finally, in regard to criminal
actions the court is enjoined to make use of the same pre-sentencing
investigation reports that are compiled in respect of ordinary
1) Cf s 22 Standard Family Court Act.
2) S 48 (9) Hawaii Revised Statutes.
3) S 42. Cf s 20 Standard FWJily Court Act. Dyson and Dyson 44.
4) S 61 (b) Hawaii Revised Statutes. See below at 49 for the
termination of parental rights.




The preliminary investigation procedure has an equally important
part to play in non-criminal matters. Thus, with a view to deciding
whether a formal hearing is necessary in respect of those matters
covered by sections 14 (3),2) 14 (4)3) and 14 (5)4) of the Hawaii
Revised Statutes a preliminary investigation may be conducted
'with the consent of the parties in interest,.5) .
So as to place the family court in a.position to arrive at a
decision which will be in the best interests of any minor involved in
a criminal or non-criminal case, the court is enjoined by the
prov~s~ons of section 45 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes to make use of
social study and pre-sentencing reports. 6) Such social study reports
1) S 45 Hawaii Revised Statutes. See below for a discussion on s 45.
2) Divorce, annulment and determination of paternity.
3) The granting, enforcement, and reciprocal enforcement, of maintenance
orders.
4) Commitment of adults alleged to be mentally defective or mentally
ill.
5) S 42 Hawaii Revised Statutes.
6) Cf s 23 standard Family Court Act. Unlike the Hawaii legislation,
s 23 Standard Family Court Act prescribes the minimum matters that·
shall be covered by the report; viz. 'The investigation shall
cover the circumstances of the offense or complaint, the social
history and present condition of the child or litigants and family,
and plans for the child's immediate care ••• ; in cases of support,
it shall include such matters as earnings, financial obligations, and
employment.' Despite these differences, the provisions of s 45
Hawaii Revised Statutes apparently reflect the clearly stated sentimeni
of the Hawaii State Commission on Children and Youth in its report
No. 28 of July 1964 at 3 (see above at 35) which reads: 'It is
vital that a family court always be mindful of the rights and
responsibilities of parents in its attempt to protect the interests
of children. The State, as parens patriae, can involve itself in a
family situation only when it becomes apparent that the parents
have been unable or unwilling to carry out their responsibilities.
The court must be mindful also of the State's responsibility to proteci
the children and to assure that they are properly supported. Thus,
in the interests of the public as well as the children, the judge
needs all the relevant information he can get from a person not
involved in the proceedings and who is qualified by training and
experience to secure it objectively.' According to the 1977 Hawaii
Report (Table 13) a total of 238 requests for social study
investigations were made.
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are obligatory in cases concerning minors falling within the ambit of
sections 11 (1) and 11 (2) of the Hawaii Revised statutes,l)
unless the court otherwise orders. 2) They are also obligatory 'in
proceedings to decide disputed or undetermined legal custody and in
custody disputes arising out of a divorce action', unless the court
otherwise orders.3) But such reports may only be called for where
the judge so exercises his discretion where it is believed to be
'necessary to assure adequate protection of the minor or of any other
person involved in the case' and 'in support cases covering financial
ability and other matters pertinent to making an order of support. ,4)
It will be recalled5) that any person making or filing a written
report, study or examination is liable to direct and cross examination
on request. In practice, however, the maker of such report is very
rarely called upon to submit to cross examination even where one or
other of the parties is legally represented. The recommendations of
the maker of the report are generally accepted without question.
The value of such reports cannot be over-emphasized. As Dyson and
Dyson point out: 6)
'Not only does the court receive a useful guide in reaching
a decision but the investigators are often able to smooth
over a number of problems during the investigation process
itself. For example, a social worker in exploring whether a
father claiming custody can provide a suitable home may induce
the father to withdraw his claim voluntarily, by reasoning with
him that he cannot change diapers or that his mother is probably
going to end up raising the child.'
1) See above at 36 for ss 11 (1) and 11 (2).
2) S 45 Hawaii Revised Statutes.
3) Ibid.
4) Ibid.
5) See above at 55 n 4. S 41 Hawaii Revised Statutes.
6) At 35.
CF) Termination of Parental Rights
An innovative and unique procedure for the termination of
parental rights is provided for by section 61 of the Hawaii Revised
statutes. A distinction is made between the voluntary and involuntary
termination of parental rights. In the former case, 'the parents or
either parent or the surviving parent who desire to relinquish
parental rights to any natural or adopted child and thus make the child
available for adoption or readoption' may make the necessary
application to the family court by way of petition. Insofar as an
unborn child is concerned such petition may be filed by the mother
at any time after the sixth month of pregnancy. But after the birth
of the child the mother is expected to provide written confirmation
of her petition before the court can order the adoption to take place.
Alternatively, the mother must be given 10 days notice of the court's
intention to order the termination of parental rights and allow the
mother an opportunity to be heard.
l
)
As to the involuntary termination of parental rights this may
occur in anyone of the following instances;2) namely, where a legal
parent:
Ca) has deserted the child without affording means of identification
for a period of at least 90 days; or
Cb) has voluntarily surrendered the care and custody of the child
to another for a period of at least two years; or
Cc) has failed /When the child is in the custody of another7
to communicate with the child when able to do so for a period
of at least one year; or
Cd) has failed /When the child is in the custody of another7
to provide for the care and support of the child when able to do so
for a period of at least one year; or
1) The same period of 10 days notice must also be given to the parents
or surviving parent where they have previously filed a petition to
relinquish their parental rights. The procedure described here
would appear to apply to both legitimate and illegitimate children.
But notice of termination of parental rights also must be given to
the child's father /referred to in s 61 (4) Hawaii Revised Statutes
as the 'legal, adjudicated or presumed father'7 unless the identity
or whereabouts of the father is unknown. -
2) S 61 (b) Hawaii Revised Statutes.
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(e) whose child has been removed from his physical custody
in terms of section 11 (2) (A) of the Hawaii Revised Statutes
l
)
and who is unable to provide immediately and in the forseeable
future for the care necessary for the well-being of the child; or
(f) has been found to be mentally ill or mentally retarded and
incapacitated from giving consent to the adoption of, or from
providing adequate care to the child; or
(g) has been found not to be the child's natural or adoptive
father.
The petition to terminate the rights of any parent on any of the
above grounds may be filed 'by some responsible adult person on behalf
of the child,.2) Furthermore, 'a copy of the petition, together with
notice of the time anj place of the hearing thereof, shall be personally
served at least twenty days prior to the hearing upon the parent whose
rights are sought to be terminated. ,3)
Regardless of whether the petition to terminate parental rights
is voluntary or involuntary, a copy thereof must be forwarded to the
director of the department of social services and housing.4) The
director shall then have the right of appearance on behalf of the
child at any hearing as well as the right to be heard. He is also
accorded the same rights of appeal as any other party to the proceedings
and, to this extent, he is entitled to rely on the assistance of the
Hawaii Attorney-General. 5) The director of social services and housing,
any petitioner, or any parents whose parental rights are affected, may
request 'an objective investigation of the circumstances of the minor
6)
and of the parent or parents concerned.' Upon receipt of such
1) See above at 36 for s 11 (2) (A) which deals with a child who is
found to be neglected in that he has not received proper support,
medical or other care necessary for his well-being, or who has been
abandoned.
2) S 61 Cb) ~3) Hawaii Revised Statutes. Although the filing of a
petition to terminate parental rights 'by some responsible adult
person' seems to be very wide it must be remembered that most of the
instances in which this may be done constitute serious charges of
child neglect for which remedial action is needed. In practice, it
would be an intake worker (see 40 n 4 above) who would file the
petition on receipt of a complaint from a relative, neighbour or
friend of the child.
3) Ibid.




request the court must adjourn the matter for at least 30 days to
enable the requisite report to be filed which, when filed, forms
part of the court record. If necessary, the court may 'appoint a
guardian ad litem to represent and defend the interests of the child
or of any minor parent. ,1)
The right to appeal against an order terminating parental rights
is preserved but it is limited to the ground that the order was not in
the best interests ahd welfare of the child concerned. 2) The order to
terminate parental rights shall not 'operate to terminate the mutual
rights of inheritance of the child and the parent or parents involved,
or to terminate the legal duties and liabilities of the parent or
parents, unless and until the child has been legally adopted,.3)
(G) Counselling and Divorce Procedure
Like the Standard Family Court Act, the Hawaii Revised statutes
does not make specific provision for pre- or post-divorce counselling.
But the power to order the parties to a matrimonial dispute to submit
to counselling seems to be inherent in the provisions of section 42 of
the Hawaii Revised statutes which provides, inter alia, that in actions
for divorce the court may make a preliminary investigation and 'wi~h
the consent of the parties ••• may make such adjustment as is
practicable without further formal procedures~,4) Apart from this,
the Director of the Hawaii Family Court reports5) that
'/M7arital counseling services are provided to clients who seek
th ' , t 6) H th' ",lS aSSlS ance. owever, lS serVlce lS limlted to short
term counseling within a 60 day period at which time referral is
1) Ibid.
2) S 63 Hawaii Revised Statutes.
4) The 1977 Annual Report (Table 13) reveals that the Hawaii Family
Court ordered oounse11ing in 12 cases in the period covered by the
report.
5) In a private communication addressed to the writer in May 1978.
6) The 1977 Annual Report (Table 13) reveals that there were 128 cases
for counselling filed prior to the initiation of a divorce action.
52
made to another community agency for longer term counseling
or toward hopefully having assisted the couple in reducing or
ameliorating their hostilities toward each other.'
Apparently, the voluntary use of this facility is not too frequently
resorted to since 'middle-cass people who can afford to go elsewhere
are not likely to seek advice at the family court.,l) In a pamphlet
entitled 'You Are Still Parents,2) ten social agencies and
organisations in Honolulu are listed and which are available to people
experiencing post-divorce problems regarding the custody of, and
access to, their minor children.
But where there are any minor children involved in any divorce,
the person filing the complaint for divorce is required at the same
time tq complete a 'conciliation form,.3) The family court personnel
will then review the information contained in the form and may then
decide to contact the parties involved to offer them the services of
the court. This offer may be accepted or rejected by the parties
concerned and in this way the voluntariness of the services offered by
the court is preserved.
the other.
No pressure is put on the parties one way or
If a divorce proceeds as an uncontested matter, the case is set
down by the plaintiff's attorney for hearing in a closed court
room. If,however, the case is being contested, then either party
may set the case down for hearing. Each party must provide full
1) Dyson and Dyson 39 quoting the Director of the Hawaii Family Court.
2) Prepared and published by the Hawaii State JUdiciary in 1975. The
main purpose of this pamphlet, which is handed to every divorced
or separated couple, is to emphasise to divorced and separated
couples that they are still responsible to their children for their
support; for the provision of advice and guidance to their
children as they grow up; and for assisting their children to cope
with their changed world brought about by the divorce or separation.
A pamphlet published by the Los Angeles Conciliation Court has a
similar theme. See Appendix 'A' below.
3) Information on this aspect of the Hawaii divorce procedure has
been gleaned from a short handbook entitled 'Divorce In Hawaii',
prepared and published by the Hawaii State Judiciary in 1976.
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financial disclosure and if the custody of, and access to, any minor
children are at issue a social study report must be compiled before
the hearing. In the normal course, a pre-hearing conference is held
between the judge and the attorneys for the parties 'to refine issues
and suggest settlement.' If no agreement is reached on the
contested matters the case must then proceed to trial in"the usual
way after which the decree of divorce may be granted.
In cases where urgent relief is sought at the pre-divorce stage,
such as interim maintenance, protection from physical harm, protection
against the wasting or squandering of matrimonial property, or in
respect of the custody of minor children, this is readily available
in the form of an 'order to show cause. ,1) This order is served on
the defendant who is allowed to file a reply. If the parties cannot
reach agreement on any of the issues raised in the 'order to show
cause' the matter is then set down for hearing in court not less than
48 hours after service of the order.
(H) Statistical Data2)
Statistics reflected in the 1977 Annual Report3) show that the
family court carries a very heavy caseload. For the period 1976-
1977 a total of 15756 cases were initiated in the family court. This
together with a total of 8094 cases pending at the beginning of the
period under consideration, meant that the family court had a total
caseload of 23850 cases, in respect of which a final decision was
reached in 14609 cases: this represented an increase of lOO~ over
the number of cases completed in the previous year. 4)
1) According to the 1977 Annual Report 76, a total of 1099 'orders to
show cause J were filed. At the beginning of the period under con-
sideration 879 such orders were pending. By the end of the period
under consideration 828 orders had been finalised: 407 matters were
contested, 55 uncontested and 366 resolved through other means: eg
as a result of a pre-hearing confering between the judge and the
attorneys for the parties.
2) The statistical data cited here only refers to the First JUdicial
Circuit, Honolulu.
3) Table 13.
4) For a full appreciation of the statistical data cited here it must be
remembered that for the period under consideration 2 circuit court
judges and 5 district court judges, supported by a staff of 143
persons, were responsible for the total caseload: 1977 Annual Report 37
More specifically, with regard to divorce the family court
carried a total caseload of 6825 cases in respect of which finality
was reached in 4265 cases. Of these completed cases 278 were
contested while 3513 were uncontested. Divorce cases accounted for
the largest part of the family court's workload.
Apart from divorce cases, the family court also disposed of
3653 cases of children involved in 'law violations.' Final
adoption orders were granted in 514 cases while at the end of the
period under consideration 364 adoption cases were still outstanding.
Paternity proceedings were also concluded in 363 cases.
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4. The Family Court of Australia
(A) Background, Objectives and status
'Possibly the most humane and enlightened social reform to be
enacted in Australia since the Second World War' is how the Hon"Kep
Enderbyl) described the Family Law Act of 1975. 2) It is not the
function of this work to deal with all the changes brought about
by the Family Law Act. 3) Suffice to point out that the Act has,
inter alia, swept away the old fault-principle of Australian
divorce law and has provided 'irretrievable breakdown' as the
sole ground for the dissolution of marriage. 4) In addition, the Act
abolished the decree of judicial separation,5) the order for the
restitution of conjugal rights,6) and imprisonment as a penalty for
failing to pay maintenance. 7) The duty to pay maintenance as between
husband and wife is no longer simply based on the criterion of
matrimonial fault but, rather, is conditional upon, inter alia, the
extent to which a party is able to pay, and is limited to when the
other party is unable to supp~rt himself or herself. 8)
1) 'The Family Law Act 1975' (1975) 49 ALJ 477.
2) Act 53 of 1975 (Cth).
on 5 January 1976.
The Family Law Act came into operation
3) The main changes brought about by the Family Law Act are
mentioned by Enderby (1975) 49 ALJ 477; Joske 1-11; Nygh 1-15;
Family Law Service (1976) 1001-1018; Family Law Handbook 3-24.
4) S 48 (1) Family Law Act.
5) S 3 (2) (C) (iv) Family Law Act.
6) S 3 (2) (C) (v) Family Law Act.
7) S 107 (1) Family Law Act.
8) S 75 (2) Family Law Act sets out all the criteria that can be
taken into account in maintenance proceedings.
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Certainly, the most far-reaching innovation brought about by
the Family Law Act is the creation1 ) of the Family Court of Australia,
which has as an indispensib1e part of its make-up a counselling
and reconciliation procedure. 2) The main objectives of the Australian
Family Court are contained in section 43 of the Act which enjoins the
court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to have regard to -
'(a) the need to preserve and protect the institution of
marriage as the union of a man and a woman to the
exclusion of all others voluntarily entered into for life;
(b) the need to give the widest possible protection and
assistance to the family as a natural and fundamental group
unit of society, particularly while it is responsible for
the care and education of dependent children;
(c) the need to protect the rights of children and to promote
their welfare;
(d) the means available for assisting parties to a marriage to
consider reconciliation or the improvement of their
relationship to each other and to the children of the
marriage. '
The Family Court of Australia is accorded the status of a 'superior
court of record,3) and it 'consists of a Chief Judge and of Senior
Judges and other Judges, not exceeding 6 in total, or such greater number a
1) By s 21 .(1) Family Law Act. The feasability of establishing a
family court system in Australia had been mooted for some time
before 1975. In this connection see, inter alia, Biggs 'Stability
of Marriage - A Family Court?' (1961) 34 ALJ3'43; Howard
'Matrimonial Conciliation' (1962) 36 AI.J IZf]"; Finlay 'Family
Courts - Gimmick or Panacea' (1969) 43 ALJ 602; Finlay 'Justiciable
Issues and Legalism in the Law of Divorce' (1972) 46 ALJ 543, 557-
560; Turner 'Family Courts: Their Formation and Jurisdiction'
(1973) 8 Aust Journ of Social Issues 121; Kovacs 'Maintenance in
the Magistrates' Courts: How Fares the Forum?' (1973) 47 ALJ 725,
733-734; Bates 'A Family Court in Australia - Its Implications
for Lawyers and Legal Education' (1975) 9 Law Teacher 18.
2) Ss 14-19 Family Law Act.
3) S 21 (2) Family Law Act.
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may be prescribed by regulations from time to time.,l) According
to section 22 (2) of the Family Law Act a judge of the family court2)
is expected to possess the following qualification: that is -
Ca) he must be, or must have been a judge of another court, or
he must have been enrolled as a legal practitioner of the Higl1
Court or of the Supreme Court for not less than 5 years; and
(b) by reason of training, experience and personality, he must
be a suitable person to deal with matters of family law.3)
(B) Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the family court is prescribed by section
( ) f · t" 4)31 1 of the Family Law Act and with regard to causes 0 ac 10n
it extends to
1) S 21 (3) Family Law Act. The first, and present, Chief Judge is
Justice Elizabeth Evatt. Initially, apart from the Chief Judge,
5 other judges were appointed to the bench of the family court:
(1976) 50 ALJ 6. \ihen the Family Law Regulations 210 of 1975 were
first published provision was made for increasing the number of
judicial appointments from 6 to 29. In a communication to the
writer in June, 1978, from Mr Justice R S Watson, Senior Judge of
the family court, the writer was advised that there were then 36
judges of the family court with 2 further appointments still to be
made~ At that stage, the Family Court of Western Australia had 5
judges. Of the 36 judges of the Family Court of Australia, 32 were
males and 4 were females: Lusink 'The Family Law Act 1975-77:
Australia' (1978) 16 Concil Cts Rev 39, 40.
2) Unless otherwise indicated the words 'Family Court' will henceforth
mean the Family Court of Australia or the Australian Commonwealth
Family Court.
3) The retiring age for judges of the family court is 65 years: s 23 A
Family Law Act 1976, inserted by s 4 Family Law Amendment Act, 102
of 1977.
4) It may be mentioned that since Australia, like South Africa, is such
a vast country, it has been impossible to establish a family court in
every rural town. The family court has, however, been given the
power to sit in any place in Australia ,IS 27 Family Law Act7, and it
may go on circuit in such country places where business does not
warrant the establishment of a permanent family court. In any event,
the family court shares some co-ordinate jurisdiction with the
Australian courts of summary jurisdiction. Appeals from the courts
of summary jurisdiction lie either to the family court or to the
'Supreme Court of that State or Territory'. is 96 (1) Family Law Act7.
1. matrimonial 9auses.
cause' is defined as:
~ccording to section 4 (1) a 'matrimonial
'(a) proceedings between the parties to a marriage for a decree of
(i) dissolution of marriage; or
(ii) nullity of marriage;
(b) proceedings for a declaration as to the validity of a
marriage or of the dissolution or annulment of a marriage by
decree or otherwise;
(c) proceedings between the parties to a marriage with respect
to -
(i) the maintenance of one of the parties to the marriage; or
(ii) the custody, guardianship or maintenance of, or access
to a child of the marriage;
(ca) proceedings between the parties to a marriage with respect
to the property of the parties to the marriage or of either of
them, being proceedings in relation to concurrent, pending or
completed proceedings for principal relief between those parties;
(cb) proceedings by or on behalf of a child of a marriage
against one or both of the parties to the marriage with respect
to the maintenance of the child;
(d) proceedings between the parties to the marriage for the
approval by a court of a maintenance agreement or for the
revocation of such an approval or for the registration of a
maintenance agreement;
(e) proceedings between the parties to a marriage for an
order or injunction in circumstances arising out of the marital
relationship;
ef) any other proceedings (inclu~ing proceedings with respect
to the enforcement of a decree or the service of process) in
relation to concurrent, pending or completed proceedings of a
kind referred to in any of paragraphs (a) to (e), inclUding
proceedings of such a kind pending at, or completed before, the
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commencement of this Act;,l)
2. proceedings instituted or continued under the Marri~e Act 1961-
1973, other than proceedings under Part VII of that Act;
3. matters arising under a law of a Territory concerning -
(a) the adoption of children;
(b) the guardianship, custody or maintenance of children; or
(c) payments of a kind referred to in section 109 of the Family
Law Act.3) The payments provided for in section 109 refer to:
(i) the expenses of maintaining, for the period before her
confinement or expected' confinement, a woman who has
been, or is expected to be, confined for the purposes
of childbirth;
(ii) the medical, surgical, hospital or nursing expenses in
respect of the confinement of such woman;
(iii) the expenses of maintaining such a woman for the period
immediately following her confinement;
(iv) the expenses of maintaining a woman who is expecting a
child, where an order has been made by reason of the
fact that she was expecting the child;
(v) an amount in respect of the maintenance of an ex-nuptial
child who has not attained the age of eighteen years and
which is payable on the oasis of parentage of the child;
(vi) funeral expenses in respect of an ex-nuptial child
payable on the basis of parentage of the child;
(vii) funeral expenses in respect of the mother of an ex-nuptial
child on the basis of the parentage of the child;
1) Paragraphs (c) and (e) were amended by, and paragraphs (ca) and (cb)
were added by, the Family Law Amendment Act, 209 of 1976. It became
necessary to effect these amendments as a result of the constitutional
challenge to certain provisions of the Family Law Act in the cases of
Russell (a Victor~an case) and Farrelly Ca South Australian case)
both of which were heard, and dealt with, together by the Australian
High Court and reported at (1976) 59 ALJR 594: see below
under 'Jurisdictional Limitations and Constitutional Challenge.'
2) S 31 (1) (b) Family Law Act.
3) S 31 (1) (c) Family Law Act.
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(viii) the medical, surgical, hospital or nursing expenses in
. respect of any woman or child referred to in (vi) and
(vii) above; and
4. matters in which jurisdiction is conferred on it by a law made by
Parliament. l )
(c) Transitional Period and state Family Courts
Even for Aus~ralia, the family court concept constituted a
radical departure from established procedure. Accordingly, the
family court was designed to be phased in gradually and, to this
extent, section 40 (2) of the Family Law Act provided that the family
court was not to exercise its jurisdiction until such time as the
Governor-General had by proclamation fixed a date from which"proceed-
ings could be instituted in the family court. 2) In the interim,
jurisdiction under the provisions of the Family Law Act was to be
exercised by the various State courts, either at Supreme Court level
or at summary jurisdiction (magisterial) le~el.3) But since the Family
Court of Australia is a creation of the Federal Legislature it cannot
assume jurisdiction over certain matters, such as adoptions and paternity
disputes, which remain the preserve of the State courts. 4) Thus, until
such time as the Federal Government has entered into the agreements
provided for by section 41 (1) of the Family Law Act with the various
State governments, the family court and the various State courts
will continue to exercise their own respective jurisdictions over the
various family law matters. It is anticipated, however, that the
jurisdiction of the various State courts over family law matters will
be gradually phased out once such agreements have been concluded.
1) S 31 (1) (d) Family Law Act.
2) Cf s 2 Family Law Act. As has already been noted, the Act came
into operation on 5 January 1976 from which date the family court
began to exercise its jurisdiction.
3) In the main, the State Supreme Courts have general original
jurisdiction while the jurisdiction of the courts of summary
jurisdiction is limited to applications concerning the property
rights of spouses, the guardianship and custody of the children
of the marriage, and proceedings for an order or injunction in
circumstances arising from a marital relationship: Nygh 42.
4) See below under 'Jurisdictional Limitations and Constitutional
Challenge.'
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In terms of section 41 of the Family Law Act an agreement is
provided for in terms of which the Australian Federal Government
will provide the necessary funds for the establishment and adminis-
tration of state family courts. It is expressly provided
however, that before such agreement can be entered into between the
Federal Government and any state Government, the Governor-General must
be satisfied on the following points: namely, that
'Ca) arrangements have been made under which Judges will not be
appointed to that court except with the approval of the
Attorney-General of Australia;
Cb) Judges appointed to that court are by reason of training,
experience and personality, suitable persons to deal with
matters of family law and cannot hold office beyond the age of
65 years; and
Cc) arrangements have been made under which full use will be
made by that court of the counselling and welfare facilities
that are available to the Family Court of Australia. ,1)
Once the Governor-General is satisfied on these points he will then
issue the necessary proclamation in terms of which such newly created
state family courts will assume federal jurisdiction under the provisions
of the Family Law Act. This means that the then newly created state
family courts will assume jurisdiction over the entire range of
matrimonial causes whether or not the action flows from, or is an
incident of, a marriage.
This, however, does not mean to say that the individual states
are unable to establish their own family courts in the absence of an
agreement with the Federal Government. But, of course, such a state
family court will only have jurisdiction over matters affecting the
family at state level only. In fact, the state of South Australia
had already established its own family court prior to the passing of
the Family Law Act. But this court only has the status of a
1) S 41 (4) Family Law Act.
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f . . d· t· 1)court 0 summary Jur1s 1C 1on.
Presumably because of distance considerations, Western Australia
is the only state which has set up a family court2) in accordance with
the provisions of section 41 of the Family Law Act. The Western
Australian family court has full jurisdictional powers and it does not
seem to labour under the jurisdictional and procedural problems
that are experienced in other states. Thus, it has jurisdiction not
only over those matters referred to in the Family Law Act, but
prov1s10n is also made for it to acquire jursidiction over non-
federal matters such as ex-nuptial children (including paternity
disputes) and adoptions.3) Although Western Australia has its own
separate family court, appeals from that court may be heard by the
4)
Full Court of the Australian Family Court. A judge of the Western
Australian family court is accorded the status of a State Supreme Court
jUdge.5 ) Should the rest of the Australian States follow the example
of Western Australia it will be possible for family courts to be set
up in every State which would have jurisdiction over all State family
law matters as well as the family law matters provided for by the
Family Law Act.
1) NYgh 40. The South Australian family court first opened its
doors to the public in February 1974 and it has jurisdiction
over, inter alia, the following matters - (1) custody and guardian-
ship proceedings (ie independent of divorce); (2) matrimonial
property disputes; (3) consents to marry; (4) paternity cases;
(5) adoptions; (6) breach of peace proceedings; (7) assaults
by one member of the family against another; (8) maintenance
proceedings, including proceedings for enforcement and variation.
For a comprehensive description of the South Australian family
court see Turner 'Family Courts - The Adelaide Experiment'
Viewpoints (1974) 5-12.
2) Family Court Act, 1975-76 (WA): see also Finlay 'Australian
Family Law: The Twilight Zone' (1976) 8 Fed LR 77, 84: Crawford
'The New Structure of Australian Courts' (1978) 6 Ad LR 201, 210.
3) S 26 Family Court Act, 1975-76 (WA).
4) S 94 Family Law Act.
5) Ss 15-16 Family Court Act, 1975-76 (WA): see Wade 'Jurisdiction
under the Family Law Act to Make Orders Affecting Property' in the
Absence of Proceedings for Principal Relief' (1977) 5 Univ Tas LR
248, 2:51.
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(D) Jurisdictional Limitations and Constitutional Challenge
Reference has already been made above to the fact that the family
court is a creation of the Australian Federal Legislature. The family
court, accordingly, only has a unified and all-embracing jurisdiction
over both federal and territorial family law matters within the Federal
Territories to which the Family Law Act applies. l ) The Territories
concerned are the Australian. Capital Territory (ACT); the Northern
Territory and Norfolk Island. 2) This is the result of the fact
that Australia operates under a federal constitutional set-up.
Under the Australian constitution the Federal Legislature is given the
power to legislate on, inter alia,
, (xxi) Marriage;
(xxii) Divorce and matrimonial causes; and in relation thereto,
parental rights, and the custody and guardianship of
infants. ,3)
Any matters falling within the realm of family law not covered by the
above fall to be dealt with only by the various State parliaments.
This explains the apparent anomaly why the Family Court of Australia
cannot acquire jurisdiction over paternity disputes, illegitimate
children and adoptions: these matters fall within the jurisdiction
of the various State courts. 4)
Because of the dichotomy in jurisdiction over family law matters
as a result of the constitutional set-up, it was inevitable that there
1) S 31 (1) (c) - see under 'Jurisdiction' above.
2) See s 4(1) Family Law Act for the definition of 'Australia' and
'Territory. '
3) S 51 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 63 and 64 Vict.
Cap 12 (1900).
4) Nygh 10. Some of the constitutional difficulties which have been
experienced in the field of family law had already been anticipated
by a number of writers: eg Sackville and Roward 'The Constitutional
Power of the Commonwealth to Regulate Family Relationships' (1970)
4 Fed LR 30; Finlay 'Commonwealth Family Courts: Some Legal and
Constitutional Implications.' (1971) 4 Fed LR 287. For recent
contributions see Finlay 'Australian Family Law: The Twilight Zone'
(1976) 8 Fed LR 77; Finlay in a note in (1976) 50 ALJ 360; Turner
'The Commonwealth Family Law Act, The First Challenge'. Russell v
Russell' (1976) 1 Aust Child Fam Welfare 51: Lusink 'The Family Law
Act 1975-77 - Australia' (1978) 16 Concil Cts Rev 39; Lane 'Federal
Family Law Powers' (1978) 52 ALJ 121; Crawford 'The New Structure of
Australian Courts' (1978) 6 A~ 201, 205-210.
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should be a challenge to the constitutional validity of certain of the
provisions of the Family Law Act of 1975. This challenge came about
in the case of Russell v Russell: Farrelly v Farrellyl) which declared
invalid certain sections of the Family Law Act. As to the jurisdiction
of the family court, the Australian High Court held in the Russell and
Farrelly case that the provisions of section 4(1) of the Family Law Act
defining a 'matrimonial cause,2) were invalid to the extent that they
strayed outside the area of constitutional validity; ie where the
Family Law Act purported to make provision for any matter not falling
within its 'marriage' pow~r in terms of section 51 of the Australian
Constitution. Thus, it was held that it is only where, the litigants
in an action are married to eacn other that proceedings may be brought
in the family court in respect of the following matters;3) namely,
(a) proceedings for the maintenance of one of the parties to a
marriage: in other words, maintenance proceedings cannot be
brought in the family court independently of, and unsupported by,
an action for the annulment of, or dissolution of, or declaration
as to the validity of, a marriage. Thus, for example, actions
for maintenance against a third party on behalf of an ex-nuptial
child fall outside of the jurisdiction of the family court and
remain exclusively within the jurisdiction of the State courts;
1) (1976) ALJR 594: see also Cako /19777 VR 245. For comprehensive
discussions on the Russell and Farrelly case see, inter alia, the
post 1975 references given in the note immediately above and also
the Family Law Service (1976) 1006-1010.
2) See above under 'Jurisdiction' where the definition of a 'matrimonial
cause' in its amended form is cited in full.
3) And then only if they involve ancillary relief tinder paragraphs
(a) and (b) of the definition of 'matrimonial cause' in s 4 (1)
Family Law Act.
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Cb) proceedings with respect to the property of one or both
t o t . 1)par les 0 a marrlage;
(c) proceedings with respect to the custody, guardianship, or
maintenance of, or access to, a child of the marriage. But such
proceedings may only be brought in the family court if the parents
are also involved in an action for the annulment of, or dissolution
of, or declaration as to the validity of, the marriage. In the
result, the phrase 'child of a marriage' as originally contained in
the Family Law Act has had to be amended to give it a more
restricted meaning: the phrase 'child of a marriage' is now
limited, for most purposes, to a child born to, or adopted by, the
t o t . 2) d·t 1 d f 1 hild hpar les 0 a marrlage an 1 exc u es, or examp e, a c w 0
has been merely accepted by the parties into their family, such as
a stepchild. Thus, actions relating to the custody of such stepchild
or other ex-nuptial children cannot be brought in the family court.
1) It had earlier been held by the Australian High Court in Lansell
(1964) 110 CLR 353 that the Federal Parliament had the power to
provide for the re-arrangement of property rights between spouses
as an incident of divorce. But unlimited property jurisdiction
which is not ancillary to principal relief was held in the Russell
and Farrelly case to be beyond the power of the Federal Legislature:
Wade 'Jurisdiction under the Family Law Act to Make Orders Affecting
Property in the Absence of Proceedings for Principal Relief' (1977)
5 Univ Tas LR 248. ~nus, for example, a spouse cannot obtain from
the family court an immediate and urgent 'property order' (eg where
the other spouse is squandering the matrimonial assets) before
seeking principal relief (ie a divorce), or where no principal relief
is being contemplated at all.
2) s 4 Family Law Amendment Act, 63 of 1976, has amended s 5 Family Law
Act as a re~t of the decision in the Russel1and Farrelly case:
s 5 (1) now reads: 'For the purposes of the application of this
Act in relation to a marriage -
(a) a child adopted since the marriage by the husband and
wife; or
Cb) a child of the husband and wife born before the marriage;
shall be deemed to be a child of the marriage, and a child
of the husband and wife (including a child born before the
marriage) who has been adopted by another person or other
persons shall be deemed not to be a child of the marriage.'
66
Section 97 (1) of the Family Law Act originally provided for the
hearing of all proceedings in the family court to be conducted in
closed court. l ) This provision failed to pass the scrutiny of the
High Court in the Russell and Farrel1y case: it was held by a majority
of three to two that this provision was invalid insofar as State courts
were concerned since it concerned the constitution and organizational
structure of State courts which did not fall within the power of the
Federal Legislature. The validity of this provision was, however,
upheld insofar as it applied to the family court.
The 'no robes' provision2) was a little more fortunate in
surviving an attack upon its constitutional validity insofar as State
courts were concerned.. It was held in the Russe1l and Farrelly case,
again by a majority of three to two, that this provision was valid.
The proviso was added, however, that non-compliance with the 'no robes'
section in any State court would not render a judgment of that court
invalid.
The constitutional challenge to these seemingly insignificant
procedural provisions of the Family Law Act Qarried with it far-
reaching implications: it, in fact, opened the way for the High Court
to cast doubt upon the constitutional validity of other provisions
of the Family Law Act, and which it did in obiter form. 3)
The supporters of the family court concept can hardly regard these
challenges in a light vein since, as Turner pertinently remarks,4)
'the way in which family law is administered is even more important
than the corpus of the law.'
1) That is, with the exception of relatives or friends of either party,
marriage counsellors, welfare officers and legal practitioners: s 97
(2) Family Law Act.
2) S 97 (4) states that 'Neither the JUdge hearing proceedings under
this Act nor counsel shall robe.'
3) Family Law Service (1976) 1008.
4) 'The Commonwealth Family Law Act: The First Challenge: Russe1l v
Russe11, (1976) 1 Aust Child Fam Welfare 51, 53.
67
(E) Procedure
The clearly stated aim of the Family Law Act
l
) is that the
family court shall 'proceed without undue formality and shall endeavour
to ensure that all proceedings are not protracted.' The fact that
neither judge nor counsel need robe also lends itself to the informality
of proceedings. But, as has just been noted, section 97 (1) of the
Family Law Act which provides for all hearings to be conducted behind
closed doors only applies to the family court itself and not to the
state courts. The clear aim behind this provision was also to restrict
the formalism experienced in the ordinary law courts.
(F) Family;Law Council and Institute of Family Studies
An interesting innovation is to be found in section 115 of the
Family Law Act which provides for the establishment, by the Attorney-
General, of a Family Law Council 'to advise and make recommendations
to the Attorney-General ••• concerning
(a) the workings of this Act and other legislation relating to
family law;
(b) the workings of legal aid in proceedings in family law; and
(c) any other matters relating to family law. ,2)
The Family Law Council consists of a 'Judge of the Family Court and such
other judges, officers of the Public Service of Australia or of a State,
representatives of marriage counselling organizations and other persons
1) s 97 (3) Family Law Act.
2) S 115 (3) Family Law Act. The Family Law Council performs
functions similar to that performed by the director of the Hawaii
Family Court (above 39-40). It may also be likened to the
Standing Advisory Committee appointed by the Minister of Economic
Affairs in terms of s 18 COmpanies Act, 61 of 1973. The function
of this committee is 'to make recommendations to the Minister in
regard to any amendments to !the Companies Act7 which may appear to
it to be advisable and shall-advise the Minister on any matter
referred to it by the Minister.' So far as family law in Australia
is concerned the Family Law Council is now able to keep abreast of
current social developments. Cf the Board of Family Court Judges in
Hawaii appointed in terms of s 5 Hawaii Revised Statutes (Chap 571)
which is discussed below at 83.
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as the Attorney-General thinks fit. ,1) Meetings of the Family Law
Council are convened either by the chairman of the Council or by the
Attorney-General. Records of the meetings are to be kept and an
annual report is to be furnished to the Attorney-General setting out
the operations of the year. As Nygh puts it: 2)
'Hopefully, it Lthe Family Law Counci~7 will provide an
important and expert body whose recommendations can be
acted upon by Parliament without having to enter into
political controversy.'
In addition to the Family Law Council, prov1s10n is made for the
establishment of an Institute of Family studies.3)The functions of
this research institute are:
'Ca) to promote, by the encouragement and co-ordination of
research and other appropriate means, the identification of,
and development of understanding of, the factors affecting
marital and family stability in Australia, with the object of
promoting the protection of the family as the natural and
fundamental group unit in society; and
Cb) to advise and assist the Attorney-General in relation
to the making of grants, out of moneys available under
appropriations made by the Parliament, for purposes related
to the functions of the Institute and the supervising of the
employment of grants so made.'
S 115 (2) Fami1f Law Act. According to the Second Family Law
Council Report 1978) the Chairman of the Council is Justice
Elizabeth Evatt, the Chief Judge of the family court: there are
12 other members of the Council.
At 5. See also Joske 8-9- In the first 2 Annual Reports of the
Family Law Council numerous recommendations for improvement to
the Family Law Act were made. Many of these recommendations
appear to have been accepted by the Australian Parliament and the
Act has already been amended in numerous respects.
Part XIV A {Ss 114 A - 114 ~ Family Law Act.
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(G) Counselling and Reconciliation
A counselling and reconciliation procedure is provided for by
sections 14 to 19 of the Family Law Act. l ) These provisions have
been framed in accordance with the sentiments expressed in section
43. 2) In all proceedings for the dissolution of a marriage and in
maintenance or custodial proceedings, a positive duty is cast3) upon
the judge or magistrate, and also upon the legal representatives of
the parties, to bring their minds to bear upon the possibility of a
reconciliation of the parties. To this extent, a judge or magistrate
is empowered to adjourn proceedings to enable the parties to consider
the possibility of a reconciliation and, with the consent of the parties,
may even interview them in chambers. 4) Should the judge or magistrate
consider it desirable the parties may even be referred to a marriage
counsellor?) or approved marriage counselling organization. 6)
Thereafter, if either of the parties requests that the hearing be
proceeded with, the judge or magistrate shall resu~e the hearing as
soon as possible.7)
1) See Family Law Service (1976) 1031-1038.
2) S 43 Family Law Act is cited in full above at 56.
3) By s 14 (1) Family Law Act.
4) S 14 (2) (a) and (b) Family Law Act.
5) A marriage counsellor is defined by s 4 Cl) as:
'Ca) a person appointed as a counsellor under section 37
~e by the Attorney-Gener~7; or
(b) a person authorized by an approved marriage counselling
organization; or
(c) a person authorized under the regulations to offer
marriage counselling.'
6) See below at 71 for approved ,marriage counselling organizations.
7) S 14 (3) Family Law Act.
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It would seem that the parties are at least o~liged to attend
any session set up for them by a marriage counsellor or an approved
marriage counselling organization and that a failure to do so may
constitute a contempt of court. The Family Law Act, however, does
not make this particularly clear. But, Nygh suggests that marriage
counselling must be conducted on a voluntary basis otherwise very
little success can be achieved. The learned author expresses
"himself thus: l )
'There is, of course, no requirement that the parties should
actually attempt reconciliation. All that is required is
that the parties, either separately or together, meet with-
a marriage guidance counsellor to discuss the chances of
reconciliation. The meeting may establish no more than
that no such chance exists; hopefully in some cases it may
prevent an over-hasty divorce.'
Similarly, where the family court has granted an injunction 'for
the personal protection of a party to the marriage or of a child of
the marriage or for the protection of the marital relationship or in
relation to the property of a party to the marriage or relating to
the use or occupancy of the matrimonial home,,2) it may direct or
advise either or both of the parties to attend upon a marriage
counsellor.3) In this instance, the Act4) makes it clear that a
failure to comply with such direction or advice does not constitute
a contempt of court.
The confidentiality of any admissions or communications made to
a marriage counsellor is protected by section 19 (1) of the Family Law
Act. 5)
1) At 33-34.
2) S 114 (1) Family Law Act.
3) S 14 (4) Family Law Act.
4) Ibid.
5) See also Reg 20 Family Law Regulations.
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The counselling and reconciliation machinery is not only available
to those who have actually initiated a matrimonial action but is also
available to anyone who simply seeks the assistance of the counselling
services of the family court.1 )
All counselling, however, is meant to be conducted on a short-term
basis. It is envisaged that long-term counselling will be handled
by voluntary organizations. 2) The Attorney-General is given the
power to approve any organization as an official marriage counselling
organization.3) The criteria for such approval, which are contained
in section 12 (2) of the Family Law Act, are that -
'(a) the organization is willing and able to engage in marriage
counselling; and
(b) marriage counselling constitutes, or will constitute, the
whole or major part of its activities. ,4)
Provision is made for the appointment of a Director of Counselling
and Welfare, as well as other counsellors and we1fareofficers.5) The
1) Ss 15 and 16 Family Law Act.
2) Nygh 31.
3) S 12 (1) Family Law Act.
4) An approved organization may receive funds approved by the
Australian Parliament upon such conditions as the Attorney-
General may determine: s 11 Family Law Act. The organization
must, however, submit to the Attorney-General each year an audited
financial report and-a report on its marriage counselling
activities: s 13 Family Law Act. Failure to submit the requisite
reports may result in the revocation of the Attorney-General's
approval: s 12 (6) Family Law Act.
5) S 36 (8) Family Law Act. The present director is D J McKenzie
who has very kindly made available to the writer various reports,
reviews and statistical data prepared by himself and his staff.
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director, who is expected to work in close liaison with the Chief
Judge of the family court, has the duty of preparing documents for
distribution to all courts exercising jursidiction under the Family
Law Act, and to all legal practitioners, setting out information
regarding the following matters:
'(a) the legal and possible social effects of proposed
proceedings (including the consequences for the children of
the marriage); and
(b) the counselling and welfare facilities available within
the family court and elsewhere. ,1)
Where either of the parties to a matrimonial action is legally
represented, the legal representative is obliged to furnish his client
with copies of such documents prepared by the director before any
proceedings are actually initiated. 2) Where, however, neither of the
parties is legally represented, this becomes the duty of an officer of
the family court.3)
(H) General
It is apposite to recall that the Family Law Act was promulgated
against the background of a research into 'The Law and Administration of
Divorce, Custody and Family Matters, with particular regard to
Oppressive Costs, Delays, Indignities and other Injustices. ,4)
1) S 17 Fami.1y Law Act: Reg 19 (2) Family Law Regulations. A
pamphlet entitled 'Family Law and You' prepared by the Director of
Counselling And Welfare is designed to assist the public to answer
the following questions: Would marriage counselling help? Where
are marriage counsellors located? What kind of court proceedings
can be taken and how do they operate? Is legal advice available, or
can you conduct your own case? Are you eligible for social security?
2) Reg 19 (3) Family Law Regulations.
3) Reg 19 (4) Family Law Regulations.
4) Enderby 'The Family Law Act 1975' (1975) 49 ALJ 477. The research
referred to was conducted by the Australian Senate Standing Committee
on Constitutional and Legal Affairs. Its final report was presented
to the Australian Parliament in 1974 and it was mainly on the
strength of this report that the Family Law Act was promulgated.
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With regard to costs, section 117 (1) of the Family Law Act
provides that each par~y to proceedings under the Act must bear his/
her own costs. The court, however, still retains its discretion
on the question of costs and in terms of section 117 (2) of the
Family Law Act the court has the discretion in particular circumstances
'to make such orders as to costs and security for costs, whether by
way of interlocutory order or otherwise. ,1) It would seem t~at the
Family Law Act now recognizes the equality of sexes so far as earning
capacity is concerned. 2) A party is no longer automatically
entitled to his/her costs on 'winning' a case: the criterion seems
to be, inter alia, the ability or otherwise to pay costs. This is
also in keeping with the aim of the Family Law Act to abandon finally
the fault-principle in family law.
Whether the aim of cutting down on the costs of matrimonial
litigation will be achieved in practice is doubted at this stage since
the family court, especially in SYdney,3) is faced with a tremendous
backlog of cases. It is alleged4) that this is hardly an improvement
on the position as it existed under the old legislation. It is, of
course, true that undue delays in disposing of matrimonial cases· can
be costly from the financial point of view. Furthermore, such undue
delays are hardly conducive to the reduction of the acrimony which is
traditionally associated with matrimonial litigation in its fault-
orientated context. But this backlog is seen5) as being only a
temporary set-back while the Family Law Act experiences its teething
problems.
Certainly, a number of problems are being experienced with the
implementation of the Family Law Act. This is inevitable
1) See also s 118 which permits the court to make such order as to
costs as it thinks fit where proceedings are held to be frivilous
or vexatious.
2) It must also be remembered that legal aid is now readily available:
ss 117 (3) and (4) Family Law Act.




considering that it has constituted a radical change in the family law
of Australia. Its implementation has been a tremendous expense to
the Australian taxpayer with the appointment of family court judges
and other personnel to administer the Act: new court premises have also
had to be found and even constructed. But in the long run these costs
may prove to have been justified and the assertion of Enderby,l) a
former Commonwealth Attorney-General, that the Act is 'possibly the
most humane and enlightened social reform to be enacted in Australia
since the Second World War' may well prove to be correct.
1) 'The Family Law Act 1975' (1975) ALJ 477.
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CHAPTER FOUR
A BRIEF ~\TALUATION OF THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE FAMILY COURTS UNDER CONSIDERATION
1. Introduction
There are two basic lessons to be learnt from an evaluation of
the Conciliation Court of Los Angeles, the Family Court of Hawaii and
the Australian Family Court. In the first place, it would seem that
before any meaningful changes can be made to family law and, more
particularly, before serious consideration can be given to the
establishment of a family court system, there will have to be a radical
overhaul of the divorce law. In this respect, the traditional fau1t-
orientated principles of divorce law will have to be eliminated or
severely curtailed. l ) It would also seem that a serious consideration
of the family court system involves not only the reform of the
substantive law of divorce but also a reform of the divorce procedure
and a change of attitude towards the problems of divorce. 2)
In the second place, it is apposite to note that such family courts
as there are differ from country to country, and even from State to
state as in the United States of America. It is clear, therefore, that
the establishment of a family court in any particular country has to be
tailored to the needs and social development of the society it seeks to
serve. Furthermore, the development of the family court system must
be seen as an ongoing . 3)exerClse.
The following characteristics of the family courts under consideration
will now be discussed and evaluated; namely, unified jurisdiction; family
court procedure; counselling; and the safeguarding of the interests of minors.
1) See, for example, the contribution that the California Family Law Act,
1970, made to the development of the Los Angeles Conciliation Court:
see above at 16-17. .
2) The drafting of the Standard Family Court Act, 1959, is evidence of
this fact: see also Rubin 'The Standard Family Court Act' (1961) J Fam
Law 105 •
. 3) Cf the role of the Family Law Council and the Institute of Family





The most frequently cited argument in support of the establishment
of family courts is the attempt to eliminate the problems of fragmented
jurisdiction in matters falling within the realm of family law. This
is not only the view of the many writersl ) on the subject, but it is
also the conclusion of various commissions and committees. 2) The
criticisms that can be levelled at the fragmentation of jurisdiction
in family law matters are crisply presented by Roscoe Pound3 ) as follows:
1) Among the many writers in the United states who have criticized the
fragmentation of jurisdiction in family law matters are Alexander
'What is a Family Court Anyway?' (1952) Conn BJ 243, 256-257;
Alexander 'The Family Court - An Obstacle Race' (1958)
19 Univ Pitts LR 602-603; Goldberg and Sheridan 'Family Courts -
An Urgent Need' (1959) 8 J Fam Law 537-539; Pound 'The Place of
the Family Court in the JUdicial System' (1959) 5 NPPA Journ 161;
Watson 'Family Law and its Challenge for Psychiatry' (1962) 2
J Fam Law 71, 76; Arthur 'A Family Court - Why Not?' (1966) 51
Minn LR 223-225: 229-230; Dinkelspiel and Gough 'The Case for a
Family Court - A Summary of the Report of the California Governor's
Commission on the Family' (1967) 1 Fam LQ 70, 72; Dyson and Dyson
515-516; Kay 'A Family Court. The California Proposal' (1968) 56
Galif LR 1205, 1239-1241; Gordon 'The Family Court: wnen Properly
Defined it is both Desirable and Attainable' (1975) 14 J Fam Law 1,
9-12. On the problem of fragmented jurisdiction in Australia see,
inter alia, Biggs 'Stability of Marriage - A Family Court?' (1961)
34 ALJ 343, 348-349; Turner 'Family Courts: Their Formation and
Jurisdiction' (1973) 8 Aust Journ Social Issues 121, 123-125.
As to the position in Canada see, inter alia, Baxter 'Family Law
Reform in Ontario' (1975) Univ Tor LJ 23~4l-242; Macdonald
'A Comprehensive Family Court' (1967) 10 Can BJ 323, 325-329;
Payne 44-48; Webb 'Family Courts for Quebec' 1975 NZLJ 803. As to
the position in England see, inter alia, Brown 'The Legal Background
to the Family Court' 1966 Br Journ crImino~ 139, 141-143;
Samuels 'Family Courts - The Future' (1972) 122 NLJ 133;
Manchester 'Reform and the Family Court' (1975) 125 NLJ 984;
Turner 'University of Birmingham - Institute' of JUdicial Adminis-
tration, Family Courts' (1974) 4 Fam Law 39-41. Horgan 'Family
Court: The Need and the Obstacles' (1976) 27 NILQ 120, 121-122,
discusses the problem of fragmented jurisdiction in the Irish
Republic.
2) See, for example, Finer Report § 4.342 - 4.346; Law Reform C mmission
of Canada: Working Paper Number 1: The Family Court (1972) _
discussed by Eeke1aar in (1974) 37 MLR 450.
3) 'The,Place of the Family Court in the JUdicial System' (1959) 5 NPPA
Journ 161, 164.
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'A system of courts devised to deal with the typical single issue
required by the system of formulating an issue in pleadings,
reducing the controversy by a series of successive formal
statements to a fact asserted by the one and denied by the other,
is not adequate to the troubles of a family in a complex society
and manifold, diversified and complicated activities of today.
Treating the family situation as a series of single separate
controversies may often not do justice to the whole or to the
several separate parts. . The several parts are likely to be
distorted in considering them apart from the whole, and the
whole may be left undetermined in a series of adjudications of
the parts.'
The unfortunate consequences of this needless fragmentation of
jurisdiction are also neatly summarized by the same writerl ) as
follows:-
'1. It ~he fragmentation of jurisdictio~ involves conflicts
and overlappings of jurisdiction and consequent waste of judicial
power on jurisdictional points at the expense of the merits of
cases.
2. It involves ~7 waste of litigants' time and money in
throwing meritorious cases out of court to be litigated over
again in other tribunals.
3. It involves successive appeals such as those on jurisdictional
questions followed by appeals on the merits.
4. It requires ~7 determination of controversies in fragments
in which the merits of the whole situation may be lost or the
efficacy of the legally appointed remedies may be impaired.
5. It involves a waste of public money in maintaining separate
courts of limited powers, whereas a unified administration not
only would deal more adequately with each aspect but would assure
effective dispatch of the whole at less expense both to litigants
and to the parties.'
1) Gp cit 162.
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In all fairness, it must be pointed out that to vest in a single
court an all-embracing jurisdiction over all family law matters will
not necessarily eliminate a fragmented approach to family law,
especially in major population centres, where there will be a natural
tendency to 'dePartmentalize' such a court.
l
)
Guidance as to what family law matters should fall within the
unifying jurisdiction of a family court, must inevitably be obtained
from the Standard Family Court Act of 1959. With regard to
children the model Act proposes to give to a family court exclusive
original jurisdiction over the following persons and causes of action:-
delinquency cases; neglect cases; children whose environment is
injurious to their welfare or whose behaviour is injurious to their own
and others' welfare; children who are beyond the control of their
parents or other custodians; custody and guardianship cases; adoptions;
termination of parent-child relationships; consents to marriage;
employment or enlistment of a child; treatment or commitment of the
mentally ill or defective. 2 ) With regard to adults, the Act proposes
that a family court be given exclusive original jurisdiction over the
following causes of action and persons:- criminal offences committed
against children by parents or legal guardians; desertion of,
abandonment of, or failure to support, any pers~n in contravention of
any law; criminal offences committed against any member of the accused's
immediate family; actions for support, maintenance, divorce, separation,
annulment, and paternity of a child born out of wedlock; actions
under the reciprocal enforcement of maintenance orders legislation;
and mentally ill or defective persons. 3)
1) Payne 41-42. For example, the reality of a unified jurisdiction over
all family law matters in the New York Family Court has not material-
ized. Various specialist departments of this court are, in fact,
scattered throughout the city of New York: Paulsen 'Juvenile Courts,
Family Courts, and the Poor Man' (1966) 54 Calif LR 694, 706-707.
2) See generally s 8. Standard Family Court Act: see also (1959) 5 NPPA
Journ 99, 116-118, for comments on this section. The use of the words
'delinquency' and 'neglect' was av.oided because of the stigma attached
to them. The phrases preferred by the framers of the model Act are
'any child who is alleged to have violated or attempted to violate any
federal, state or local law, or municipal ordinance' and 'any child
who is neglected as to proper or necessary support, or education as
req11ired by law, or as to medical or other care '
3) See generally s 11 Standard Family Court Act.
•
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(B) Los Angeles Conciliation Court
With the above in mind, the jurisdictional limitations of the Los
1)
Angeles Conciliation Court immediately become apparent. Thus, for
example, the Conciliation Court has no jurisdiction to grant a divorce
order: 2 ) this falls within the jurisdiction of the California Superior
Court of which the Conciliation Court is only a 'special department. ,3)
Neither does it have any jurisdiction over juvenile offenders. The
reason for this omission is that the Conciliation Court has preferred
to be regarded as a purely helping social agency rather than be
associated with crime, delinquency, law enforcement and punishment.
Such an association, it was felt,4) would have impaired the image of
the Conciliation Court.
The strength of the Conciliation Court lies not so much in an
all-embracing jurisdiction - which it does not have - but, rather, in
its stated purpose of protecting the rights of children, of promoting
and protecting family life and the institution of marriage, and of
providing means for the reconciliation of spouses and the amicable
settlement of domestic and family controversies. 5) Accordingly, the
Conciliation Court generally only has jurisdiction over spouses who
have children and who are involved in a matrimonial dispute which
may result in the break-up of the marriage. 6 ) The Conciliation Court
is, however, prepared to assume jurisdiction over matrimonial cases
in which no children are involved if the normal work of the court in
, l' . , t· d' d 7) Acases lnvo vlng mlnors lS no Jeopar lze • s has already been
1) See above at 21-23 for the jurisdiction of the Los Angeles
Conciliation Court.
The Conciliation Court also does not appear to have any jurisdiction
over matrimonial property disputes, though it does play a very useful
supportive role in this field in its pre- and post-divorce counselling.
3) Elkin 'Conciliation Courts: The Reintegration of Disintegrating
Families' (1973) 22 Fam Coordinator 63.
4) Cf Finlay 'Family Courts - Gimmick or Panacea?' (1969) 43 ALJ 602, 603.
5) S 1730 California Code of Civil Procedure.
6) S 1760 California Code of Civil Procedure: s 1760 is cited in full
above at 21.
7) See above at 23.
/
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noted,l) the court has been given jurisdiction over post-dissolution
counselling and custody/access disputes. Finally, it has' the
jurisdiction to give pre-marital counselling to any couple (when one
or both are under the age of 18 years) where the Superior Court of
California has ordered such counselling. 2 )
(C) The Hawaii Family Court
Unlike the Los Angeles Conciliation Court, which falls far short
of the ideal of consolidated family law jurisdiction proposed by the
Standard Family Court Act of 1959, Hawaii has made a determined effort
to consolidate its family law jurisdiction. As has already been
noted,3) the Hawaii Family Court assumes jurisdiction over the same
matters involving children and adults as those listed in the Standard
v
Family Court Act. In this respect, the Hawaii Family Court is more
recognizable as a court of law than the Los Angeles Conciliation Court.
Another material difference between the Hawaii Family Court and the
Los Angeles Conciliation Court is that the former makes no specific
provision for pre- or post-divorce counselling, whereas this feature
constitutes the strength of the latter. Such pre- or post-divorce
counselling that is offered by the Hawaii Family Court is of a purely
4)voluntary nature.
1) Above at 31-33.
2) See above at 17-21.
3) See above at 36-38.
4) See above at 51-52.
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(D) The Family Court of Australia
The scope of the family court's jurisdiction has already been
noted. l ) It must, of course, be stressed that the failure to
achieve a completely unified jurisdiction for the family court has
not been due to a lack of endeavour on the part of the sponsors of
the Family Law Act of 1975. 2 )
(E) Conclusion
Of the three
Court is the only
jurisdiction over
family courts considered above, the Hawaii Family
one to have a comprehensive and integrated
all matrimonial and familial proceedings. 3) The
Los Angeles Conciliation Court lies at the other extreme while the
Australian Family Court lies somewhere between these two extremes.
That the draftsmen of the Australian Family Law Act have failed to
. t d f 'I t' h dl ,,4)achieve a fully 1ntegra e aml y cour 1S ar y surpr1s1ng.
This failure is clearly attributable to the uncomfortable dichotomy
between federal and state family law, and to constitutional issues
such as those raised in the Russell and Farrelly case. 5) It is, therefore,
1) Above at 57-60 and 63-66.
2) See below under 'Conclusion'.
3) Reagh 'The Need for a Comprehensive Family Court System' (1970) 5
UBCLR 13, 26, suggests that Hawaii has 'probably the most integrated
and comprehensive family court now in existence.'
4) In this respect, the Australian experience can be compared with that
in Canada where the jurisdiction and organization of the respective
family courts vary from province to province: Payne 90-91. The
family courts of the various Canadian provinces do not have a supreme
court status: Payne 89. Accordingly, in view of the constitutional
limitations on the tr~nsfer of jurisdiction over 'many types of
matrimonial and familial proceedings' to an inferior court, such as a
provincial family court, it follows that such a court will never be
able to acquire a comprehensive and integrated jurisdiction over all
family law matters: Payne 74, 90, 95 and 104-109. The submission is
made by Fayne at 106, however, that jurisdiction over all family law
matters should in fact be conferred on provincial family courts which
should be accorded a supreme court status.
5) (1976) 50 ALJR 594.
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inevitable that because of the Australian constitutional set-up there
should be jurisdictional, as well as procedural, difficulties being
, f' 't t' 1) Fexperienced. This is a frustratlng and con uSlng Sl ua lone or
example, custody cases may fall within the jurisdiction of either
the Australian Family Court or a state court according to the principles
laid down in the Russell and Farrelly case. 2 ) Thus, in a recent case,3)
a father of minor children erroneously made application for their
custody to the Supreme Court of New South Wales while, at the same
time, the maternal grandparents of the children also acted in error by
applying to the family court for their custody.4)
Various recommendations for the elimination of the jurisdictional
problems being experienced by the Australian Family Court have been
made by various commentators5 ) and the Family Law Council. In its
first Annual Report for 19776 ) it was recommended that there should be
a unified jurisdiction over maintenance and custody matters in respect
of all children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, and that to
achieve this the various states should surrender their jurisdiction
1) In commenting on the Russell and Farrelly case Turner 'The Common-
wealth Family Law Act: The First Challenge' (1976) 1 Aust Child
Fam Welfare 51, 56, suggests that the Australian Federal Legislature
has been frustrated in its efforts to create a truly unified family
court structure because of the Australian constitution which has
'once again prevented or placed severe restrictions on sweeping and
enlightened legislation ••• The framers of the Australian constitution
have a lot to answer for.'
2) 2ee above at 65.
3) Cited in (1978) 52 ALJ 237, 238.
4) Not unnaturally Helsham CJ described this situation as being a
'silly' one. His Lo'rdship continued t~ add that 'When the law is
stupid, those who suffer because of it are entitled to have its
stupidity publicly exposed'.
5) Among the Australian commentators who have made suggestions for
improvement are Finlay 'Australian Family Law: The Twilight Zone'
(1976) 8 Fed LR 77; Finlay in a note in (1976) 50 ALJ 360; Turner
'The Commonwealth Family Law Act: The First Challenge: Russell v
Russell' (1976) 1 Aust Child Fam Welfare 51; Wade 'Jurisdiction under
the Family Law Act to make Orders affectlng Property in the Absence of
Proceedings for Principal Relief' (1977) 5 Univ Tas LR 248.
6) At § 55.
over these matters to the family court. In its second Annual Report
for 19781) the Family Law Council again expressed itself In favour of
such change and even went further than before by suggesting that the
law relating to the guardianship of ex-nuptial children should also fall
under the "jurisdiction of the family court. There is no doubt that
with the passage of time these jurisdictional problems of the Australian
Family Court will be ironed out. Until this happens the Family Court
of Australia will continue to experience conflicts and overlappings of
jurisdiction and the determination of cases in fragments will not
result in the expected saving of costs of litigation and an expeditious
determination of cases. 2 )
By way of contrast with the position in Australia, Hawaii has
experienced a relatively smooth transition from its old court structure
/
to the new regime of family courts. Provision has been made for the
establishment in Hawaii of a Board of Family Court Judges which is
obliged to meet at least once every 6 months to discuss and 'attempt
to achieve agreement upon general policies for the conduct of family
courts and forms for use in such courts. ,3) The Board may also,
inter alia, formulate recommendations for remedial legislation. 4)
In practice, however, the Board seldom meets mainly because of a lack
of time and funds for travel among the islands that constitute the
8tate of Hawaii. 5) Thie, in fact, only serves to highlight the smooth
passage Hawaii experienced with the establishment of its family court.
As already indicated above,6) the Conciliation Court of Los Angeles
is restricted in its jurisdiction. The Conciliation Court, by
its nature, however, is not suited for an all-embracing jurisdiction
1 ) At §s 5-12.
2) See the comment in the (1978) 52 ALJ 237 where it is suggested
that the failure to achieve a more expeditious disposal of family
law cases in the family court is one of its most serious defects.
3) s 5 Hawaii Revised Statutes.
4) Ibid.
5) Dyson and Dyson 533.
6) At 79-80.
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over all family law matters. Such all-embracing jurisdiction is
clearly the aim of the Hawaii Family Court, where it has been achieved,
and the Family Court of Australia, where it has yet to be achieved.
The continuing efforts to obtain this unified and comprehensive
jurisdiction in Australia are indicative of the advantages to be
obtained from a unified family court system. Certainly, this
should not be impossible of attainment in the South African context
where there are no constitutional difficulties of the sort that exist
in Australia.
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3. Counselling: Conciliation and Reconciliation
(A) Introduction
An important feature of any family court is to be found in the
provision it makes for counselling. This is particularly true of the
American family court system which is basically committed to a 'social
work philosophy which regards family breakdown as a phenomenon to be
dealt with primarily by diagnosis and treatment. ,1) This approach is
1) Finer Report § 4.281. It is, however, difficult to understand
the Finer Committee's assertion ;at § 4.2827 that it owed 'little
to American experience or writings, or to any preconceived
attachment to the notion of a family court,' particularly when
the Finer Committee itself ;at § 4.2837 favoured the following
criteria which, it felt, a family court should in principle satisfy.
They are very similar to the main criteria of most American family
,courts; namely,
'(i) the family court must be an impartial judicial institution,
regulating the rights of citizens and settling their disputes
according to law;
(ii) the family court must be ,a unified institution in a system
of family law which applies a uniform set of legal rules, derived
from a single moral standard and applicable to all citizens;
(iii) the family court must organize its work in such a way as to
provide the best possible facilities for conciliation between
parties in matrimonial disputes;
(iv) the family court must have professionally trained staff to
assist both the court and the parties appearing before it in all
matters requiring social work services and advice;
(v) the family court must work in close relationship with the
social security authorities in the assessment both of need and of
liability in cases involving financial provision;
(vi) the family court must organize its procedure, sittings and
administrative services and arrangements with a view to gaining
the confidence and maximising the convenience of the citizens who
appear before it.'
The Finer Committee also appears to have relied heavily on the
commentaries of writers such as Hall; Brown 'Legal Background to
the Family Court' 1966 Br Journ Criminology 139; Samuels 'Family
Courts - The Future (1972) 122 NLJ 133. These writers, in turn,
appear to have been influenced by the American family court
experience. See also Phillips 'A Family Court System for
Scotland?' (1976) Journ Law Soc Scotland 12 and 52 esp 53-54.
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understandable when it is remembered that the American family court
1)
system has its roots in the juvenile court movement.
This 'social work philosophy', which promotes the diagnosis and
treatment of family law problems provides the essential link between
the legal and social sciences and this, in turn, would appear to be
possible only by the creation of a single court system with exclusive
jurisdiction over family law matters. The main motivations
behind the promotion of this social work philosophy would appear to be
the desire to safeguard the interests of children; the desire to
prevent needless divorces from taking place; the desire to minimize
the bitterness, distress and humiliation experienced by parties to a
matrimonial conflict; the desire to enable the court to focus its
attention upon the real problems of a marriage in jeopardy; and the
desire to provide a form of individualized justice for every person
falling within the jurisdiction of a family court. 2 )
Before one is properly able to evaluate the counselling services
of the family courts under consideration it is necessary (i) to dispel
the ill-conceived notion that the function of the counsellors of the
family court is solely to promote the reconciliation of warring spouses
and to prevent, at all costs, a divorce from taking Place;3) (ii) to
highlight the distinction between the conciliation and reconciliation
process;3) and (iii) to refer, briefly, to the English counselling
experience.
1) See above at 4-6.
2) Cf the stated purpose of the Los Angeles Conciliation Court in
s 1730 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is cited in full
above at 15. See also the oft-quoted aims of a good divorce law
as formulated by British Law Commission in 1966 in its report
Field of Choice at § 15; viz. '~A7 good divorce law should seek
to achieve the following objectives:
(i) to buttress, rather than to undermine, the stability of
marriage; and
(ii) when, regrettably, a marriage has irretrievably broken
down, to enable the empty legal shell to be destroyed with the
maximum fairness, and the minimum bitterness, distress and
humiliation.'
3) 8ee, for example, Appendix 'B' which sets out the counselling
services offered by the Edmonton Family Court, Alberta, Canada.
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(i) Reconciliation at all Costs:
Nothing could be further from the truth than the idea that the
family couut personnel make it their business to prevent warring
spouses from obtaining a divorce to which they are entitled. Perhaps
the clearest statement on the true role and function of a family
court counsellor is that of Elkinl ) who states that:
'We ;the counsellors7 do not have as a goal the saving of all
marriages, but we are concerned with the tragedy of the unnecessary
divorce. The intent of the law is very clear and definitely
embraces more than a reconciliation function. A conciliation
court serves families. If in the course of such service a
family does not reconcile, this does not mean that the counsellor's
concern and responsibility to the family is at an end. In such
cases, we still offer a very important and worthwhile service
in our counseling efforts to help the family close the book
gently rather than bang it shut in anger; to help the family
terminate the marriage with dignity, minimal trauma, and without
the need to strike back - a need which is often responsible for
much of post-divorce litigation. Conciliation court counselors
recognize that a divorce decree cannot and does not end parental
responsibility to the children - for parents are forever. Nor
do problems stop when the divorce decree is final. One of our
goals with unreconciled families is to assist the husband and
wife to focus feelings and decisions so that they can continue to
exercise their joint responsibilities to their children in a
constructlve way, as well as to use the crisis of divorce as an
1) 'Conciliation Courts: The Reintegration of Disintegrating Families'
(1973) 22 Fam Coordinator 63, 64.
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opportunity for personal growth and fulfilment. ,1)
(ii) Conciliation and Reconciliation
The distinction between the conciliation and reconciliation process
has not always been readily apparent. The failure to appreciate the
significant differences between these two concepts may well account for
some of the misguided criticisms of the counselling functions of the
family court system. 2) In England, the Finer Committee appears to have
1) Famil and Divorce Counseli in Courts: A Position
Paper 1977 has again emphasized that 'Conciliation does not just
mean reconciliation. "Conciliation" is an umbrella concept •••
under which is subsumed any marriage, family and divorce counseling
service w~ich is court related ••• Conciliation courts engage in
conciliation counseling, which includes reconciliation counseling,
separation and divorce counseling, custody and visitation counseling,
both before, during the divorce, and after the final decree has been
entered. Conciliation courts deal with the crisis of divorce or
impending divorce, an experience which next to death is one of the
most wrenching and stressful of all experiences ••• ' On the
attributes of a good marriage counsellor see Elkin Techniques are not
Enough (1970) - a paper presented at the Eighth National Conference
of Conciliation Courts in May 1970 at Detroit, Michigan. For further
descriptions of the counselling process in American family courts
see, inter alia, Biggs 'Stability of Marriage - A Family Court?'
(1961) 34 ALJ 343, 350; l~cdonald 'A Comprehensive Family Court'
(1967) 10 Can BJ 323, 333-335; Kay 'A Family Court: The California
Proposal' (1968) 56 Calif LR 1205, 1225-1226; McLaughlin 'Court-
connected Marriage Counseling and Divorce - The New York Experience'
(1971) 11 J Faro Law 517, 530-531.
2) The lack of appreciation of the important differences between the
conciliation and reconciliation process has, in part, been due to
the fact that some family courts have themselves failed to
define the true functions of their counsellors: ie whether their
aims are directed at conciliation, or at reconciliation, or both:
see McLaughlin 'Court-connected Marriage Cour~eling - The New
York Experience' (1971) 11 J Fam Law 517, 530; Payne 403-405.
recognized the importance of the distinction between conciliation and
reconciliation and it has rightly emphasized
l
) that:
'By "reconciliation" we mean the reuniting of the spouses.
By "conciliation" we mean assisting the parties to deal
with the consequences of the established breakdown of their
marriage, whether resulting in a divorce or a separation,
by reaching agreements or giving consents to reducing the
area of conflict upon custody, support, access to and
education of the children, financial provision, the disposition
of the matrimonial home, lawyers' fees, and every other matter
arising from the breakdown which calls for a decision on future
2)
arrangements. '
Of the two processes the reconciliation process, by its very
nature, must of necessity rank before the conciliation process in
point of time. It is, in fact, a widely held view that for the
reconciliation process to have any chance of success it must be applied
at an early stage of marital discord and, preferably, before an
attorney is consulted. Once an attorney is consulted the possibility
of reconciliation becomes remote. 3)
1) Finer Report § 4.288.
2) Cf Manchester and Whetton 'Marital Conciliation in England and Wales'
(1974) 23 ICLQ 339, 342, where they point out that 'whereas marital
reconciliation is designed to keep the marriage legally intact and
may be the result of coutiselling, the aim of the counsellor is to
help couples perceive for themselves the potential which the marriage
itself may still have for them. Indeed there is some reason to
believe that, even if the married partners decided not to become
reconciled, the conciliation process may assist them to face the
post-divorce situation.'
3) ef Freeman 'The Search for a Rational Divorce Law' (1971) 24 CLP
178, 205-207, who pertinently points out that 'The solicitor is not
only ill-equipped to undertake guidance but his training and
environment are such that therapy is a remedy that is not even
likely to occur to him. Furthermore, he lacks the incentive.
He is not paid if his conciliatory services prove successful'.




The English Counselling Experience
In England, the purely reconciliation-orientated provisions of
section 6 of the Matrimonial Causes Act of 19731 ) have apparently met
with very little enthusiastic support. Section 6 states that
'(1) Provision shall be made ••• for requiring the solicitor
acting for a petitioner for divorce to certify whether he has
discussed with the petitioner the possibility of a reconciliation
and given him the names and addresses of persons qualified to
help effect a reconciliation between parties to a marriage who
have become estranged.
(2) If at any stage of proceedings for divorce it appears to
the court that there is a reasonable possibility of a reconciliation
between the parties to the marriage, the court may adjourn the
proceedings for such period as it thinks fit to enable attempts
to be made to effect such a reconciliation.'
It is clear that the emphasis is on the reconciliation of spouses
experiencing marital discord. No provision at all is made for post-
divorce counselling. In this regard, Freeman2) expresses himself as
follows:
'The world of the formerly married has been but little explored.
Role disturbance and adjustment, alienation have to be conquered.
Unlike death, the patterns of post-divorce adjustment are not
well institutionalised. A high percentage of divorcees remarry,
many of them successfully. But many problems could be alleviated
if post-divorce welfare was strengthened. ,3)
1) Chapter 18. See generally Stone 105-108; Bromley 256-257;
Cretney 153-155. See also Puttirig Asunder 150-161 where the
conclusion reached is that more effort should be put 'into saving
marriages than in terminating them.'
2) 'The Search for a Rational Divorce Law' (19'71) 24 CLP 178, 207.
3) Freeman's comments were being directed at the identical provisions
of the 1969 Divorce Reform Act (Chapter 55) which were replaced by
s 6 of the 1973 Matrimonial Causes Act (Chapter 18).
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When the provisions of section 6 (1) first appeared in 1969,
there was a tendency on the part of solicitors to regard the section
as being responsible for a needless and unwarranted increase in their
paper work - a .necessary formality that had to be complied with in




'It is important that reference to a marriage guidance
counsellor or probation officer should not be regarded as
a formal step which must be taken in all cases irrespective
of whether or not there is any prospect of reconciliation.'
The practical effect of section 6 (1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act,
as read with the above Practice Direction, was to emphasize what
always had been appreciated; namely, that a divorce should be
proceeded with only when it is genuinely desired and unavoidable.3)
With regard to section 6 (1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act its
effectiveness in practice is debatable. In the first place, for
there to be any chance of a reconciliation being effected, the
reconciliation counselling must be invoked at an early stage of marital
discord - certainly before the case has reached court, and preferably,
before a solicitor is consulted. 4) Secondly, no English divorce court
has ever needed statutory authority to adjourn so as to enable the parties
to a matrimonial action to reconsider their decision to divorce. In
the third place, it is unlikely that the possibility of reconciliation
will be seriously considered by the spouses where the court suo motu
adjourns a case. Only the spouses themselves, and not the court, are
best qualified to decide whether or not reconciliation is a viable
1) See Griew 'Marital Reconciliation - Contexts and Meanings' (1972)
30 Camb LJ.
2) /19717 1 All ER 63.,
3) As Griew 'Marital Reconciliation - Contexts and Meanings' (1972) 30
Camb LJ 294, 307-308, puts it: 'The practical effect ••• /Is to
provid~7 a statutory incentive to do what self-respecting solicitors
claim always to have done spontaneously - namely, to ensure, when
necessary and so far as they can, that divorce is genuinely desired
and unavoidable.' See also Bromley 257.
4) See abov~ at 89.
proposition.
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It would seem that for such adjournment to be of any
value it must at least be with the consent of the parties themselves,
and they must have expressed a willingness to submit to reconciliation
11 ' 1)counse lng.
It was, no doubt, because of the above shortcomings of section 6 (2)
of tne Matrimonial Causes Act that another Practice Direction of
considerable importance was issued in January 19712 ) when, for the first
time, there appeared a measure of recognition of the importance of the
distinction between reconciliation and conciliation counselling. Tnus,
it is stated3 ) that:
'/E7ven if complete reconciliation cannot be achieved, expert
help will often enable the parties to resolve, with the minimum
possible anxiety and harm to themselves or their children, many
of the issues liable to be ancillary to the breakdown of a
marriage. Short of this, it should at least identify the issues
on which the parties remain seriously at variance and on which
in consequence they require adjudication by the court.'
In view of the significance of the distinction between reconciliation
and conciliation counselling the procedure prescribed by the Practice
Dlrection is worthy of citation in full, if only to confirm the failure
of the erstwhile purely reconciliatory approach. The Practice Direction,
in fact, marks a substantial deviation from the spirit and letter of
section 6 (2), and it provides that:
1) On the shortcomings of s h (2) Matrimonial Causes Act see Griew
'Marital Reconciliation - Contexts and Meanings' 294, 309: the
writer's comments are directed at the provisions of s 3 (2) of the
1969 Divorce Act (Chapter 55) which are identical to s 6 (2) of
the ~rm;nrar-Cauces Act (Chapter 18). Commenting on similar
provisions in the Australian Matrimonial Causes Act of 1959 Mr Justice
Selby 'Development of Divorce Law in Australia' (1966) 29 MLR 473,
487, is of the view that 'Experience suggests that ••• !these provisions7
remain in the realm of pious hope. By the time a matrImonial cause -
reacnes a hearing the parties are too far E~art, one of them, at least,
is too anxious for a final determination of the suit and too much
bitterness has been engendered to allow any reasonable prospect
of reconciliation.' Cf Hahlo 'Fighting the Dragon Divorce.' (1963)
80 SALJ 27.
2) !I97] 7 1 AJ 1 ER b94.
")) Ibid.
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'(a) Where the court considers that there is a reasonable
possibility of reconciliation or that there are ancillary
proceedings in which conciliation might serve a useful purpose,
the court may refer the case, or any particular matter or
matters in dispute therein, to the court welfare officer.
(b) The court welfare officer will, after discussion with the
parties decide whether there is any reasonable prospect of
reconciliation (experience having shown that reconciliation is
unlikely to be successful in the absence of readiness to
cooperate on the part of the spouses) or that conciliation
might assist the parties to resolve their disputes or any part
of them by agreement.
(c) If the court welfare officer decides that there is not
sucn reasonable prospect, he should report accordingly to the
court.
(d) If the court welfare officer decides that there is some
reasonable prospect of reconciliation, or that conciliation might
assist the parties to resolve their disputes, or any part of them,
by agreement, he will, unless he continues to deal with the case
himself, refer the parties to either (i) ~ probation officer;
or (ii) a fully qualified marriage guid2nce counsellor
by the branch of the appropriate organisation concerned with
marriage guidance and welfare; or (lii) some other appropriate
person or body indicated by the special circumstances (eg
denominational) of the case.
(e) The person to whom the parties have been referred will
report back to the court welfare officer who in turn will report
to the court. These reports will be limited to a statement
whether or not reconciliation has been effective, or to what
extent (if at all) !~e parties have been assisted by conciliation
to resolve their disputes or any part of them by agreement.'
While this Practice Direction is a great improvement on the
erstwhile application of section 6 (2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act,
it is debatable whether it succeeds in practice since it is designerl
1)
for operation in an adversary atmosphere. It is true that the sole
ground on which a divorce may be granted in England is 'that the
marriage has broken down irretrievably. ,2) But a court will only find
that a marriage has broken down irretrievably if it is satisfied on
one or more of the facts listed in section 1 (2) of the Matrimonial
Causes Act, three of which are clearly fault-orientated. 3) Against
this background it is difficult to reconcile the conciliation process
with the adversary procedure where fault-orientated considerations
play such an important part. Such agreements as are negotiated in
such an adversary atmosphere can hardly be construed as genuine agreements.
On this aspect, Eekelaar
4) expresses himself as follows:
'~7ithin the adversary mould of ••• litigation it is very
difficult to know how genuine agreements are. This is because
the parties may be in negotiation, often through their solicitors,
until the last moment and settlement might only have been reached
at the door of the court. This type of process resembles the
kind of bargaining common in commercial litigation and is far
removed from conciliation. By the time the parties come before
a registrar, even if he is disposed to try and promote a better
atmosphere there may be little he can do in the short time
available to him to reduce the hostility encouraged by the bargaining
1) See below at 114-121 for the adversary procedure.
2) S 1 (1) ~trimonial Causes Act 19'/3 (Chap Id).
3) These facts are that 'Ca) the respondent has committed adultery
and the petitioner finds it intolerable to live with the respondent;
Cb) the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner
cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent; (c) the
respondent has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period
of at least 2 years immediately preceding the presentation of the
petition; (d) the parties ••• have lived apart for a continuous
period of at least 2 years immediately preceding the presentation
of tne petition ••• and the respondent consents to the decree
being granted; (e) the parties ••• have lived apart for a continuous
period of at least 5 years immediately preceding the presentation of
the petition See Cretney 97-153; Bromley 244-256.
4 ) At 150-151 •
95
postures adopted earlier. ,1)
Thus, although referrals to the probation services by divorce
courts for conciliation work have been increasingly made, the overall
. .. . 12 ) Th· .total number of referrals st1ll rema1ns m1n1ma • 1S 1S
understandable when it is remembered that such referrals can only be
made after the divorce action has already commenced. It is, accordingly,
submitted that there is much substance in the suggestion of Manchester
and Whetton3) that the ineffectiveness of the reconciliation provisions
of the Matrimonial Causes Act has been due to a misplaced emphasis
on reconciliation: it might have been better if the empnasis was
placed on conciliation (or divorce) counselling with the possibility
of reconciliation (albeit on very rare occasions) being seen as a hopeful
4)consequence. If reconciliation were to be the sole aim of the
counselling services it is clear that its effectiveness would be
inhibited by at least two important factors. In the first place,
many parties would be 'scared off' 1n thinking they would lose their
remedies if they attempted a reconciliation. In the second place, it
is a truism that no matter what counselling they receive the parties
concerned will never reconcile if they do not want to do so. The yosition
is well expressed by Griew5 ) as follows:
1) See also Manchester and Whetton 'Marital Conciliation in England and
Wales' (1974) 23 ICLQ 339, 358.
2) Eekelaar 150.
3) 'Marital Conciliation in England and Wales' (1974) 23 ICLQ 339, 359.
4) Cf Payne 405: '/17egislation should specifically reflect the
philosophy that counselling cannot be sub-divided into separate
categories such as "reconciliation" counseling and "conciliation"
counseling and that the role of the counsellor is to assist in the
resolution of matrimonial and familial problems irrespective of
whether this leads to the preservation of the marriage or family
unit or to its dissolution and disintegration.'
5) 'Marital Reconciliation - Contexts and Meanings' (1972) 30 Camb LJ
294, 312. See also Sir Jocelyn Simon PC 'Recent DPvplopments in
the Matrimonial Law' - the 1970 Riddell Lecture cited in full by
Rayden 3227, 3238: '/E7ven if full reconciliation is not possible,
skilful and sympathetic advice will often enable the parties to go
their separate ways with the least pain and damage to themselves
and their children.' Cf Clark 285.
I
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'~7he avoidance of divorce may be the product of counselling.
But, it is not, for the counsellor, the aim; it may not, in a
particular case, be a desirable outcome. The counsellor can
hardly help his clients to determine for themselves what is best
for themselves if the "best" is predetermined.'
(B) Los Angeles Conclliation Court
(i) Pre-marital Counselling
The Los Angeles Conciliation Court was the first American family
court to introduce the concept of pre-marital counselling.
1
) The
procedure is described above. 2 ) There is, at present, very little
research data available to enable one to assess the success rate of
the pre-marital counselling procedure. 3) But according to Elkin
4
)
it has been found in a recent survey that out of the 58 superior courts
in California most of them were in favour of the pre-marital counselling
provisions of section 4101 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Apparently,
only one court argued in favour of the repeal of section 4101. Despite
this, however, the survey showed that the effectiveness o~ the pre-
marital counselling provisions 'will remain contradictory until more
information is available. ,5)
It should, of course, be remembered that the superior courts of
California are only permitted to order pre-marital counselling for a
couple applying to court for permission to marry where one or both
are under the age of 18 years, and the court considers SUCh
1) 19'7'1 Conciliation Court Report 8.
2) At 17-21.
3) Elkin 'Premarital Counseling for Minors: The Los Angeles Experience'
(1977) 26 Fam Coordinator 429, 442.




Furthermore, pre-marital counselling is not
normally undertaken by the Conciliation Court staff, but by outside
counselling services. l ) At the most, it can be said that enthusiasm
for c?urt connected pre-marital counselling in the Los Angeles
Conclliation Court is guarded.
(ii) Pre-Divorce Counselling
Such statistical data as there is concerning the success of the
2)
Conciliation Court is to be found in the various annual reports.
In 1977 the Conciliation Court completed a total of 1245 cases in
respect of which 747 couples were either reconciled or entered into an
amicable agreement. 3) This represents a success rate of 60% for the
year ending 1977. Failure to effect a reconciliation, or an amicable
'Husband and Wife' agreement, was registered in 436 cases - a failure
rate of 35,02% - while 62 cases were dismissed. Neither the 1976
and 1977 annual reports indicate how many minor children were
involved in those cases where a reconciliation was effected.
4
) Nor
1) According to Payne, 316, the only conciliation court whose personnel
have assumed responsibility for pre-marital counselling is the
Conciliation Court of Maricopa County, Arizona. The 1977 Annual
Report of the M3.ricopa Conciliation Court, 8, shows that in 1977
the total number of couples where one or both partners were underage,
and who needed court permission to get married, was 240. Of this
number, 194 couples were granted the necessary permission to marry,
while 46 couples were either refused permission to marry or were
allowed to re-apply at a later date : see also 110 n 1 below.
2) See also Foote, Levy and Sander (1966) 790 n 110: statistical data
relating to the Conciliation Court does not appear to have been cited
in the 1976 edition of the authors' work.
3) A completed case is one in which the parties have reached a definite
decision to resume or not to resume the marriage: Maddi 'The Effect
of Conciliation Court Proceedings on Petitions for Dissolution of
M:3.rriage' (1973-74) 13 J Fam law l+95, 498.
L+) Such statistics are, however, to be found in the 1974 Conciliation
Court Report (Table 1) for the years 1972, 1973 and 1974: viz
-
Total Cases Completed
1972 1973 19~J11+54 1103 984
Reconcilia tion Effected 1097 832 812 I
Unreconciled 357 269 172
--
Reconciliation Percentage 76,0//0 75,6% 82,5%
Number of children involved in reconciled cases 1929 1458 1399
do the annual reports indicate how long the couples remained recon-
ciled. But it has been alleged that by means of a follow-up
procedure, on average, three out of four reconciled couples were still
1 " t th later.
l ) I t f th f 11lVlng oge er one year n erms 0 e 0 ow-up
procedure a judge of the Conciliation Court writes to every reconciled
couple one year after the reconciliation has been effected enclosing
a questionnaire which asks, inter alia, whether they are still living
together as man and wife or, if not, when they separated. Also
enclosed is a stamped and self-addressed envelope in which to return
the questionnaire. No further follow-up is effected because, as
Roward remarks,2) 'It is a fair conclusion that if a couple remain
reconciled one year later they are likely to remain so.,3)
It must be stressed, however, that the statistics cited above have
been gleaned from the official reports of the Los Angeles Conciliation
Court. The only independent evaluation of the Conciliation Court that
the writer has been able to discover is that of Maddi.
4
) It must also
be noted that it has been suggested that some of the claims of success
are exaggerated. 5 ) In this regard, it is significant to recall that
1) Elkin 'Conciliation Courts: The Reintegration of Disintegrated
Families' (1973) 22 Fam Coordinator 63, 67. See also Burke
'The Role of Conciliation in Divorce Cases' (1961) 1 J }am Law
209, 212 - 'At the end of one year following the effecting of a
reconciliation, attempts are made to ascertain whether or not the
parties are still living together. Three out of every four replies
received reveal that the reconciliations remain in effect; that one
out of every four fails. Often the letters of reconciled persons
contain voluntary expressions of gratitude for the efforts and
advice of the counselors. In the 1954-59 period there were over
seven thousand seven hundred children involved in the families
reconciled. '
2) 'Matrimonial Conciliation' (1962) 36 ALJ 148, 152.
3) Whether this is in fact a 'fair conclusion' is highly debatable:
cf Maddi 'The Effect of Conciliation Court Proceedings on Petitions
for Dissolution of Marriage' (1973-74) 13 J Fam law l+g5, 498.
4) 'The Effect of Conciliation Court Proceedings on Petitions for
Dissolution of Marriage' (1973-74) 13 J Fam law.
5) See, for example, Clark 285. Even Fayne, 452, doubts the accuracy
of the official statistics and he points out (ibid) that 'reliance
cannot be placed upon such statistics in the absence of any
in~ependent appraisal.'
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proceedings in the Conciliation Court are initiated by way of a
'Petition for Conciliation·,.l) A reluctant. respondent could be
compelled to attend counselling sessions by the issue of a citation.
In practice, however, this citation is only issued if it is felt that
it might accomplish some constructive purpose. Thus, the conciliation
process is hardly ever set in motion where one of the parties is reluctant
to attend. It follows, then, that the court counsellors are only
called upon to concentrate their attentions on those cases where the
parties have voluntarily expressed a willingness to submit to
counselling. 2) In this way, the reconciliation statistics are made
to look more impressive than would be the case if counselling was thrust
on everyone. Thus, in the official reconciliation statistics no
account is taken of those cases which proceed to a final decree of
divorce in which no 'Petition for Conciliation' has been filed.
The impressive statistics suggesting an outstanding reconciliation
rate would, therefore, appear to be illusory. For example, in a
sample study undertaken by Maddi3) it would appear that out of 6682
dissolution, nullity and legal separation cases filed in the Su~erior
Court of the Los Angeles County for the period February to May, 1970,
only in 330 cases was a 'Petition for Conciliation' filed. This
constituted only 4,9% of the total sample. When measured against
the total number of dissolution, nullity and legal separation cases,
the reconciliation rate would, in fact, be very low. At the
. ~.: .'
conclusion of her comprehensive evaluation of the Conciliation Court
procedure, Maddi suggests that4)
1) See above at 23-25 for the 'Petition of Conciliation.'
2) As Foster 'Conciliation and Counseling in the Courts in Family Law
Cases' (1966) 41 NYULR 361, 366, puts it: '/T7he conciliation
court makes its services available only to a-select group where at
least one of the parties is highly motivated for reconciliation.'
3) 'The Effect of Conciliation Court Proceedings on Petitions for
Dissolution of Marriage' (1973-74) J Fam Law 495, 506-507: cf
Foster 'Conciliation and Counseling in the Courts in Family Law
Cases' (1966) 41 NYULR 361, 366.
4) Gp cit 551-552 •
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'Although there may be other reasons for supporting or
establishing a conciliation service similar to the one examined
in this study ~e Los Angele~7, the impact on the overall decree
rate of cases which have filed for dissolution of marriage is
not one of them. This is not to say that the service does not
have any impact on the decree rate, but that the impact was not
clearly demonstrated by the statistics gathered and in any event
is restricted to such a small proportion of the total dissolution
filing that the overall effect is negligible. In a county such
as Los Angeles, where over 47,000 family law petitions are filed
each year, even a relatively large and well staffed conciliation
court can provide services for only a small fraction of the
couples coming before the court.'
Maddi then concludesl ) that
'Unless the service were expanded dramatically it could not
serve more than a minor proportion of the attrition - prone cases.
Therefore, unless legislatures are willing to fund conciliation
programs with large staffs capable of serving a significant
portion of the population seeking divorce, the impact on ~h~7
decree rate is bound to be minimal. Nor is it clear that
serving a larger portion of the divorce-seeking population would
have a significant impact.'
Whether the Conciliation Court would, in fact, be able to increase
its staff resources is highly debatable. The truth of the matter is
that a large porportion of divorce-bound couples have no desire at all
to submit themselves to counselling. To this extent, the Conciliation
Court adopts a realistic approach in that its counselling services are
only available to those who are likely to benefit from them; namely,
those who are desirous of counselling.2) In this way, the staff of
the Conciliation Court are better able to concentrate their
endeavours on those cases where the germ of reconciliation exists.
1) Ibid.
2) Cf Foote, Levy and Sander 787: 'It's silly ••• to try to achieve
reconciliation, for the divorce proceeding merely hardens the
parties in the discord and makes treatment that much harder.'
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This approach is, in any event, absolutely necessary in view of the
fact that the Conciliation Court is in no position to offer long-term
11 0 1)counse lng.
One's impression of the official statistics must, therefore, be
tempered by the realization that they refer only to those who have
submitted themselves voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the Los Angeles
Conciliation Court and do not take account of the greater majority of
those who proceed to obtain the final decree of divorce without first
having gone through the court counselling process. Thus, although
the results of the Conciliation Court, at first blush, seem
impressive, they are by no means as impressive as often made out to be.
This submission appears to be supported even by some who are, or have
been, most directly concerned with the operation of the Conciliation
Court. Thus, even Meyer Elkin, the former Director of Counselling
Services of the Los Angeles Conciliation Court, was constrained to
admit that he was not 'so naive as to believe that the mere
establishment of a court of conciliation and its successful operation




In post-divorce counselling the emphasis is on conciliation
counselling as opposed to reconciliation counselling.
attention is focussed on the 'world of the formerly
In this way,
1) In 1976, largely due to a fiscal crlSlS, there was a 5ry~ reduction
in both the clerical and professional staff of the Conciliation
Court with the result that the services offered by the court h~i,
of necessity, to be curtailed. This resulted in an even more
selective intake process: 1976 Conciliation Court Report 1. But,
the erstwhile position has now, happily, been restored while the
. selective intake process has been retained: 1977 Conciliation Court
Report 3.
2) 'Conciliation Courts: The Reintegration of Disintegrated Families'
(1973) 22 Fam Coordinator 63, 71.
3) Cf Elkin 'Postdivorce Counseling in a Conciliation Court' (1977)
1 Journ of Divorce 55: 'The divorce experience does not stop with
the divorce decree. The divorce decree merely indicates that the
legal aspects of the divorce may be over. But more important than
the legal divorce is the emotional divorce, which is a process that
continues beyond the legal experience.' See above at 31-33 for the
post-divorce counsell:ng procedure in the Conciliation Court.
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married. ,1) Regrettably, there has been very little published
comment on the efficacy of post-divorce counselling in the
Conciliation Court. 2 ) The 1977 Conciliation Court Report3) does,
however, show that in 1977 out of 692 couples who were referred to
the Conciliation Court for post-divorce counselling, approximately
41% were able to work out a written amicable agreement with resulting
benefits to them and their children. This, in itself, would appear to
be a significant rate of success and one can readily agree with Payne's
conclusion4) that 'If ••• court-counselling staff have a useful role
to discharge in the context of "conciliation counselling" this role
appears equally significant irrespective of whether litigable issues
arise before or after judicial dissolution of the marriage.'
(c) The Hawaii Family Court
Unlike the position in the Los Angeles Conciliation Court
there is no provision in the Hawaiian legislation for pre-marital
counselling, the attitude being that this is a matter for the
individual concern of the parties involved and their parents.5)
As to pre- and post-divorce counselling this is conducted on a
limited scale. Thus, for the 1976-1977 period the family court was
concerned with a total of 214 cases at the pre-divorce stage out of
which 17 cases were completed at the end of the period under consideration. 6
1) Cf Freeman 'The Search for a Rational Divorce Law' 24 CLF 178, 207.
2) See Payne 410-414; Elkin 'Postdivorce Counselling in a Conciliation
Court' (1977) 1 Journ of Divorce 55.
3) At 19.
4) At 414.
5) See above at 51 and see Payne 317-318.
6) These figures have been extracted from the 1977 Hawaii Report
(Table 13) 76.
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With the exception of these statistics very little empirical data
regarding the efficacy of the counselling services of the Hawaii
Family Court is available. It seems a little surprising that the
above statistics do not reveal a heavier counselling caseload in
view of the fact that -
'in the first circuit, intake services are freely offered -
even advertised - to the general public. "Take your troubles
to the family court; make a phone call or drop by the office"
is the title of an article in a local paper. They story lists
a family court telephone number which the public may call any
week day between 8 and 4.30 for free "advice or information
about any problem involving your family." Or people may come
in off the street if they would rather seek help face to face.,l)
In fact, the counselling services of the family court are not unduly
flooded with requests for counselling assistance for at least the
following reasons: in the first place, 'middle class people who can
go elsewhere are not likely to seek advice at the family court. ,2)
In this regard, Dyson and Dyson:) observe, that 'it must be remembered
that most of the people who appear before family courts are members of
the lower economic classes.' In the second place, the counselling
therapy offered by the family court is of a short-term nature in that
an effort is always made to conclude a case within 90 days.4)
It is clear that the strength of the Hawaii Family Court is not to
be found in its counselling services. Corbett and KingS) sum up the
position with regard to Hawaii as follows:
'Our family court is being developed as a court
the techniques of the social services and not as
agency utilizing the authority of the law.'
1) Dyson and Dyson 9.
utiliZing7
a social
2) Dyson and Dyson 39, quoting Mary Jane Lee, Director of the Family
Court of the First Judicial Ci~cuit, Hawaii.
4) Dyson and Dyson 40.
5) 'The Family Court of Hawaii' (1968) 2 Faro LQ 32, 39.
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Interestingly, even though the family court's counselling services do
not concern themselves to any great extent with matrimonial problems
at their various stages, they do concentrate to a large extent on
children accused of 'law violations.' Thus, according to the 1977
Hawaii Reportl ) of the 3653 child 'law violation' cases dealt with
by the family court in 1976-1977, 1595 of the cases were successfully
disposed of by the counselling services. In respect of children
needing protective supervision 960 cases were handled and disposed of
by the counselling services.
(D) The Family Court of Australia
(i) .Pre-marital Counselling
The pre-marital education programmes provided for by the Australian
Marriage Act of 19612) are relatively new to the Australian scene.
Very little is known about their effectiveness to reduce the rate of
marriage breakdown and divorce, or to improve the quality of marital
relationships.3) Bates,4) however, does suggest that the pre-marital
education provisions are totally ineffective. In particular, he
suggests that section 13 (1) (c) of the Marriage Act which requires an
authorized celebrant to
'give to the parties ~o a marriag~7 a document ••• outlining
the obligations and consequences of marriage and indicating the
availability of pre-marital education and counselling,'
is nothing more than an 'impertinence' ,5) if only because young people
on the threshold of marriage are generally unwilling to learn no matter
how well intentioned the advice given is. As a general proposition, so
it is alleged, such young people have their own pre-conceived ideas on
matters such as sex, courtship, marriage and child-bearing.
1) (Table 13) 76 and see below under 'Safeguarding the Interests of
Children.'
2) As amended by the Marriage Amendment Act, 1977: see Bates 'The
Enforcement of Marriage Revisited' (1977) 6 Anglo Am LR 172, 179-180.
3) Second Family Law Council Report (1978) 43.
4) 'The Enforcement of Marriage Revisited' (1977) 6 Anglo Am LR 172, 179.
5) Per ~ontra Turner 'The Marriage of Minors' (1968) 8 Univ WALR 319,
who strongly argues that counselling is much more effective before the
marriage takes place than after it breaks down. Cf Appendix 'C'
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(ii) Pre- and Post-Divorce Counselling
Counselling and reconciliation procedures were originally
provided for by the Commonwealth M9.trimonial Causes Act, 1959-1966.
These procedures, however, did not find widespread acceptance in
1) l"t' 1 t" d bAustralia. Thus, for examp e, l was serlOUS y ques lone y
Kovacs2 ) whether such provisions actually worked in practice. So
also Bates3 ) has long suggested that too much emphasis is placed on
the first of the two main objectives of a good divorce law propounded
by the British Law Comwission in 1966.
4
) Like Kovacs, Bates is of
the view that 'social problems require social answers' and that in
place of the first of the main objectives of a good divorce law as
propounded by the British Law Commission the following would be a
more suitable and realistic formula; namely,
'That the law should ensure that the unhappy and unsuccessful
marriage be dissolved as effectively as possible, thus giving
encouragement to successful marriages and emphasising their
importance to the welfare of the spouses, their children and,
hence, tne community. ,5)
1) See, for example, the articles cited by Hambly and Turner 199, as
well as the comments of Mr Justice Selby 'Development of Divorce Law
in Australia' (1966) 29 MLR 473, 487, and Butler 'A Sole Ground for
Divorce' (1971) 45 ALJ l~ 173-174. See also Finlay 35-52.
2) 'Maintenance in tne M9.gistrate' s Court: How Fares the Forum?!
(1973) 47 ALJ 725 at 734 I'It is time to abandon the practice of
looking to-r;gal institutIons for the correction of social ills,
a practice Which is both naive and evasive. '7.
3) 'The Enforcement of Marriage' (1974) 3 Anglo Am LR 75. At 83 the
learned writer suggests that 'Reconciliation provisions can only be
truly effective if applied at an early stage in the development of
marital difficulties: they h8ve no place in divorce litigation.'
The learned writer then goes on (ibid) to suggest that it is time for
legislatures to 'free tnemselves from the notion that divorce is
somehow socially undesirable and that a marriage is worth preserving
for its own, rather than the parties', sake.'
4) Fleld of Choice § 15: these objectives are cited above at B6 n 2.
5) 'Legal and Social Chane;e in Australian Family Law' (1976) 9 CILSA 299,
30~. In this respect, Ebtes 'The Enforcement of M9.rriage Revisit:ed'
(1977) 6 An510 AM LR 172, 177-179, is very critical of the provisions
of s 43 of the Australian F81f1i1y Law Act, 1975, which, he believes,
have fallen into the same pitfalls as the counselling and reconciliatior
provisions of' the Matrimonio.1 Caus0s Act, 1959.
106
But the reaction towards the counselling and reconciliation provisions
of the Family law Act l ) has not been entirely negative. There are
some who regard these provisions as being among the more positive
2)
of the Act.
Although no independent research data regarding the counselling
and reconciliation provisions of the Family Law Act ~s available,
one can, at least, refer to the personal observations and conclusions
of those most directly concerned with the admlnistration of these
provisions. 3) It must be stressed, though, that in having regard to
these observations the political background against which the Family
law Act was promulgated must not be lost sight of~) The Act was----
assented to in June 1975 but was only to come into force on a date to
be fixed by 1 t· 5) The Act was passed by a majority of 8ry;6proc ama lone
1) s 43 (d): see above at 56 where this section is cited in full.
2) For example Nygh 29-36 and Enderby 'The Family Law Act 1975' (1975)
49 ALJ 477.
3) Numerous working papers and view-points have been prepared by various
officials responsible for the administration, and implementation,
of the counselling and reconciliation provisions of the Family Law Act.
These have been made available to the writer by the Director of
Court Counselling (D J McKenzie). At least two of these working
papers deal with the difficulties attendant upon the collection of,
and research of, court counselling data and statlstics; viz McKenzie
'Problemsfor Research in Family Court' (fuy 1978) and Nasser 'Court
Counselling Data Collection and St~tistics' (August 1978). The
main problem, at present, seems to lie in the unsystematic compiling,
and keeping, of records coupled with the fact that most Australian
family courts are experiencing administrative teething problems and
a shortage of adequately trained staff.
4) Tne political background against which the Family Law Act finally
came into effect is graphically explained by McKenzie in a paper
read at the Family Conciliation Conference in Vancouver in February
1978 entitled 'The Setting-up of a Family Court Counselling System
in Australia.' The account given in thp text is mainly based on
this paper.
5) S 2 Family law Act.
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in both Houses of Parliament and 'objection or assent was seen as
a matter of conscience and not politics.' But because of the
political and constitutional upheaval that existed in Australia
during 1974 and 1975 it was widely felt that if a family court were
to exist at all it had to be set up as soon as possible. Accordingly,
urgent steps were taken to set the wheels in motion and the Chief
Judgel ) was appointed in May 1975 while the first Princlpal Director
of Court Counselling was appointed in August 1975. The original
deadllne by which the family court was to begin functioning was October
1975. This deadline was later extended to the 5th January 1976 and thls
was, in fact, the date on whicn the Family Law Act came into effect.
Because of the almost indecent haste to get the family court
established, it was inevitable that there would be teething problems
above the normal. There were, for example, no reliable estimates of
the likely clientele of the counselling and reconciliation services.
The practical experience of those responsible for launcning the
provisions of the Family Law Act was practically ~ est. Furthermore,
it was found that it was impossible to recruit as counsellors people
of a sufficiently mature age with appropriate credentlals. 2 ) The
Principal Director of Court Counselling, in fact, 'spent much of the
time between October 1975 and March 1976 travelling around the capital
cities, attempting to get some uniformity, and giving some encouragement
to counselling staff who were beset by problems of equipment and
accommodation.' It was only in June 1976, some 6 months after the
family court had come into existence, that a meeting of the Directors
of Court Counselling from the various registries could be held with a
view to organizing a general system for·court counselling. 3 ) ~ way of
contrast, however, it seems that because the Western Australian Family
1) Justice Elizabeth Evatt.
2) In a working paper entitled 'Family Court Counsp11ing - One Year
After' McKenzie admits that 'By ~nd large, the people selected Jas
counse11ors7 tended to be younger than overseas expp.rience had -
suggested as an acceptable minimum age.' McKenzie does add,
however, that in his experience this was not a significant inhibitin8
factor in regard to the services offered.
3) In fact, thp continued survival of the family court was in doubt
rif>ht up until jud~ment was delivpred in May 1q76 in the celebrated
ca~p.s of Russp11 and !arrp]ly (1976) 50 ALJR 5q~.
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Court was established some six months after the Commonwealth Famlly
Court, it was better prepared and equipped to face its teething
problems.
When one bears in mind the above background it is not altogether
surprising that sound and objectively critical comment on the efficacy
of the counselling and reconciliation provisions of the Family Law Act
is not presently available. But such comment from those concerned
with tne implementation and administration of these provisions is




'It will be appreciated ••• that it is not easy to get a
completely satisfactory evaluation of a system. Family Court
counsellors have had many surprising and spectacular successes
where people who have drawn themselves up into warring factions,
and after counselling withdrew their suite from the court and
had voluntary orders made. Althouth these successes have been
heartening and have sustained counsellors' morale through a very
stressful time ••• we must be cautious. ,2)
There is also evidence to suggest that many solicitors, who had
prevlously adopted a cynical attitude towards the establishment of tne
family court, now seem more interested in an early referral to the
counsellors for reconciliation and divorce counselling. But an overall
enthusiastic acceptance of the family court by solicitors still remains
a dream in Australia. 3) There is still much tension between the counsellor~
and the legal profession 'who are stlll very attached to the value of
1) 'Family Court Counselling - One Year After' (W-Jrking Paper).
2) Marchall, the Director of Court Counselling of the Sydney Registry,
in a working paper entitled 'Social Workers and Psychologists as
Family Court Counsellors wi thin the Family Court of Australia'
(M3.rch 19'//) reports as follows: 'My o'Nn experience so far leads
me to beJ.ieve that it !the family court7 is essentlally a "helping
court" anc that the provision of counselJ.ing and welfare services
within the Court structure was a wise and useful provision. It
remains to be seen if the service can continue to gain acceptance
and credibility and to what extent it will be able to contribute
conceptually as well as in practical terms to the future development
of the Family Court.'
")) See Flnlr1Y l~p, whf?re it is sup;fl;esteci that lee;al practitioners are
suspicio If" of counf"ellin{'" becaus(j 'it will affect their relationship
wi.tt1 tJ ,> elj('nt.' It is concndf'd, now('vpr, that if clients persist
i nth n i r d j v0 re p act 10n aft p reo U nSf'> 1 1 j n{" , com 11un i cat ion betwe en




Another positive result of the establishment of the family court
is that the reconciliation and counselling provisions have resulted in
a tremendous saving of legal costs for the parties to a matrimonial
action. For example, McKenzie reports
2
) that
'For a half-day case, the cost to clients is also not
inconsiderable and counselling which enabled the case to be
settled out of court would save from $240 in solicitors' fees,
$500 in barristers' fees (if employed by both clients) and
from $24 in worktime lost, a total of $765, or $382 per client.
Most of this would be paid by the taxpayer if the clients were
on legal aid.'
Beyond suggesting that there are some very positive results
flowing from the counselling and reconciliation provisions of the Family
Law Act, it is difficult to be dogmatic in one's views on the efficacy
of these provisions. Difficulties are being experienced. 3) But, it
is significant to note that despite these difficulties it has not
been seriously suggested that the counselling and reconciliation procedures
should be scrapped in their entirety.
1) Marchall in a paper entitled 'The Work of the Counselling Service
of the Family Court of Australia in Conciliating Family Disputes and
in Related Tasks' delivered at the Association of Conciliation
Courts Conference in Vancouver in May 1976 I'This (relationship
between counsellors and solicitors) remains-an area of some tension,
and gives the counselling service one of its main challenges in the
future. '7 This view was confirmed by Mr Justice R S Watson, Senior
Judge of the family court, in information supplied to the writer.
His lordship does add, though, that these difficulties are in the
process of being resolved (June 1978). It would seem that the erstwhil
hostility of the legal profession towards counselling /See Finlay 487
has now been tempered. --
2) In a working paper entitled 'Cost Benefit Consideration of Court
Counselling' (1976 and 1978). See also McKenzie 'Family Court
Counselling - One Year After' where the assertion is made that 'In
one three week interval it was found that 70% of people presented
for section 62 conferences withdrew from court action and had
voluntary orders made. Wnen costing was carried out, it appeared
that for the three week period alone there was an approximate saving
to the client and taxpayer combined of something like %33.000'.
S 62 Family law Act is dealt with below at 137-140.
3) See the Family Law Council Beport (1978) 35-38 where it is pointed
out that some of the practical difficulties being experienced relate
to a l~ck of counselling facilities in the magistrates' courts and
the heavy work load carried by 'the counsellors in the family court.
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(E) Conclusion
There is little or no evidence to suggest that pre-marital
counselling achieves any useful purpose. Hawaii has chosen to leave
out of its legislation altogether any reference to pre-marital
counselling. In the Los Angeles Conciliation Court pre-marital
counselling is limited to cases where one or both of the parties to
an intended marriage are under the age of 18 and where application has
been made for the court's permission to marry. Even then, pre-marital
counselling is not undertaken by the Conciliation Court staff but by
outside counselling agencies. There seems, in fact, to be a strong
body of opinion that pre-marital counselling should not form part of
the functions of a family court. l ) With regard to the position in
Australia pre-marital counselling provisions have only been in force
since 1977 and already their efficacy has been doubted. 2 )
It would seem, then, that the better view is that court-connected
pre-marital counselling does not achieve all that is hoped for: it
certainly does not help to reduce the divorce rate. In any event,
the best evidence available seems to indicate that the available
counselling services are already stretched to their limit without also
being burdened by pre-marital counselling tasks and programmes.
As to pre-divorce counselling, this constitutes the high-water
mark of the Los Angeles Conciliatlon Court. That this court achieves
tremendous success in this direction cannot be doubted, even though
official statistics would appear to be inflated. But it must be
stressed that the secre t ,) f tne le s Angeles ConciJ.. ia tion Court's
success lies in tne fact that its attention is focussed only In those
couples with m~rital problems who desire some form of counselling.
Counselling, no matter how freq~·=nt or intensive, and no matter whether
it is compulsory or not, is never likely to succeed unless the parties
1) See, for example, Payne 314-318 and 383-384 where the views for and
against the efficacy of pre-marital counselling by the staff of
family courts are convassed. Apparently, the only court whose personne
have ~ssumed responsibility for pre-marital counselling is the
Conciliation Court of Maricopa County, Arizona - see above at 97 n 1.
~ usef~l doc~ment prepared by ~he Concili~tion Court of Maricopa County
lS entltled You Rnd Your Marrlage : A GUlde to a Happy Marriage' :
see Appendix 'C'. This document is. handed to all couples on receipt
of their licence 'to contract a legal marriage.'
2) fee above at 104.
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being counselled desire to be counselled.
It is difficult at this stage to give an accurate assessment of
pre-divorce counselling in Australia. It may, however, be argued
that the misgivings expressed in respect of the reconciliation provisions
of the Matrimonial Affairs Act of 1959 are equally valid in respect of
the Family Law Act of 1975. It should also be remembered that there is
an apparent hiatus in the Australian counselling system in that no
provision has been made for counselling in the magistrates' courts.
l
)
It is argued2 ) that 'if it were possible to provide the services of
trained counsellors at an early date in the breakdown, not only might
there be better prospects of reconciliation but, should breakdown ensue,
the possibility that bitter disputes over custody and other matters
might be lessened.' Furthermore, one is mindful of the frequent
assertion3) that the counsellors attached to the family court have to
endure an exceptionally heavy work load.
In one's assessment of court-connected counselling one cannot
help but be struck by the paradox that, on the one hand, it is generally
believed that pre-marital counselling is ineffective while, on the other
hand, it is widely argued that pre-divorce counselling is initiated at
too late a stage for reconciliation to be considered as a real possibility.4)
In this regard, the crucial question to be asked is: at what stage in
the legal procedure should provision be made for counselling for it to
play a more meaningful role in the possible reconciliation of the parties?
Most of those who are concerned with this question are agreed that the
prospects of reconciliation are better if counselling is invoked at an
early stage of marital discord. But, one should guard against an
over-preoccupation with the possibility of reconciliation. One must
accept the reality that a marl'iage maybe incapable of being preserved.
In this situation, which is more normal in practice than exceptional, the
counselling services can, and do, play a most constructive role in
1) Family Law Council Report (1978) 36.
2) Ibid.
3) Ibid.
4) It is quite possible that this paradox is responsible for the Hawaii
Family Court pJaying down its counselling role.
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Fromoting the amicable and equitable settlement of pre-divorce problems.
l
)
Expressed in different terms this means that reconciliation should be
seen as the subsidiary object of court-connected counselling rather than
as its main one. Should, however, the possibility of reconciliation
arise further cou~selling in this direction must, of necessity, be
conducted by outside counselling services. In this respect, the idea
of using the court's authority, as in the case of the Los Angeles
Conciliation Court, to oblige the parties to honour the terms of a
'reconciliation agreement' is a little difficult to acceFt. Certainly,
there can be no object~on to using the court's authority to ccmpel
a party, in appropriate circumstances, to attend a counselling session
fubject, however, to the proviso that if it becomes appar'ent that
further counselling is going to be of no use the court authority to
compel further attendances immediately should be discontinued. After
all, the decision to reconcile is one that can be made only by the
parties themselves.
Finally, with regard to post-divorce counselling, the Australian
and Hawaii Family Courts have not been as successful as the Los Angeles
Conciliation Court. This is a serious drawback since, it is submitted,
post-divorce counselling and guidance has an important and constructive
role to play in the world of the formerly married. The Family Law
Council of Australia is aware of its deficiency in this regard and
in its Second Annual Report of 19782) it remarked that
'The Council is of the view that many people may require
counselling at the stage of the decree absolute and should be
Bncouraged to seek it. To facilitate this and to help persons over
what can be a difficult time, the Council considers that a post-
divorce document should be prepared for distribution with the
decree absolute. Such a document should include basic information
and addresses of counselling organisations. The Council has been
informed that such a document is being prepared by the Court
Counselling Service.'
Such documents or pamphlets have been prepared by the Los Angeles
Conciliation Court and the Hawaii Family Court, and the documents of
1) Cf Payne 116.
2) At 38.
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k bl 0 01 0 t t 1)both courts are remar a y Slml ar ln con en • In these documents,
copies of which are handed to all divorced persons when the divorce
order is granted, emphasis is.placed on the fact that although the
parents are now legally separated their responsibilities towards their
children continue. Practical guidelines are offered to assist the
parents and their children to cope with the divorce situation with
the minimum bitterness, distress and humiliat~on.2) Should on-going
post-divorce counselling be required this can be obtained from any of
a number of social agencies and organizations, which are listed in the
documents. There is no doubt that such documents play a most
constructive role in alleviating some of the trauma experienced at the
post-divorce stage.
1) The document emanating from the Conciliation Court of Los Angeles
is entitled 'Parents Are Forever' while that of the Hawaii Family
Court is entitled 'You Are Still Parents' : see Appendix 'A' below.
2) For example, the following is some of the advice offered: assure
your children that they did not cause the divorce; continuing
anger or bitterness can injure your child more than the divorce
itself; beware of hindering your children's growth by over-
protecting or over-burdening them; never question the children
about their parent; encourage regular contact with the other
parent. With regard to access rights the following is some of the
advice offered: the visit should not be used to check on the
other parent; do not try to punish the other parent through the
~hildren by reducing or denying visitation rights; keep to your
visitation schedule and inform the other parent timeously if you
cannot keep an appointment; avoid taking your children to your
girlfriend's (or male-friend's) house; try always to maintain
contact with your children.
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4. Family Court Procedure
(A) Introduction
Fundamental to the success of any family court is the informality
of its procedure; that is, if it is to obtain and retain the confidence
of the persons it seeks to help. The degree of informality varies
from court to court. The question of what degree of informality
(if at all) the ideal family court should aspire to inevitably leads
to a consideration of the merits and demerits of the adversary
procedure as opposed to the inquisitorial procedure. Insofar as it
may be relevant to the concept of family courts it is proposed to
refer, very briefly, to some of the main advantages and disadvantages
1)
of the adversary procedure.
(i) Advantages of Adversary Procedure
Inasmuch as the divorce action ordinarily involves many conflicting
interests it has been argued that the proper way to protect the various
interests at stake is to insist upon a rigid and highly formalised
procedure such as the adversary procedure. In this way, the danger of
t b "th 1 f 'd ' 1."s 1" " t d 2) Butno 0 serv1.ng e proper ru es 0 ue process e 1.ml.na e •
to the uninitiated observer it may be difficult to understand how a
highly rigid and formalised adversary procedure is able to protect the
various conflicting interests at stake in a divorce action especially
when the undefended divorce action (and most divorce actions are Undefended)
takes but a few minutes to be disposed of by the court. 3) However,
what the uninitiated observer does not· realize is that the plaintiff's
1) The main advantages and disadvantages of the adversary procedure are
fully discussed by Payne 49-77.
2) See Re Gault 387 US (1967) 18-20 where Fortas J said: 'The absence
of procedural rules based upon constitutional principle has not
always produced fair, efficient, and effective procedures. Departures
from established principles of due process have frequently resulted
not in enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness ••• Unfortunately,
loose procedures, high-handed methods and crowded court calendars,
whether singly or in combination, all too often have resulted in
depriving some juveniles of fundamental rights that have resulted in
a denial of due process ••• Due process of law is the primary and
indispensible foundation of individual freedom.' See also Fortas J in
Kent v United States 383 US 541 (1966) 554-556, and see above at 5.
3) These few minutes in a divorce court have been described by Lord
Scarm~n, the Chairman of the Law Commission of England in a speech
entitled 'Family Law and Law Reform' delivered at the University of
Bristol in March 1966 as the 'u~submerged tip of the iceberg'. Copious
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legal representative has, inter alia, taken a comprehensive statement
from his client; has given instructions to counsel for the drafting
of the particulars of the claim; has drawn his client's attention to
the necessity for making proper provision for the custody, maintenance
and welfare of any minor children (and of the necessity of satisfying the
court on this score); has more often than not negotiated a settlement
with the defendant spouse for a fair and equitable distribution of the
matrimonial property and assets (which settlement forms the basis of a
consent paper ultimately to be made an order of court); and, generally,
(if he is as conscientiQus as he is made out to be), has advised his
client on any number of other ancillary matters of great legal and social
importance. It is, Lord Scarman concludes,l) 'a complete misconception
to assess the value of the judicial process ••• by looking only at the
unsubmerged tip - the ten minutes taken in open court to prove that
which is uncontested, namely, the matrimonial offence.'
As a corollary to the paragraph above it is submitted that there is
much substance in the suggestion of Payne2) that because the great
majority of divorce cases are undefended this is evidence of the
'efficacy of the adversary procedure which promotes the negotiation of
settlements by the lawyers representing the two spouses and the
consensual resolution of matters incidental to the divorce, such as the
distribution of matrimonial property and assets, interspousal maintenance,
and the custody and support of the children of the family. ,3)
Finally, from the practical point of view it is unnecessary to
subject every marriage breakdown to the full investigative process of
the inquisitorial procedure, especially where the divorce action is
undefended. To submit the undefended divorce action to the full glare
of the inquisitorial procedure would only serve to prolong the agony
for the warring spouses and their children and to increase, unnecessarily,
the legal costs. In any event, court-connected counselling services are
1) Ibid.
2) At 67-68.
3) Cf Arthur 'A Family Court - Why Not?' (1966) 51 Minn LR 223, 228-229 _
'It may well be true that cross-examination engenders bitterness, but
if the truth be necessary to the viable solution, the crucible of
adversary proceedings will best find that truth ••• Moreover, lawyers
are quite able to find compromise ••• That lawyers lack objectivity
in adversary proceedings is also true; they are appearing as advocates,
not as arbitrators. It is the judge who is objective.'
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generally far too under-staffed and over-burdened to engage in such
an exercise in every divorce case.
1)
(ii) Disadvantages of Adversary Procedure
The assertion has been made2) that family law cases involve not only
legal problems but also social problems. Accordingly, it is highly
undesirable to force the parties to matrimonial litigation into
opposing corners so that they become the participants.of a 'mud-
slinging' match t~e outcome of which will benefit neither party, least
of all the minor children involved.3) Rather, it would be in the public
1) Apart from Payne 49-77 where most of the criticisms of the adversary
procedure in family law litigation are thoroughly canvassed, see
Dyson and Dyson 509-511; Alexander 'Lets Get the Embattled Spouses
out of the Trenches' (1953) 18 Law and Contempt Problems 98;
Alexander 'The Family Court - An Obstacle Race' (1958) 19 Univ Pitts
LR 602 esp 614-615; Alexander 'The Lawyer in the Family Court' (1959)
5NPPA Journ 172; Elkin 'The Language of Family Law is the Language of
Criminal Law' (1975) 13 Concil Cts Rev iii-v; Elston, Fuller and
Murch 'Judicial Hearings of Undefended Divorce Petitions (1975) 38
MLR 609, 634-640; Bates 'The La~jer's Social Role: A Lesson from
Family Law' (1978) 2 Natal Univ LR 125, 134-136.
2) Eg Payne 49.
3) See Alexander 'Lets Get the Embattled Spouses out of the Trenches'
(1953) 18 Law and Contemp Problems 98, 101 who posed the following
apt question: 'Did it ever strike you as at least mildly absurd
that the law should proclaim its interest in the preservation of the
family unit and express its desire to see the disunited reunited,
and then when the parties go to law for relief the law, instead of
helping them reunite, forces them to fight each other?' The same
writer, a former judge of the Toledo Family Co~rt, Ohio, in an
article 'The Family Court - An Obstacle Race?' (1958) 19 Univ Pitts LR
602, 604, observes that 'The divorce court appears to have inherited
from the ecclesiastical courts, Anglican as well as Roman, not the
basic Christian p~ilosophy of love and forgiveness but the ancient
pagan doctrine of guilt and punishment.' See also Bradway 'Wny
Divorce?' 1959 Duke LJ 217, 226, who states that 'If divorce were
a simple matter, like an ordinary action for civil damages, there
might be more reason to supply it with an adversary setting. But
it is not simple.' The writer then goes on to add (at 227) that
'Divorce too often tends to place the couple on a sort of barbaric
pyre and to invite all the neighbors to view the ghastly show. It
pours oil on the troubled flames.' See also Bradway 'Divorce
Litigation and the Welfare of the Family' (1956) 9 Vanderbilt LR 665,
669-671.
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interest, and in the interests of the parties and their children, for
the court to be seised of the real reasons for the marriage and family
breakdown, than for the court to be engaged in a recriminatory fault-
finding enquiry. Thus, the retention of, or undue emphasis on, the
adversary procedure clearly inhibits the diagnostic and therapeutic
functions of a family court.
The traditional divorce court is only concerned with the legal
grounds for divorce and the legal severance of the marriage tie: it
cannot resort to a diagnostic approach and neither can it prescribe
any therapy. The adversary procedure militates against a therapeutic
approach since the prescription for therapy becomes a ~ sequitur
the moment the initiator of a matrimonial action walks into his/her
attorney's office to set in motion the adversary procedure against the
defendant spouse. The legal practitioner is, of course, very well
. 1)
aware of the failure. The application of a diagnostic and
therapeutic approach to the divorce procedure may well be questioned.
But, it is important to bear in mind that while, as a general proposition,
civil litigation is economically orientated,2) this is not necessarily
so in the case of divorce and matrimonial litigation. Certainly, divorce
litigation is both economically and emotionally orientated. There is
much more involved in the divorce action than the severance of the
marriage tie, the settlement of proprietary disputes between the parties,
and the assessment of the quantum of any maintenance payable. Also at
stake, for example, is the question of the custody and guardianship of,
and access to, any minor children of the marriage. The issues involved
in a divorce action are not only legal in character, but also of a
social and emotive nature and which are not always capable of solution
1) This may well account for the almost traditional hostile reaction of
the legal profession to the idea of introducing an inquisitorial
procedure in the divorce court.
2) Eg breach of contract; claims for specific performance; claims
for damages for non-performance, or improper, or incomplete,
performance of contractual obligations; claims for damages in
delict. Defamation and nuisance cases, of course, are not purely
economically orientated.
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(or even of understanding) where the parties are driven int~ opposing
1)
corners by the adversary procedure.
The adversary procedure has also been criticized as being unnecess-
arilYt formal, involved and expensive. 2) Like all other superior court
litigation matrimonial litigation is notoriously expensive,3) especially
if an appearance to defend has been entered. Regrettably, where, as
in the great majority of cases, the divorce action is undefended, this
cost factor in the adversary procedure can, and often does, promote harsh
and unconscionable settlements. 4) In the result, a divorce action
has generally become more concerned with economic considerations than
with the fact of divorce itself.?)
1) Bradway 'Divorce Litigation and the Welfare of the Family' (1956) 9
Vanderbilt LR 665, 669-671, comments as follows: 'In ~ divorce case
the orthodox adversary litigation framework may be adequate to provide
the limited quantum of facts necessary for the court to decide the
private issues between the spouses. These are basically economic in
character, mostly lying in the past, and often limited to a few narrow
points. But if we conceive of divorce on a larger canvas in terms of
the ailing family as including public problems, non-economic in
character and dealing with the relations between the family and the
state, it is reasonable to argue that something more than direct and
cross-examination is indicated.'
2) Cf Payne 77.
3) Cf Coetzee J in Reef Lefebvre (pty) Ltd v S A RailWBBS and Harbours
1978 (4) SA 961 (w) 966-967; Ni~naber 1980 (2) SA 03 (0).
4) Payne 70-72. Kay 'A Family Court: The California Proposal' (1968)
56 Calif LR 1205, 1236, makes the following allegation: 'The law also
allowed the defendant /le where the plaintiff did not appear before
the court with clean hands7 to demand payment for consenting to the
divorce ••• /H7igher alimony, vacating the family apartment, unequal
division of matrimonial property, transfer of ownership of real or
personal property, and cash payments were all included in typical
arrangements made to acquire the necessary consent to divorce.' An
example of a South African Case in which a divorced mother was induced
to enter into an agreement which was contra bonos mores rather than
sacrifice the custody of her children is Shepstone 1974 (1) SA 411
(D); 1974 (2) SA 462 ,(N).
5. Cf Baxter 'Family Law Reform in Ontario' (1975) 25 Univ Tor LJ 236,
245. In his review of J G Miller Family pro~erty and Financial
Provision (1974) Holmes, writing in the (197 ) la Law Teacher 55-56,
observes that 'divorce has become less about divorce and more about
money. The very fact that books are written and published which are
concerned only with the financial and property aspects of family law
rather than the traditional approach of ceremony, coverture, divorce,
nullity, and finance in one volume evidences the growing importance
placed upon financial and property aspects rather than upon marriage
'and divorce.'
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Despite the abolition of the fault-orientated grounds for
divorce in most American jurisdictions, the parties to a divorce
action are still cast in the role of a winner and a loser by the




'No-fault divorce laws have eliminated some of the harshness of
the divorce process, but not all. No-fault has eliminated blame,
but does not eliminate the need to deal with the emotional crisis
of divorce which may include the ongoing need to strike back and
use the children as weapons. Of particular concern is the fact
that child custody and visitation issues are still "resolved"
through fault proceedings which allow blame and deepseated
animosities to further fragment an already fragmented family.
We will not achieve a no-fault approach to family law until no-
fault attitudes and values penetrate the attorney's office, and
even before that, society itself must accept a no-fault attitude.'
There can be no doubt that legal practitioners, 'schooled in the adversary
mould as they are, are responsible for the perpetuation of the adversary
procedure in family law matters. In the American context, at any rate,
the legal representative of a party to a matrimonial action appears to be
concerned only with the interests of his client and he considers that
he has no business meddling in the lives and affairs of those who are not
his clients, such as any minor children of his client. The moment a
legal representative drops his partisan approach, and attempts to put on
an impartial mantle, he faces the risk of losing a client. The world of
the legal practitioner is a highly competative one. In any event, the
legal practitioner is schooled in the adversary procedure, though he is
prevailed upon by the ethics of his profession to appreciate both sides
of a case. The legal practitioner owes a primary duty to his client
subject to the qualification that he does not knowingly mislead the
court.
2
) But this, in turn, is dependent upon the instructions he receives
from his client and, generally speaking, the busy practitioner has no means,
let alone the time and inclination, to check on his instructions in every
case. The weakness of this state of affairs is highlighted by the fact
1) 'The Language of Family Law is the Language of Criminal Law' (1975)
13 Concil Cts Rev iii, iv.
2) On the duties of an advocate see Singleton 22-39. On the duties of
an attorney see Randell and Bax 85-89. On the position of the legal
representative in divorce proceedings in South Africa see below at
173-177.
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that most divorce cases are undefended. The end result is that the
court, more often than not, is provided with insufficient information
to determine upon the root causes of the marriage breakdown. In this
respect, the Finer Reportl ) expresses itself very clearly as follows:
'In the accusatorial or adversary form of procedure, as it
characterises our civil form of litigation, the parties not
only choose the issues which form the subject matter of the
dispute, but also determine what evidence shall be brought
before the court. The court has no right and no means to
act as its own fact-gatherer. ,2)
It must be pointed out that most of the criticisms of the adversary
procedure mentioned above were voiced at a time when fault-orientated
grounds for divorce were still very much part of the divorce process.3)
It is trite that in recent years there has been an almost international
movement away from fault-orientated grounds of divorce. Despite this
movement, however, it is submitted that the above criticisms of the
adversary procedure are still relevant in the modern context of no-
fault divorce. Thus, to permit divorce on no-fault grounds while, at
the same time, to demand an adherence to the adversary procedure in the
divorce court would appear to be anomalous. These two concepts are
mutually incompatible. It is difficult to imagine how the adversary
procedure can permit a family court to give expression to its diagnostic
and therapeutic functions notwithstanding the abolition of the fault-
orientated grounds for divorce in most jurisdictions.
Alexander4) comments as follows:
1) At § 4. 405 •
In this regard,
2) See also Dyson and Dyson 510 who point out that 'The traditional
divorce procedure has no provision for examining the underlying
psychological problems of the marriage, for seeking a solution short
of divorce, for counseling on problems attendant on divorce, or in
fact for offering any advice at all, beyond what the parties' lawyers
may offer on their own.' See also 287 and 298 below.
3) See, for example, Dyson and Dyson, ibid, who feel that 'The tadversar~7
procedure for dissolving marriages, like a primitive dance, is
essentially a ritual. A lawyer files a petition charging a guilty act.
Highly stylized testimony is given in open court to prove the act.
Where there is a contest, it centres on fEhe7 relative "fault" of the
parties, with the respondent often seeking to show that the petitioner
is equally "guilty".'
4) 'Lets Get the Embattled Spouses out of the Trenches' (1953) 18 Law
and Contemp Problems 98, 102.
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'As an observer in the front-line trenches in the war
between the spouses, ••• I ... express the ever-deepening
conviction that ••• the private fight concept and the adversary
proceeding makes the court inevitably more of a punitive
than a healing agent, and makes almost impossible the court's
attempts at preventive justice.'
The learned writer then continues to add,l) rather significantly, that
'This conclusion is born of experience sitting contemporaneously in the
adversary divorce court and the non-adversary juvenile court.'
(B) Los Angeles Conciliation Court
There is very little scope for the employment of the adversary
procedure in the Los Angeles Conciliation Court. There are a number
of factors which bring about this result and these may be tabulated as
follows:
(i) In 1970 the California Code of Civil Procedure was amended
so that the erstwhile fault-based grounds for divorce were abolished. 2)
The 1977 Conciliation Court Report3) suggests that the abolition of the
fault-based grounds for divorce
'greatly reduces the necessity for the type of aggressive
pre-marital and courtroom techniques conducive to much of the
hostility in contested cases. Legal efforts can now more
productively be expended on matters relating to property
valuation, accounting and tax problems, rather than the fault
of one marriage partner or a third party'.
The inter-party animosity, of course, will never be entirely eliminated
insofar as the divorce action is concerned. The most that can be hoped
for is that this animosity will be reduced. In this regard, the following
4)comment is made in the 1977 Conciliation Court Report ; namely,
'While it would be naive to believe that a statutory enactment
can eliminate all rancour and acrimony in marital disputes, the
1) Ibid.




elimination of fault and the limitation of adversary activity
has materially assisted. The concept that a marriage breaks
down solely because of the fault of only one marriage partner
is too archaic to require criticism. The abolition of "granting"
a divorce to one spouse "against" the other for wrongdoing is an
enlightened improvement.'
(ii) Another significant amendment was effected to the California
Code of Civil Procedure in 1970 in terms of which all community property,
upon the dissolution of a marriage, is to be divided equally between the
spouses, unless the spouses themselves agree otherwise.
l
) This statutory
provision appears to be couched in peremptory terms so that the court
has no discretion in the matter where the spouses are unable to agree
on the division of the community property between themselves. Prior to
1970, the court had a discretion to award more than half of the community
property to the innocent spouse where a divorce had been granted on the
grounds of extreme cruelty or adultery. This led to much heated
litigation the purpose of which was to ensure a spouse's stake in the
community property. It is clear that the necessity of resorting to
the adversary procedure for the determination of inter-spousal property
disputes has been severely limited by this innovation. Instead, the
parties are encouraged to reach an amicable agreement on the question
of the division of matrimonial property.
(iii) Yet another change of far-reaching importance that was
effected to the California Code of Civil Procedure in 1970 was that the
custody of a child involved in a matrimonial dispute is to be awarded
2)to one or more persons who are listed in a definite order of preference.
Previously, the custody of a child was given to the father or the mother
depending on the age of the child. The 1970 amendment was designed to
give effect to the best interests of the minor children involved in
divorce litigation and to play down the possibility of minor children
being used as pawns by their parents in custody disputes.- In reality,
however, the 1970 amendment has failed to curtail the resort to the adversar~
1) 1977 Conciliation Court Report 11. Community property is 'roughly
defined as all property acquired by either spouse during marriage,
except property acquired by gift or inheritance, the income on such
property, or its later transmutations. All property owned prior to
marriage is separate property.' (ibid). .
2) ~ee below at 132-133 where this order of preference is listed.
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d o t 1)procedure in custody lSpU es. The minor children of a broken
marriage are still being used by their parents to strike at each other
regardless of whether this is in the best interests of the children or
not. Such battles over the children are particularly pronounced at
the post-divorce stage.
(iv) The adversary procedure is also curtailed at the counselling
stage by virtue of the fact that counsellors are obliged to maintain a
strict stance of impartiality. Moreover, a counsellor's relationship
with his clients is strictly confidential and communications between
counsellor and client are privileged.
2
) This undoubtedly helps to keep
the counsellors outside the area of the adversary atmosphere. Thus, a
counsellor never submits written or oral reports to the court even in
respect of those cases where clients have been referred to counsellors
for post-divorce custody / access counselling.
is explained by Elkin3) as follows:
The counsellor's role
'The court feels that once a counselor reports to the bench and
makes a recommendation, he becomes an investigator, and that the
roles of counselor and investigator should not be intermixed.
As an investigator he would become part of the adversary process.
This would be inconsistent with his role, which is to diminish the
impact of the adversary procedure rather than increase its
destructive impact.'
At the conclusion of the counselling process, all that the court receives
from the counsellor is a notice as to whether an amicable agreement has
been effected or not. If, however, an amicable agreement has been
entered into, this must be reduced to writing so that a copy thereof can
be referred to the court in much the same way as a consent paper in South
Africa is presented for endorsement as an order of court.
1) Thus, Elkin 'Postdivorce Counseling in a Conciliation Court' (1977)
1 Journ of Divorce 55, 62, reports that 'Unfortunately, the adversary
approach is still used regarding custody / visitation matters, even
in courts following the no-fault approach.' In his recent Position
Paper Elkin also says: 'Although no-fault legislation has diminished
the primitive aspects of family law, there is still an adversary
procedure used in custody / visitation conflicts, ugliest of all
litigation, with no winners - just sheer damage to the physical and
mental health of all concerned including the relationship between the
parents. '
2) 1977 Conciliation Court Report 17 and see Elkin 'Conciliation Courts:
The Reintegration of Disintegrating Families' (1973) 22 Fam Coordinator
63, 67.
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(c) The Hawaii Family Court
One of the pronounced features of the Hawaii Family Court is the
emphasis it places on the welfare and protection of children.
l
) With
regard to a child in conflict with the law the view has been expressed
2
)
that such child needs help and that such help can only be given in a
non-adversary atmosphere. This view is mirrored in section. 1 of the
Hawaii Revised Statutes in terms of which the traditional adversary
procedures are played down. Thus, the informal juvenile court procedure
has been adopted by the family court. Judges seldom wear robes and
proceedings are conducted in small conference-sized rooms without elevated
benches. In the normal course, proceedings are conducted in an informal
conversational manner. 3)
The adversary procedure, of course,. has not been completely
eliminated in Hawaii. The traditional adversary procedure is, for
example, resorted to in cases where the family court has waived its
jurisdiction over delinquent children between the ages of 16 years and 18
4)
years. Furthermore, all findings of fact by a judge of the family
court 'shall be based upon a preponderance of evidence admissible in
the trial of civil cases. ,5) The only exception appears to lie in
S 1 Hawaii Revised Statutes: see below at 133-137.




2) Eg in a comment on s 1 Standard Family Court Act in (1959) 5
NPPA Journ 99, 106.
3) See s 41 Hawaii Revised Statutes which states, inter alia, that with
regard to the procedure in children's cases 'The hearings may be
conducted in an informal manner ••• The general public shall
be excluded and only such persons admitted whose presence is requested
by the parent or guardian or as the judge ••• finds to have a direct
interest in the case or in the work of the court from the standpoint
of the best interests of the child involved.' See also pyson and
pyson, 65, who points out, however, that the danger of this informality
lies in the fact that it may 'tempt the trier of fact to slur over
certain procedural requirements.'
4) See above at 37 on waiver of jurisdiction.
5) S 41 Revised Statutes of Hawaii: cf s 19 Standard Family Court Act
and the comments thereon in (1959) 5 NPPA Journ 99, 137-141.
S 41 is cited in extenso below at 134.
125
the case of children under the age of 18 years who are alleged to
have committed a criminal offence in which case 'proof beyond a reasonable
doubt in accordance with rules of evidence applicable to criminal cases'
is the standard. l ) In addition, 'the maker of any written report, study
or examination shall be subject to both direct and cross-examination
upon demand, and when he is reasonably available. ,2) The retention
of the civil and criminal standards of proof, as well as the availability
of cross-examination, coupled with the right to legal representation,
. seems to suggest that, in reality, it is difficult to subvert completely
the adversary procedure in the family court. The continued adoption
of the adversary procedure is apparently necessary for the attainment of
proper justice and the protection of 'due process' rights. However,
with regard to the right to legal representation, although this is
enshrined in the Hawaii Revised Statutes~) the practice seems to be to
discourage the exercise of this right. 4) In this way, the adversary
atmosphere of the traditional courtroom is inhibited.
By way of contrast,' the adversary procedure is a characteristic
feature of adult criminal proceedings. Unlike a child, an adult, if
found guilty, is deemed to have been criminally convicted and, in
appropriate circumstances, a prosecuting official from the ordinary
criminal courts can be invited to prosecute an adult criminal case in
the family court. 5 )
S 41 Revised Statutes of Hawaii.
adjudication ••• shall be deemed a
shall be found guilty or be deemed
adjudication:' see s 1.
2) Ibid.
But, it must be noted that 'no
conviction' and 'no child
a criminal by reason of such
3) S 41 Revised Statutes of Hawaii, wfiich is cited in extenso below at 134.
4) Dyson and Dyson, 51, report that 'even the manner in which the right
to a private attorney is presented ••• seems to be somewhat weighted
against the likelihood that the right will be exercised. In one
observed hearing, the referee stated to a child's father, "You
have the right to hire." After the child's father declined to
exercise the right, the referee nodded and said, "98 percent of all
children are not represented in this court," as if to imply approval
of the father's decision.'
5) S 42 Revised Statutes of Hawaii.
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Despite the fact that Hawaii has adopted a no-fault divorce law,
it seems that the adversary procedure still has an important role to play,
° dO I) I dO to hespecially ln contested lvorce cases. n a lvorce ac lon, were
the parties are unable to resolve any of the matters at issue between
them, the case will be set down for hearing by a judge. Each Party
must then provide full financial disclosure and if the question of the
custody of, and access to, any children is involved, a 'Social Study'
report must be prepared for the court. Thereafter, a pre-hearing
conference between the attorneys for the parties and the presiding judge
is held in order to define the issues between the Parties and to try and
effect a settlement. Thus far, the adversary procedure plays no part
in the attempted resolution of the problems experienced by the parties
to the divorce action. If, however, no solution is arrived at in con-
sequence of the pre-hearing conference, the contested hearing will subseq-
uently take place. At the contested hearing the parties and their
witnesses will be called upon to give their evidence in the usual way,
and they may be subjected to cross-examination. Thereafter, the court
will arrive at its decision in the normal course. The decision may
be reviewed on a 'motion for reconsideration'. If either party is still
not satisfied with the result, the. decision may be taken on appeal
to the Hawaii Supreme Court. It follows from this brief description
of the contested divorce case in Hawaii that it is entirely up to the
parties concerned to decide whether they wish to resolve their differences
in a more tranquil non-adversary atmosphere or to 'fight it out' in a
more expensive adversary setting.
CD) The Family Court of Australia
As has already been pointed out,2) it is a fundamental principle
of the Family Law Act that formal procedure be kept to a minimum and
that proceedings should not be unduly protracted. In this respect,
1) The account of the divorce procedure in contested divorce cases
that follows is based upon the account given in a pamphlet published
by the Hawaii State JUdiciary in 1976 entitled 'Divorce In Hawaii.'
2) Above at 67, and see s 97 (3) Family Law Act.
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. 1 ) . d th t . t . d· 2 )the Family Law Regulatlons prOVl e a In cer aln procee lngs
the court may, with the consent of the parties, dispeJse with such
procedures and formalities as it thinks fit. This, however, does
As it was put by the learned
not mean that a judge of the family court is permitted to dispense
'palm tree justice,;3) he is still obliged to act in accordance
with legal principle. Thus, the suggestion by Watson J in the court
~ quo in the case of Re Watson: Ex Parte Armstrong4 ) that proceedings
in the family court were not adversary, but were in the nature of
an inquisition followed by an arbitration did not meet with the
approval of the Australian High Court.
judges5) of the High Court
'He ithe judge of the family cour!7 must also follow the
procedure provided by the law. The provisions of s 97 (3)
which require him to proceed without undue formality, do not
authorize him to convert proceedings between the parties into
an inquiry which he conducts as he chooses ••• A judge can
neither deprive a party of the right to present a proper case
nor absolve a party who bears the onus of proof from the
necessity of discharging it. These remarks are not intended
to fetter a judge of the Family Court in the exercise of a
proper discretion or to insist upon the observance of unnecessary
formality; they are designed to make it clear that a judge of
the Family Court exercises judicial power and must discharge his
duty judicially.'
Although provision has been made for formal procedure to be kept
down to a minimum by, for example, introducing a no-robes provision6 )
1) 210 of 1975: Reg 108 (2).
2) Normally, evidence in an application for a decree of dissolution of
marriage that is defended, or an application for a decree of nUllity,
shall be given orally and the traditional procedures and formalities
shall be observed.
3) Re Watson: Ex Parte Armstrong (1976) 50 ALJR 778, 783. See also Nygh l~
4) (1976) 50 ALJR 778. Watson J's views are cited in the High Court
judgment of Jacobs J at 793-794; 'The matter in which I am involved
is more in the nature of an enquiry, an inquisition followed by an
arbitration ••• We do the best we can and look upon this procedure •••
as an inquiry rather than an adversary procedure.'
5) At 783: per furwick CJ, Gibbs, :'tephen and Mason JJ.
6) ~ 97 (4) Family Law Act: see above at 66-67 where this provision
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and providing for proceedings in the family court to be conducted behind
1) .
closed doors, the adversary procedure is still very much part of the
Australian Family Court scene. This is particularly the case where a
divorce action is defended or where there is an application for a decree
of nUllity.2) In these cases, the court has no discretion but to order
that evidence be given orally so that a situation is created where the
adversary procedure can play an important part.
On the other hand, where an application for the dissolution of a
marriage is undefended, and provided no children under the age of 18
years are involved, the parties to the action need not attend court,
unless the court otherwise directs, and the matter may be decided on
affidavit. 3) But where any children under the age of 18 years are
involved the court requires the parties to the marriage to be present
at the hearing to give oral evidence concerning the welfare of the
children. 4) In this case, the adversary procedure will play its usual
role and in this way the best interests of the minor· children are safe-
guarded.
But in all other actions which may be brought in the family court,
and which are not referred to in regulations 106 and 1075), the court
1) S 97 (1) Family Law Act: see above at 66 where this provision is
discussed. The decisions of the Australian High Court in the Russell
and Farrelly cases (1976) 50 ALJR 594, which upheld the constitutional
validity of s 97 (1) only insofar as it applied to the Commonwealth
Family Court, caused widespread reaction on the ground that the public
is denied access to the family court, and to information about its
procedures and decisions. The Family Law Council in its Second
Report (1978) at § 203 has recommended that this section be amended
to allow hearings in the fqmily court to take place in open court
except when the court is exercising jurisdiction in respect of the
custody, or guardianship of, or access to, a child of a marriage.
2) Reg 107 Family Law Regulations.
3) Reg 106 (1) Family Law Regulations. Cf the position in England -
in an undefended divorce action which is not based on the defendant's
behaviour, and if there are no children of the marriage, the petitioner
need not attend court and may simply give evidence on affidavit: see
Bromley 266-267.
4) Reg 106 (3) Family Law Regulations.
5) Namely, undefended applications for the dissolution of marriage in
respect of which no children under the age of 18 years are involved,
and defended actions for divorce or where a decree of nullity has
been applied for. .
129
has a discretion to order that evidence be given orally or by
affidavit. l ) Regulation 108 (2) of the Family Law Regulations then
goes on to say that in such proceedings 'the court may, with the consent
of the parties to the proceedings -
(a) dispense with such procedures and formalities as it thinks
fit; and
(b) inform itself on any matter in such manner as it thinks just
notwithstanding any rules of evidence to the contrary. ,2)
In this way, the formal adversary procedure is curtailed. For example,
proceedings between the parties to a marriage concerning their property
can be more expeditiously disposed of, rather than for the parties to
be obliged to confront each other in open court in an acrimoniously-
charged atmosphere. It must, of course, be emphasized that the court
can only exercise its discretion in this way with the consent of the
parties. It is, after all, up to the parties themselves to bring to
the attention of the court any matters that are at issue between them
rather than for the court to insist in every case upon a microscopic
investigation into every marriage where there is an application for a
divorce.
(E) Conclusion
Notwithstanding the criticisms of the adversary procedure, it would
seem that its total elimination in family law litigation is an ideal
incapable of attainment. Los Angeles Conciliation Court, for example,
which comes the closest of the three courts considered above to
eliminating the adversary procedure, still finds that the adversary
procedure is necessary in custody cases where children are being used
by their parents to strike back at each other. Also, one suspects
that those concerned with the administration of justice in American
family courts are deeply conscious of affording to every litigent
1) Reg 108 (1) Family Law Regulations.
2) Reg 108 (2) Family Law Regulations.
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his 'due process' rights so that, in reality, it becomes very difficult
1)
to play down to any great extent the adversary procedure. .
By way of contrast, there seems to be a more open admission in
Hawaii and Australia that the adversary procedure still has an
indispensibl~ part to play in the administration of justice, particularly
i~ defended divorce actions. However, the experience of the family
courts of Hawaii and Australia shows that it is possible to blend the
adversary and inquisitorial procedures' according to the exigencies of
the situation. Even in the undefended divorce action an enquiry into
the causes of the marital breakdown is unnecessary where the marriage
is clearly dead. But such an enquiry may become necessary where the
interests of any minor children are at stake or where there is any
dispute over the matrimonial property. It is one thing to place less
stress on the adversary procedure2) and another to attempt to eliminate
it altogether. With the former there can be no objection but the
latter remains an unattainable dream.
1) Cf Gault 387 USl (1967) and Kent 383 us 541 (1966).
2) Cf Biggs 'Stability of Marriage - A Family Court?' (1961) 34 ALJ
343 \iho reports as follows with regard to the Toledo Family Court,
Ohio; 'In striving to get the parties to come to an amicable
settlement, either completely or in part, the idea of adversary
proceedings is played down as much as possible.'
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5. Safeguarding the Interests of Children
CA) Introduction
Almost without exception, family courts have as one of their main
objectives the protection of the rights of children. That this should
be so cannot be doubted especially in divorce litigation.
l
) But,
the extent to which, and the manner in which, this protection is afforded
varies from court to court according to the jurisdictional limitations
of each individual court. 2)
CB) Los Angeles Conciliation Court
In order to ensur~ that the rights of children involved in divorce
lit~gation are adequately protected, the attention of the counselling
services is focussed on those matrimonial controversies in which
children are involved. 3 ) It is reasoned that if the parents can be
prevailed upon to adjust their differences in an amicable, mature and
responsible way then the problems of any minor children involved will be
4)
similarly resolved. As it is put in the 1977 Conciliation Co¥rt Report:
'We feel we help the children when we help the parents, but if
the children need a more direct kind of counseling help just for
themselves, this in itself'will cause the conciliation court
counselor to make a referral to a qualified community counseling
resource. In other words, we try our best not only to hear the
anguish of the parents who sit before us, but we also listen to
1) Cf Elkin in the Preface of the 1974 Conciliation Court Report; viz,
'Children of divorce are children in crisis. In their state of
helplessness and powerlessness, they suffer silently, consumed by a
kind of anxiety that only a child can feel, as his family, his most
important source of nurturing ani security, collapses.' See also,
inter alia, Goldstein, Freud and Solnit 105-111; Stone 13-20, 71-73,
76-79, 97-101, 198-208, 230-231, 243-245; Eeke1aar 40-43; 61-119,
217-235; G1endon 272-275.
2) Eg the Los Angeles Conciliation Court has no jurisdiction over
juvenile delinquency cases, wh~reas the Hawaii Family Court does.
Also, the A~stralian Family Court has no jurisdiction over illegitimate
children, paternity disputes and adoptions whereas the Hawaii Family
Court does, while the Los Angeles Conciliation Court has no
jurisdiction over adoptions.
3) See 23 above.
4) At 4.
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the silent cries of children, for the cries of children
are often echoes of parental pain.'
Accordingly, the idea of independent legal representation for children
of divorce does not appear to be strongly countenanced in Los Angeles.
There are somel ) who argue that an independent legal representative for
children involved in a matrimonial dispute in the context of the Los
Angeles Conciliation Court is superfluous because of the substitution
of the fault-orientated divorce procedure by the marriage breakdown
theory. This (so the argument continues), taken in conjunction with the
counselling process, makes it unnecessary to consider too seriously
the possibility of children being used by their embittered parents
as instruments with which to hit back at each other. On the other hand,
there are others2) who consider the separate legal representation of
children of divorce as being absolutely essential no matter whether
the proceedings are conducted in an adversary or inquisitorial-atmosphere.
Since the jurisdiction of the Conciliation Court is limited in its
scope,3) it does seem that to insist upon the separate legal representation
of children in the Conciliation Court context is superfluous. Furthermore,
since the abolition of the fault-orientated grounds for divorce in
California in 1970
4) the sole criterion for the award of the custody of
children is now the 'best interests of the child' and in this regard
a definite order of precedence has been laid down; namely, the custody
of a child will be awarded -
(i) to either parent according to the best interests of the child; or
(ii) to the person or persons in whose home the child has been living
in a wholesome and stable environment; or
(iii) to any other person or persons deemed by the court to be suitable
1) Eg Kay 'A Family Court: The California Proposal' (1968) 56 Calif LR
1205, 1236-1237.
2) Eg Payne 488-489 and Bradway 'Divorce Litigation and the Welfare of
the Family' (1956) 9 Vanderbilt LR 665, 675-676.
3) See above at 79-80. The Conciliation Court has no jurisdiction over
adoptions, juvenile delinquency cases: neither does it have'the power
to grant an order of divorce or a decree of judicial separation.
4) See above at 16-17.
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and able to provide adequate and proper care and guidance
to the child. l )
This, coupled with the strongly motivated counselling services makes
it unlikely that the Conciliation Court would grant any order
detrimental to the best interests of a child. 2)
of affairs is open to grave doubt. Be that as it may, it does seem
that great stress is placed on the best interests of children by the
Hawaii Family Court. This is more noticeable than in the case of the
Los Angeles Conciliation Court because the Hawaii Family Court has
assumed a more comprehensive jurisdiction over children4) which includes,
inter alia, jurisdiction not only in respect of children involved in
divorce litigation, but also over children who are neglected, subjected
to physical or emotional deprivation, or who are beyond the control of
their parents, or who are truants, or who are juvenile delinquents.5)
In the exercise of its jurisdiction over children, the family
court is enjoined by the provisions of section 41 of the Hawaii Revised
statutes to resort to a relaxed and informal procedure. 6) Thus, section
41 states that:
1) 1977 Conciliation Court Report 10, and see s 46 Hawaii Revised statutes
which is cited below at 136-137.
2) For an excellent overview of custody disputes in the American context
see Mnookin 'Child-Custody Adjudication: JUdicial Functions in the
Face of Indeterminacy' (1975) 39 Law and Co~temp Problems 226: see
also aster 'Custody Proceeding' (1965) 3 J Fam Law 21.
3) See above at 125.
4) See above at 36-38.
5) It should be noted that s 1 Hawaii Revised Statutes states, inter alia,
that 'no adjudication by the court of the status of any child ••• ----
.shall be deemed a conviction; no child shall be found guilty or be
deemed a criminal by reason of such adjudication'.
6) T~e re~evant portion of s 41 (as well as other sections) are being
clted In extenso because of the general unavailability of the Hawaii
Statutes in Soutq Afrl~a.
'Cases of children in proceedings under section 11(1) and (2)1)
shall be heard by the court separate from hearings of adult
cases The hearings may be conducted in an informal manner
and may be .adjourned from time to time. The general public
shall be excluded and only such persons admitted whose presence
is requested by the parent or guardian or as the judge or
district family judge finds to have a direct interest in the case
or in the work of the court from the standpoint of the best
interests of the child involved. Prior to the start of a hearing,
the parents, guardian, legal custodian and, when appropriate,
the minor shall be notified of the right to be represented by
counsel •••
In the disposition part of the hearing any relevant and material
information, including that contained in a written report, study
or examination, shall be admissible, and may be relied upon to the
extent of its probative value: provided that the maker of the
written report, study or examination shall be subject to both
direct and cross-examination upon demand and when he is reasonably
available. The disposition shall be based only upon the admitted
evidence, and findings adverse to the child as to disputed issues
of fact shall be based upon a preponderance of such evidence.
Upon the final adverse disposition, if the parent or guardian is
without counsel the court shall inform the parent or guardian of
his right to appeal
The judge or the senior judge if there is more than one may by
order confer concurrent jurisdiction on. a district court .~. to
hear and dispose of cases of violation of traffic laws or
ordinances by children ••• The exercise of jurisdiction over
children shall, nevertheless, be considered non-criminal in
procedure and result in the same manner as ,though the matter had
been adjudicated and disposed of by a family court.'
Although the procedure prescribed for children appears to be informal
and relaxed, the basic legal rights (or 'due process' rights) are still
1) Ss 11(1) and (2) are cited in full above at 36-37.
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safeguarded so that the prospect of the Gault-type of situation
occurring in Hawaii seems remote. No effort seems to have been spared
to give effect to the best interests of children in Hawaii. In this
regard, the provisions of section 44 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes
are most instructive; namely,
'The court may order that a child or minor [Wno is facing a
criminal charg~7 be examined by a physician, surgeon,
psychiatrist, or psychologist, and it may order treatment by
them ••• For either the examination or treatment, the court
may place the child or minor in a hospital or other suitable
facility. The court, after hearing, may order examination by
a physician, surgeon, psychiatrist or psychologist, of a
parent or guardian whose ability to care for a child before the
court is at issue.
No child under the age of twelve shall be adjudged to come
within section 11(1) without the written recommendation of a
psychiatrist or other physician duly qualified and experienced
in the practice of child psychiatry. ,1)
It would seem that next to the development of the probation services no
development in the juvenile court system has been more fruitful than the
increasing use of psychological and psychiatric study and treat~ent.
Physical and mental examinations often reveal unsuspected conditions
which help to explain the misbehaviour at issue. The discretion to
order physical and mental examinations is clearly in keepin~ with the
Hawaii Family Court's functions of understanding and helping rather
than simply convicting and punishing.
The decision whether to order the above examination and/or treatment
is, in the normal course, in the discretion of the court. But, the
court has no discretion but to call for a 'social study report' in all
cases wnere a minor appears in court pursuant to the provisions of sections
11(1) and 11(2).2) Such 'social study reports', though normally essential
in custody and maintenance disputes, are in the discretion of the court.
1) This procedure is substantially the same as that provided for by s 22
,(~tandard Family Court Act.
2) S 45 Hawaii Revised Statutes.
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Thus, the rest of section 45 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes states
that -
'Except where the requirement is waived by the judge, social
studies shall also be made in proceedings to decide disputed
or undetermined legal custody and in custody disputes arising
out of a divorce action. In all other awards of custody
arising out of a divorce action, including those where an
agreement with respect to custody has been made by the parties,
and in any other case or class of cases, the judge may order a
social study when he has reason to believe such action is
necessary to assure adequate protection of the minor or of
any other person involved in the case. By special order of
the judge ••• a social study may be required in support cases
covering financial ability and other matters pertinent to
making an order of support
The judge may order and use presentence investigation with
respect to any criminal action under the jurisdiction of the
court ••• '
In matrimonial actions, the interests of minor children are also
of paramount importance. In this regard, the provisions of section 46
of the Hawaii Revised Statutes are worthy of extensive citation; namely,
'In actions for divorce, separation, annulment, separate
maintenance, or any other proceeding where there is at issue
a dispute as to the custody of a minor child, the court may,
during the pendency of the action, at the final hearing at any
other time during the minority of the child, make such order for
the custody of the child as may seem necessary or proper. In
awarding the custody, the court is to be guided by the following
standards, considerations and procedures:
(1) Custody should be awarded to either parent according to the
best interests of the child.
(2) Custody may be awarded to persons other than the father or
mother whenever such award serves the best interest of the
child. Any person who has had de facto custody of the child
in a stable and'wnolesome home and is a fit and proper person
shall prima facie be entitled to an award of custody.
(3) If the child is of sufficient age and capacity to reason, so
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custody shall be considered and given due weight by the court.
(4) Whenever good cause appears therefor, the court may require
an investigation and report concerning the care, welfare and
custody of any minor child of the parties •••
(5) The court may hear the testimony of any person or expert
produced by any party or upon the court's own motion, whose
skill, insight, knowledge or experience is such that his
testimony is relevant to a just and reasonable determination
of what is the best physical, mental, moral and spiritual
well-being of the child whose custody is at issue.
(6) Any custody award shall be subject to modification or change
whenever the best interests of the child require or justify
the modification or change and wherever practicable, the same
person who made the original order shall hear the motion or
petition for modification of the prior award.
(7) Reasonable visitation rights shall be awarded to parents and
to any person interested in the welfare of the child in the
discretion of the court, unless it is shown that such rights
of visitation are detrimental to the best interests of the
child.
/
(8) The court may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the
interests of the child and may assess the reasonable fees and
expenses of the guardian ad litem as costs of the action, payment
in whole or in part by either or both parties as the
circumstances may justify.'
The interesting feature of the above provision is that it goes much further
than any other possibly comparative provision of the Standard Family Court
Act. Clearly, the best interests of minor children involved in custody
disputes wPighed heavily with the Hawaiian Legislature and in giving effect
to these best interests it wOuld appear to have succeeded admirably.
CD) The Family Court of Australia
The jurisdictional limitations with regard to children have already
been dealt with above.
l
) Part VII of the Family Law Act deals
1) See above at 63-66: h9-70. For examplp, like Los Angeles, but
unlike Hawaii, the Australian Family Court h~s no jurisdiction over
children involved in criminRl cases.
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. f . 1) Fwith the welfare and custody of the chlldren 0 a marrlage. or
the purpose of Part VII a child is any person below the age" of 18
2)years. Where the welfare and custody of a child are at stake,
proceedings in respect thereof may be instituted independently of any
principal matrimonial relief, such as the dissolution of, annulment of,
or declaration of the validity of, a marriage. This means that
proceedings relating to the welfare and custody of a child can be
brought in any court, other than the Family Court, which has
jurisdiction under the Family Law Act. Such proceedings can be
initiated either before or after the dissolution of a marriage. But,
in any event, whether the proceedings are ancillary to such principal
relief or not, section 62 (1) of the Family Law Act states, inter alia,
that -
'the court may, at any stage of the proceedings, of its own
motion or upon the request of a party to the proceedings,. make
an order directing the Parties to the proceedings to attend a
conference with a welfare officer3) to discuss the welfare of
the child and, if there are any differences between the parties
as to matters ,affecting the welfare of the child, to endeavour
to resolve those differences.'
If any party should fail to attend such conference it is the duty of the
1) Part VII of the Act, which comprises ss 60-70 inclusive, is
comprehensively discussed by Nygh 75-91 and Joske 66-78 (and 1977
~upplement). It will be recalled (see above at 69-72) that as a
result of the decisions in the Russell and Farrelly cases (1976)
50 ALJR 594 (and see also Cako /i9777 VR 245), the phrase 'child of
a marriage' is now restricted to meaning a child born to, or adopted
by, the parties to a marriage. It follows that illegitimate children
and stepchildren do not fall within the jurisdiction of the family
court: see also Finlay 'A~stralian Family Law: The Twilight Zone'
(1976) 8 Fed LR 77, 79-81.
2) Cf s 61 (2) Family Law Act, which states that 'An order with respect
to the custody or guardianship of or access to, a child -
(a) shall not be made in respect of a child who has attained
the age of 18 years or is or has been married; and
(b) ceases to be in force when the child attains the age of 18
years or marries.'
3) It may be mentioned that the description 'Welfare Officer' is not
approved of by the Family Law Council: it prefers the description
'Oourt Co~nsellor'. In this context the description 'Court
Counsellor' is undoubtedly more appropriate than 'Welfare Officer.'
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welfare officer to report such failure to the court.
l
) A report of the
welfare officer may be received in evidence,2) though anything said at,
or any admission made at, the conference is not admissible as evidence
in any court unless the parties so consent. 3)
There is little empirical data available on the efficacy of the
procedure just described. Initially, there was much hostility and
distrust towards such procedure. McKenzie, however, reports
4
) that
the erstwhile hostility and distrust have been converted into
enthusiasm. The result is that there has been an increasing demand
for the services of the welfare officers, which has caused a manpower
problem. This problem, however, is not seen as a major obstacle and,
in fact, there now appears to be a hard core of seasoned welfare
officials who have acquired, through their experience, the necessary
expertise in respect of matters affecting the wishes of children involved
in custody and access disputes. Much of the work of the welfare
officers is devoted to the counselling of couples who no longer wish to
live together but who, nevertheless, are genuinely concerned about the
welfare to their children notwithstanding the fact that they themselves
cannot agree in respect of them.
Despite the recent enthusiasm for the above procedure, it is,
nevertheless, apparent that some practical problems are being experienced
with the application of Section 62 (1) of the Family Law Act. In the
first place, there appears to be some controversy over the weight to be
attached to the reports of welfare officers. This controversy is
analysed by Bates5) who inclines to the view that 'It would seem strange
1 ) S 62 (3) Family Law Act.
2) 2- 62 (4) Family Law Act.
3) S 62 (5) Family law Act.
4) In a paper presented at a Congress of Psychiatrists in Melbourne
in A~gust 1978 entitled 'Children in the Family Court.'
5) 'New Trends and Expert Evidence in Child Custody Cases: Some New
Developments and Further Thoughts from Australia' (1979) 12 CILSA
68, 78-81.
if the 1975 legislation, aimed as it is at informalising court procedures,
were to require stricter standards in this area than were previously
required. ' Obviously, one of the ways of testing the views and opinions
of welfare officers is to submit them to cross-examination. But, even
then, there is some doubt as to whether this is permissible under the
provisions of the Family Law Act.
In the second place, there are practical difficulties in the
application of section 62 (1) of the Family Law Act when the court requires
both a conference to be held and a report to be submitted. If a report
only is called for, the welfare officer concerned usually arranges a
conference between himself and the parties to enable him to compile the
necessary report. If such a conference is held it is not deemed to be
confidential so that any disclosures or statements made at such conference
may be disclosed in a subsequent report to the court. On the other hand,
if a conference has been ordered in terms of section 62 (1) of the Family
Law Act then all statements and disclosures made at this conference
to the presiding welfare officer are confidential, and are inadmissible
in evidence unless the parties agree under section 62 (5) to such statements
or disclosures being given in evidence in the report. Welfare officers
are, therefore, under the duty to ensure that they are quite clear as to
the circumstances under which the conference is being held. The parties
themselves may not fully appreciate the distinction between these two
different types of conferences unless it is explained to them. This
particular problem is presently under investigation by the Family Law
Council,l) wbich has pointed out, however, that the parties to a conference
do not themselves necessarily regard confidentiality as important.
Nevertheless, the possibility does arise that if matters important to
the welfare of a child are disclosed at the second type of conference2 )
the welfare officer may well find himself being precluded from reporting
these matters to the court.
Before granting an order for the dissolution of a marriage the
court must first satisfy itself that there are no children of the marriage
1) 1978 Family Law Council Report §s 41-44.
2) le where a conference has been ordered by the court in terms of
s h2 (1) }4'amil;t, L'lw Ac t.
under the age of 18 years.
itself that -
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If there are, the court must then satisfy
'(i) proper arrangements ••• have been made for the welfare of
those children; or
(ii) there are circumstances by reason of which the decree nisi
should become absolute notwithstanding that the court is
1)
not satisfied that such arrangements have been made.'
If the court should be in any doubt as to the arrangements made for
the welfare of the children of a marriage, the court may adjourn the
proceedings until a report has been obtained from a welfare officer.
2
)
An attempt is made to give effect to the paramount interests of
the children of marriages that have broken down not only at the pre-
divorce state but also at the post-divorce stage. In this regard, the
provisions of Section 64 (1) of the Family Law Act are pertinent; namely,
'In proceedings with respect to the custody, or guardianship
of or access to, a child of a marriage -
(a) the court shall regard the welfare of the child as
the paramount consideration;3)
(b) where the child has attained the age of 14 years, the
court shall not make an order contrary to the wishes of
the child unless the court is satisfied that, by reason of
special circumstances, it is necessary to do so; or
(c) subject to paragraphs (a) and (b), the court may make
such order in respect of those matters as it thinks proper,
including an order until further order.'
1) S 63 (1) Family Law Act.
2) S 63 (2) Family Law Act.
3) The wording of s 64 (1) Family Law Act is s~bstantially the same as
s 85 (1) of the Commonwealth Matrimonial Causes Act of 1959 which,
in turn, is discussed in some depth by Finlay 'First or Paramount?
f.L1Je I,1terests of the Child in Matrimonial Proceedings' (1968) 42
ALJ 96.
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It is, of Gourse, one thing to talk about the noble sentiment of
r~~g3.rding t~1e wel fare of a child of a br:lk8n ma.rr~age as the paramount
consideration, but it is quite another matter to give effect to this
consideration. There are, however, various ways of giving effect to
this consideration and one of them is by making greater use of the reports
of welfare officers as outlined above. Another welcome tendency in this
direction is the giving of some recognition to expert psychiatric
evidence. l ) However, with the comparatively recent emergence of
psychiatry as an important science, it is becoming increasingly obvious
that the courts alone are ill-eq~ipped to give adequate expression to
the best interests of children involved in matrimonial litigation.
This point is emphasized by Goldstein, Freud and Solnit
2
) as follows:
'Too frequently there is attributed to law and its agents a
magical power - a power to do what is far beyond its means.
~lile the law may claim to establish relationships, it can in
fact do little more than give their recognition and provide them
an opportunity to develop ••• It ithe la~7 neither has the
sensitivity nor the resources to maintain or supervise the ongoing
day-to-day happenings between parent and child - and these are
essential to meeting ever-changing demands and needs. Nor does
it have the capacity to predict future events and needs, which
would justify or make workable over the long run any specific
conditions it might impose concerning, for example, education,
visitation, health care or religious upbringing ••• In the long
run the child's chances will be better if the law is less pretentious
and ambitious in its aim; that is, if it confines itself to the
avoidance of harm and acts in accord with a few, even if modest,
generally applicable short-term predictions.'
With regard to the separate legal representation of the children
1) See Barnett iI97~7 2 NSWLR 403, 409-410, and Bates 'Custody of
Children: Towards a New Approach' (1975) 49 ALJ 129. It is however-- , ,
by no means the invariable rule that favourable consideration will be
given to expert psychiatric evidence in Australian child custody cases.
Cf Bates 'Expert Evidence in Cases involving Children' (1975-76) 12
Univ WALR 139 - 'wwyers must ••• face the fact that the psychiatrist,
clinical psychologist and social worker possess qualities and expertise
which they do not, and in cases concerning the welfQre of children
there can be no place for the lawyers' traditional insularity.' (at 152):
Bates 'New Trends and Expert Evidence in Child Custody Cases: Some New
. Developments and Further Thoughts from Australia' (1979) 12 CILSA 65.
2) At 49-;2.
of parties involved in matrimonial litigation section 65 of the Family
Law Act states that -
'Wnere, in proceedings with respect to the custody,
guardianship or maintenance of, or access to, a child of
a marriage, it appears to the court that the child ought
to be separately represented the court may, of its own
motion, or on the application, of the child or of an
organization concerned with the welfare of children or of
any other person, order that the child be separately
represented, and the court may make such other orders as it
thinks necessary for the purpose of securing such separate
representation.'
Where the court has ordered such separate legal representation it may
request that the representation be arranged by the ~stralian Legal Aid
Office. l ) Although the decision to allow a child to be separately
represented appears to be in the discretion of the court, it does
seem that the court will be sparing in the exercise of its discretion
in favour of such representation.
(E) Conclusion
One of the most effective ways of ensuring the protection of the
best interests of children is to afford them separate legal representation,
not only where their parents are involved in matrimonial litigation and
where custody, access and maintenance is at issue, but also in neglect
and juvenile delinq~ency cases. 2 ) As the experiences of the Hawaii
and Australian Family Courts reveal there is an increasing recognition
of the fact that a child is as much a party to matrimonial proceedings as
are his parents. There would seem to be some confusion, however,
as to the exact role of the legal representatives of children; that
is, are they simply to play a passive role in assisting the court to
arrive at a proper decision regarding the best interests
1) Reg 112 (2) Family Law Regulations.
2) le where juvenile delinquency cases fall within the jurisdiction of
a family court as in Hawaii. On the question of the right to legal
representation see generally Dyson and Dyson 48-64 (esp 52-53) and
Payne 336-338 and 470-506.
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of children on the available evidence,l) or are they to play a more
active role (including the conducting of appropriate investigations)
in presenting to the court facts and evidence which will be in the
best interests of the children they represent?2) In this regard, it
would seem that the Hawaii Family Court inclines to the view that a
child's legal representative only has a passive role to play and this
may well account for its authorities expressing approval of decisions
not to engage legal representatives. There is no evidence of similar
approval from the Australian Family Court judges. It is submitted
that there is much merit in the separate legal representation for the
children of divorce. 3 ) One may, with justification, even go further
by recommending such separate legal representation in all cases in which
children are involved.
Certainly, the experiences of all three courts discussed above
show that there is a growing awareness of the need to give greater effect
to the best interests of children, be it their best financial, or moral,
or spiritual interests. The courts can no longer continue to pay lip-
service to the best interests of children. Nor can the courts, in their
apparent endeavour to give expression to the best interests of children,
simply rely on whatever -evidence the warring parents choose to place
before them. Children are not chattels. There is, fortunately, a
recent awareness of this truism as is evidenced, for example, by the
procedures governing all three courts above which make it necessary to
give, so far as possible, effect to the wishes and desires of children
of a mature age regarding any preference as to which parent should have
4)
custody. In their own respective ways the Los Angeles Conciliation
Court and the Family Courts of Hawaii and Australia have made honest
endeavours to give expression to the best interests of the children
with which they are concerned. The limitations of the Australian Family
Court in this regard are not due to any lack of endeavour but, rathe-r,
to the peculiar constitutional problems that prevail there.
1) le a type of watching brief.
2) See, for example, Bates 'The Lawyer's Social Role: A Lesson from
Family Law' 1978 Natal Univ LR 125, 138-139.
3) Cf Fayne 474-475.
4) See generally Mnookin 'Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions
in the face of Indeterminacy' (1975) 39 Law and Contemp Problems 226:
aster 'Custody Proceeding' (1965) 3 J Fam Law 21.
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Finally, the greater attention that is now being focussed on the
best interests of children has led to a greater degree of co-operation
between the lawyer and the behavioural or social scientist than was
hitherto thought possible. There is evidence of such co-operation
in all three courts above.
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CHAPrE R FIVE
SOUTH AFRICAN MATRIMONIAL LAW REFORM
1. Introduction
In the climate of divorce and matrimonial property law reform
virtually the world over,l) it is not surprising to note that there
has also been some development in recent years in South Africa in
these fields. Thus, for example, section 3 of the Matrimonial Affairs
Act of 1953 was amended2 ) and the Divorce Act of 19793 ) as well as the
Dissolution of Marriages on Presumption of Death Act of 19794 ) were
1) Apart from the legislative developments in Los Angeles, Hawaii and
Australia which have been noted above in Chapters 3 and 4, there have
also been recent developments in the divorce and matrimonial proper-ty
laws in England /Cf Matrimonial Cuases Act, 1973 (Chapter 18)7,
Canada, United States of America, France, Federal Republic of Germany,
the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries. Such is the pace
of legislative change that it is becoming increasingly difficult to
keep abreast of recent developments: see Hahlo in Studies On
Divorce 13-14; Glendon who canvasses recent changes in the United
States, England, the Federal Republic of Germany and France.
Apart from dealing with recent developments in South Africa,
Barnard in his thesis (1979) covers divorce law reform in England
and the Netherlands. The following are some of the many recent
law journal discussions on legislative changes effected in different
parts of the world: Glendon 'The French Divorce Reform Law of 1976'
(1976) 24 Am Journ Comp Law 199; Floyd 'The New French Divorce
Law' (1976) 126 ALJ 692; Meston 'Divorce Reform in Scotland'
(1977) 51 Tulane ~259; Rheinstein and Glendon 'West German
Marriage and Family Law Reform' (1978) 45 Univ Chicago LR 519;
Mul1er-Freienfels 'The Marriage Law Reform of 1976 in the Federal
Republic of Germany' (1979) 28 ICLQ 184. Also see generally Chloros.
2) By Act 13 of 1976. For comments on the amendments see van Aswegen
'Wet 13 van 1976 onder die Vergrootglas' (1977) 18 Cod 25;
Sinclair 'Household Necessaries: A Necessary Amendment' (1977)
94 SALJ 449; Nathan 'Household Necessaries: The Proof of the
Pudding and a New Recipe' (1979) 96 SALJ 247.
3) Act 70 of 1979.
4) Act 23 of 1979. For comment on this Act see Nathan 'New Grounds for
Dissolution of Marriage' (1979) 8 BML 224; Nathan 'Presumption of
Death and Dissolution of Marriage'-rl979) 96 SALJ 439; Stoop 'Enkele
Aspekte van die Wet op Ontbinding van Huwelike by Vermoede van Dood,
Wet 23 Van 1979' (1979) 20 Cod 12; Venter 'Vermoede van Deod en
Beeindiging van die Huwelik.-r1979) 2 DJ 290; Pauw 'Die Vermoede van
Dood - Nuwe en Du Reg' (1980) 43 THR-HR71.
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promulgated. Further changes are also anticipated in the field of
matrimonial property law. l )
Of the legislative changes that have already been effected, the most
far-reaching are to be found in the Divorce Act of 1979 in terms of
which the erstwhile fault-principle of the South African divorce law
has apparently been abandoned,2) as well as the decree of judicial
separation and the order for the restitution of conjugal rights. 3 ) A
considered treatment of other changes brou~ht about by the Divorce Act
would be beyond the scope of this thesis. 4 What is more important from
the point of view of this thesis lies not so ~ch in what the Divorce Act
has achieved but, rather, in what it failed to achieve. In this regard,
it is appropriate to consider some aspects of the Divorce Report (1978)
of the South African Law Commission.5 )
1) Towards the end of 1979 the South African Law Commission published
a draft Bill on Matrimonial Property, together with an explanatory
memorandum. This is the second draft Bill to have been prepared
by the Law Commission: 5887 dated 24 February 1978. On suggestions
for the reform of the South African universal community system see,
inter alia, Van Wyk Thesis (1976) 304-307.
2) Ss 3-5 Divorce Act.
3) S 15 Divorce Act. As to judicial separation generally see
Schafer 'Judicial Separation' (1976) 93 SALJ 289.
4) These changes include the prohibition against the publication of
particulars of a divorce action IS 127; the granting to the court
of a discretion where an order for the forfeiture of the benefits
of a marriage is sought IS 97; the granting to the court of a
discretion to apportion the-costs of a divorce action IS 107; the
placing of less emphasis on the fault element when the-quantum of
maintenance to be paid is in issue IS 7 (2)7., For discussions on
the Divorce Act (and the preceding Divorce-Bill) see, inter alia,
Barnard 'Enkele Opmerkings oor die Voorgestelde Nuwe Suid-Afrikaanse
Egskeidingsreg' (1978) 41 THR-HR 263; Sinclair 'The New Divorce
Bill' (1978) 7 BML 219; Barnard 'Nog 'n Stap Nader aan 'n Nuwe
Egskeidingsreg' 1979 DR 11; van Wyk 'Die Wet op Egskeiding 70 van
1979' 1979 DR 633; Barnard Thesis (1979); Hahlo and Sinclair;
Barnard (Divorce).
5) Report 57 of 1978.
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2. The Law Commission's Attitude to Family Courts
It must be stressed at the outset that the Law Commission's inquiry
only related to the law of divorce and it did not examine the concept of
the unified family court system as a whole.
l
) Rather, it confined
itself to matters such as the potential reconciliation between the
parties to a divorce, and the regulation of the consequences of divorce
in a way satisfactory to the parties having regard to the interests of
o hOld 2)mlnor c l ren•.
It was also pointed out3) that in 1974 two state officials, one
from the Department of Justice and one from the Department of Social
Welfare and Pensions, toured Canada and the United States to study
their family court systems. Their conclusion was that the family
courts visited performed the same functions as our Childrens' Courts,
Maintenance Courts, the Juvenile Courts.
The Law Commission pointed out that although there was tremendous
enthusiasm for the institution of family courts, there appeared to be
little idea as to 'what the character and modus operandi of such courts
should be •. ,4) It found,5) however, that the ideal family court would
appear to have at least the following characteristics:-
(a) it should have a comprehensive and unified jurisdiction over
all matters affecting the family unit;
(b) its approach should be therapeutic;
(c) its procedure should be informal;
Cd) it should be within the reach of, and readily accessible to,
all those with problems falling within its jurisdiction.
1) For example, the Law.,Commission did not consider (except, perhaps, in
parenthesis) matters such as the adoption of children, consent to
marry, children in need of care, juveni:e delinquency and other matters
that could fall within the jurisdiction of a family court.
2) Divorce Report (1978) § 13.3.
3) Ibid.
4) Divorce Report (1978) § 13.1. Cf Finer Report § 4.280: 'The dearth
of material helps to explain why the numerous submissions made to our
Committee in favour of the introduction of a family court system offer
more by way of enthusiasm than elucidation.'
5) Divorce Report (1978) § 13.1. Cf Finer Report § 4.283.
The Law Commission conceded that it had obtained very little
guidance from a study of the family courts in different parts of the
world because, as it pointed out,l) they varied from each other
considerably on. the question of jurisdiction. Thus, for example, only a
few states in America which have family courts also include divorce
within their jurisdiction, No guidance was sought, or obtained, from
the Australian Family Court system because it was felt, at that stage,
that it could not be determined how successful they were.
In canvassing the viability of the family court system, the Law.
Commission only referred to the works of McLaughlin,2) Cretney and
Gordon. 3 ) The Finer Report received no more than a fleeting mention,
whereas the views of Phillips,4) who suggests that the many claims of
success attributed to family courts have not been substantiated, would
appear to have influenced the Law Commission considerably.
Dealing specifically with the reconciliation function of family
courts the Law Commission was of the view that reconciliation could
not be foisted upon anyone., Furthermore, the manpower to investigate
and promote the possibility of reconciliation between the parties in a
domestic dispute would not be available. In any event, the Law
Commission was of the view that 'a judge should be able to tell at a
glance,5) which cases are likely to be amenable to counselling. Hence,
the Law Commission preferred to allow the court a discretion to decide
1) Divorce Report (1978) § 13.2.
2) 'Court - Connected Marriage Counseling ~nd Divorce - The New York
Experience' (1971) 11 J Fam Law 517.
3) 'The Family Court: When Properly Defined, it is both Desirable
and Attainable' (1975) 14 J Fam Law 1.
4) 'A Family Court System for Scotland' (1976) 21 Journ Law Soc
Scotland 12 and 52.
5) Divorce Report (1978) § 13.3.
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which cases should be postponed with a view to affording the parties
an opportunity to effect a reconciliation.
/
As to the therapeutic function of a family court the Law Commission
felt that the main objection lay in the possibility of a family court
'being converted into a social service bureau which deviates from the
application of substantive law.,l)
Finally, the Law Commisqion felt that 'the fragmentation of juris-
diction regarding family law matters was not a serious problem in
South Africa. ,2) It was felt3) that the services rendered by the
Childrens' Courts, Maintenance Courts and Juvenile Courts were 'apparently
being rendered satisfactorily at present.' Also, from a practical
point of view it would be impossible to establish a family court with
Supreme Court status in every rural town in South Africa.
1) Divorce Report (1978) § 13.3.
2) Divorce Report (1978) § 13.5.
3) Ibid. It may be mentioned that Barnard Thesis (1979) 437 generally
supports the Law Commission's attitude to family courts: see also
Barnard (Divorce) 86-88.
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3. Criticisms of the Law Commission's Approach to the Concept of
Family Courts
Although the Law Commission did not regard an examination of the
family court system as its main area of concern, it is submitted,
nevertheless, that it adopted a negative approach to the concept of
family courts. This can be attributed to the following factors:
In the first place, the Law ·Commission was entirely representative
of the legal profession, both practising and academic. l ) The problems
of divorce are not only legal in nature, but are also social,
psychological, spiritual and economic in nature. It is regrettable
that representatives of other disciplines concerned with the problems
of divorce were not also invited to serve on the Commission on an
ad hoc basis. By way of contrast, for example, the Group appointed
by the Archbishop of canterbury in January 1964 to review the English
law of divorce consisted of a bishop and 2 canons, 2 judges (one being
a Lord of Appeal and the other a judge of the High Court), a barrister,
a female solicitor, a consultant psychiatrist, a director of advanced
legal studies, a professor of sociology, a female writer on Christian
ethics, a member of parliament, and the president of a society
described as the National Council for the Unmarried Mother and her
Child. This Group produced its report2) in 1966 and such is the
standing and significance of this report that it cannot be ignored
or overlooked by any committee, group or commission anywhere in.the
Western World which has been charged with an examination of the law
of divorce. Taken in the context of its time in 1966, Putting Asunder
recommended changes in the English divorce .laws which can only be
described as radical and far-reaching but which, today, are virtually
accepted in most legal systems as being absolutely essential.
One is prompted to ask whether these changes would have been recommended
had the membership of the Archbishop's Group been confined exclusively
1) The members of the Law Commission were made up of 2 judges, an
advocate, an attorney, the head of the Department of Justice Training
Section, and 2 professors of law, one of whom was a female ;Professor
Catherine Smith7 who was invited to serve on the Commission-on an
ad hoc basis for the purposes of the divorce law project. Professor
Smith's main interests appear to lie in the field of commercial law
and she is the author of The Law of Insolvency (1973): she did,
however, write a short article entitled 'Equal Rights for Women





to the leg pro eSS1on.
The legal profession is, by tradition, conservative notwithstanding
the fact that 'the dynamic nature of society inevitably produces changes
which require laws to change.,2) In reality, such changes are very
slow in forthcoming notwithstanding the clamour for change.' This is
particularly true of South African family 1aWJ. 3) The Law Commission
has itself aCknow1edged4) the existence of a widespread demand for
the institution of family courts in South Africa. Yet, despite the
circumscribed limits within which it worked, the Law Commission
1) Cf the composition of the Hawaii Commission on Children and Youth
regarding its 'Proposal for the Establishment of a Family Court in
the' First Circuit of Hawaii' /See above at 34-357, and the Finer
Committee. - -
2) Per Kirby 'Law'Reform, Why?' (1976) 50 AIJ 459, 562.
3) For example, in Glazer 1963 (4) SA 695 (AD) the Appellate Division
refused to extend an earlier 'error' in interpreting Groenewegen
to afford a surviving spouse the right to claim maintenance out of
the estate of the deceased spouse. . This earlier 'error' had been
made by Lord De Vi11iers C J in Care1se v Estate de Vries (1906) 23
SC 532 who held that a father's estate, if able to, is liable for
the support of both his legitimate and illegitimate children. (see
Beinart 'Liability of a Deceased Estate for Maintenance' 1958 AJ 92).
The effect of Glazer's case has been to perpetuate an unpardonable
hardship on a surviving wife who was married out of community of
property to her husband and who has ·been disinherited by him.
Clearly, some remedial legislation is called for and, indeed, has
been called for by, inter alia, Hahlo 'Maintenance out of a Deceased
Estate: An Epitaph' (1964T"8I SALJ 1; and Beinart 'The Forgotten
Widow' 1965-1966 AJ 285. A proposed Family Maintenance Bill was
read once in Parliament after which it was referred to a select
committee which recommended that it be dropped. (The full English
version of this proposed Bill is reproduced in (1971) 88 SALJ 205
Annexure 1. See also Hahlo 'The Sad Demise of the Family Maintenance
Bill 1969' (1971) SALJ 201.) It would seem that despite the clamour
for change in this respect our Legislature is unable, or unwilling,
to take up the necessary challenge. Cf van den Heever J A in
Oberholzer 1947 (3) SA 294 (AD) at 297 ('Family law is resistant
to change ••• and is not readily influenced by foreign schematic
notions') See also Boberg 283-286; Olivier 235.
4) Divorce Report (1978) § 13.1.
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has failed to give adequate expression to these demands 'and the
Legislature, in which the legal profession is more than well
represented, is not likely to initiate a family court system in
South Africa without a firm recommendation from the Law Commission.
In the second place, it is submitted that the Law- Commission's
satisfaction with the present court structure is entirely misplaced. l )
For example, it is submitted that the problem of fragmented jurisdiction
in family law matters is a real one. 2) Also, it is submitted, it
cannot be said that there is widespread satisfaction with the
services presently being rendered by the Childrens' Courts, the
Maintenance Courts and the Juvenile Courts. Even at Supreme Court
level the services rendered by that court in the field of divorce law
are far from satisfactory.
1) Cf the Commission under the chairmans~ip of Mr Justice G G Hoexter
'to inquire into the structure and functioning of the courts of law
in the Republic of South Africa.' Government Gazette 6761 of
30 November 1979.
2) See below'at Chapter 8.
4. The Law Commission's Attitude to Inquisitorial Procedure
The Law Commission felt that the introduction of an inquisitorial
, 1)
procedure was unnecessary. Instead, it was felt that the Law
Commission's proposed changes to the substantive law, especially the
recommended introduction of the irretrievable break-down of marriage
as a ground for divorce, 'would go a long way towards mitigating
the conflict and emotion with which divorce proceedings are fraught.,2)
These proposed changes have now been effected3 ) and it remains to be
seen whether the conflict and emotional upheavals -associated with
the divorce action will be significantly reduced. 4)
1) Divorce Report (1978) § 13.9.
2) Ibid.
3) S 3 Divorce Act.
4) Hahlo and Sinclair 62-63 suggest that the possibility cannot be
excluded that 'court battles about maintenance, forfeiture
of patrimonial benefits, provisions for the welfare of the
minor children of the marriage and costs may become more frequent
and bitter.'
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5. The ProsPects for a Family Court System in South Africa
At this stage, it may seem that the establishment of a full-
blooded family court in South Africa is remote. However, it is
significant to note that on the 30th November, 1979, the State
President appointed the Hoexter Commission of Inquiry to report on,
inter alia, the desirability of establishing an intermediate court
sYptem and of establishing a family court as a branch of such
intermediate court system, 'or otherwise,.l) It is submitted that
this is a very welcome step in the right direction.
The Hoexter Commission's· terms of reference regarding family
courts call into question the status of a family court. In South
Africa, marriage always has been regarded as a status which
lies at the root of civilized society.2) It is submitted that this
traditional approach should be nurtured and any effort to compromise
this status by bringing within the jurisdiction of a court with a
status inferior to that of the Supreme Court the problems of marriage
and divorce should be resisted. It is significant to note that the
Conciliation Court of Los AngelesJas well as the Hawaii and the
Australian Family Courts all have a superior court status. The effect
of this is to attract to the bench of a family court judges and legal
practitioners of high repute, calibre, and ability.3) Were it otherwise,
1) The background to the appointment of the Hoexter Commission lies
in the comments of the Secretary for Justice !J P J Coetzer7 in the
1978 ~~nual Re ort of the De artment of Justice 5-7: see also
Coetzer 'Intermediere Howe' 197 132 DR 73. The Secretary for
Justice has suggested, inter alia that the proposed intermediate
court system be given civil, as-well as criminal, jurisdiction so
that, for example, divorce actions would fall within its jursidiction.
2) Weatherley (1878) Kotze 66 at 71; Carter 1953 (1) SA 202 (AD);
Campher 1978 (3) SA 797 (0) at 802.
3) Cf Finer Report § 4.350. 'Just as it is essential to localise the
family jurisdiction, so, reciprocally, is it essential to have that
local jurisdiction supervised by professional judges of the highest
rank, to guard against error and promote uniformity in decision.'
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there might well be a tendency to regard litigation in the family
court as a matter to be handled by the junior and less experienced
members of the profession. As Arthur puts itl )
'The Family Court must be a division of the highest court
of general jurisdiction. It cannot be an inferior court
or it will attract inferior people and acquire an inferior
. , 2)1mage •
The problems of marriage and divorce and, indeed, the problems of
family law in general are too complex, vital and important to be
relegated to a court of inferior status.3)
It is a truism that our Supreme Court judges are overburdened
and that our magistrates are under increasing work pressure. But,
rather than increase the criminal jurisdiction of magistrates, and
rather than create so-called intermediate courts, and rather than
give such intermediate courts a civil jurisdiction to include family
law matters such as divorce, it may be better to give serious
consideration to the establishment of family courts with an all-
embracing jurisdiction over all family law matters. In this way,
the Supreme Court judges would be relieved of handling divorce cases,
applications for consent to marry, maintenance cases, juvenile
delinquency cases and the like. 4) The result would be to reduce
the present burden on our judges and magistrates and a family court
of the highest status would be created to give some meaningful
expression to the problems of family law that hit at the root of
civilized society.
1) 'A Family Court - Why Not?' (1966) 51 Minn LR 223, 230-231.
2) See also Payne 597; Goldberg and Sheridan 'Family Courts - An
Urgent Need' (1959) 8 J Public Law 537, 538-539.
3) Cf Paulsen 'Juvenile Courts, Family Courts, and the Poor Man'
(1966) 54 Calif 1R 694-695. At 698 the writer states that 'It is a
common belief among New York social workers that the Family Court
does not possess annulment, separation or divorce jurisdiction
because of notions related to class divisions. How would it be
possible for the judges who preside over the delinquent, the
neglected, and the husbands who refuse to pay small support orders,
to handle intelligently the complex separation agreements of the
well-to-do?'.
4) See below at 268-269.
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CHAPTER SIX
RHODESI~) DIVORCE LAW REFORM
There are two main reasons for briefly considering recent
developments in the Rhodesian law of divorce; firstly, Rhodesia, like
South Africa, practices a Roman-Dutch common law system; and
secondly, an inquiry into the divorce laws of Rhodesia was conducted
at more or less the same time that the South African Law Commission
was investigating the South African law of divorce.
are, accordingly, most useful.
1. Rhodesian Divorce Commiss~on
Comparisons
In August 1976 the Rhodesian State President appointed a Commission
to inquire into certain aspects of the Rhodesian law of marriage and
divorce. 2) The Commission's terms of reference were -
'To inquire into the law in Rhodesia relating to
Ca) the age at which persons can enter into marriage;
Cb) the grounds upon which a divorce may be granted;
Cc) the procedure for obtaining a divorce;
Cd) the property rights of the parties on divorce,
especially the question of maintenance of the spouses
and any dependent children;
Ce) the custody of and access to minor children of the
marriage on the actual separation of the parties;
and, having regard to social conditions in Rhodesia and any changes in
the relevant laws in the United Kingdom and the Republic of South
Africa relating to the above-mentioned matters, to report whether
1) For the purposes of this thesis the words 'Rhodesia' and 'Rhodesian'
will be used in preference to the words 'Zimbabwe'·or 'Zimbabwean'.
2) Apart from the chairman there were 5 other members of the Commission
from differing walks of life, two of whom were females: one of the
females was a Black.
any changes in the present law of Rhodesia are necessary or
desirable and, if so, to what extent.'
It is not the purpose of this thesis to traverse all the recommen-
dations of the Rhodesian Divorce Commission save to mention those that
are apposite to this thesis. Its first recommendation was for the
establishment of specialist matrimonial courts in Rhodesia.
l
) The
Divorce Commission motivated its recommendation for the establishment
of such courts as follows r
Ca) the legal personnel involved in the adjudication of
matrimonial matters should have, so far as possible, a special
training and interest in this field;
Cb) the proposed matrimonial court should have its own pre-trial
or reconciliation machinery in an effort to curtail the 'ill-
advised or over-hasty divorce proceedings which are presently
instituted and subsequently regretted';
Cc) a simplified and less formal trial procedure should be
employed in the proposed matrimonial court. This would also
have the effect of curtaili~ costs;
Cd) the establishment of such courts ,should result in a 'greater
consistency of approach' to matrimonial proceedings. This would
also enhance a greater degree of expertise in the field of
matrimonial law.
The Rhodesian Divorce Commission's second recommendation2) concerned
the setting-up of the proposed matrimonial court in the two main
Rhodesian centres of Bulawayo and Salisbury to 'deal with all disputes
relating to marriage, divorce, maintenance, matrimonial property rights,
custody of, and access to, children, and many other ancillary matrimonial
proceedings'. The Divorce Commission left the door open for the
inclusion within the jurisdiction of the proposed matrimonial court of
all matters falling within the realm of family law such as adoptions.
1) Rhodesian Divorce Commission Report § 13.
2) § 14.
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As to the composition of the proposed matrimonial court the
Rhodesian Divorce Commission recommended that the presiding judge
(or magistrate) should be required to sit with two assessors 'one of
whom would be required to be a person qualified and experienced in
social work. ,1) It was recommended that the second assessor be
drawn from a panel 'but selected for especial interest and experience.'
Furthermore, both sexes would have to be represented on the bench of
such matrimonial court.
With regard to procedure, the Rhodesian Divorce Commission
2)recommended that the proposed matrimonial court should be given the
power to formulate its own\ rules governing the conduct of its
proceedings. Approval was also voiced of the present High Court
practice whereby all matrimonial cases w~re being dealt with as hearings
in private. As to privacy, it was recommended3) that the proposed
court should have the power to curtail the press reporting of any
proceedings before it. The Commission even ~ent further in suggesting
that in 'legal reporting' the parties should be protected in having
their identities withheld. Attorneys should have the right of audience
in the proposed court and proceedings should be by way of petition
rather than by way of action. 4) The reason given for this recommen-
dation was the apparent curtailment of costs.
As to the counselling and reconciliation efforts to be undertaken
with regard to warring spouses the Rhodesian Divorce Commission made
the following recommendations:5)
Ca) that the proposed matrimonial court should have attached to it
a registry of counsellors, some of whom would be legally qualified




4) § 20. By way of contrast, South Africa has abolished petition
proceedings: Petition Proceedings Replacement Act, 35 of 1975.
This Act came into force on 1 July 1976.
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team of counsellors ~hould be both full-time and part-time members
of the proposed court registry. Also included in the team of
counsellors should be workers from other fields such as clergymen
and counsellors of marriage guidance societies;
Cb) that matrimonial proceedings should not be allowed to be
instituted until the parties have been counselled. Furthermore,
attorneys should be 'restrained from writing to one spouse on
the instructions of the other until counselling has taken place.'
The duration and scope of the counselling should be in the
proposed court's discretion; and
Cc) that the counsellors of the registry forming part of the
proposed matrimonial court sho~d 'produce advisory literature
on both the legal and social aspects of marriage and matrimonial
proceedings' for the benefit not only of those contemplating
matrimonial action but also for the benefit of those 'looking
for advice and guidance in a troubled or unsuccessful marriage.'
Closely allied to the above is the recommendationl ) that 'wherever
one of the intending spouses is under the age of 21, both spouses should
be required to be counselled before the court consents to the marriage. ,2)
1) § 30 Ca).
2) It is interesting to note that the Rhodesian Divorce Commission
suggested IS 30 Cb)7 that the phrase 'intending spouses under the
age of 2l'-should expressly include 'a girl over 19 whom we have
recommended should be relieved of the requirement of having
parental or judicial consent, and any intending spouse under the
age of 21 who has peen previously married and divorced or widowed
and who would ••• enjoy the legal status of a major.'
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2. Brief Appraisal of Recommendations
One's immediate impression of the Report of the Rhodesian Divorce
Commission is that the Commission had to contend with terms of reference
that were very onerous and far-reaching in nature. l ) The Commission,
however, appears to have completed its task with commendable speed
in the face of great difficulties. 2 )
The obvious danger of working under stressful circumstances is that
the resultant report is likely to be characterized by an insufficient
consideration of and research into a number of important matters. Thus,
for example, the proposals regarding matrimonial courts and counselling
only featured in but a few pages of the Report. 3 ) Apart from mentioning
that family or matrimonial courts exist in the United States of America,
Canada and Australia there is little evidence of a detailed research into
their success or otherwise in those countries. The mere fact of their
existence in other countries is not ipso facto evidence of their success.
For example, although pre-marital counselling is provided for in the Los
Angeles Conciliation Court it is generally not considered to be a success.
Hawaii does not even have pre-marital counselling provisions and in
Australia there is little evidence to suggest .that pre-marital counselling
is likely to be a success.4) If there are any special reasons why it
is considered that pre-marital counselling should be a success in
Rhodesia, these have not been reflected in the Rhodesian Divorce
Commission Report.
With regard to its recommendations regarding counselling the
Rhodesian Divorce Commission does not appear to make clear the distinction
1) The Rhodesian Divorce Commission itself seems to have appreciated its
difficulties in this regard: see its Report 1-6.
2) The Rhodesian Divorce Commission was appointed in August 1976 and it
completed its Report in September 1977. Also, the Commission only
had the benefit of assistance from a total of 97 memoranda: no oral
evidence was heard: see the Report at (ii)-(iv).
3) Rhodesian Divorce Commission Report 7-16. By way of contrast see
the voluminous Finer Report.
4) For pre-marital counselling in Los Angeles, Australia and Hawaii see
above at 17-21; 51; 96-97; 102; 104; 110.
162
" " t" 11" d "1" t" 11" 1 )between concllla lon counse lng an reconcl la lon counse lng.
rhere also seems to be a misplaced emphasis on reconciliation
counselling. 2 ) Also, the suggestion that the duration and scope of
counselling should be in the discretion of the proposed matrimonial
court appears to be a ~ sequitur in the light of the earlier
recommendation that attorneys should be 'restrained from writing to one
spouse on the instructions of the other until counselling has taken
place.' How is the proposed court going to be able to bring its mind
to bear on the question of the duration and scope of any counselling
when attorneys are not going to be permitted even to write the
customary first letter to the other spouse until such counselling has
taken place? If the purpose of counselling at this stage is simply
to advise and inform 'intending litigants as to all the consequences
of divorce' then surely the same purpose could be achieved by means
of advisory literature?
It is also to be regretted that the Rhodesian Divorce Commission did
not give one the benefit of its views regarding the procedures to be
adopted to give expression to its counselling recommendations. For
example, the suggestion that no person should be permitted to institute
proceedings until counselling has taken Place3) by itself seems
draconian in the extreme. How is the counselling to be effected?
Must both parties be present at the same time or would it be in order
for them to be counselled separately? Would the proposed counselling
authorities have the power to summon a reluctant party to attend coun-
selling sessions? What if the other party is absent or cannot be found?
Are the children of the parties, wnere they are mature enough, to be
included in the proposed counselling programme? Can a person be denied
1) See above at 88-89.
2) Cf the English reconciliation-orientated counselling experience
which is discussed above at 90-96.
3) Rhodesian Divorce Commission Report § 21 Cb).
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his or her right to obtain a divorce where the marriage is an empty shell
simply because the other party is reluctant or unwilling, or even
unable, to submit to counselling?
It is submitted that the Rhodesian Divorce Commission has, neverthe-
less, made a number of enlightened suggestions which, unfortunately,
are detracted from by a lack of consideration of some of the more
important points of detail. Notwithstanding this, the effect of the
Rhodesian Divorce Commission Report shows that the matrimonial laws
of that country are in a state of flux. But whether that country has
the time, the inclination, the manpower or financial ability to give
expression to its Commission's recommendations is open to grave doubt
in view of its present political and constitutional difficulties.
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CHAPrER SEVEN
THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
FAMILY COURI'S IN SOUTH AFRICA
1. The Children of Divorce
The effect of section 6 of the Divorce Act of 1979 is to give
statutory effect to what every divorce court judge has always done;
that is to attempt to ensure that the best interests of the children
1)
on divorce are adequately safeguarded. Of particular significance
is section 6 (1) of the Divorce Act wfiich states that -
'A decree of divorce shall not be granted until the court is
satisfied that the provisions made or contemplated with regard
to the welfare of any minor or dependent child of the marriage
are satisfactory or are the best that can be effected in the
circumstances. '
Yet, notwithstanding this provision, the crucial question remains;
namely, are the courts properly able to discharge their duty to the
children of divorce by giving adequate expression to their best interests?
It is true that section 6 (4) of the Divorce Act permits the court to
appoint a legal practitioner to represent a child at divorce proceedings
between the parents. But this provision is only couched in permissive
terms and is not peremptory. Considering the number of children
involved in divorces in South Africa each year one is constrained to
wonder how a judge is able to give adequate expression to the best interests
of such children, unless they are separately legally represented. 2 ) In
other words, the problem at issue is not whether the judges are giving
any expression to the best interests of children on divorce but whether
they are able adequately to do so under the present divorce procedure. 3)
1) ef Fletcher 1948 (1) SA 130 (AD); Bailey 1979 (3) SA 128 (AD), and
the authorities cited by Hahlo at 459 n 19. See also Spiro 259-261.
2) See below at 249-251.
3) See Olmesdahl 'The Rights of Children on Divorce' 1980 DR 481, and
see below at 301-302.
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This problem must be seen aga~nst the background of the following
t t · t· 1) .s a 1S 1CS:-
WHITES
Year Number of Marriages Number of Divorces Number of Children
1968 37162 6241 8818
1969 39179 7262 10092
1970 41427 7748 11098
1971 42121 8240 11710
1972 41294 8432 11940
1973 40602 8890 10031
1974 41066 9907 11145
1975 41333 10730 12386
1976 40483 10350 13815
1977 38537 9864 13019
Totals 403204 88164 114054
COLOUREDS
Year Number of Marriages Number of Divorces Number of Children
1968 12488 741 1389
1969 12819 748 1345
1970 13832 753 1497
1971 14190 886 '1748
1972 15385 900 1833
1973 16626 1212 2151
1974 16054 1307 2237
1975 16694 1260 2204
1976 18010 1187 2333
1977 18611 1165 2435
Totals 154709 10159 19172
1) These statistics have been gleaned from the 1977 Marriage and
Divorce Report. For the purposes of this thesis the reference
to statistics has been confined to the last 10 years for which
records have been kept. There is no reason to believe that the
divorce rate will drop in view of the promulgation of the Divorce
Act in June 1979: if anything, the indications are that the divorce
rate will increase: Sunday Times 3 February 1980.
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ASIANS
Year Number of Marriages Number of Divorces Number of Children
1968 4823 88
1969 5299 160
1970 5490 143 No statistics for
1971 6077 163 the period 1968-
1972 7166 187 1976 appear to




1977 7831 364 547
Totals 67064 2023 547
Regrettably, the writer can find no statistics of a similar sort for
the Blacks. This is, presumably, because Black marriages are governed
either by the Customary Law or the Common Law of South Africa, or both.
From the writer's personal experience, however, it can be stated that the
numbers of Black divorces granted by the Supreme Court are very few and
far between because of the higher costs of Supreme Court litigation as
opposed to the more expeditious and less expensive litigation in the
special Black divorce courts. l )
If there is any substance in the contention of Rahlo and Sinclair 2 )
that 'If the experience in other countries is any guide, it will not often
happen that separate legal representation of a minor child will be ordered'
then, it is submitted, our courts, notwithstanding the provisions of
section 6 (1) of the Divorce Act, will in reality just not be able to give
adequate expression to the best interests of the children on divorce.
O~r divorce statistics make this impossible and the complaint of van den
1) S 10 Black Administration Act, 38 of 1927 and see Rahlo 39 and the
authorities cited at n 58. Also see below at 215.
2) At 42.
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Heever J in Walkinshawl ) that in an undefended divorce action the court
is normally obliged to decide questions of custody on the one-sided
version of the plaintiff without the advantage of a probation officer's
impartial report is still valid today.
1) 1971 (1) SA 148 (NC) at l49H. Cf Trengove JA in Golden Jubilee
Report (1974) at 102 /See also (1975) 90 DR 259, 2647 where
the learned Judge of Appeal states that'Wanneer die-huwelik ontbind
word, en die kinders nie langer onder die sorg, toesig en beheer
van albei ouers kan bly nie, moet die hof, as opperste voog,
besluit wie die toesig en beheer van die kinders sal kry. Dit is 'n
lewensbelangrike funksie. Dit affekteer jaarliks die lewens van
die duisende kinders wat deur die egskeidings van hul ouers getref
word ••• Maar ingevolge ons huidige stelsel, veral soos dit in die
Transvaal geld, kan die hof ••• hierdie belangrike plig nie behoorlik
uitvoer nie. ' The learned Judge of Appeal gives the following as
his reasons for the above statement:
(i) the high number of unopposed divorces;
(ii) the fact that in the great majority of cases the parties enter
into a consent paper concerning the custody of any children and that
the court only has the benefit of the one-sided evidence of the
plaintiff;
(iii) the fact that because of the high number of divorces a judge
is not able /In the Transvaal, at any rate7 to devote more than
3-5 minutes to each case in order to ascertain what is exactly in
the best interests of any children concerned in the divorce.
This is by no means a situation that is unique to South Africa.
For the position in England see Elston, Fuller and Murch 'Judicial
Hearings of Undefended Divorce Petitions' (1975) 38 MLR 609, 626.
See also Eekelaar 143 who points out that the position-in Canada is
no different to that prevailing in England.
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2. The Judge in Divorce Proceedings
An analysis of the statistics referred to above reveals a number
of alarming features. Thus, if one were to confine oneself to the
total number of Wnite, Coloured and Asiatic divorces for the year




Taking into account the fact that as at the end of 1977
a total of 901 ) judges of the Supreme Court this would mean
of them would have granted approximately 126 final orders
of divorce. More specifically, in the Transvaal each of the
35 judges of the Transvaal Provincial Division would, on average,
have granted 160 fin~l orders of divorce. 2 )
Lest the uninitiated get the impression that our judges of the
Supreme Court are only concerned with divorce cases, one must hasten
to add that the same 90 judges, in the same period, dealt with 40795
civil cases and 3700 criminal trials: they also heard 2440 appeals
from the Magistrates' Courts, 63 appeals from the Commissioners' Courts,
and 482 appeals from the Regional Courts. In addition, they reviewed
70264 judgments from the Magistrates' Courts and 5183 judgments from
the Commissioners' Courts. The judges were also faced with 13958
1) According to the 1977 (4) SA Law Reports: this figure includes
the acting judges, but excludes the Judges of Appeal and South
African judges on secondment to the Supreme Courts of Transkei
and Bophuthatswana.
2) Cf Mr Justice JJ Trengove "n Kritiese Beskouing van ons
Egskeidingsreg met Verwysing na die Skuldbegrip' - Paper Delivered
at the South African Law Conference, Cape Town, April 1972, where
the learned Judge of Appeal remarks: 'Ek wonder dikwels watter
indruk toeskouers wat die verrigtinge in die hof vir onbestrede
egskeidings op 'n Woensdag in Johannesburg of Pretoria bywoon -
waar die regter tussen vyftig en negentig egskeidingsake op 'n dag
afhandel - van die hof se houding ten opsigte van huwelike en
egskeidings kry.' See also Petersen'Divorce Law Reform' (1971) 88
SALJ' 478, 479, where it is stated that on the 25th March 1971 a
total of 192 couples had their marriages dissolved in the
Witwatersrand Local Division.
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applications and 69124 motion' court applications. l )
In view of the pressure of work that a modern-day judge is
faced with it is not altogether surprising that the present Chief
Justice should remark that he was 'jammer om te moet konstateer dat die
"tranquility" waarna verwys word, vandag weens die hoeveelheid werk
verdwyn het.,2) In addition, there has been a remarkable admission by
1) These figures have been gleaned from the 1977 Report of the
Department of Justice 58-59. For the most recent figures
available see the 1978 Report of the Department of Justice 92.
The comparative table of figures for the 2 periods are as follows:
Civil cases disposed of
Criminal cases disposed of
Appeals from magistrates' courts
Appeals from commissioners' courts
Appeals from regional courts
Reviews of judgements of magistrates
Reviews of judgements of commissioners
Applications received
In Forma Pauperis applications


























2) Per Rumpff CJ on the occasion of the centenary celebrations of the
Transvaal Supreme Court in Pretoria on 21 May 1977. The learned
Chief Justice had just commented on the fact that judges
of yesteryear were able to engage in very valuable research into our
legal heritage, mainly because of the tranquil and unpressurized
atmosphere that then prevailed: see (1977) 115 DR 392, 394.
Even the Appellate Division has not escaped the increasing
pressure of work: see the Hon Mr Justice PJ Wessels 'Die Rol van
die Howe as Regsprekende Gesag' (1978) 131 DR 597, 600-601.
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a judgel ) that he was unable to prepare a proper judgment in a
civil case because of pressure of work. Yet another jUdge2 )
complained that he was forced to retire prematurely because his
health was deteriorating as a result of the pressure of work he was
being subjected to.
In the light of the above, it is difficult to agree with the Law
Commission's suggestion that 'a judge should be able to tell at a glance
1) Sunday Times 19 June 1977. Cf the comments of Irving Steyn J in
S v Kavin 1978 (2) SA 731 (W) at 732; viz, 'Before commencing
judgment I should like to express my appreciation to my learned
assessors for having been so willing to work, and to work very hard,
since the adjournment yesterday in order to enable us to deliver
this judgment today. Probably the main motivating reason for
delivering judgment today is the fact that, if we did not deliver
it today, this court could not be reconstituted for at least the
following three weeks... In the circumstances we have done the
best we could ••• ' See also Novick and Another v Comair Holdings
Ltd and Others (1979) (2) SA 116 (W). The opening words of Colman
J's judgment were as follows: 'The litigation with which I am
concerned began as an urgent application ••• It took up 13 days in
November ••• I heard evidence on 20 days in Feburary, 17 days in
March and 8 days in April. That was followed by 16 or 17 days of
argument. Although there were only 15 or 16 witnesses, nearly all
of them were examined and cross-examined at great length: and about
250 exhibits were put in ••• I think ••• that I am right in saying
that (apart from questions of credibility) over 40 distinct issues
were raised for determination. The evidence which bears on most
of those issues is widely scattered over the record and the exhibits.
That being the magnitude and complexity of the material laid before
me, I have been faced with unusual difficulties in deciding how to
formulate this judgment.'
2) Sunday Times 26 June 1977. See also Coetzer 'Intermediere Howe'
(1978) 132 DR 673 and the 1978 Annual Report of the Department of
Justice 5-7-.-
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in which cases it would be unnecessary to take steps with a view to
reconciliation. ,1) This would be to accord to our judges superhuman
qualities which no mortal possesses.
Certainly, the above statistics bear stark testimony to the fact
of the large number of minor children involved in the divorces granted.
In respect of each of these children important issues are involved.
Essentially, these concern questions of far-reaching significance such
as custody, access and maintenance. In this regard, the following
observation of Attorney van der Fbst
2
) is most pertinent:
'Persoonlik dink ek dit sou onbillik wees om te verwag dat 'n
regter wat voorsit in 'n Mosiehof in die geval van onverdedigde
egskeidingsake, so 'n volledige ondersoek ten opsigte van
minderjarige kinders moet instel, want daar is glad te 'veel
ander sake en werk wat met so 'n geleentheid ook sy aandag
verge Sal dit nie veel beter wees en sal dit nie tot groter
voordeel van ontwrigte minderjarige kinders en die gemeenskap
as 'n geheel strek, indien 'n spesiale egskeidingshof wat 'n
afdeling van ons huidige Hooggeregshof kan wees, ingestel
word nie?'.
It is indeed a tribute to the judges of the Supreme Court that they,
somehow, manage to discharge an Herculean task. However, to discharge
a task is one thing: to do so properly is another!3)
1) Divorce Report (1978) § 13.3. Cf Barnard (Divorce) 87.
2) Golden Jubilee Report at 131. van der Post is described as the
President of the Law Society of the Free State.
3) Cf the following comment of Pentragon in the Law Society's Gazette -
cited in (1977) 115 DR 381; viz 'The burden we put on our judges
is a heavy one, heavier than most of us realize ••• /W7hat they
tell us ••• is that they ~an discharge it properly wIth the help •••
of that small band of professional advocates who present the evidence
and the arguments, and whom they can trust to select what is
essential, bring it before them in an orderly fashion, and above all
exercise integrity in not coaching witnesses, not suppressing
documents, not putting forward known false points and drawing the
court's attention to all the relevant law, even if it is against
them. Judges are not omniscient. They need clear argument and,
frequently, guidance to lead them to a decision.'
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Quite apart from the onerous burden we place on our judges, it
must be pointed out that our judges are impartial arbiters who remain
detached from the arena of conflict. Accordingly, a judge cannot
take an active part in the counselling of any parties to a divorce
action no matter how desirable he feels this to be. He can only
order the parties to consider the possibility of reconciliation,
either through marriage counselling, or treatment, or by further
reflection. l ) But this procedure is hardly ever resorted to. In
any event, our judges are generally unskilled and untrained in the
behavioural sciences to engage actively in any counselling. 2)
Furthermore, the divorce process is nothing more than a ritual over
which the judge presides. It is true that the divorce judge has to
be satisfied that a marriage has irretrievably broken down before
granting a final order of divorce3) and that the interests of any
4)
dependent and minor children have been safeguarded. However, taking
into account the high divorce rate and the number of children involved,
it is seriously doubted whether our judges are properly able to direct
their attention to these matters in each and every divorce case.
It is, of course, fair to point out that although the divorce
process is, from a judge's point of view, nothing more than a ritual,
the role of the judge must be seen in its proper perspective. In most
divorce cases, the appearance of the plaintiff in court is preceded by
costly and time-consuming negotiations between the parties and their
legal representatives. 5) More often than not, this results in a
consent paper which the court is ultimately called upon to embody in
the final order of divorce.
1) S 4 (3) Divorce Act.
2) ef Payne 81-82.
3) S 4 (1 ) Divorce Act.
4) S 6 (1) Divorce Act.
5) See above at 114-115.
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3. The Legal Representative in Divorce Proceedings
° 0 ° dO 1)As the Magistrate's Court has no jurlsdlctl0n over lvorce
the l~tigant in a divorce action must perforce engage both an attorney
and an advocate to present the case to the Supreme Court. Apart from
2) ° 1 dOh ° t t lIt to ththe costs lnvo ve ln aVlng 0 engage wo ega represen a lves, e
attorney and the advocate labour under a number of difficulties insofar
as divorce litigation is concerned.
In the first place, neither the attorney nor the advocate are
experienced or skilled in the behavioural sciences. This clearly
imposes on the legal practitioner in divorce proceedings a serious
limitation with regard to the evaluation of any prospect of reconciliation. 3 :
1) S 46 (1) Magistrate's Court Act, 32 of 1944: see also s 19 (1)
Supreme Court Act, 59 of 1959.
2) The average cost of an undefended divorce action without any
complications varies between R350 and R450. If defended, the cost
will be considerably higher and may even run into thousands of
Hands, depending on the complexity of the case. According to
Christie in 1973 RLJ 89, 91, 'divorce has never been a profitable
part of the work of the legal profession'. However, it is hard to
escape a contrary conclusion. Thus, the total of 11393 White,
Coloured and Asian divorces in 1977 would have cost a total of
R4557200 (ie on the assumption that each divorce cost R400). On
average, the attorney's fees (ie less disbursements and counsel's
fees) in each case would amount to approximately three quarters of
the costs; viz R300. Accordingly, in attorney's fees alone the
11393 White, Coloured and Asian divorces in 1977 would have brought
in a total of R3417900. On the basis that in 1977 there were
approximately 3000 practising attorneys in South Africa, each
attorney would have earned approximately Rl139 per annum for divorce
work alone. This figure is, however, illusory because most of the
divorce work is handled in the bigger centres such as Johannesburg,
Pretoria, Cape Town and Durban. It may be mentioned that if an
attorney receives instructions from a correspondent to attend to a
divorce action the costs will be higher still. It has been estimated,
for example, that the costs of an undefended divorce action which
originates from Pietersburg but which is heard in the Supreme Court
in Pretoria would amount to approximately R425: 1978 Report of the
Department of Justice 5. It is interesting to note that the cost
of a divorce in England when neither of the parties is obliged to
attend the court hearing amounts to between £100 and £200:
Eekelaar 143.
3) Alexander 'The Lawyer in the Family Court' (1959) 5 NPPA Journ 172,
175; Manchester and Whetton 'Marital Conciliation.in England and
Wales' (1974) 23 ICLQ 339, 352; Callner 'Boundaries of the Divorce
Lawyer's Role' (1977) 10 Fam LQ 389, 392.
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Apart from his lack of expertise and experience in the behavioural
sciences the attorney in particular is inhibited from giving more
than just a cursory consideration to the question of marriage
counselling for a number of other reasons. For example, according
to the ethics of his profession, the attorney must avoid a conflict
of interestsl ) and this he will not be able to do if he feels obliged
to counsel both Parties to a divorce action. At best, the attorney
can refer his client to outside counselling agencies ani marriage
guidance clinics for assistance. But this is not what his client
.:
has paid him for and the average attorney, rightly, is conscious
of the fact that clients only consult him to organise a burial for
a dead marriage, and not to attempt to resurrect it. 2 ) Furthermore,
the attorney is paid to be partisan: traditionally, his duty is to
represent his client to the best of his ability. From the client's
point of view this partisanship is most essential and if he is not
partisan enough the attorney runs the risk of losing a client. 3)
1) cr § 13 of the Inte~national Code of Ethics cited by Randell and
Bax 280-281; Payne 82.
2) Manchester and Wnetton 'Marital Conciliation in England and Wales'
(1974) 23 ICLQ 339, 351 ('If we examine ••• the client's view of
the lawyer, he tends to be seen as a legal expert paid to exercize
his specific skills, not to be burdened with social or personal
problems or doubts as to wnether legal proceedings are really wanted. ,)
3) Murch 'The Role of Solicitors in Divorce Proceedings' (1977) 40 MLR
626, 635 - the second part of this article is published in (1978;-41
MLR 25. Murch, however, points out (at 637 and 33) that an over
robust stance of partisanship on the part of a solicitor can be a
self-defeating exercise. Most divorce cases result in a consent
paper in one form or another. In the survey conducted by Murch it
was found that a number of solicitors had presumed that their clients
were in conflict simply because they were divorcing each other: this
had made the settlement of a consent paper much more difficult and
costly •
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In the second place, the legal representative of a litigent in a
divorce action is bred in the tradition of an adver~ary atmosphere.
This pre-supposes that there is a dispute on two sides.
l
) This,
however, is not always the case, though once the adversary procedure
has been invoked the ;rospect of bitterness, distress or humiliation
being experienced between the parties becomes real. Furthermore,
guilt-orientated principles in our divorce laws do not seem to have
been entirely eliminated. Thus, for the purposes of sections 7 (2)~)
9 (1)3) and 104) of the Divorce Act the conduct of the parties is
still one of a number of important factors which must be taken into
account by the court. The effect of this is that the law tends to
present only one face of divorce. 5) In view of the fact that the
great majority of divorce cases are undefended it is to be expected
that the divorce courts will continue to be presented with one-sided
versions of the events surrounding the divorce. The great divorce
battles of the future will not be concerned with the fact of divorce
itself but will be, as in the past, mainly concerned with financial
matters such as maintenance, patrimonial benefits and costs. The
main problems is that the court will not always be in a position to
ascertain the defendant's version of events unless the defendant decides
to enter a costly appearance to defend.
In the third place, the fact that the great majority of divorce
cases are undefended conjures up the real possibility of undue pressure
being brought to bear on the defendant to agree to any number of harsh
and unconscionable terms in a consent paper. It is a matter of consider-
able concern that a party to a divorce action can be so easily, and
sometimes unscrupulously, pressured into signing away maintenance rights,
proprietary rights, and rights of access to children. 6 ) Alternatively,
the same pressure can be used to persuade a defendant to agree to
1) Elston, Fuller and Murch 'Judicial Hearings of Undefended Divorce
Petitions' (1975) 38 MLR 609, 634; and see 174 n 3 above.
2) S 7 (2) deals with the maintenance payable by one party to the other.
3) S 9 (1) deals with the forfeiture of the patrimonial benefits of a
marriage.
4) S 10 deals with the costs of the divorce action.
5) Cf Manchester and Whetton 'Marital Conciliation in England and Wales'
(1974) 23 ICLQ 339, 373-374.
6) See, for example, Shepstone 1974 (1) SA 411 (D); 1974 (2) SA 462 (N).
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maintenance claimsl ) and claims to patrimonial benefits2 ) which in
normal circumstances would not be justified.
Finally, the attorney in particular is not in the ideal position
to ascertain the best interests of the children of divorce. 3) Although
section 6 (4) of the Divorce Act is a step in the right direction in
that it gives the court a discretionary power to appoint a legal
practitioner to represent a child at divorce proceedings it is
submitted that it does not go far enough. 4) The difficulty that an
attorney finds himself in on this point is neatly highlighted by Murch5)
as follows:
'The fact that solicitors seldom see the children of their.
divorcing clients, coupled with their partisan role means that
when drawing up the documentary evidence concerning the children
for the court ••• , solicitors are restricted to adopting their
clients' view of the children. Solicitors who take a separate
individual perspective of their own, in the context of the
present adversarial procedure, risk their client asking the
question "Which side is he on?'"
The position of the advocate vis-a-vis the children of divorce is
even harder to justify. He only sees the interests of the children
through the eyes of his client and instructing attorney. In practice,
1) Cf Beneke 1967 (1) SA 855 (T) which is commented on by Rahlo 'To
Divorce or not to Divorce' (1965) 82 SAW 285. The defendant spouse
agreeing to pay token maintenance in circumstances where this is not
justified also appears to be a fairly common experience: Schafer
'Token Maintenance' (1980) 43 THR-HR 57.
2) Cf § 3.1 Divorce Report (1978) where it is stated that 'There is
evidence that the proviso to s 3 of the ;-Matrimonial Affairs7
Act is used to compel a husband in the case of divorce to agree to
. a settlem~nt that is advantageous to the wife.'
. 3) See above at 164-167 on the children of divorce.
4) Further on the question of separate legal representation for children
see below at 248-251.
5) 'The Role of Solicitors in Divorce Proceedings' (1978) 41 MLR 25, 28.
177
he will never meet the children and only on very rare occasions
might he consult the more mature children about their wishes on
matters such as custody and access. For that matter, he usually
only meets his client for the first time on the morning that the case
is to be heard in court. l )
To s~m up, one can do no better than to cite the following words
2)
of Attorney van der Post ; namely,
'Die advokate en prokureurs doen hulle bes om to verseker
dat die belange van die kinders behoorlik in ag geneem word
met die aangaan van skikkingsaktes, maar daar moet onthou
word dat in 'n oorweldigende meerderheid van die sogenaamde
onverdedigde egskeidingsake, sien die advokaat en die
prokureur van die een gade nooit die teenparty nie en hoor
hulle slegs die verhaal van hulle eie klient. Dit is ook
'n onomstootlike feit dat in hierdie soort van sake 'n
klient voor sy eie advokaat en prokureur horn gewoonlik baie
goed voordoen en sy eie saak so goed as moontlik voorstel.
Heeldikwels gebeur dit dat die klient sy eie advokaat
en prokureur nie in sy volle vertroue neem en al die
omstandighede, insluitende sy finansiele vermoe, aan hulle
openbaar nie.'
1) Eekelaar 142-143: Elston, Fuller and Murch 'Judicial Hearings
of Undefend~d Divorces' (1975) 38 MLR 609, 614.
2) Golden Jubilee Report 130, 131.
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4. Conclusion
The inescapable conclusion from the above brief review is that
our consumers of justice are getting a raw deal in the field of
divorce law. The present procedure for obtaining a divorce is hardly
designed to engender an healthy respect for our judicial institutions.
It is true that much-needed reforms have been effected by the Divorce
Act. l ) But, it is submitted that, in addition, a complete overha~l of
the procedure for obtaining a divorce,2) less emphasis on the adversary
procedure and a serious re-appraisal of the role of the advocate (and
to a lesser extent, the attorney) in the divorce process are required.
Above all, serious consideration will have to be given to the
establishment of family courts in South Africa. In this regard, the
Finer Report 3 ) makes the following pertinent observation:
'There is no branch of legal administration for which the
respect of the community is more important than the
administration of family law, and in the ultimate resort,
the case for a family court is that it is the institution
through which respect for the law can be fully achieved.'
But, before serious consideration can be given to the establishment
of family courts in South Africa further research will have to be
undertaken. Even the Law Commission itself has recognized4 ) that
'The law must keep pace with developments in all spheres
of life. We live in a time where development in many fields
are taking place rapidly. Changing circumstances require
1) Eg the elimination of our erstwhile fault-orientated grounds for
divorce.
2) Cf Alexander 'Legal Sciences and the Social Sciences: The Family
Court' (1956) 21 Miss LR 105, 108 J'Reform of the divorce laws will
do no good unless we can establish-new procedures in courts which
are especially designed and equipped for that purpose. '7: see also
Bahlo 'Fighting the Dragon Divorce' (1963) 80 SALJ 27,-30: Fayne 5.
3) § 4.424.
4) 1975 Annual Report of the South African Law Commission RP 45/1975, 10.
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continuous adaptations in our law and often rules of law
which applied for many years must be reconsidered. ,1)
But whether the Law Commission is able to ·keep pace with developments
in all spheres of life, particularly with regard to family courts, is
open to serious doubt. The Law Commission only operates on a part-
time basis and it is expected to give its attention to many comprehensive
and wide-ranging programmes and projects. One can only marvel at the
Law Commission's industry in completing the work it has. 2 ) Accordingly,
it is submitted that the Law Commission's conclusion3 ) that the
'existing divorce courts can efficiently adjudicate upon divorce
proceedings, and ••• that there is /llo7 ••• need to establish special
family courts for this purpose' cannot be regarded as the final word
on the matter. 4 )
The Law Commission then went on (ibid) to
of full-time members of the commission.
repeated in the 1978 Annual Report of the
Commission RP 65/1979.
plead for the appointment
The same plea has been
South African Law
2) Since its establishment in 1973 the Law Commission has completed
20 projects: 1978 Annual Report of the South African Law Commission
RP 65/1979. This is a remarkable achievement in view of the fact
that the Law Commission only meets irregularly. In 1978 the
Commission met on 3 occasions while in 1977 it met on 4 occasions.
In 1976 it only met twice and in 1975 it met 4 times. The danger
of approaching law reform in this piecemeal manner will be to
develop our law of marriage as it has always been developed; ie
by means of a 'patchwork quilt of changes, brought about partly by
legislation and 'partly by the subtler hardly alluvial process
of judicial law-making.' - per Hahlo '100 Years of Marriage Law in
South Africa' 1959 AJ 48. This method of law reform is not likely
to result in the establishment of fa~ily courts in South Africa.
3) Divorce Report (1978) § 18.7.
4) Cf the Law Commission's acknowledgement /Divorce Report (1978)
§ 13.~7 that 'with various organisations- ••• as well as with the
public at large, there is a strong feeling in favour of family courts.'
This acknowledgement may well have been the reason for including
within the terms of reference of the Hoexter Commission of Inquiry
the direction to consider the question of family courts at the
proposed intermediate court level: see above at 155.
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CHAPrER EIGHT
THE FRAGMENTATION OF JURISDICTION IN FAMILY LAW MATTERS
1. Introduction
The problem of fragmented jurisdiction is not unique to South
Africa as the experience in Los Angeles, Hawaii, Australia and other
countries shows. The problem of fragmented jurisdiction is
traditionally seen as the main justification for the establishment
1)
of family courts. This is because a fragmentation of jurisdiction
in family law matters can result in competing and overlapping
jurisdictions as well as a 'potential conflict of philosophy and
approach in the respective courts which engenders forum shopping. ,2)
It will be recalled3) that the South African Law Commission came
to the conclusion that the fragmentation of jurisdiction regarding
family law matters was not a serious problem and that the services
rendered by the Maintenance Court, the Children's Court and the
Juvenile Court were 'apparently being rendered satisfactorily at
I 4)
present.' It is respectfully submitted that this conclusion is
I not supported by the reality of the situation as it presently exists.
If further justification for the establishment of family courts in
South Africa is needed, it is to be found in the fact that there is a
multiplicity of jurisdictions in family law matters, such as maintenance,
consents to marry and in the law relating to minors generally.
1) See above at 76.
2) Payne 41.
3) See above at 150.
4) Divorce Report (1978) § 13.8.
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2. Maintenance Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction in respect of matters relating to maintenance is
vested in four different courts as well as in the Minister of Social
Welfare and Pensions.
(A) The Supreme Court
Maintenance jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court by
Sction 7 of the Divorce Act which reads as follows:
'(1) A court granting a decree' of divorce may in accordance
with a written agreement between the parties make an order
with regard to the division of the assets of the parties or
the payment of maintenance by the one party to the other.
(2) In the absence of an order made in terms of subsection (1)
with regard to the payment of maintenance by the one party to
the other, the court may, having regard to the existing or
prospective means of each of the parties, their respective
earning capacities, financial needs and obligations, the age
of each of the parties, the duration of the marriage, the
standard of living of the parties prior to the divorce, their
conduct insofar as it may be relevant to the break-down of the
marriage, and any other factor which in the opinion of the
court should be taken into account, make an order which the
court finds just in respect of the payment of maintenance by
the one party to the other for any period until the death or
remarriage of the party in whose favour the order is given,
whichever event may first occur.,l)
The Supreme Court's jurisdiction is not only limited to granting main-
tenance orders on divorce, but it may also grant maintenance orders
pendente lite. 2 ) Nor is the Supreme Court's maintenance jurisdiction
1) s 7 Divorce Act replaces s 10 Matrimonial Affairs Act. For the
legal position prior to the passing of the old s 10 in 1953 see
Rahlo 442.
2) Rule 43(1)(a) Consolidated Rules of the Supreme Court. Further
on maintenance pendente lite see Rahlo 524-525; za~hiriou 1967
(1) SA 342 (W) at 345 F-G; Colman 1967 (1) SA 291 C); Varkel
1967 (4) SA 129 (C) at 131 G; Gunston 1976 (3) SA 179 (W) 181
F-H; Smit 1978 (2) SA 720 (W); &rass 1979 (1) SA 245 (R);
van der Walt 1979 (4) SA 891 (T) at 892; Nienaber 1980 (2) SA 803 (0).
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limited to 'the payment of maintenance by the one party to the
other'. The Supreme Court may also grant a maintenance order in
respect of a 'dependent child of the marriage'~) Furthermore, the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction in this regard is not only limited to
the dependent children of a marriage but it also extends to questions
of whether persons related to each other in any way other than as
parent and child are under a duty to support each other; for example,
whether a grandchild is under a legal duty to support a grandparent
where there are other closer relatives in a position to provide the
° °t ° t 2)requlsl e maln enance.
Over the years, however, the Supreme Court's maintenance juris-
diction has been 'watered down' so that, for practical purposes, it is
generally only concerned with the granting of maintenance orders
on divorce.3) Its maintenance jurisdiction has been largely taken
over by the Maintenance Court in respect of which a cheaper and less
formal procedure is provided for by the Maintenance Act. 4) Whilst
the Supreme Court retains its overall power to grant a variation or
rescission of a maintenance order it has been pointed out on more than
one occasion that the Supreme Court is generally reluctant to become
involved in such applications when the matter can just as easily be
handled by a Maintenance Court where it is likely to be dealt with
more expeditiously and, certainly, on a cheaper scale.5) Thus, for
example, in Sher6) Me1amet J said:
1) S 6 (3) Divorce Act.
2) Barnes v Union and South West Africa Insurance Co Ltd 1977 (3) SA
502 (E), and see generally Boberg 249-278.
3) Boberg 293; Olivier 233-234.
4) Act 23 of 1963.
5) The Maintenance Court is given the power by s 5 (4), as read with
the definition of a 'maintenance order' in s 1, of the Maintenance
Act to vary or discharge any maintenance order, even that of a
Supreme Court.
6) 1978 (4) SA 728 (W) at 729 G-H.
'Although all these authorities indicate that the proper
forum for disputes of this nature is the maintenance court,
none suggest ••• that this Court has lost or abrogated its
jurisdiction in this regard. J It is competent to bring an
application for variation or suspension of a maintenance
order in this Court but it is a procedure which is actively
discouraged by virtue of the fact that ~h~7 procedure in the
former court is cheaper and more expeditious. Applications
are discouraged normally by refusing to allow a successful
applicant his costs. In the absence of what has been
described as good and sufficient circumstances or reasons
or special reason a Supreme Court will not allow a successful
applicant his or her costs. ,1)
There are at least two undesirable features arising out of the
legal position just described. In the first place, it is seriously
doubted whether consistent expression is given to the sentiment that
so far as possible applications for the variation of, discharge of or.
enforcement of maintenance orders should be handled by the Maintenance
Court. A clear example of this anomaly is to be found in the case
of Watson2) which concerned an application for the variation of a
maintenance order. No indication was given as to why the proceedings
were launched by way of notice of motion in the Supreme Court rather
than in the Maintenance Court except, perhaps, because the defendant
was clearly a man of substantial means. Such overlapping and
competing jurisdiction between the Supreme Court and the Maintenance
Court is, it is submitted, unjustified and unwarranted. There can be
no legal justification for affording litigants the right to choose
which court they should approach in maintenance matters. An
unfortunate effect of such overlapping jurisdiction is the regrettable
suspicion that the Supreme Court is more readily available to wealthy
litigants than to poorer ones. In any event, as h~s already been
1) See also Troskie 1968 (3) SA 369 (W) at 371; Tate v Jurado 1976
(4) SA 238 (W).
2) 1979 (2) SA 854 (AD). See the comment on Watson's case by
Schafer 'An Upward Variation of a Maintenance Order - An Expensive
Luxury versus the Best Interests of a Child?' (1979) 96 SALJ 540.
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pointed out,l) the judges of the Supreme Court are overburdened
enough without becoming embroiled in maintenance applications
which could be more properly dealt with by the Maintenance Court
which was established for the purpose of providing a cheaper, less
formal and speedier form of relief.
In the second place, with regard to maintenance matters, there
would appear to be no consistency in the powers accorded to the
judges, magistrates and officers presiding over Maintenance Courts.
Thus, for example, despite the fact that the Maintenance Court has
the power to vary, suspend, discharge ani enforce a maintenance order
of the Supreme Court, a magistrate presiding over a criminal
prosecution for a contravention of section 11 (1) of the Maintenance Act
is precluded from writing the arrears off. 2 ) Similarly, such
magistrate presiding over a criminal court is not permitted to amend
a maintenance order,3) no matter how desirable this may be. In the
latter event, however, a magistrate has the discretionary power to
convert the criminal proceedings into an enq~iry by a Maintenance Court. 4 )
Wnere such conversion has been effected the magistrate no longer functions
as a magistrate presiding over a criminal court but as a judicial officer
presiding over a Maintenance Court. Thereafter, the Maintenance Court
may amend the maintenance order. It would seem, however, that such
power of conversion is only accorded to a magistrate and public
prosecutor in terms of section 13 of the Maintenance Act and not to a
1) See above at 168-172.
2) S v Dickenson 1971 (3) SA 932 (E). Beadle CJ explains the reason
for this in S v Clark 1971 (2) SA 352 (R AD) at 355 c: '/TIne
obligation to pay arrear maintenance is a continuing obligation and
as soon as the accused has the money in his possession with which to
pay the arrear maintenance he is under a duty to use that money to
pay such arrears'.
3) S v Jacobs 1973 (4) SA 302 (0); S v Sebola 1974 (1) PH H (S) 92 (NC);
s v Olivier 1976 (3) SA 186 (0) at 190, 191 G-H.
4) S 13 Maintenance Act. Cf ~ v Cloete 1977 (4) SA 90 (K). The public
prosecutor also has the right to request such conversion. In practice,
it is open to an accused to try to persuade the magistrate to effect
such conversion if he (the accused) wishes to argue that the amount
he has been ordered to pay by way of maintenance no longer takes
account of the alleged changed circumstances: S v Miller 1976 (1)
~A 12 (C) at 14; ~ v Olivier 1976 (3) 186 (0) at 190 D.
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Supreme Court judge to whom application has been made for the payment
of arrear maintenance. For example, in Sherl ) it was argued2 ) that
by launching proceedings in the Supreme Court, the Applicant was
denying the Respondent 'the opportunity of converting the proceedings
into an enquiry in regard to the whole maintenance order.' Although
there would appear to be some substance in this argument it was
rejected on the facts by Melamet J because, inter alia, the Applicant
had already on two previous occasions 'gone before the maintenance
court. ' On the last occasion the criminal proceedings were converted
into an enquiry which was subsequently abandoned. 3) If, as Sher's
case seems to indicate, the Supreme Court does not have the power to
convert an application for the payment of arrear maintenance into an
enquiry, then the possibility does exist of an applicant choosing to
bring the application in the Supreme Court so as to frustrate the
possibility of having an enquiry.
Mention has already been made of the fact that the Maintenance
Court is accorded the power to vary or discharge any maintenance order,
4)
even that of a Supreme Court. What used to be anomalous about this,
however, was the fact that, for example, the Cape Provincial Division
of the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to vary or alter a maintenance
order of, say, the Transvaal Provincial Division. 5) Only the Transvaal
Provincial Division had the power to vary its original order.
1) 1978 (4) SA 728 (W).
2) At 729 A.
3) It may be mentioned that the ordinary execution of a Supreme Court
maintenance order is competent but rarely resorted to: Rahlo
447 n 126. Cf Jeanes v Jeanes and Another 1977 (2) SA 703 (W);
DJ Preez 1977 (2) SA 400 CC). But proceedings for contempt of court
are not appropriate: Du Plessis 1972 (4) SA 216 (0).
4) See above at 182.
5) Joss v Board of Executors 1978 (1) SA 1106 (C) and on appeal to the
Full Bench see 1979 (1) SA 780 (C). But now see s 8(2) Divorce Act
which gives any court the power to rescind, vary or suspend a
maintenance order. The only requirements appear to be the 'domicile'






The Maintenance Court is a creature of statute. Section 2 of
the Maintenance Act states that 'Every magistrate's'court shall
within its area of jurisdiction be a maintenance court for the purposes
of this Act.' This court is presided over by a magistrate in his
capacity as a presiding judicial officer2 ) whereas the maintenance
officer, who investigates maintenance complaints and who institutes
the enquiry in the Maintenance Court, is usually a public presecutor
who has been specially appointed to this position. 3 ) The Maintenance
Court is given the power to make, enforce, vary or discharge a
4)
maintenance order, including an order of the Supreme Court. A
maintenance order is privileged in that it may be executed upon any
pension, annuity, gratuity, compassionate allowance or other similar
benefit not normally subject to execution or attachment. 5 ) So also,
a maintenance order is not affected by the insolvency of a husband, nor
does the order automatically terminate in the event of the husband's
t t · 6)seques ra lone
~lite apart from its powers under the Maintenance Act, the
Maintenance Court also has the power to enforce a maintenance order
emanating from a proclaimed country.7) But, the power to enforce a
1) Boberg 293-301; Hahlo 117-121; Olivier 233-235.
2) s 3 (1) Maintenance Act.
3) S 3 (2) Maintenance Act. For a proper description of the officials
of the Maintenance Court see Khumalo 'Procedure under the
Maintenance Act 1963' (1966) ~5 SALJ 266.
4) S 5 (4) Maintenance Act.
5) S 11 (2) Maintenance Act. See also s 4 Pension Laws A~endment Act,
73 of 1973, which provides that if a pensioner is ordered by the
Supreme Court on divorce to pay maintenance to his ex-spouse the
~linister of Social Welfare and Pensions may direct that part of the
pension shall be paid to the ex-spouse.
6) Hahlo 120 and the authorities cited at n 113-114.
7) S 4 Reciprocal Enforcement of Maintenance Orders Act, 80 of 1963.
The proclaimed countries are conveniently listed by Hahlo 120 n 118.
maintenance order of a proclaimed country does not include the power
to vary it: this can only be done by the court that originally
granted the order. l )
strangely enough, although a magistrate's court has no jurisdiction
in matters in which the dissolution of a marriage, or a separation
from bed and board,2) or of goods, of married persons is sought,3) the
irony of the factual position is that a magistrate can quite conceivably
find himself in the position of having to adjudicate in what can
appropriately be termed a 'mini' divorce action. Thus, the judicial
officer presiding over a Maintenance Court (who is, after all, a
magistrate) may well be obliged to adjudicate upon a complicated issue arisir
out of matrimonial fault where this has been put in issue in a maintenance
4)
case.
(C) The Children's Court
The Children's Court is given the power?) to grant a contribution
order for the maintenance of a child alleged to be in need of care.
6)
The Children's Court is presided over by a commissioner, or assista~t
1) Rirschowitz 1965 (3) SA 407 (w).
2) Judicial separation is no longer part of our law: s 14 Divorce Act.
3) S 46 (1) Magistrate's Court Act, 32 of 1944.
4) As in Alarakah 1975 (3) SA 245 (RAD). The fault-principle has
been 'watered down' considerably as a result of the passing of the
Divorce Act, which came into force on 1 July 1979. The extent
to which the fault principle plays a part in the divorce process
is still a matter of some contention: cf Rahlo and Sinclair 1-7.
The fault-principle, however, would still appear to be an important
consideration insofar as the grant of a maintenance order on
divorce is concerned: s 7 (2) Divorce Act and see 175 above.
5) By s 62 (1) (a) Children's Act, 33 of 1960.
6) For a full description of a 'child in need of care' see below at
243 n 1.
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commissioner, of child welfare.
l
)
h Ol If ° ° t t 2)of c 1 d we are 1S a mag1s ra e.
In the normal course, a commissioner
A contribution order is defined
by section 1 of the Children's Act as 'an urder for the payment or
recurrent payment of a sum of money as a contribution towards the
maintenance of a child in a place of safety or in any custody wherein
he was placed under this Act or the Criminal Procedure Act ••• , or
towards the maintenance of a pupil.' A pupil is also defined at the
same place as 'any person who, under any law, was sent to or received
in or is cared for in an institution or any person who ~as been released
on licence or has absconded from an institution and who is still under
the control or protection of the management of that institution, or
is liable to be brought back thereto.'
Unlike the conventional order for maintenance, a con~ribution
order for the maintenance of any person shall not continue to apply once
that person reaches the age of 21 years.3) Furthermore, such order
shall have the effect of a civil judgment of a Magistrate's Court
in favour of the Government of the Republic and may be enforced by a
clerk of the court like any other jUdgment. 4) Whether a contribution
order can be construed as falling within the ambit of the penal
provisions of the Maintenance Act is open to doubt though both Spiro5 )
and Boberg
6) are inclined to the view that it does.
1) S 7 (1) Children's Act.
, 2) S 2 (1) Children's Act.
3) S 64 (2) Children's Act.
4) S 63 Children's Act.
5) At 400.
6) At 441 no 98.
CD) The Magistrate's Court
In terms of section 62 (1) Cb) of the Children's Act a
magistrate is also given the power to grant a contribution order
for the maintenance of any child or pupil of an institution. Apart
from this, the magistrate is given the right to preside over the
criminal presecution of any person for the failure, inter alia, to
maintain a child which such person is legally liable to maintain,l)
and of any person who fails to comply with an ordinary maintenance
2)
order.
(E) The Minister of Pensions and Social Welfare
Jurisdiction is vested in the Minister of Pensions and Social
Welfare to make a contribution, out of moneys appropriated by
Parliament for this purpose, to the maintenance of a child or pupil
in a children's home. 3) He may also make a similar contribution to
the maintenance of any child by his parent, step-parent or guardian or
the person in whose custody the child has been placed under the
provlslons of the Children's Act, or section 290 of the Criminal
4)
Procedure Act, 51 of 1971.
(F) Procedure in Maintenance Cases
The procedure applicable in maintenance cases generally varies
from the formal notice of motion proceedings in the Supreme Court for
maintenance pendente lite5) and applications in the Supreme Court for
1) S 18 (2) Children's Act.
2) S 11 Maintenance Act.
3) S 89 (1) Cb) Children's Act.
4) S 89 (1) (c) Children's Act. S 290 Criminal Procedure Act deals
with the manner in which a convicted juvenile is to be dealt
with; viz, that, inter alia, until such time as he can be sent
to a reformatory (where this has been so ordered) the juvenile
offender may be kept in a place of detention or a place of safety.
5) Rule 43 Consolidated Rules of the Supreme Court.
/
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maintenance on divorce,l) 011 the one hand, to the more informal and
relaxed procedure in the Maintenance Court and the Children's Court,
on the other hand. Even within the ambit of the Maintenance Act itself,
differing degrees of formality are applicable in an enquiry under
section 5, on the one hand, and a prosecution for a failure to comply
with a maintenance order under section 11, on the other hand. Thus,
the procedure in a criminal prosecution under section 11 is strictly
adversary whereas, according to Kumleben J in the case of Perumal v
N 0d 2)al 00 ;
'The proceedings in ••• ;the Maintenance Court7 are
inquisitorial in character. The court is enjoined to
hold and conduct the necessary enquiry, which has as its
object the determination of important questions relating
to the duty of support. Often the interested parties •••
are without legal representation. In the circumstances
it is clearly the duty of the maintenance officer3 ) to
ensure that a thorough investigation is carried out.,4)
~lite apart from the differing degrees of formality applicable in
the above mentioned courts dealing with maintenance, it is significant
to note that the officials presiding over these various courts all
have differing legal training, experience and qualifications. Does
this not inevitably lead to inconsistency in maintenance matters?
Certainly, the magistrates, presecutors and clerks of court who operate
in Maintenance Courts generally do not see this type of work as being
their most important. These officials are schooled in a criminal
adversary atmosphere and, through no fault of theirs, are often
insensitive to the difficulties experienced by persons receiving
1) S 7 Divorce Act.
2) 1975 (3) SA 901 (N) at 903 D-E.
3) The learned judge appears to have failed to make the proper distinction
between the maintenance officer and the jUdicial officer presiding
over a Maintenance Court: see Khumalo 'Procedure under the Maintenance
Act 1963' (1966) 85 SALJ 266.
4) Further on the procedure applicable in the Maintenance Court see,
inter alia, Pieterse 1965 (4) SA 344 (T) at 346; Buch 1967 (3)
cA 83 ~at 85-87; Kruger v Ferreira 1979 (1) SA 915 (NK);
Govender v A~urtham and Others 1979 (3) SA 358 (N) at 360-362.
maintenance.
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Thus, accusations of a lack of understanding and
sympathy for the plight of women who have not received their
maintenance cheques on due date are frequently voiced. So, also,
frequent accusations are levelled against officials in the Maintenance
Office for failure to take prompt and effective action against maintenance
defaulters. In fact, one often comes across the allegation that there
is, on the part of certain maintenance officials, a misplaced expression
of concern at the 'burden' a maintenance defaulter is called upon to
dischargel
The Gff~cials charged with giving expression to the provisions of
the Maintenance Act are, as public servants, liable to frequent
transfer. This is to be regretted since, it is submitted, it would
be better if such officials remain in the community they are expected
to serve. There is, however, no easy solution to this problem and
one can sympathize with the difficulties experienced by such public
officials: they have, after all, to look after the interests of the
broadest possible spectrum of the public from the poorest to the
richest; from the lowest class to the upper class; White, Black and
Brown people. Is the Maintenance Court as presently structured properly
able to discharge its duties? Can it, for example, at any given moment,
properly handle a maintenance claim of, say, R2 500 per month by a woman
for her personal maintenance and RI 000 per month for each of her 3 minor
children? Bearing in mind that there appears to be no limit to the
amount of maintenance that may be claimed in a Maintenance Court, how
is the judicial officer presiding over the Maintenance Court going to
acquit himself in such an application when he is only used to handling
small maintenance claims?l) Has not the Maintenance Court, with the
passage of time, acquired a reputation of being a poor person's
2)
court?
1) Is this, perhaps, not the reason why cases such as Watson 1979 (2)
SA 854 (AD) bypass the Maintenance Court and are launched, in the
first instance, in the Supreme Court? See also Schafer 'An Upward
Variation of a Maintenance Order - An Expensive Luxury versus the
Best Interests of a Child?' (1979) 96 SALJ 540.
2) Cf Paulsen 'Juvenile Courts, Family Courts and the Poor Man' (1966)
.54 Calif LR 694: see 156 n 3 above.
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The building that houses the Magistrate's Court is usually the
same building in which the Maintenance Office is housed. This
inevitably leads to the constant presence of policemen, prison
officials, criminals and persons charged with having committed crimes
of one sort or another. The surroundings are steeped in a criminal
atmosphere. How soul distroying it must be for perfectly respectable
women (in most of the smaller centres at any rate) to have to queue
up behind a counterl ) during a busy month-end period with all sorts
of persons not even remotely concerned with maintenance matters?
How much more of an ordeal does it not become for the woman to be told
that her cheque is not ready or that the maintenance payable has not
yet been paid in? Worst still for the woman whose maintenance is not
timeously or regularly paid so that because of her frequent visits
to the Maintenance Office she comes to be branded as a nuisance!
The procedure prescribed for the Maintenance Court2) is so designed
to cut down on costs. The maintenance officer is the person to whom
a complaint is made on oath when it is alleged either that any person
legally liable to maintain any other person has failed to maintain
such person, or that sufficient cause exists for the substitution or
discharge of a maintenance order. Having received details of the
complaint, the maintenance officer is then given the discretion to
decide whether to institute an enquiry in the Maintenance Court or not.
In practice, however, it is submitted that he very rarely decides not
to proceed with an enquiry. If he decides to proceed with the necessary
enquiry the maintenance officer has the power to summon certain
persons, including the person alleged to be liable to comply with the
duty of support, to appear before the Maintenance Court. He will
also collect all the necessary evidence that he can to place before
the Maintenance Court.
The procedure to be observed by the Maintenance Court is prescribed
by section 5 of the Maintenance Act. Section 5 (2) of the Act states
1) Which is usually protected by iron-grill bars!
2) Ss 4 and 5 Maintenance Act.
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that 'Any person against whom an order may be made under this section
may be represented by counsel or by an attorney'. This does not
appear to include the other party to the proceedings. However, it is
submitted that it cannot have been the Legislature's intention to deny
such person the right to legal representation. l ) Certainly, in practice,
the informal nature of the proceedings provided for makes it desirable
that the interests of all parties be safeguarded by legal representation,
if this is desired. This, in turn, makes the task of the presiding
officer an easier one to discharge. If the parties are unrepresented
the tas~ of the presiding officer becomes more difficult since he is
not permitted simply to play a passive role in the proceedings; he
cannot leave the leading of evidence to the parties concerned; he is
not permitted to function as an umpire2 ); he may examine or cross-
examine both parties; he may even have to summon witnesses and require
3)books and documents to be produced. In short, he is obliged to act
in a way very different to his normal role as a magistrate presiding
over a criminal case or an ordinary civil case. He has to grapple
with concepts peculiar only to the provisions of the Maintenance Act.
Ordinary laymen do not know how to conduct an enquiry of the sort
provided for by the Maintenance Act. They require assistance from
their legal representatives and, if unrepresented, from the officer
presiding over the Maintenance Court. Is not the situation of which
Claassen J complained of in Pieterse's case
4 ) where the whole enq~iry
recorded in the Maintenance Court took up only 24 lines, of far too
freqJent occurrence?
1) On the question of legal representation see Katzen v Presiding Officer,
Maintenance Court, Johannesburg 1975 (1) SA 805 (T), esp 808 A-B; and
see Boberg 294 n 28. See also Huisamen 'Ondersoeke Ingevolge die
Onderhoudswet, 1963' (1973) DR 165 where a full report on the case
of Tulipan v Maintenance Officer, Cape Town, and Chanin, Case No
M27/70, appears.
2) Boberg 295.
3) On the procedure :n the Maintenance Court see, inter alia, Pieterse
1965 (4) SA 344 (T); Buch 1967 (3); Perumal v Naidoo 1975 (3) SA
901 (N); Kruger v Ferreira 1979 (1) SA 915 (NK); Govender v
Amurtham and Others 1979 (3) SA 358 (N).
4) 1965 (4) ~A 344 (T) at 346.
194
3. Minors
With regard to minors the following courts have jurisdiction: the
Supreme Court, the Children's Court and the Magistrate's Court. In
addition, the Minister of Social Welfare and Pensions is given limited
powers of jurisdiction over minors.
(A) The Supreme Court
At Common Law, the Supreme Court has overall jursidiction in respect
of all matters relating to minors. l ) It exercises this jurisdiction
in its capacity as upper guardian. 2 ) However, as Boberg rightly points
out,3) the Supreme Court's Common Law powers in this regard have been
largely superseded by the more comprehensive statutory powers accorded
to it by the Matrimonial Affairs Act and the Childrens Act. 4) This
was mainly because of the Supreme Court's inability at Common Law to
give effect to the true interests of minor children whose parents,
though not divorced or judicially separated, were de facto living apart
from each other. Thus, section 5 (1)5) of the Ma~imonial Affairs Act
provides that -
1) Boberg 412 n 2 where all the relevant authorities are conveniently
collected.
2) On the historical development of the concept in terms of which the
Supreme Court sees itself as the upper guardian of all minors see
Spiro 1-5; Hahlo and Kahn 386.
3) At 412 and 421.
4) See also s 19 (1) Supreme Court Act, 59 of 1959, where it is stated,
inter alia, that fA provincial or local division shall have
jurisdiction in and over all persons residing or being in and all
causes arising and all offences triable within its area or juris-
diction and in all other matters of which it may according to law
take cognizance
5) As amended by s 16 Divorce Act. See also s 6 (3) Divorce Act which
is substantially the same as s 5 (1) Matrimonial Affairs Act, except
that s 6 (3) goes further by giving the Supreme Court the power to
grant orders for the maintenance of dependent children. Furthermore,
s 6 (3) only applies to a court granting a decree of divorce
whereas s 5 (1) applies where the parents are already divorced or
are living apart. Hahlo and Sinclair 40-42.
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'Any provincial or local division of the supreme court or any
judge thereof may, on the application of either parent of a
minor whose parents are divorced or are living apart, in regard
to the custody or guardianship of, or access to, the minor,
make any order which it may deem fit, and may in particular,
if in its opinion it would be in the interests of such minor
to do so, grant to either parent the sole guardianship (which
shall include the power to consent to the marriage of the child)
or the sole custody of the minor, and the court may order that,
on the predecease of the parent to whom the sole guardianship
of the minor is granted, a person other than the surviving
parent shall be the guardian of the minor either jointly with
or to the exclusion of the surviving parent.'
Prior to the introduction of the original section 5 (1) in 1953 the
father of a minor child was alone entitled to all the natural
guardianship rights and the Supreme Court could only interfere with
these natural guardianship rights in exceptional circumstances. l )
Now, of course, where the parents are ~ivorced the father of a minor
child no longer automatically has a better claim than the mother to the
natural guardianship rights. The oft-expressed test is what is in
the best interests of the minor child. 2 ) But the essential qu~stion
is whether proper effect is being given to the best interests of
minor children. 3 ) Is the child not still considered as the 'prize'
for the winning litigant in matrimonial litigation?4)
1) Calitz 1939 AD 56 at 63. See also generally §s 140-172 Women's
Disabilities Report (1949).
2) Fletcher 1948 (1) SA 130 (AD); Bailey 1979 (3) SA 128 (AD); and
see Sornarajah 'Parental Custody: The Recent Trends' (1973) 90
&ALJ 131.
3) See above at 176 and below at 2RR n 3 and 301 n 2. As to what is
meant by the 'best interests of a child' see Young J in van Deijl
1966 (4) SA 260 (R) at 261 H where he said: 'The interests
of the minor mean the welfare of the minor and the term welfare must
be taken in its widest sense to include economic, social, moral and
religious considerations. Emotional needs and the ties of affection
must also be regarded and in the case of older children their wishes
in the matter cannot be ignored.' fee also Boberg 4230427.
4) See the review of Hahlo by Olmosdahl in (197~) 93 SALJ 232, 243-244;
Boberg 41h n 13. On the question of the split 8uardianship and
custody of minor children see I!ahlo 456 et seg; Bobp.rg 427-42R;
Olivier 30(-30R.
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While the Children's Courtl ) does not completely replace the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over matters involving children,
there is still the possibility of the Supreme Court competing with
the Children's Court for jurisdiction over matters affecting
children. 2) Thus, where a Children's Court has dealt with a child
in terms of section 31 of the Children's Act,3) a judge of the
Supreme Court will not upset this order by imposing his own order:
if he does in fact grant an order regarding the custody or
guardianship of a child, this may be made subject to any existing
order of the Children's Court, as in the case of Walkinshaw,4) or it
may be ordered to take effect only from the date when the order of
the Children's Court ceases to operate, as in the case of Forbes.5)
But where the Children's Court has already transferred the parental
6) .
power from one parent to another the Supreme Court, in a subsequent
matrimonial action between the parents, has not felt itself barred
from again considering the question of guardianship, as in the case of
Walters. 7)
But where the Children's Court is confronted with a prior Supreme
Court order concerning the custody of a child the position is even
/
more uncertain. As a general proposition, an order of the Children's
Court cannot be allowed to compete with an order of the Supreme Court:
such order would be invalid to the extent that it purports to compete
1) See below at 198 where Childrens' Courts are dealt with.
2) Spiro 329. Where this occurs the solution to this difficulty
is by no means clear.
3) S 31 is cited below at 199 n 1.
4) 1971 (1) SA 148 (NK) •
5) 1960 (1) SA 875 (D) : see also Lochenbergh 1949 (2) SA 197 (E).
6) In terms of s 60 Children's Act.
7) 1949 (3) SA 906 (0).
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1)
with, or vary, an order of the Supreme Court. But what exactly
2)
is a competing order is a difficult question to answer. Certainly,
the significance of this difficulty is highlighted by Vieyra J in the
case of Raath v Carikas3) as follows:
'Supposing, for example, that, custody having been awarded
to a mother by the Supreme Court, the child thereafter becomes
in need of care4 ) because it has been abandoned, or because
the custodian parent has been convicted of committing some
offence ••• In such circumstances, it could not be disputed
that an enquiry could be instituted under section 30 /of the
Children's Act7 at the instigation of a policeman or a
probation officer who was apprised of these facts, even if
the parents made no move in the matter. If that is so, an
appropriate order could be made by the children's court which
could not be regarded as competing with or of varying the
original order to the extent of being inconsistent with it.,5)
That this difficulty regarding 'competing' orders exists can, of
course, only be attributable to the fragmentation of jurisdiction in
regard to matters affecting minors. 6 ) Would this difficulty not be
resolved by the establishment of a unified family court in respect of
which there can be no question of competing jurisdictions?
1) Raath v Carikas 1966 (1) SA 756 (W).
2) See Boberg 445-447 where the learned author discusses this question
in a comprehensive review of the relevant authorities.
3) 1966 (1) SA 756 (W) at 761-762.
4) Boberg at 445-446 rightly points out that 'A child may be in
need of care from the very inception of his sojourn with a legally-
appointed custodian as easily as with a naturally-acquired one.'
5) See also Murphy v Venter 1967 (4) SA 46 (0) at 51-52.
6) As to the suggested solution to the problems of 'competing'
orders just outlined see Boberg 447.
/
(B) The Children's Court
This court, which has existed in South Africa since 1937, is
constituted by the provisions of sections 4 and 5 of the Children's
Act, and 'it sits in a room other than that in which any other court
ordinarily sits, unless no such other room is available and suitable. ,1)
The official presiding over the Children's Court is the commissioner
2)
or assistant commissioner of child welfare, and except for the fact
that its proceedings are generally conducted in camera3) the Children's
Court is governed by the same rules of procedure as govern the
ordinary courts. 4) Thus, in Napolitano v de Wet NO and Others5)
Marais J said -
'I am of the opinion that children's courts were intended to
be courts of law, bound in the main to observe all the rules
of evidence and procedure commonly observed by other courts
of law. There appears to be no basis for the contention
that it might pardonably function less formally than any other
court of law, or might admit otherwise inadmissible evidence
except where explicitly or by necessary implication a departure
or relaxation has been provided for.,6)
The jurisdiction of the Children's Court is extensive and far-
reaching. Its general powers7) include the power -
1) S 8 (1) Children's Act.
2) S 7 (1) Children's Act.
3) s 8 (2) Children's Act.
4) S 9 Children's Act.
See generally Spiro 320-329; Boberg 430-456.
5) 1964 (4) SA 337 eT) at 342 F-G.
6) See also Snyder en Andere v Steenkamp en Andere 1974 (4) SA 82 (N)
at 87 D-G; J and ~~other v Commissioner of Child Welfare, Durban
1979 (1) SA 219 eN) at 222 D-H.
7) Spiro 325.
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(i) to make certain orders in respect of children found to
. 1)
be in need of care ;
(ii) to make temporary custody orders in respect of children
h t 1 " " t
2)w ose paren s are lvlng apar ;
(iii) to deprive a parent living apart from the other of the
parental power3); and
(iv) to make adoption orders. 4)
1) These orders are provided for by s 31 (1) Children's Act. The
Children's Court, after holding the necessary enquiry in terms
of s 30 may, after finding a child to be in need of care, order
that the child -
(a) be returned to or remain in the custody of his ~arents or
guardian or of the person in whose custody he was immediately
before the commencement of the proceedings; or
(b) be placed in the custody of any suitable foster parent; or
(c) be placed under the control of an approved agency; or
(d) be sent to a children's home; or
(e) be sent to a school of industries.
See also Spiro 325-326.
For the definition of a child in need of care see below at 243.
According to the 1978 Social Welfare and Pensions Report, 20, the
following numbers of children were dealt with as provided for in
(a), (b), (d) and (e) above in the years 1976, 1977 and 1978: viz
1976 1977 1978
Returned to former custody 1164 1135 1093
Referred to children's homes 1185 873 755
Referred to school of industries 613 498 343
Placed in foster care 930 897 791
2) S 83 (1) Children's Act.
3) S 60 (1) Children's Act. Cf s 5 (1) Matrimonial Affairs Act and
s 6 (3) Divorce Act which are discussed above at 194 n 5.
4) S 71 (1) (a) Children's Act.
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Certainly, the largest proportion of the work of the Children's
Court is concerned with children alleged to be in need of care and
the granting of adoption orders. Thus, the total number of children
found to be in need of care for the years 1976, 1977 and 1978 were
as follows:
1976







The following table reflects the total number of adoption orders











In addition to the above powers, a commissioner of child welfare
is given other duties and powers. For example, a commissioner of
child welfare may at any time direct that a protected infant, or any
infant who is being kept apart from his parents in circumstances
believed on reasonable grounds to be prejudicial to his interests, be
medically examined. 3 ) The commissioner of child welfare may, of course,
delegate some of his duties regarding the protection of infants by
appointing any person to be an 'infant protection visitor. ,4)
If any person wishes to provide entertainment at which a child
under the age of 14 years is to perform, or be exhibited, application
will have to be made to a commissioner of child welfare who will give
his permission for such performance or exhibition only if:
1) 1978 Social Welfare and Pensions Report, 21.
2) 1978 Social Welfare and Pensions Report, 24, Table 27.
3) S 12 (4), as read with s 11 (1), Children's Act. The power to
order the medical examination of a sick or filthy child is also given
to a medical officer by s 20.
4) S 12 (1) Children's Act.
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(a) the child is physically or mentally fit for the
performance or exhibition; and
(b) there is no risk of physical, mental or moral injury
or detriment to the child; and
(c) proper provision is made for securing the health,
education and kind treatment of such child.
l
)
Whilst it may be generally true to s~y that Childrens' Courts
function as ordinary courts of law2) it is, nevertheless, pertinent to
note that enquiries to determine whether a child is in need of care are
much more informal than proceedings relating to an order for adoption.
Thus, in Napolitano v Commissioner of Child Welfare, Johannesburg3)
Holmes JA said:
'In my view it is plain that an enquiry under s 30
/Of the Children's Act7, to determine whether a child
is in need of care, is a much more informal proceeding
than that relating to an application for adoption
under s 71 /Of the Children's Act7; and different
issues are involved. Hence, it was irregular in this
case for the Commissioner to telescope t~e two
proceedings into one. To put it another way,
inadmissible or incompetent evidence was admitted in
the hearing of the application for the adoption, namely
the evidence which had been led in the enquiry under s 30'.
It would seem that quite apart from the fact that there are different
courts available to deal with children in one way or another, there
are differing degrees of formality or informality recognized within the
framework of the Children's Court itself. Furthermore, the Children's
Court is a court for children only and it has no business involving
itself in the domestic problems of the parents of the children that
are before it. In this regard, de Vos Hugo JP clearly sets out the
position in Ex Parte Kommissaris, Kindersorg: In Re Steyn Kinders4)
as follows:
1) S 23 Children's Act: Spiro 345 and 350.
2) See the authorities cited above.
3) 1965 (1) SA 742 (AD) at 745 G-H.
4) 1970 (2) SA 27 (NK) at 33 G.
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'Daar is perke aan die bevoegdheid van die kinderhof
en 'n kinderhofondersoek kan nie [.ebruik word om
huweliksprobleme tussen ouers op te los nie. Dat daar
sulke probleme kan ontstaan en dat dit 'n nadelige invloed
op die kinders kan he ly geen twyfel nie, maar verrigtinge
onder die Kinderwet kan nie gebruik word om daardie probleme
1
. ,1)
op te os nle.
In any event, it should also be noted that as against this background
the commissioners of child welfare, who are also magistrates, are
steeped in a criminal court atmosphere which inevitably makes them
generally ill-equipped for the many tasks entrusted to them by the
Children's Act. 2)
(C) The Magistrate's Court
With regard to criminal prosecutions, the minor, at first blush,
appears to be getting the best of both worlds. Thus, section 254 (1)
of the Criminal Procedure Act states that
'If it appears to the court at the trial upon any charge
of any accused under the age of eighteen years thet he is
a child in need of care3) as defined in section 1 of the
Children's Act, 33 of 1960, and that it is desirable to
deal with him in terms of sections 30 and 31 of that Act,
it may stop the trial and order that the accused be brought
before a children's court ••• and that he be dealt with
under the said sections 30 and 31.,4)
This procedure, however, will only be invoked where the trial court
feels that the child concerned falls within the definition of .a child
in need of care. The criminal proceedings are then replaced by an
enquiry and the child is thereafter dealt with by the Children's Court
in the manner described above.
1) See also Weber v Harvey NO and Others 1952 (3) SA 711 (T).
2) With regard to the competing jurisdiction between the Supreme Court
and the Children's Court see above at 194.
3) For the definition of a child in need of care see below at 243.
4) S 254 (1) Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977, replaces the old s 159
of the 1955 Act, the only difference being that the old s 159 made
it clear that the procedure did not apply to minors charged with
murder or rape. This limitation apparently no longer applies.
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If, however, the minor concerned does not fall within the
definition of a child in need of care, he will be dealt with by the
juvenile criminal court in the same way as any other ordinary
convicted person. In this case, though, the provisions of section
290 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act are relevant in that -
'Any court in which a person under the age of eighteen
years is convicted of any offence may, instead of imposing
punishment upon him for that offence -
Ca) order that he be placed under the supervision
of a probation officer; or
(b) order that he be placed in the custody of any
suitable person designated in the order; or
Cc) deal with him both in terms of paragraphs Ca)
and (b); or
Cd) order that he be sent to a reform school as
defined in section 1 of the Children's Act, 33
of 1960.,1)
It is clear that the sentencing and treatment of convicted juveniles
involves considerations additional to those existing where an adult is
sentenced. Thus, in Adams2) Steyn J very appropriately remarked that -
'Dit is met die jeugdige soveel meer as met enige
andcr beskuldigde noodsaaklik dat die Hof sy
straftoemetingsfunksie nie behoort uit te voer
tensy by volledige gegewens voor hom het aangaande
wat 'n gepaste vormis is ~ie. Die regspleging
verg steeds die grootste voorsorg en versigtigheid
1) According to the 1978 Social Welfare and Pensions Report, 23, Table
26, the total number of juvenile offenders dealt with under the
provisions of this section in 1976, 1977 and 1978 was 107, 164 and
985 respectively. There appears to have been a dramatic increase in
the number of juveniles dealt with under this section in 1978.
Of the 985 juveniles so dealt with 784 were dealt with in terms of
s290 (1) Cc) Criminal Procedure Act ie they were placed in the custody
of a suitable person and under the supervision of a probation officer.
In 1977 only 12 juveniles were dealt with in this manner. No
explanation is given in the Report for such a dramatic increase.
2) 1971 (4) SA 125 (K) at 126 G.
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by die vasstelling van 'n geskikte straf, maar dit
verg dit in 'n besondere mate waar met jeugdiges
gehandel word. Die moontlikheid van hervorming
is by die jeug soveel meer aktueel en die gevolge
van 'n onoorwoe uitoefening van diskresie deur die
voorsittende amptenaar kan soveel meer onherstelbare
b · . d· 1 ,. d· ,1)skade mee rlng ln le geva van n Jeug 1ge.
The dilemma facing the trial court, however, lies in deciding
which of the above two sections of the criminal code to invoke -
whether to refer the juvenile accused to the Children's Court as a
child allegedly in need of care, or whether to deal with the accused
after conviction in one of the ways provided for by section 290 (1) of
the criminal code. Whatever the decision of the trial court the
consequences for the juvenile accused are far-reaching. To assist the
trial court to arrive at a proper decision a probation officer's report
may be called for an~ as a rule of practice, before a juvenile is
sentenced in respect of a serious offence one is usually called for. 2)
Despite this rule of practice, however, it cannot be said that a
decision which is in the best interests of a juvenile accused is
always taken. This clearly emerges from a brief review of the
following recent cases. 3) These cases concern, in the main, the
question of the desirability of ordering a juvenile to be sent to a
reformatory in terms of section 290 (1) W) of the Criminal Procedure Act.
1) See also Yibe 1964 (3) SA 502 (E).
2) See, for example, Jansen and An 1975 (1) SA 425 (AD) at 428 A
where Botha JA said: 'To enable a court to determine.the most
appropriate form of punishment in the case of a juvenile offender,
it has become the established practice in the Courts to call for
a report on the offender by a probation officer in, at least, all
serious cases.' Jansen and An was followed with approval by
Rumpff CJ in Hlongwana 1975 (4) SA 567 (AD) at 570-571. See also
Harcourt 637 and Midgley 130-131. Further on probation officers
see below at 234-235.
3) That is, Yibe 1964 (3) SA 502 (E); A and Others 1976 (3) SA 144
(C); R 1977 (1) SA 759 (C); ~ 1978 (2) SA 75 (C).
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This problem was highlighted by Wynne J in Yibe's caseI) where he
adopted with approval the following sentiment of Gardinerand
2)
Lansdown ; namely,
'The main purpose of a reformatory is to secure the
reformation of a juvenile delinquent and the correction
of his maladjustment to society, ends which might be
hopeless of attainment if he was associated with
criminals. Before, however, a sentence of reformatory
detention is passed, care should be taken to see that
the accused is a fit subject for the reformatory. His
offence may have been really a boyish prank, his character
may be good and there may be no need of a reformation,
he may be in charge of parents or fit persons to look
after him, and he may as a general rule be amenable to
their control. In such circumstances it would be wrong
and might cause incalculable harm to the boy, to send him
to a reformatory... It must be borne in mind that any
sentence of detention in a reformatory is bound to be
drastic. It removes a boy from his relatives for at
least two years, and whatever care be taken in regard
to the classification, it is bound to bring him into
contact with some boys of vicious tendencies. 3)
Before deciding therefore upon detention in a reform-
atory, the Court should take into consideration the
nature and circumstances of the offence, and if
sufficient information is not disclosed by the evidence
in the case, should make enquiries as to the accused's
character, his home life, and should determine whether
his case is one for which reformatory treatment is
needed.'
Yibe's case concerned a ten year old African boy who had been
sentenced by a magistrate to a reform school for the theft of a 44
gallon drum of paraffin. He admitted two previous convictions for
theft though, in the instant case, there had been a suggestion that




he had been 'forced' to steal. The probation officer recommended
l
)
that the accused be given cuts and be placed in the custody of his
parents, under the control of a probation officer, coupled with the
direction that he attend school regularly. The magistrate, however,
disagreed with this recommendation and felt that the time had come
'to bend the tree,2) and he sentenced the boy to a reformatory.
On review Wynne J altered this sentence and ordered3), instead, that
the accused be placed in the custody of his father, under the super-
vision of a probation officer.
Magistrates in particular have been frequently enjoined in the
past to note that to send a juvenile to a reform school is a drastic
measure and that the greatest care should be exercised before such a
sentence is imposed. In particular, it is generally undesirable to
impose such a sentence on a first offender.
4
) Even in recent times
the Supreme Court has expressed concern at the manner in which the
power to sentence a youthful offender to reformatory has been invoked.
Thus, in A and Others5 ) two out of the three female accused, both aged
. 6)
19 years, were sentenced to be detained in a reformatory. The effect
of these sentences was that they were liable to serve 'a term of
incarceration of 4 years' since they could be detained in a reformatory
until they reached the age of 23 years. 7 ) Their offence was that of
being on board a ship in the Republic without the permission of the
owner or the m~ster of the ship.8) It was pointed out by Van Winsen AJP
1) At 504 H.
2) At 503 G.
3) At 512 F.
4) The authorities are reviewed by Wynne J in Yibe 1964 (3) SA 502 (E):
see also Zungu 1962 (1) SA 377 (N).
5) 1976 (3) SA 144 (C).
6) The third accused was an adult and her sentence of a fine of R50
or 100 days imprisonment was found to be in order.
7) At 145 A. Cf Re Gault 387 US 1 (1967) and Kent v United States
383 US 542 (1966).
8) In contravention of s 318 (a) Merchant Shipping Act, 57 of 1951.
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that the maximum fine for this offence was RlOO. In the circumstances
Van Winsen AJP (Steyn J concurring) held that there was no ground for
distinguishing the cases of the two female juvenile accused,
particularly in view of the fact that a probation officer had reported
that no meaningful advantage was to be gained by placing the two younger
girls in a reformatory. The sentences on each of the two younger girls
were accordingly altered to fines of R50 or imprisonment for a period
of 100 days.
The case of A and Others was subsequently followed by the case of
R,l) the facts of both being substantially the same. In D's case the
accused was a 16 year old female juvenile and the order that she be
sent to a reformatory could have meant a period of incarceration for
5 years for an offence that· the Legislature did not regard in a serious




,/I}t must be conceded that a reform school does not
always reform. Young people do not necessarily benefit
from a prolonged spell in a reformatory. In a case such
as this both prison and the reformatory should be
avoided and a third course adopted. In my view this is
an appropriate case for the application of the machinery
of the Children's Act.,3)
One of the most recent cases in point is the case of ~4) where
a female accused, aged 15 years, was convicted of housebreaking with
intent to steal and theft from her own home during he~ mother's
absence. The items stolen were a pair of trousers and some groceries.
On review, Hofmeyer AJ, following Zungu and Another5 ) and Yibe6), ordered
that the reform school sentence be set aside and that the accused be
dealt with as a child in need of care in terms of section 30 of the
Children's Act.
1) 1977 (1) SA 759 (C). It is clear that in both cases, the females
were on board the ships for the purposes of prostitution.
2) At 760 G.
3) For the orders that a Children's Court may grant in terms of s 31 (1)
Children's Act see above at 199 n 1.
4) 1978 (2) SA 75 (C).
5) 1962 (1) SA 377 (N).
6) 1964 (3) SA 502 (E).
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In the final analysis, then, it can hardly be seriously contended
that a minor is in the position of getting the best of both worlds
when it comes to criminal prosecutions. That the problems outlined
in the brief analysis of the cases above are very real are evidenced
by the fact that in recent years there has been a significant increase
in the number of juveniles committed to reformatories. Thus in 1976
a total of 65 juveniles were sentenced to a reform school while in
1977 the number was 82 juveniles. In 1978 the number of committals
to a reform school jumped to 127.1)
(D) The Minister of Social Welfare and Pensions
Apart from his many administrative duties under the Children's
Act,2) the Minister of Social Welfare and Pensions has a number of
powers over minors at the post-committal stage. For example, after
consultation with those in charge of the institution or approved
agency at which a pupil or child is being 'detained', the Minister may
order the discharge of such pupil or child from the effect of any
order made under section 31 of the Children's Act, or under section
290 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act. So also, the Minister may
cancel any licence granted to any pupil~) The Minister also has the
power to authorize the marriage of a minor pupil or child in certain
. t 4)
c~rcums ances.
1) 1978 Social Welfare and Pensions Report, 23, Table 26.
2) By virtue of Proclamation 42 of 1968 the administration of the
provisions of the Children's Act is entrusted to the Minister
of Social Welfare and Pensions.
3) S 44 (7) (a) Children's Act.
4) This is dealt with immediately below under 'Consent to Marry'.
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4. Consent to Marry
The granting of consent to minors wishing to marry also affords
another example of needless multiple jurisdiction. The position,
very briefly stated, is that a judge of the Supreme Court can be
called upon to override the parents' or guardians' refusal to give
their consent to the marriage of their minor child, or to overrule
the refusal by a commissioner of child welfare to give his consent
to a minor's proposed marriage. l ) A judge will only override a
prior refusal of consent if such refusal is without adequate reason
and contrary to the interests of such minor. 2)
On the other hand, a commissioner of child welfare can be
approached for his permission for a minor to contract a marriage
where the minor concerned is unable, for some reason or other3), to
obtain the consent of a parent or guardian. 4)
But where a female under the age of 15 years or a male under
the age of 18 years wishes to marry an approach must be made to the
1) S 25 (4) Marriage Act, 25 of 1961.
2) C en 'n Ander v van T 1965 (2) SA 239 (0); Allcock 1969 (1)
SA 427 (N); Kruger v Fourie 1969 (4) SA 469 (0). See also
Joubert 'Geregtelike Toestemming tot Huwelike van Minderjariges'
1976 DJ 243.
3) For example where the parent is absent or where his whereabouts
are unknown.
4) S 25 (1) Marriage Act, and see Ex Parte Visick and k~other
1968 (1) SA 151 CD).
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Minister of the Interior for his consent to the proposed marriage. l )
It should be noted that the application to the Minister of the Interior
is quite apart from any parental or guardian's consent which, if
2)
refused, may invol,;-e an application to a judge of the Supreme Court. '
An interesting, but very welcome, practice on the part of the Minister
is to call for psychological reports on the background of all boys
and girls under 18 years and 15 years respectively who intend to marry.3)
Such reports deal with the desirability of the proposed marriage and
the chances of its success.
Where a minor has been placed in the custody of a person or
institution, other than in the custody of a parent or guardian, and
such minor wishes to marry, the requisite permission will h~ve to be
1) S 26 (1) Marriage Act. According to the 1979 Interior Department
Report, 22, applications for ministerial permission to marry in 1977,








1977 1978 1979 1977 1978 1979
4 5 4 19 27 30
2 1 1 10 1 1
- - - - - -
4 6 5 8 8 2
2 2 2 2 - -
- - - - - -
Should the necessary ministerial consent be lacking, the 'marriage',
if it takes place, will be null and void: Shields 1959 (4) SA 16 (W);
Abels 1961 (2) SA 639 (C). But, the children of such 'marriage'
will be treated on the same basis as the children of a putative
marriage and be declared legitimate: Abels (supra). In this case the
plaintiff bona fide believed that the marriage was valid and binding
notwithstanding the fact that she lacked the necessary ministerial
permission to marry.
2) The necessity for obtaining the Minister's consent falls away if
'the consent of a judge or court having jurisdiction in the matter
is necessary and has been granted' : s 26 (1) Marriage Act - second
proviso.
3) 1978 Annual Report of the Department of Social Welfare and Pensions
RP30/1978.
211
obtained from the Minister of Social Welfare and Pensions. The
Minister will only give his permission if he is satisfied 'on the
two following points:
(i) that it is in the interests of the minor to get married; and
(ii) that the parent or guardian of the minor has unreasonably
withheld consent, or cannot be found, or is deceased, or is
unable to give consent because of mental illness. l )
In the light of the above one is prompted to ask whether it is
really necessary to make provision for so many officials, apart from
parents and guardians, to have the power to determine whether a minor
should or should not marry. Surely, a judge of the Supreme Court
can just as competently deal with such questions as a commissioner
of child welfare, or the Minister of the Interior, or the Minister
of Social Welfare and Pensions?
1) S 59 (4) Children's Act.
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5. The Fragmentation of Jurisdiction in respect of Customary Family
Law Matters.
It is proposed to deal very briefly with the fragmentation of
1)
jurisdiction in family law matters under the Customary Law. The
legal position of the South African black citizen is often complicated
by the fact that, broadly speaking, there are two systems of law
available to him and within each system there are various courts
administering that system. These two systems are the traditional
Customary Law2) and the South African Common Law.
At the lowest level of jurisdiction there are the courts of chiefs
and headmen which are created by section 12 of the Black Administration
Act, 38 of 1927, and which have limited civil and criminal jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the chief or headman is limited to 'civil claims
arising out of Black Law and Custom brought before him by Blacks against
Blacks resident within his area of jurisdiction. ,3) The chief or
headman, however, has no power 'to determine any question of nullity,
divorce or separation arising out of a marriage. ,4) The courts of
chiefs and headmen are characterized by their informality. Legal
1) The term 'Customary Law' is being used in preference to other terms
like 'Bantu Law', 'Native Custom', 'African Law', or 'Black Law'
for the reasons given by Kerr 7-12.
2) The courts administering Customary Law are discussed by, inter alia,
Seymour 14-36; Olivier (N) 577-578; Yates 'Bantu Civil Courts
in South Africa' (1971-72) 7 Spec Juris 42 /reprinted in (1973)
70 DR 4217 - this article is critically analysed by Suttner
'Problems of African Civil Law Today' (1974) 78 DR 266 and 311;
see also Labuschagne and Swanepoel 'Regspleging van die Stedelike
Swartman in Suid-Afrika' (1979) 12 DJ 17-25.
3) S 12 (1 ) (a) Black Administration Act.
4) Proviso to s 12 (1) Black Administration Act.
213
practitioners are not permitted to appear in these courts and for the
judgments of these courts to be effective they must be registered with
the clerk of the Commissioner's Court within two months of deliverance,
otherwise they lapse. Appeals from these courts are heard in the
Commissioner's Court. l )
At the next level of importance there is the Commissioner's Court
which is created by section 10 (1) of the Black Administration Act.
This court is enjoined by the Act to hear all 'civil causes and matters
between Blacks and Blacks only.' But from the family law point of view,
the Commissioner's Court has no jurisdiction in respect of the following
matters:
(1) where the status of a person in respect of mental capacity
is sought to be affected;
(2) where a decree of nullity, divorce or separation in respect
f .. ht 2)o a marr~age ~s soug •
Recognizing the fact that Blacks have always 'had a relatively well
developed legal system,3) the Legislature granted the Commissioner's
Court a discretion as to which system of law to apply.
11 (1) of the Black Administration Act provides that -
Thus, section
'Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, it shall
be in the discretion of the Commissioner's Courts in all
suits or proceedings between Blacks involving questions of
customs followed by Blacks, to decide such questions
according to the Black law applying to such customs except
insofar as it shall have been repealed or modified:
Provided that such Black law shall not be opposed to the
principles of public policy or natural justice: Provided
further that it shall not be lawful for any court to
declare that the custom of lobola or bogadi or other similar
custom is repugnant to such principles.'
1) S12 (4) Black Administration Act.
2) Proviso to s 10 (1) Black Administration Act. These matters that
are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Commissioner's Court fall
to be dealt with by either the Supreme Court or the Divorce C0urt:
see bplow.
3) Suttncr 'Problems of African Civil Law Today.' 1974 DR 266 and 311.
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This section is critically examined by, inter alia, Kerrl ) who
points out2 ) that the above discretion is given to the court and
not to either or both of the parties. The exercise of this discretion
is no easy matter as the cases of Ex Parte Ministe'r of Native Affairs:
In Re Yako v Beyi3) and Umvov04) show. Pending a decision by the
court the Black Man may well find himself in a state of uncertainty
as to which system of law will apply to his particular problem. 5 )
1) 'Choosing a System of law by the Exercise of Discretion' 1977 AJ 95.
See also Bennett 'The Application of Common Law and Customary law
in Commisnioners' Courts.' (1979) 96 SALJ 399; Bennett 'Conflict
of laws in South Africa: Cases Involving Customary law' (1980)
43 THR-HR 27.
2) At 96.
3) 1948 (1) SA 388 (AD).
4) The case of Umvovo was comprehensively ventilated in the courts
and is cited at the following references: (1949) 1 NAC (S) 96;
(1950) 1 NAC (S) 90; (1952) NAC (S) 80; (1952) NAC (S) 151;
1953 (1) SA 195 (AD). '
5) It would seem that the problem for the Black Man is not too
serious since the effect of Ex Parte Minister of Native Affairs:
In Re Yako v Beyi 1948 (1) SA 388 (AD) is that the Common Law
will apply in the Commissioner's Court unless the court, in terms
of s 11 (1) Black Administration Act decides to apply Customary
Law. vfuat is clear, however, is that the exercise of the court's
discretion will quite often have a profound effect on the result
of the case so far as the respective litigants are concerned.
This point is graphically illustrated by Kerr 'Choosing a System
of law by the Exercise of Discretion' 1977 'AJ 95, 98-99, as follows:
'In South African common law the mother of a; illegitimate child
is its guardian. The father is bound to maintain the child.
In the customary law of the Cape Nguni tribes, in certain cases the
father, if he pays damages plus a beast for isondhlo, is entitled
to claim the custody and guardianship of the child. Suppose that
the mother institutes a common law action against the father for
maintenance and that she is successful. If the father then
tenders to her guardian damages plus a beast for isondhlo he will
be entitled, if customary law is applied and if the mother has
been joined in the action, to take the child and to cease paying
the maintenance ordered.'
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Appeals from the Commissioner's Court are heard in the Appeal
Court for Commissioners' Courts which is created by section 13 of the
Black Administration Act. A decision of the Appeal Court for




Like the Commissioner's Court, the Divorce Court is a creature
of statute, which has 'jurisdiction to hear and determine suits of
nullity, divorce and separation between Blacks ••• in respect of
. t . .. th f ' 2 ) S hmarriage and to declde any ques lons arlslng ere rom. uc
questions would include disputes concerning the custody of children,
maintenance and matrimonial property rights. 3) The Divorce Court
has a concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court to hear an action
for nullity, divorce or separation where the parties are both Black
and have married under the Common Law. However, the Divorce Court
was specially created for Blacks4) and the scale of costs applicable
in this court is much cheaper than that applicable in the Supreme
Court. Not insignificantly, Clayden J in the case of Mbelle5) spoke
of the 'determination to discourage litigants from the use of an
expensive procedure where a cheaper one is available.' His Lordship
then went on to point out6) that -
'Just as any litigant is discouraged from proceeding
in the Supreme Court when he can proceed in the
magistrate's court by the likelihood that his costs
will be limited, so the !Blac~7 instituting pro-
ceedings for divorce ••• is encouraged to use the
special court which has been provided for such actions.'
S 18 (2) Black Administration Act. But in terms of s 14 of the
Act the Minister of Co-operation and Development may submit any
decision of the Appeal Court for Commissioners' Courts to the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court where he has any doubts
as to the correctness of its decision on a question of law. The
resultant decision will be binding on all Commissioners' Courts
and all Appeal Courts for Commissioners' Courts.
S 10 Black Administration Act, 1927, Amendment Act, 9 of 1929.
The Divorce Court was formerly known as the 'Bantu Divorce Court': \
s 17 (1) (k) Second Black Laws Amendment Act, 102 of 1978. There
are th:ee ~ivi~io~s of the Divorce Court: viz, the Southern Divorce
Court In Klngwllllamstown; the North-Eastern Divorce Court in
Pietermaritzburg; and the Central Divorce Court in Johannesburg.
Seymour 31. If such custody, maintenance and property disputes are
not raised in conjunction with a divorce action then the Commissioner's
Court is the appropriate court to deal with any such question.
Mnimane 1931 WLD g9.
1947 (1) SA 782 (W) Qt 784.
r \
216
The Black who has married under the Common Law who wishes to obtain
a divorce has the choice of going to the Divorce Court or to the
Supreme Court. It is clear that although the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court has not been ousted by the Divorce Court, the choice as
to the forum in which a Black will launch his matrimonial action is
going to be affected by the question of costs.
Not only do the Blacks have the right to choose the forum in
which to launch any matrimonial action, but they also have the right
to choose the form of their marriages: they may decide to marry
either under the Common Law or under the Customary Law. l ) The choice is
entirely theirs. But whatever their choice, they are going to be
2)
bedevilled by problems of conflict of laws. It is clear that we
can no longer regard the Customary Law as a primitive system of law
for primitive peoples. The way of life for the Black has experienced
far-reaching 'social adjustments and upheavals' leading /broadly
speakin~7 to the detribalization of the Black Man. 3) Ye~,
notwithstanding this fact old customs and traditions die hard with
the result that, for example, it is not uncommon for Blacks to marry
under the Common Law while, at the same time, giving expression to
the customary system of lobola. 4) If, however, the marriage should
fail and if the parties should bring their divorce action before the
Divorce Court, the Divorce Court will not consider any question
arising out of the lobola contract.5) The proper forum for the
disposal of any dispute on the lobola contract is the Commissioner's
Court which is able to exercise its discretion in deciding whether to
1) Seymour 58-60; 92 ff; 237 ff.
2) Seymour 43-45 and see Bennett 'Conflict of Laws in South Africa:
Cases involving Customary Law' (1980) 43 THR-HR 27.
3) Suttner 'Problems of African Civil Law Today' (1974) 78 DR 266, 267.
4) The custom of lobola is expressly declared by the proviso to s 11 (1)
Black Administration Act not to be repugnant 'to the principles of
public policy or natural justice.'
5) Mtiyane 1952 NAC 229 (N-E).
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apply Customary Law so as to give effect to the custom of lobola.
l
)
Finally the Supreme Court itself may deal with an action based on a
lobola contract which was entered into in connection with a Common
La . 2)w marrlage.
Appeals from the Divorce Court are heard in the Supreme Court. 3 )
On the other hand, appeals from the Commissioner's Court are heard
in the Appeal Court for Commissioners' Courts.
4
)
Finally, it may be mentioned that quite apart from the problem
arising out of the fragmentation of jurisdicti~n in respect of
Customary Law matters, the Black Man is confronted with two further
difficulties: Firstly, the Customary Law is not always to be found
in readily accessible form,5) and, secondly, the Customary Law tends
to vary from tribe to tribe.
Whether the proposed family court in South Africa should have
a discretion to apply Customary Law is not an easy matter to decide
upon. There are two possible avenues of approach. In the first
place, the solution may be to make only the Common Law of South
Africa applicable in the proposed family court. Thus, any family law
problem falling within the ambit of Customary Law, but outside the
field of the Common Law, would have to be dealt with by any of the
courts described above which administer the Customary Law. The
decision as to whether a matter properly falls to be determined by the
1) S 11 (1) Black Administration Act. According to Kerr 'Roman-
Dutch Law Marriages and the Lobola Contract' 1960 AJ 334 and
'Implied Lobola Contracts Ancillary to Roman-Dutch-raw Marriages'
1963 AJ 49, where the parties have married under the Common Law
any lobola contract should be regarded as being ancillary to the
Roman-Dutch Law marriage contract. In other words, the lobola
contract is a contract in Roman-Dutch Law which contains implied
terms based on the Customary Law.
2) Sigcau 1944 AD 67 and see Kerr 'The Application of Native Law in the
Supreme Court' (1957) 74 SALJ 313.
3) S la (5) Black Administration .Act, 1927, Amendment Act, 9 of 1929.
4)\ S bee a ove at 215.
5) Kerr 13-14.
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proposed family court, or by one of the courts outlined above, would
1)
have to remain with the proposed family court.
It is doubted, however, whether this suggested solution will meet
with much approval. It is a suggestion which is deceptively simplistic.
The difficulties that are being sought to be avoided would in fact be
perpetuated by the suggested solution. Thus, for example, the same
Black family could find itself being subjected to the jurisQiction of
both the proposed family court and one of the courts administering
Customary Law. Thus, a dispute arising out of a lobola claim could fall
to be determined by the Customary Law whereas a custody and guardianship
dispute~) or a maintenance claim, could well fall within the jurisdiction
of the proposed family court. A further problem could arise where one
of the litigants wishes to have a matter settled by the proposed family
court whereas the other litigant might wish to have the matter decided
by one of the courts administering the Customary Law.
The second possible solution to the question whether the proposed
family court should have a discretion to apply Customary Law is that it
should have such a discretion. The only possible difficulty with this
suggested solution is that the Customary Law is not always to be found
in readily accessible form and it tends to vary from tribe to tribe.
It is suggested, however, that this problem can be readily overcome by
giving a judge of the proposed family court the discretion to appoint
an assessor to assist him with any matters arising out of the Customary
Law. In practice, this would only occur in rarely disputed family law
cases which involve complicated and obscure points of Customary Law.
Of course, the main advantage of the second suggested solution is that
the proposed family court would be available to everyone in South Africa
so that it would not assume an inferior status in the eyes of the largest
section of the South African population.
1) It must, of course, be remembered that any Black can bring any action
before the Supreme Court: cf Sigcau 1944 AD 67.
2) On the question of which system of law will applyin guardianship
disputes see Kerr 'Does a Minor need two Natural Guardians in two
Systems of Law to assist Him at the same Time?' (1965) 82 SALJ 487.
See also Church 'Guardianship as an Incident of the Customary Law of
Parent and Child - With reference to Transkei' (1979)"12 CILSA 326.
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CHAPTER NINE
THE COURTS AND THE BEHAVIOURAL AND SOCIAL SCIENTISTSl ) .
1. Introduction
The main purpose of this chapter is to show that there already
exists in South Africa a reasonably sound foundation on which there is
co-operation between the courts on the one hand, and the behavioural and
social scientists on the other. It is the nurturing of, and strengthening
of, this co-operation that lies at the root of a successful family court
system.
For the purposes of this thesis a broad distinction is made between
the medical profession on the one hand, and the behavioural and social
scientists on the other. Broadly speaking, the medical profession includes
not only the general medical practitioner but also the medical specialist
and pathologist. Included within the broad description 'behavioural and
social scientists' are psychiatrists, psychologists, probation officers,
social workers and sociologists. 2)
1) 'Social workers and sociologists, as well as psychologists and
psychiatrists, now and in the foreseeable future, will have a minimal
impact on the law, including our areas of mutual concern. This is
because law is a fickle mistress with many consorts, including religion,
philosophy and history. To single out but one love of the law is to
ignore her promiscuity. The behavioural sciences will have to compete
with experienced rivals in courtroom and legislative chambers, and it
is to be doubted that law ever will settle for one true love. Such is
her nature.' - per Foster in his review of the 1966 edition of Foote,
Levy and Sander in (1966) 42 NYULR 396, 398.
2) The broad distinction being made between the medical profession, and
the behavioural and social scientist is an arbitrary one. In other
contexts this would not be a valid distinction to make. Thus, for
example, a psychologist and a medical practitioner are persons who are
registered as such under the same piece of legislation; viz The Medical,
Dental and Sup lementary Health Service Professions Act, 56 of 1974
see sI. A psychiatrist is defined by s_l Mental Health Act, 18 of
1973, as a person who is registered as such. It is to be noted that a
psychiatrist falls within the ambit of s 32 (1) Medical, Dental and
Su lementa Health Service Professions Act, 56 of 1974, which provides,
inter alia, that 'The registrar of the South African Medical and Dental
Counci17 shall •.. establish and-keep registers in which shall ••• be
entered particulars in respect of persons who are practising any
profession ••• which has as its object the treatment, prevention or
relief of psysical or mental defects, illnesses or deficiencies in man.'
See'also s 79 (12) Criminal Procedure Act where it is stated that a
psychiatrist means a person registered as such under the Medical,
Dental and Supplementary Health Service Professions Act.
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2. The Medical Profession
There exists a long tradition of healthy co-operation between
the courts and the medical profession, particularly in the field of
1 · t d .. 1 1 1) Ex· "h th t 1 1de lC an crlmlna aWe perlence sows a as a genera ru e
this co-operation and assistance on the part of the medical profession
is freely given.
To a lesser extent, however, this co-operation is made necessary
by the requirements of some or other statutory enactment. For example,
section 12 (4) of the Children's Act provides that -
'A commissioner of child welfare may at any time
direct that a protected infant or any such infant as
is mentioned in paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of
section eleven who is kept within his district,2)
be medically examined by the district surgeon, or
any other qualified medical practitioner. ,3)
1) For example, in a delictual claim based on an assault, and in a
criminal prosecution for an assault, medical reports are, more
often than not, of crucial importance. So also, in drunken driving
cases the opinion evidence of a medical practitioner is vital: see
Cooper and Bamford 332-380. In murder prosecutions the evidence of
a pathologist is generally considered indispensable.
2) S 11 (1) (b) Children's Act deals with an infant which is being
kept apart from its parents in circumstances believed on reasonable
grounds to be prejudicial to its interests. See also s 20
Children's Act which makes provision for children alleged to be
sick or filthy to be medically examined.
3) For a further example see s 3 (2) Inquests Act, 58 of 1959, which
provides that 'any magistrate to whom the death is reported shall,
if he deems it expedient in the interests of justice, cause it
;the body? to be examined by the district surgeon or any other
medical practitioner who may, if he deems it necessary for the
purpose of ascertaining with greater certainty the cause of death,
make or cause to be made an examination of any internal organ
or any part or any of the contents of the body, or any other
substance or thing.' See also s 25 (1) Compulsory Motor Vehicle
Insurance Act, 56 of 1972, in terms of which a medical report in
regard to the cause of death or the nature and treatment of the
bodily injury in connection with a claim for compensation is
absolutely essential.
221
3. Behavioural and Social Scientists
(A) Psychiatrists and Psychologists
The relationship between the courts and psychiatrists and
psychologists has not always been consistently sound. It is only
in comparatively recent years that psychiatry and psychology have
made their impact as recognizable science. Statutory recognition
is now accorded to the professions of psychiatry and psYChology.l)
Although psychiatrists and psychologists are newcomers to the modern
scene their contribution to the development and shaping of our law
has not been insignificant both in the area of statute and Common Law.
(i) Statute
The Mental Health Act, 18 of 1973, represents a recognition by
the courts and the legislature of the important role that psychiatry
and psychology have to play in the administration of jUstice. 2 )
Although the Mental Health Act generally obliges the alienist to
1) See above at 219 n 2.
2) The Mental Health Act must be considered against the background
of the attempted assassination in 1960, and the assassination
in 1966, of a former South African premier, Dr H F Verwoerd.
In 1966 a one-man commission of inquiry under the chairmanship of
Mr Justice J T van Wyk, a Judge of Appeal, was appointed to inquire
into the circumstances of the assassination: see Report RP 16 of
1967. Also in 1966, a further commission under the chairmanship
of Mr Justice F Rumpff, the present Chief Justice, was appointed to
inquire 'into the responsibility of mentally deranged persons and
related matters:' see Report RP 69 of 1967, hereafter referred to
as the Rumpff Report. For a critical analysis of the Rumpff
Report's criterion'of responsibility where insanity is raised as a
defence see Olmesdahl 'Furiosus Solo Furore Punitur' (1958) 85
SALJ 2(2. Ari~ing out of a recommendation contained in the Rumpff
ReportLe 12.427 a further commission of inquiry under the chairmanship
of Mr Justice-J T van Wyk was appointed to consider the revision of
the Mental Disorders Act, 38 of 1916. The recommendations of this
commission - see Report RP 80 of 1972 - eventually resulted in the
promulgation of the Mental Health Act. It should be noted that
when the Mental Health Act was promulgated, it left intact sections
27 to 29 bis Mental Disorders Act. These sections have, however,
now been replaced by ss 77 to 79 Criminal Procedure Act in respect
of which see below at 223-224.
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work in close co-operation with the courts, it by no means follows
that this always results in a harmonious relationship. This is
especially because of the inclusion of psychopathic disorder in the
definition of mental illness,l) since psychopathy has been described
as 'one of the most controversial, misunderstood and misused concepts
in the fields of psychology, psychiatry and law.,2) Notwithstanding
the differences of opinion that may arise between the courts and the
alienist with regard to the concept of psychopathy, it is clear that
the courts and the alienist will have to continue working in close
contact and co-operation with each other. There is, accordingly,
no room in this modern day for the outmoded suggestion that psychiatry
is 'an empirical and speculative science with rather elastic notation
and terminology, which is usually wise after the event. ,3)
1) S 1 Mental Health Act defines mental illness as 'any disorder or
disability of the mind, and includes any mental disease, any
arrested or incomplete development of the mind and any psychopathic
disorder.' A psychopathic disorder is defined as a 'persistent
disorder or disability of the mind (whether or not subnormality of
intelligence is present) which has existed in the patient from an
age prior to that of 18 years and which results in abnormally
aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the
patient and psychopath has a corresponding meaning.' See Mnyanda
1976 (2) SA 751 (AD).
2) Editorial (1976) 5 CPC 5. In Mnyanda (supra) where the definition
of a psychopath is extensively discussed and criticized, Rumpff
CJ concludes that psychopathy is a vague concept even in modern
times. See also van Rooyen, Goldberg and Morris 'The Psychopath
in South African Criminal and Mental Health Law' (1976) 9 CILSA 1
and the Report of the Committee of Enquiry into Psychopathy under the
chairmanship of Professor A J van Wyk - Report RP 93 of 1967.
3) Per van den Heever JA in Von Zell 1953 (3) SA 303 (AD) at 311 B:
see also the Rumpff Report at SS 1.13 to 1.16.
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The Criminal Proceedure Act provides further evidence of the
statutory co-operation between the alienist and the courts•. Thus,
section 79 prescribes the procedure to be adopted before an accused
person can be declared a state President's patient under sections 77
and 78. In this regard, a distinction is made between an accused
person facing a criminal charge in respect of which the death penalty
may not be imposed and an accused person facing a criminal charge
which carries a possible death sentence. As to the former situation
an enquiry into the accused's mental condition shall be conducted
'by the medical superintendent of a mental hospital designated by the
court, or by a psychiatrist appointed by such medical superintendent
1)at the request of the court.' In the latter case, the appropriate
enquiry must be conducted -
'(i) by the medical superintendent of a mental hospital
designated by the court, or by a psychiatrist appointed
by such medical superintendent at the request of the court;
(ii) by a psychiatrist appointed by the court and who is not in
the full-time service of the state; and




The rationale behind the procedure to be complied with before an accused
person can be declared a state President's patient is explained by
Rumpff JA (as he then was) in Mahlinza3) as follows:
'Omdat 'n Hof elke geval voor horn volgens die feite en
die medies-psigiatriese getuienis moet beoordeel, skyn
dit my vir die Hof onmoontlik - en ook gevaarlik - te wees
om te probeer om 'n algemene simptoon te soek waaraan 'n
1) s 79 (1) (a) Criminal Procedure Act.
2) s 79 (1) Cb) Criminal Procedure Act. The result of s 79 is that
it gives statutory effect to the rule of practice that was
previously recognized by the courts; namely, that properly qualified
expert evidence by given before the court could declare an accused
person a State President's patient. The dangers of a court finding
that an accused person was suffering from a disease of the mind,
whether temporary or permanent, without the assistance of medical-
psychiatric evidence were revealed in Regional Magistrate du Preez v
Walker 1976 (4) SA 849 (AD) at 854. See also Mahlinza 1967 (1) SA 408
(AD) at 417 F-G; Loyens 1974 (1) SA 330 (E); Trickett 1973 (3) SA
526 (T).
3) 1967 (1) SA 408 (AD) at 417 F-G.
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geestesversteuring herken kan word as 'n sieklike
geestesversteuring. Dit kan alleen lei tot
spekulasie deur Howe op 'n gebied aan hulle onbekend,
nl. die psigiatriese gebied, waardeur die benadering
van die feite van 'n spesifieke geval mediese-weten-
skaplik onsuiwer kan wees.'
(ii) Common Law
Apart from being instrumental in the shaping of some statutes,
psychiatrists and psychologists have also contributed to the develop-
ment of the Common Law. Thus, the defence of automatism clearly owes
its existence to the researches of the alienist. l ) For the defence of
automatism successfully to be raised the evidence of an alienist is
absolutely essential. The courts will not accept the accused's bald
allegations that he could not remember the events in question. 2)
The defence of automatism is further complicated by the fact that it
may be classified either as insane automatism, in which event the
accused would qualify for the special verdict in terms of sections
77 to 79 of the Criminal Procedure Act, or as sane automatism, in which
1) Burchell and Hunt 219-220; Howard 331. Automatism can be simply
described as unconscious involuntary action which is not
attributable to a disease of the mind.
2) In the case of Trickett 1973 (3) SA 526 (T) a young female, on
her way to play squash, for no apparent reason suddenly swerved
across the centre white line of the road and collided head-on
with an oncoming car. The accused claimed that she had suffered
a 'blackout'. The magistrate rejected the accused's claim and
convicted her of negligent driving. The appeal against
conviction and sentence was dismissed by Marais J largely on the
basis that no 'medical' evidence had been led to support the
accused's claim of sane wltomatism.
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event the accused would be entitled to an acquittal. l )
The distinction between sane and insane automatism was only
fairly recently accepted by the Appellate Division in Mahlinza2)
as a valid one to make, and in this regard, the vital importance
of the evidence of the alienist cannot be over-stressed. For
example, in both Schoonwinke13 ) and Kumal04) the actions of the
accused persons were attributed to epilepsy except that in
Schoonwinkel the epilepsy was not attributed to a disease of the
mind so that the accused was entitled to his acquittal,5) whereas
in Kumalo the epilepsy was due to a disease of the mind as a result
of which the accused was declared a State President's patient.
1) Sane automatism can arise in a number of different situations:
eg as the result of a nightmare: see Dhlamini 1955 (1) SA 120
(T); Ngang 1960 (3) SA 363 (T); Ncube 1978 (1) SA 1178 (R) - or
as the result of a state of amnesia or blackout: see du Plessis
1950 (1) SA 297 (0); Kruger 1958 (2) SA 320 (T); Botha 1959 (1)
SA 547 (0); Ahmed 1959 (3) SA 776 (W) - or as the result of
epilepsy: see Schoonwinkel 1953 (3) SA 136 (C); Mkize 1959 (2)
SA 260 (N) - or as the result of involuntary intoxication: see
Bourke 1916 TPD 303 at 307; Innes-Grant 1949 (1) SA 753 (AD) at
766; Johnson 1969 (1) SA 201 (AD) at 205, 206, 211; Gardener
1974 (1) SA 304 (R AD). In the case of Ncube 1978 (1) SA 1178 (R)
it was accepted that the accused had acted mechanically to a dream
picture as a result of which, without motive, intention or
volition, he stabbed the deceased, his brother and with whom he
was on affectionate terms. The action was described as a purely
reflex action. Gubbay J, however, found that although the
accused qualified for an acquittal under the Common Law, the
accused's conduct was such as to qualify him for the 'special
verdict' under the Rhodesian Mental Disorders Act, Chap 324.
2) 1967 (1) SA 408 (AD).
3) 1953 (3) SA 136 (c).
4) 1956 (3) SA 238 (N).
5) At 138G Steyn J correctly observed that 'not all epileptics are
mentally disordered; it is only a person suffering from epilepsy
who is a danger to himself or others or who is incapable of
managing his own affairs.'
(iii)
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The Standi~~ of Psychiatric and Psychological Evidence in
the Courts
Although there is much co-operation between the alienists and
the courts, it does not necessarily follow that the courts will
invariably accept the expert evidence of alienists. 2 ) There are
numerous instances of the courts rejecting the evidence of
psychiatrists and psychologists especially where those called by
the defence do not agree with those called by the state. For
example, in Harris3 ) the evidence of a psychiatrist 'of high standing,4)
to the effect that the accused was suffering from a mental disease,5)
which precluded criminal responsibility, was rejected. It would be an
over-simplistic approach to hold that the rejection of such expert
evidence is based on a subconscious resistance by the courts to the
the views of psychiatrists and psychologists, especially where they
appear on behalf of the defence. 6 ) However, in this regard, Ogilvie
Thompson CJ stated that
'~7hile the opinions in relation to psychiatric
matters of so eminent an expert in that field as
Professor Hurst naturally merit the closest attention,
it must also be borne in mind that, not only are
these opinions in large measure in direct conflict
with those expressed by the two State psychiatrists,
1) On expert evidence see generally Hoffman 78-86; Schmidt 331-336;
Joubert Vol 9 ,420-430.
2) Eg in Trickett 1973 (3) SA 526 (T) Marais J warned (at 536 G) that
'Defences such as automatism and amnesia require to be carefully
scrutinized. That they are to be supported by medical evidence,
although of great assistance to the Court, will not necessarily
relieve the Court from its duty of careful scrutiny for, in the
nature of things, such medical evidence must often be based on
the hypothesis that the accused is giving a truthful account of
the events in question.' See also H 1962 (1) SA 197 (AD) at 208;
van Z~l 1964 (2) SA 113 (AD) at 120;- Harris 1965 (2) SA 340 (AD)
at 36 •
3) 1965 (2) SA 340 (AD).
4) At 342 G.
,5) Which was described as 'manic ecstasy'.
6) The evidence of Professor Hurst on the question of 'manic ecstasy'
was really rejected because his diagnosis was based on facts which
the court did not accept as true.
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but also that, in the ultimate analysis, the crucial
issue of appellant's criminal responsibility for his
actions at the relevant time is a matter to be
determined, not by the psychiatrist, but by the Court
itself. In determining that issue the Court -
initially the trial Court; and on appeal this Court -
must of necessity have regard not only to the expert
medical evidence but also to all the other facts of
the case, including the reliability of appellant as
a witness and the nature of his proved actions
throughout the relevant period. ,1)
This does not mean to say, however, that the courts only rarely
accept the evidence of alienists: their evidence is, in fact, often
2)
heavily relied upon. In the case of Pratt, where the court found
the accused to be mentally disordered and declared him a state
President's patient, the following experts gave evidence; namely,
Professor Friedman of the Department of Forensic Medicine of the
University of the Witwatersrand; Professor BUrst, Head of the
Department of Psychiatry and Mental Health of the University of the
Witwatersrand; Dr Chesler, a Johannesburg psychiatrist; Dr Jacobson 9
1) Cf Lehnberg and Another 1975 (4) SA 553 (AD); Loubscher 1979 (3)
SA 47 (AD).
2) 19hO (4) SA 743 (T).
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another Johannesburg psychiatrist; and Professor Lamont, Head of the
Weskoppies Institution. l ) The cumulative effect of this evidence
indicated that the accused's mental condition was such that he could
not stand trial.
One of the most recent examples of the court accepting psychiatric
2), J d h 't t' .evidence is the case of Kavin. Irvlng Steyn ha no eSl a lon In
accepting the evidence of three psychiatrists who were unanimous in
their findings that because of a 'progressive depression' the accused
was not criminally responsible for the acts in question. 3 )
1) See also Rumpff Report §s 4.3 to 4.13 for details of the evidence of
the psychiatrists involved in the trial of Pratt. Evidence was also
led to show that Pratt had been treated previously in America by an
authority on epilepsy. In the trial of Dimitrie Tsafendas, who
assassinated Dr HF Verwoerd on the 6th September 1966, five psychiatrist~
one psychologist and two physicians gave evidence. Among the
psychiatrists to give evidence were the Professor of Psychiatry at the
University of Pretoria, the Senior Psychiatrist of the General
Hospital and the Deputy Commissioner for Mental Health: Rumpff Report
§s 4.14 to 4.38. For an instructive account of the general reaction
of our courts to psychiatric and psychological evidence concerning
pathological mental disturbance see Rumpff Report §s 4.1 to 4.73.
Among the cases reviewed are Kenned11951 (4) SA 431 (AD); von Zell1953 (3) SA 309 (AD); Krueer 1958 2) SA 320 (T); ~ 1960 (4) SA 27
(W); Harris 1965 (2) SA 3 0 (AD).
2) 1978 (2) SA 731 (W). Kavin's case is an early example of the
implementation of ss 77-79 Criminal Procedure Act. In particular,
Kavin's case is an example of the new approach to 'irresistible
impulse' as provided for by s 78 (1) Cb) Criminal Procedure Act.
Prior to 1977 it was generally thought that 'irresistible impulse'
was only concerned with the sudden flare-up situation as opposed to
the gradual process of mental deterioration: Burchell and Hunt 207.
It is clear that 'irresistible impulse' now includes behaviour
following upon a gradual personality disintegration which results
in mental illness.
3) Kavin had shot and killed his wife, his son and one daughter.
The fourth count related to the attempted murder of his second
daughter who survived the shooting but who was blinded for the rest
of her life.
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The leading of psychiatric and psychological evidence is not only
confined to the pre-verdict stage but is also often led at the post-
ver~ict and pre-sentencing stages of a criminal trial, especially
in cases where the imposition of the death sentence is a real
possibility. For example, in De Bruynl ) evidence of the accused's
epilepsy and psychopathic tendencies was given by a social worker,
a psychiatrist and a clinical psychologist. The purpose of this
evidence was to prove the existence of extenuating circumstances. This,
however, failed and the accused was sentenced to death.'
It is at this stage of the proceedings in a criminal trial
that the evidence of the alienist is likely to carry less weight than
would normally be the case. The reason for this is given by Ogilvie-
Thompson JA (as he then was) in Nel12 ) as follows:
'It must again be emphasised that the decision as to
the existence or otherwise of extenuating circum-
stances is, in the first instance, essentially one
for the Trial Court. It is well established that,
in the absence of any misdirection or irregularity,
this Court will not interfere with a Trial Court's
findings as to the non-existence of extenuating
circumstances unless that finding is one to which no
reasonable Court could have come.'
The learned former Chief Justice then went on to say:3)
'Wnether or not a convicted murderer's psychopathic
personality is to be regarded as an extenuating
circumstance falls to be decided by the Trial Court
in the light of the facts of the particular case
before it.'
1) 1976 (1) SA 496 (AD). See also Williamson 1978 (2) SA 233 (T).
2) 1968 (2) SA 576 (AD) at 580.
3) Ibid. See also Malinga and Others 1963 (1) SA 692 (AD) at 695
and Saaiman 1967 (4) SA 440 (AD) at 441.
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Even after conviction and sentence, it may be possible to lead
psychiatric evidence. l ) The discretion whether to allow such
further evidence to be called remains with the trial court. In the
case of Lehnberg and Another2 ), after convicti~n and sentence (both
accused having been sentenced to death) leave under the provlslons of
section 363 (3) of the 1956 Criminal Procedure Act3) was granted by
the trial court for the calling of certain persons to testify in
connection with the social, medical and psychological factors which
could affect the moral blameworthiness of the two convicted persons.
Those who gave evidence on behalf of the accused Lehnberg were a
psychiatrist and a psychiatric social worker. On behalf of the
second accused, Choegoe, seven experts gave evidence; namely, three
4)doctors, three professors and a female expert whose qualifications
are not mentioned in the report. The head psychiatrist of the
Valkenberg Hospital and a social worker gave evidence on behalf of
the State. The trial court (Diemont J) held that on a balance of
probabilities the accused Lehnberg was not a psychopath though it
was accepted that she displayed some psychopathic tendencies.
Although the Appellate Division5) disagreed with the trial court's
view that what was required before Lehnberg's mental condition could
be regarded as a factor in extenuation was ' 'n soort van geestelike
onweerstaanbare dwang, ,6) it did point out7) that
1) S 316 Criminal Procedure Act.
2) 1975 (4) SA 553 (AD).
3) Now replaced by s 316 (3) Criminal Procedure Act. See also
Loubscher 1979 (3) SA 47 (AD).
4) At 558 B-C. It does not appear from the report whether they were
psychiatrists or psychologists.
5) Rumpff CJ (Muller and Galgut JJA concurring).
6) At 559 B.
7) At 559 G-H.
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'dit nodig LI~7 om op te merk dat die vraagstuk van
psigopatie as versagtende omstandigheid met groot
omsigtigheid behandel behoort te word omdat dit
anders maklik sou wees om daardeur die leerstuk van
die determinisme by die agterdeur in ons strafreg in
te bring. 'n Volwaardige psigopaat mag miskien 'n
aangebore en verworwe swakheid he maar hy sal nie 'n
vrou in die publiek probeer verkrag nie. In die
opsig verskil hy nie van 'n persoon met sterk
seksdrange, wat geen psigopaat is nie, en wat ook nie
'n vrou in die publiek sal probee~ verkrag nie. Aan
die ander kant is dit moontlik dat 'n psigopaat in
sekere gevalle nie in staat is om dieselfde weerstand
te bied as wat volkome normale persone sou kon bied
nie en dan sou in sulke gevalle die swakheid tereg
as 'n versagtende omstandigheid in aanmerking geneem
kon word. '
The most recent case in which an application under section 316 (3)
of the Criminal Procedure Act was made is the case of Loubscher~)
The evidence that was sought to be led concerned the little known
disease, Huntington's Chorea. 2 ) The application failed because there
was no apparent effort on the part of the experts to connect the
mental condition of the accused with the full particulars of the crime
1) 1979 (3) SA 47 (AD). The unusual feature of Loubscher's case is
that the application to lead further expert evidence was made
direct to the Appellate Division - at 54 G-H.
2) Huntington's Chorea is described at 56 C-D as follows: '/It7
is an hereditary nervous system disease which has its onset-in
adulthood. It frequently presents as a social problem with anti-
social behaviour, change in personality and promiscuity. In the
initial stages of this disorder it is not often easily recognizable
as such. After a few years, however, characteristic abnormal
movements develop which are severe, incurable and progressive. In
fact, this disease is characterised by irregularl spasmodic involuntary
movements of the limbs and facial muscles, including speech
disturbances. The abnormal muscular movements are also associated
with mental deterioration. This progresses gradually until the
unfortunate person afflicted with this disorder loses his intelligence,
becomes demented and incontinent and death usually occurs within 10
to 15 years of onset of the disease.'
committed.
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In this regard, Rumpff CJ said
l
)
'Vir 'n Baf is die werklike motief waarmee 'n moord
gepleeg word van allergrootste belang wanneer die
toerekeningsvatbaarheid van die moordenaar oorweeg moet
word. Nietemin het nie een van die deskundiges
hom uitgespreek oor die feit dat die beskuldigde twee
maal erken het aan 'n landdros dat hy die oorledene
doodgemaak het omdat sy horn sou herken het, 'n motief
wat nie, volgens die getuienis voor hierdie Hof, iets
met Huntington-chorea te doen het nie.'
The learned Chief Justice then concluded~) by setting out the
respective roles of the courts and the alienist, as follows:
'Die kritiek wat op die getuienis van die deskundiges
in hierdie saak uitgespreek is, moet gesien word in
die lig van die begeerte van die juris dat daar same-
werking behoort te wees oor die probleem van toe-
rekeningsvatbaarheid en aanspreeklikheid in verband
met 'n misdaad tussen die juris aan die een kant, en
die psigiater of die sielkundige of die neuroloog aan
die ander kant, met erkenning van mekaar se grondliggende
benadering en probleme ••• Hiervolgens rus daar 'n
plig op die juris sowel as op die geestesdeskundige en
dit is die plig van 'n geestesdeskund~ge om in 'n strafsaak
nie slegs algemene opinies uit te spreek nie, wat miskien
op mediese gebied as verantwoord beskou kan word, maar
om sy opinies te lewer met behoorlike inagneming van
wat die taak van 'n verhoorhof is by die toepassing van
die strafreg en veral by die oorweging van toerekenings -
vatbaarheid en strafregte1ike aanspreek1ikheid.'
1) At 60 F-G.
2) At 61 Band 61 E-F.
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In the light of the above review of some of the relevant case
law, it is respectfully submitted that the present standing of
psychiatric and psychological evidence in the courts is best summed
up in the Rumpff Report l ) as follows:
'~7t is clear that the courts usually accept well-
grounded and responsible evidence from psychiatrists.
It is also evident that the testimony of psychiatrists
is not accepted (i) when the court does not accept the
facts upon which the psychiatrist based his diagnosis;
and (ii) when the psychiatrist's conception on non-
responsibility in a particular case does not agree with
that of the court. In the latter group of cases this
usually happens when a psychopath is involved who, it
is contended, could not control his emotions. The
courts obviously recognize the possibility that a
psychopath's mental condition may be such that he must
be deemed to be not criminally responsible as a result
of a morbid mental disorder, but, in the absence of
convincing facts, the courts are not disposed to return
such a verdict.'
1) At § 4.73.
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(B) Probation Officers
Reference has already been madel ) to the fact that a criminal
court dealing with a juvenile offender is often placed in the dilemma
of having to decide whether to refer a juvenile accused to the
Children's Court2 ) or whether to deal with him in the ordinary criminal
courts. 3) The report of a probation officer is accordingly of crucial
importance. 4 ) Probation officers are regarded as officers of every
Children's and Magistrate's Court and they receive their appointment
from the Minister of Social Welfare and Bensions. 5)
(i) Probation Officers in Juvenile Criminal Courts
The functions of a probation officer in a juvenile criminal
court are:
'(a) to enquire into and report to the court or
magistrate upon the character and environment of
children or persons under the age of twenty-one
years on trial before that court or undergoing
preparatory examination before that magistrate
and into and upon the causes and circumstances
contributing to the delinquency of such children
or persons ••• ~
1) See above at 202.
2) S 254 (1) Criminal Procedure Act; see 202 above.
3) S 290 (1) Criminal Procedure Act: see 203 above where s 290 (1)
is cited.
4) Zungu 1962 (1) SA 377 (N); Yibe 1964 (3) SA 502 (E); A and Others
1976 (3) SA 144 (C); D 1977-rlT SA 759 (C); L 1978 (2) SA 75 CC):
see above at 205-208 where these cases are discussed. Midgley 130-131,
however reports that a social enquiry report at an early stage of the
criminal trial of a juvenile is very rarely called for. If an
early report is called for it is only because the court wishes to
have some information on the juvenile offender's background before
deciding whether to transfer the case to the Children's Court.
5) S 57 Children's Act.
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(b) to devise and carry out measures for the observation
and correction of tendencies to delinquency in children
and for the discovery and removal of conditions causing
or contributing to juvenile delinquency;
(c) to supervise or control any child or person convicted
of an offence and placed under the supervision of the
probation officer;
(d) to perform such other duties as may be imposed upon
. A t th 1 b th M· . t ,1)them by thls c or any 0 er aw or y e lnlS er.
./
Insofar as the courts are concerned, there has been an emphasis
on the important role that probation officers have to play in the
administration of juvenile criminal justice. For example, in Adams2 )
Steyn J, after reviewing at length the importance of pre-sentencing
reports and the role of probation officers in the United States and
England, concluded3) with the following words:
'Ek het met opset vollediglik verwys na die rol wat
'n proefbeampte se verslag as 'n hulpmiddel vir die
Hof kan speel by straftoemeting. Ek het dit met
opset gedoen omdat hierdie Raf die mening toegedaan
is dat hy al hoe meer, as dit kom by die uitoefening
van sy plig om die gemeenskap te beskerm en die
indiwidu te straf, sy vonnis in die lig en nie in die
duisternis moet ople nie. 'n Behoorlik saamgestelde
voorvonnisverslag is heelvaarskynlik die belangrikste
enkele faktor wat die Hof kan help om op sodanige wyse sy
straftoemetingsplig te vervul.
1) S 58 (1) Children's Act, 33 of 1960. On the relationship generally
between the juvenile court and probation officers see, inter alia,
Motsoaledi 1962 (4) SA 703 (0) at 704 G-H; Mkwanazi 1969 (2)-SX-
246 (N); Barry and Chanaly 1973 (4) SA 424 (R AD) at 426 (F-G;
Jansen and Another 1975 (1) SA 425 (AD); Hlongwane 1975 (4) SA 567
(AD).
2) 1971 (4) SA 125 (K).
3) At 131 D-E.
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Ek onderskryf veral die feit dat, wat my aanbetref,
die Hof vir leiding soek en dat as hy betekenisvolle
aanbevelings gebaseer op gegronde feite van proef-
beamptes beskikbaar kan he die Hof sy pligte op 'n
baie beter en doeltreffender wyse sal kan uitoefen. ,1)
Earlier2 ), his Lordship had drawn attention to the fact that it happened
all too often that 'heelwat tyd is in die hof bestee om uit te vind
of ~i~7 kind skuldig was ••• , geen tyd hoegenaamd is bestee
om uit te vind wat vir hom 'n geskikte straf behoort te wees nie.'
The learned judge's comments would appear to be well-founded. In
1968 Midgley, in a penetrating analysis, reviewed all the cases dealt
with in the juvenile criminal court in Cape Town during that year. 3)
He found4) that although the probation services were being more
frequently called upon to undertake pre-sentence investigations into
the background, circumstances and needs of young offenders, in fact
such reports were only called for in 65 (or 11,3 per cent) of the cases
1) See also H and Another 1978 (4) SA 385 (E) at 386 C-E, where
Smalberger J said: 'The purpose of a probation officer's report
is to provide a court with all available information which will
assist in understanding the problems of the juvenile being dealt
with, thereby enabling the court to determine an appropriate
punishment in all the circumstances ••• The probation officer's
recommendation is merely an expression of opinion for the guidance
of the court. Wnere necessary, it must be tested and subjected to
critical analysis. The ultimate responsibility for the
determination of a proper sentence rests with the presiding
judicial officer. In order to exercise his discretion in this
regard he must apply his mind judicially to all relevant consider-
ations affecting sentence. He must not slavishly follow the
recommendation of the probation officer, and merely substitute the
latter's view for his own'. Cf Harvey 1977 (2) SA 185 (0) at 189 A-C.
2) At 127 E-F.
3) In all, 898 cases were heard in the juvenile criminal court in
Cape Town in 1968: see Table 3.5 at 91 where these cases are
analysed and categorized according to age, sex and ethnic origin.
4) At 129-130.
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in which the accused were convicted.
l
)
Notwithstanding the desirability of calling for pre-sentence
investigatory reports, the practice is only to call for such reports
in the more serious cases. 2 ) There is no statute or precedent which
places upon the court the legal obligation to call for such reports
in all cases involving juvenile offenders. Thus, for example, in
Hlongwana~) Rumpff CJ, after referring to the practice of calling
for a pre-sentence investigatory report on a convicted juvenile,
especially in serious cases, proceeded to add
4) that -
'Ek ••• wil beklemtoon dat die feit dat 'n Verhoorhof
nie 'n verslag van 'n proefbeampte ingewin het nie, nie
in elke geval en outomaties 'n geldige rede skep om 'n
opgelegde vonnis tersyde te stel nie. Ek dink nie dit
was die bedoeling om so 'n reel in die lewe te roep
nie omdat dit in elke besondere geval sal afhang van
die ouderdom van die beskuldigde en van anderrelevante
feite wat reeds deur getuienis geopenbaar is, of 'n
verdere verslag behoort te vra of nie.'
1) It is clear that the fact that only 15% of White juvenile
offenders are legally represented is further evidence of the
value of a probation officer's pre-sentence report. It is also
clear that in reality the role of the legal practitioner in the
juvenile criminal courts is limited, especially when Black
juvenile offenders are involved since even fewer of them are
legally represented. ef Gericke 'Die Professionele Verhouding
tussen die Regspraktisyn en die Maatskaplike Werker' Golden
Jubilee Report (1974) Vol 3, 104-111.
2) Motsoaledi 1964 (4) SA 703 (0) at 704 G; Mkwanazi 1969 (3) SA
246 (N); Adams 1971 (4) SA 125 (C) at 127; Jansen and Another
1975 (1) SA 425 (AD); Hlongwana 1975 (4) SA 567 (AD).
3) 1975 (4) SA 567 (AD).




It is entirely in the discretion of the court as to whether to
call for a probation officer's report or not.
l
) If a report is not
requested, it would seem that the chances of a juvenile offender being
referred to a Children's Court to be dealt with as a 'child in need
of care' are relatively slim. In this event, a youthful offender
will in all probability be dealt with in the ordinary criminal courts
and released without any further contact with social workers or
probation officers. Midgley2) reports that in 1968 in Cape Town most
of the juvenile offenders sentenced in the juvenile criminal court
were dealt with in this way.
On the other hand, the evidence led at the trial of a juvenile
offender may be such as to convince the presiding judicial officer,
without the necessity of a social welfare enquiry report, that the
juvenile offender should be more appropriately dealt with by the
Children's Court as a 'child in need of care. ,3)
The end result is that there is an under utilization of probation
officers and other welfare officials by the courts. This is
particularly manifest in the treatment of, and sentencing of, juvenile
offenders. One of the reasons frequently cited for this under-
utilization is the staff shortages in the social work services, and
the weighty case loads that existing staff have to carry. Midgley~)
however, doubts whether this is a plausible enough reason for the
courts failing to make more use of the welfare services - at any
rate, in the Cape Town metropolitan area where, in 1968, there were
3 social work training schools and numerous voluntary agencies with
specific child welfare interests. He suggestsS) that:
1) It may be mentioned, however, that in certain circumstances the
court has no discretion but to call for a probation officer's
report. Thus, for example, the court is obliged to call for a
probation officer's report before it can commit a person to an
institution in terms of the Abuse of De endence Producin Substances
and Rehabilitation Centres Act, 1 of 1971: see Dalton 197 SA
436 (0).
2) At 131.




'the supposed integration of the philosophies of
criminal procedure and social welfare in the form
of juvenile justice is in reality unworkable
The failure to produce a synthesis in these two
antithetical elements is well illustrated in the
South African juvenile court.'
It is submitted that there is much substance in the contention that
such integration is, in practice, unworkable. Furthermore, such
integration should not be seen as the ideal. The separate functions of
the courts and probation officers should always be kept in mind. The
failure to recognize their respective functions can only result in
disappointment for those wno see the working relationship between the
courts and probation officers only in terms of integration rather than
co-operation.
An appreciation of the different functions that the courts and
probation officers have to play in the administration of juvenile
justice goes a long way towards understanding why a court is sometimes
constrained to disregard the recommendations of a probation officer. l )
There are, in fact, a number of reasons why the courts may disregard
the recommendations of a probation officer; namely,
(a) the probation officer is essentially concerned with the
interests of the juvenile offender whereas the courts are obliged to
have regard to the broader interests of society as a whole. 2 ) This
1) An example of where the court chose to ignore the recommendations of
a probation officer is Yibe 1964 (3) SA 502 (E). Cf zun~ and Another
1962 (1) SA 377 (N) and H and Another 1978 (4) SA 385 (E •
2) See Adams 1971 (4) SA 125 (K); Hlongwana 1975 (4) SA 567 (AD);
H an~other 1978 (4) SA 385 (E): cf Harvey 1977 (2) SA 185 (0)
where an experienced police officer differed with the probation
officer over the question of whether an accused had been rehabilitated.
In the course of his judgment M. T Steyn J said (at 189A-C) 'waar
sekere belangrike aspekte rakende straftoemeting gedek word en behandel
is deur die getuienis van 'n proefbeampte en van ander getuies en
daar 'n botsing is tussen daardie stelle getuienis moet die aangeleent-
heid sorgvuldig van alle kante oorweeg word, en volg die nie
noodwendiglik dat die van die proefbeampte aanvaar moet word nie.
Proefbeamptes in diens van die Departement van Volkswelsyn is
specialiste op hul gebied en lewer daagliks waardevolle getuienis in
geregshowe, onder meer ten aansien van die moeilike taak van
vonnisbepaling, maar, soos ook in die geval van ander deskundiges, is
die hof nie aan hulle getuienis en menings gebonde nie, want die
verhoorhof moet al die gelewende getuienis evalueer, self tot sy eie
bevindings raak, en straf daarvolgens toemeet.'
2~
may account for the reason why the recommendations of a probation
officer may sometimes appear to a court to be unrealistic;l)
(b) the reports of probation officers are often drawn up on
the basis of hearsay, or other inadmissible, evidence and it is
for this reason that the courts sometimes are suspicious of any
recommendations made by a probation officer. 2) There is a statutory
duty cast upon a court in a criminal case to ensure that a probation
officer's report does not infringe any of the rules relating to the
admissibility of evidence;3)
1) Cf Smith and Woollard (1978) 67 Cr App Rep 211. -At 213 Lawton
LJ made the following trenchant comments: 'The court was surprised
that a probation officer should recommend that an offence of this
gravity should be dealt with by a fine particularly as Smith had
been out of work for some time and the wages he was getting as a
result of the employment which he had found a week before the trial
were on the low side.' jirhe accused had been convicted of a
burglary which was committed at a time when they were on bail for
an offence of dishonesty7. Lawton LJ continued to add /Ibid7 that
'For many years now the-courts have encouraged probation Officers
to make specific recommendations ••• Recommendations by probation
officers can be very valuable indeed but they are not likely to be
of much value if they are not realistic. Mr Devlin ;the p'robation
officer7 was in Court and was asked to explain why he-thought a fine
was an-adequate sentence for a youth who had joined with others in
turning a house upside-down ~~d stealing a considerable amount of
property. He told us he was concerned about the future of this
young man. He may be. This Court is concerned about the security
of citizens' houses and it is with regard to that object that the
Courts have to decide what should be done in this class of case.'
Smith, in a commentary on Smith and Woollard's case in /I9787
Crim L R 758, 759, suggests that Lawton LJ misconstrued-the-
functions of a probation officer whose duty 'is to recommend
what he or she thinks is most appropriate for the individual,
without having regard necessarily to the public consequences.'
See a!so Harris 'Recommendations in Social Inquiry Reports'
~9727 Crim L R 73.
2) Cf the views of magistrate Fourie 'Wetlike Optrede as Ouers Faal'
Golden Jubilee Report (1974) 76, 79-81.
3) See the proviso tos57(1)(a) Children's Act: see also~ 1970
(2) SA 25 (NC) at 26-27.
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(c) the close relationship which a probation officer must
perforce form with the accused often inhibits him from giving
expression to his genuine impressions. l ) Thus a probation officer
often finds himself in a dilemma. If he recommends, for example,
that the accused be sent to reformatory but the court disregards this
recommendation and, instead, orders that the accused be placed under
the supervision of a probation officer for a given period of time, it
is clear that the accused will harbour some resentment against the
probation officer with the result that the after-care treatment is
hardly likely to succeed. On the other hand, the probation officer
may adopt a softer approach and recommend that the accused be placed
under the supervision of a probation officer, or that he receive a
fine by way of a sentence. However, should the court, instead,
sentence the accused to a period of imprisonment, the youthful offender
may develop an over-powering feeling of having been let down. During
the course of his enquiries, questions such as 'are you going to give
my boy a good report?' and 'are you going to recommend a lenient
punishment?' are commonly asked of the probation officer. His
response and attitude to such questions will clearly determine the
degree of response and co-operation he will receive from the accused
and his family;
(d) following on from the above, it is not unusual to come across
attempts to mislead the probation officer so as to influence his
recommendations. No doubt, some attempts to mislead the probation
officer do succeed. 2) That is all the more reason for testing the
validity of a probation officer's recommendations against the evidence
that is before the court and of which the probation officer may not
have been aware;
1) Harris 'Recommendations in Social Inquiry Reports' /19797
Crim L R 73, 79.
2) Harris 'Recommendations in Social Inquiry Reports' /19797
Crim L R 73, 77, mentions a report of a probation officer which
convincingly demonstrated how the accused's early life had led
him to commit the crime he was charged with. After conviction
and sentence it was discovered that the accused was an army
deserter who had supplied wholly fictitious particulars to the
probation officer.
242
(e) finally, the standing and experience of the probation
officer producing the report may also influence the court in deciding
whether to accept or reject the recommendations made.
l
)
(ii) Probation Officers in Childrens' Courts
Probation officers derive their powers and duties from the
Children's Act. Thus section 26 (1) of the Act gives the
probation officer the power to remove a child from any place to a
place of safety if he believes the child to be in need of care.
Section 30 (1) of the Act also gives him the power to bring a child
alleged to be in need of care before the Children's Court. Under
section 31 (2) of the Children's Act a probation officer may be
appointed to supervise 'the protection, welfare and reclamation of
children. ,2) A discretionary duty is cast upon a probation officer
by s 31 (5) of the Act to furnish the commissioner of child welfare
with a report on the welfare, progress and behaviour of children
placed under probation. Reports of a probation officer are also
required to be submitted to the Minister of Pensions and Social Welfare
in respect of children in any person's custody, other than the custody
of their parents or guardians, on the expiration of the first two
years of such custody, and thereafter every succeeding year of such
custody.3)
1) In ~!ngu and Another 1962 (1) SA 377 (N) the magistrate did not
even bother to call for a probation officer's report because he
knew that the probation officer in his district was 'untrained
and inexperienced in the functions of a probation officer'.
2) It should, however, be noted that the function of a probation
officer under s 31 (2) is a limited one. Thus, his fun:tion
is merely to supervise the exercise, by the person in whose
custody the child has been placed, of the powers of control and
custody of the child. According to the case of van Schoor 1978
(2) SA 600 (AD) at 610 G nowhere does the section give the
probation officer powers which are vested in the Supreme Court
-such as defining the rights of access of the non-custodian spouse.




But the valuable role that a probation officer has to play in the
administration of juvenile justice is no better illustrated than in the
Children's Court when it is dealing with a child alleged to be in need
of care. l ) In order to arrive at a proper decision on the question of
whether a child is in fact in need of care the report of a probation
officer is of cardinal importance. 2) Thus, the fact that in the 1973-1974
1) In terms of s 1 (X) Children's Act, a child in need of care is
defined as a child who -
'(a) has been abandoned or is without visible means of support; or
(b) has no parent or guardian or has parents or a parent or guardian
who do or does not or are or is unfit to exercise proper control
over that child; or
(c) is in the custody of a person who has been convicted of committing
upon or in connection with that child any offence mentioned in
the First Schedule to this Act; or
(d) cannot be controlled by his parents or guardian or the person in
whose custody he is; or
(e) is an habitual truant; or
(f) frequents the company of any immoral or vicious person, or is
otherwise living in circumstances calculated to cause or conduce
to his seduction, corruption or prostitution; or
begs; or
being under the age of 12 years engages in any form of
street trading /Without the necessary authority7; or
being not under-the age of 12 years but under the age of
16 years engages in any form of street trading /in
contravention of the bye-laws of the local authority7; or
(h) is being maintained apart from his parents or guardian in domestic
circumstances which are detrimental to his interests and whose
parents or guardian cannot be found or have failed to make suitable
provision for the care and custody of the child although they have
been called upon to do so; or
(i) is in a state of physical or mental neglect.'
2) Where the interests of a child alleged to be in need of care are
involved, the probation officer is not the only official concerned with
the proceedings. Indeed, anyone involved in the interests of a child
is invited to participate in the proceedings - social workers,
psychologists, the parents and even the child himself: see generally
Midgley 132-133. Social welfare officers of approved agencies also
have an important role to play in Childrens' Courts: cf s 9 (3)
Children's Act. It should be noted, however, that unlike probation
officers such social welfare officers are not officers of the court
and their reports are, accordingly, not admissible in evidence
without the approval of the court: Pautz v Horn 1976 (4) SA 572 (0)
at 574 E. It would seem that the proper course would be for social
welfare officers to give their evidence orally and not on affidavit.
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period a total of 3 210 White children in South Africa were found to
be in need of carel ) is stark testimony to the value of a probation
officer's report. Furthermore, the fact that only 5% of the White
children appearing in Childrens' Courts have legal representation2)
means that the commissioner of child welfare must perforce rely
heavily on the report of a probation officer. In this regard,
Marais J in Napolitano v de Wet NO and Others3) said
'The need for reports by probation officers is self-
/
evident. Before the parents, guardian or custodian
of a child who may be in need of care are traced and
brought before the court, it may be vitally important
to collate, consider and even act upon whatever
information is available. Probation officers are
employed, inter alia, for collecting such information.'
As to the probative value of such reports, his Lordship continued to
add4) that:
1) 1974 (2) Hansard Vol 53 Col 76. It has not been possible to
obtain the figures for children belonging to other population
groups.
2) Gericke 'Die Professionele Verhouding tussen die Regspraktisyn
en die Maatskaplikke Werker' Golden Jubilee Report (1974) 104-
111.
3) 1964 (4) SA 337 (T) at 343 G-H.
4) Ibid.
2~
'This does not ••• mean that their reports are to
be relied upon in court if better evidence is
available, and as I understand the practice in
inferior as well as superior courts such a report
is superseded by direct evidence on oath whenever
its contents are challenged and better evidence is
made available • But ••• a children's court may
••• act on hearsay and otherwise inadmissible
evidence and, therefore, rely on probation officers'
reports, when better evidence cannot be obtained
without undue delay or inconvenience. ,1)
1) Cf Napolitano v Commissioner of Child Welfare Johannesburg 1965
(1) SA 742 (AD) at 745 G where Holmes JA said 'lAin enquiry
under s 30, to determine whether a child is in need of care, is
a much more informal proceeding than that relating to an
application for adoption under s 71; and different issues are
involved.' Certainly, the rules of evidence in a Children's




The basis for healthy co-operation between the courts and
behavioural and social scientists is to be found in sections 6 (1) and
(2) of the Divorce Act; namely,
'(1) A decree of divorce shall not be granted until
the court is satisfied that the provisions made or
contemplated with regard to the welfare of any minor
or dependent child of the marriage are satisfactory
or are the best that can be effected in the circum-
stances.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) the court may
cause any investigation, which it may deem necessary,
to be carried out and may order any person to appear
before it and may order the parties or any one of them
to pay the costs of the investigation and appearance.'
It is submitted that the above investigation may be carried out not
only by a social worker, but also by a psychiatrist, a ~edical
practitioner or psychologist. In this regard, Mr Justice Margo of
th Tr 1 P . . al D· ... t d h· . d 1)e ansvaa rOV1nC1 1V1S1on 1S repor e as aV1ng sa1 :
'The judge is not a child psychiatrist or a trained
social worker. His duty, within his limitations,
is to judge the issues, to weigh the evidence, and
to decide the question within the requirements of
the law and on the basis of human wisdom and
experience and to endeavour to reach the fairest,
most practical and most benevolent solution to the
family problem of custo~y. In many cases today a
welfare report has become an indispensible require-
ment. '
1) In an address to the School of Social Work, University of the
Witwatersrand, which is cited by Gericke 'Die Professionele
Verhouding tussen die Regspraktisyn en die Maatskaplike Werker'
Golden Jubilee Report (1974) 104, 110.
Reference has already been made to the number of children
. d' l't' t' 1) Wh t' d' t b' h"involved 2n 2vorce 2 2ga 20n. a 2S 2S ur 2ng, owever,
is the fact that between 55% and 60% of the marriages that end in
f · t f' f' 2) Th' tdivorce, do so in the 2rs 2ve years 0 marr2age. 2S mus
inevitably mean that most of the children involved in divorce
proceedings are at an age where a proper decision as to their
custody is of crucial importance to their future well-being: a
decision which cannot be lightly undertaken without a proper
appraisal of all relevant considerations. Yet, notwithstanding
the limitations of the jUdiciary in this regard, it is only in
exceptional cases that a welfare report on the interests of minor
children involved in divorce is called· for. 3)
It is, accordingly, difficult to accept that our courts are in
a position to give adequate expression to the best interests of
children on divorce. 4) The inability to give true expression to
1) See above at 164-167.
2) According to Trengove JA in an address entitled 'Die Howe se Rol by
Egskeiding' Golden Jubilee Report (1974) 96, 102. The text of
this address is reprinted in (1975) DR 259.
3) An example of where the courts called for a welfare report into
the circumstances relative to the custody dispute over a minor
girl is Pautz v Horn 1976 (4) SA 572 (0). But, an application
to place before the court a further report of a probation officer,
as well as a report by a social worker and also the record of an
enquiry by a Children's Court, failed notwithstanding the fact
that the opposing party had raised no objection thereto.
4) See above at 164 and cf Trengove JA 'Die Howe se Rol by Egskeiding'
Golden Jubilee Report (1974) 95, 102 - 'Wanneer die hof oor die
toesig en beheer van die kind moet beslis, moet die hof vasstel
wat in die beste belang van die bepaalde kind sal wees. Dit is
die deurslaggewende oorweging. Maar onder ons huidige stelsel,
veral soos dit in die Transvaal geld, kan die hof, na may mening,
hierdie belangrike plig nie behoorlik uitvoer nie.' Cf Olmesdahl
'The Rights of Children on Divorce' 1980 DR 481. Further on the
best interests of children on divorce see~elow at 301 n 2.
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the best interests of children on divorce can be attributed,
1) ( ) .according to Trengove JA in the Transvaal at any rate , to the
following factors:
(a) the high number of divorce actions which in the Transvaal
h th th
. 2)
is hig er an any 0 er provlnce;
(b) in undefended actions the parties usually enter into consent
papers concerning, inter alia, the custody and maintenance of any
minor children and which the courts, generally without question,
incorporate in the final orders of divorce.3) Only in rare cases
are there an official report before the court concerning the circumstances
and particulars of th~ parents and the minor children;
(c) when a judge is faced with a motion court roll of between
60 and 90 divorce actions, as is often the case in the Transvaal,
he cannot devote more than 3 to 5 minutes to any single case. It
follows that a judge cannot give his full attention to the question
of what is in the best interests of the minor children involved. 4)
It is submitted that there is much substance in the above view
of Trengove JA that the courts are simply not in a position to give
proper expression to the best interests of the children on divorce.
This is not the first occasion that a judge of appeal has drawn
attention to this situation. Thus, even as far back as 1947
Schreiner JA had t~e following pertinent comments to make in Fletcheri)
namely,
1) Op cit at 103.
2) Out of a total of 12 037 divorce orders granted in 1976 in the
Republic of South Africa, 6 204 final orders of divorce were
granted in the Transvaal alone: 1976 Report on Marriages and
Divorce in South Africa: Report 07-02-10.
3) Generally speaking, the courts do not lightly interfere with the
provisions contained in a consent paper save in exceptional
circumstances: Spiro 254 and the authorities there cited. As most
divorce actions are undefended the courts generally assume that the
parents, in their negotiations leading up to the drafting and
signing of consent papers, have properly taken the interests of any
minor children into account. But see Olmesdahl 'The Rights of
Children on Divorce' 1980 DR 481.
4) See also 168 n 2 above.
5) 1948 (1) SA 130 (AD) at 145-146.
'~7n such undefended cases, unless the court has
some reason to doubt the plaintiff's capacity to look
after the minor offspring of the marriage, an order
granting him/her custody will usually follow as a
matter of course upon the main order. The court has
ordinarily in such cases no material from which to
judge whether the children would be better off with
the plaintiff or with the defendant beyond the fact
that the latter has not taken the trouble to claim
1)
custody.'
There are three possible solutions to the apparent inability of
the courts to give adequate expression to the true interests of minor
children involved in divorce litigation; namely,
(1) such children ought to have separate legal representation.
In this regard, Olmesdah12) expresses himself as follows:
'He ~he jUdg~7 cannot ignore the fact that the
agreement as to custody in a consent paper may be
a compromise between maintenance and custody
claims, with a child a mere pawn. The court can
protect the child's interests only after adequate
investigation. Does this not mean that the child
is an indispensible party to the proceedings and
that his interests (which may conflict with those of
parents) can only be established by counsel repres-
enting him?,3)
1) Emphasis supplied. Despite the lack of adequate material from
which the best interests of minor children can be assessed, it was
recognized by Centlivres CJ in the same case (at 134) that 'what
is really in issue in all custody cases is the interests of the
child itself.' Cf Bailey 1979 (3) SA 128 (AD). See also Hahlo
459 and the authorities cited at n 19.
2) In his review of the 4 ed of Hahlo (1975) in (1976) 93 SALJ 232
at 243.
3) ef Murch 'The Role of Solicitors in Divorce Proceedings' (1978) 41
MLR 25, 35 - 'Solicitors representing divorcing parents do not see
it as their place to interview children ••• It is not always
realized by lawyers or litigants that to concentrate attention on
one member of the family to the exclusion of the others is to risk
over-simplification and bias, which, when acted upon, may weaken
the complex emotional ties that link all family members even when
a marriage is no longer viable. Many lawyers have become so
bonded to the adversary system that it is not easy for them to
appreciate this point.' See also Olmesdahl 'The Rights of Children on
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It is, of course, true that section 6 .(4) of the Divorce Act permits
the court to 'appoint a legal practitioner to represent a 'child at
the proceedings and may order the parties or any one of them to pay
the costs of the representation.' This, however, is only a
permissive provision and is not framed in peremptory terms. It is
doubted whether, in practice, this provision will be invoked to any
1)
great extent.
It is significant to note that the call for the legal
representation of children in divorce proceedings has been made not
only in South Africa, but also elsewhere. Thus, for example,
Payne2) has opined for the view that a lawyer should be attached
to the court to act, as the occassion arises, as an amicus curiae.
Payne does not envisage the lawyer's services being used in all
cases where minor children are involved but only in such cases as,
the court in its discretion considers necessary.3) In some
1) Hahlo and Sinclair 42 and see 166 above.
2) At 475. See also Bradway 'Divorce Litigation and the Welfare of
Family' (1956) 9 Vanderbilt LR 665, 676-677; cf Foster and Freed
'Child Custody' (1964) 39 NYULR 423 and 615; Mnookin 'Child -
Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Fact of Indeter-
minacy' (1975) 39 Law and Conternp Problems 226; Mnookin and
Kornhauser 'Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce (1979) 88 Yale LJ 950.
3) Cf Galligan 'Protection of Children in Family Disputes' (1973)
4 Can BJ 10 (a Canadian Judge) who draws attention to the short-
falls of the divorce procedure that then existed in Canada: he
points out, inter alia, that counsel's ethical duty is to his client
and that the interests of the children are only of peripheral
interest to him. The children themselves are generally, because
of their age, immaturity and the pressures brought to bear upon
them, unable to give the court adequate expression of their real
wishes. The parents to whom they look for the necessary guidance
are only bent on using the children as levers against each other.
Finally, it is not uncommon for parents to bargain away claims
for maintenance for the children. At 12 Galligan cites fully the
case of Hansford 119737 1 OR 116 in which he, as presiding judge,
refused to give hIs imprimatur to a clause in a consent paper in
terms of which the mother agreed to waive any claim for the future
maintenance of her child. Instead, the 'Official Guardian' was
ordered to collect, and enforce payment of, the maintenance which
the court ordered the father to pay. Cf Shepstone 1974 (1) SA
411 (D); 1974 (2) SA 462 (N).
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jurisdictions provision has been made for the courts to appoint
lawyers as 'guardians ad litem' or as 'friends of the court' to look
after the interests of minor children in cases where there is grave
concern as to their welfare;l)
(2) the second possible solution would be for the courts to
insist on the production of a welfare report on the circumstances
and background of every child involved in a divorce. The South African
2)
courts have the power to call for such welfare reports and have done
so in the past.3) However, it is seriously doubted whether our courts
have called for such welfare reports with meaningful frequency.
Unlike the position in South Africa, the Los Angeles Conciliation
Court regards as indispensible a welfare report where the custody of
a minor child is at issue. 4) The result is that the separate legal
representation of such children has become largely irrelevant;
(3) the third possible solution would be for the judge presiding
over a divorce action to interview in chambers each and every child
involved, provided the child is of an age of understanding.5) In reality,
our courts already have this power and from time to time this power is
1) Eg Wisconsin and Michigan: Foster 'Conciliation and Counseling in
the Courts in Family Law Cases' (1966) 41 NYULR 351, 360 and 367-368.
Cf s 46 (8) Hawaii Revised Statutes (Chap 571) which is cited above
at 137, and s 65 Australian Family Law Act, 1975, which is cited
above at 143.
2) S 6 (2) Divorce Act cited above at 246.
3) See, for example, the views of Mr Justice Margo cited above at 246.
4) See above at 131-133.
5) Where the children are not of an age of understanding the judge would
perforce have to rely on a welfare report.
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exercised. l ) However, this possible solution by itself should be
rejected out of hand: to demand of our judges to interview all
children of an age of understanding involved in every divorce,
custodial or maintenance action would be impractical for at least
the following reasons:
(a) our judges are simply not qualified in the social and
behavioural sciences and to expect them to rely solely on
their experience at the Bar and on the Bench would not be
fair to both the judges themselves and to the children
concerned;
(b) it is seriously doubted whether our judges would be able
to come to a proper conclusion on what is in the best interests
of the children concerned simply on the strength of a single
interview in chambers;
2)
(c) the burden we place on our judges is already heavy enough
without expecting them to conduct such interviews in chambers.
It is submitted that a combination of the proposals above would
constitute a satisfactory solution to the court's inability to give
1) A recent example of a judge interviewing in chambers children
involved in a custody dispute is N~nt 1978 (2) SA 690 (R) at
696. The presiding judge /Goldin J did, however, complain
;at 696 E7 that he did 'not-have the benefit of any expert evidence
concerning this problem'. In this case, the plaintiff father
claimed the right to bring the 3 children of the marriage (now
dissolved by divorce) up as Roman Catholics, while the defendant
mother (who had the custody of the 3 children) claimed the right
to continue to bring the children up as Anglicans. The plaintiff
failed in his action because of the failure to adduce facts to
show that the true interests of the children required a change.
2) See above at 168-172.
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adequate expression to the best interests of children on divorce.
An example of such an approach is to be found in Hawaii. Thus, in
Hawaii, if a child is old enough and capable of forming an intelligent
preference the family court is enjoined to give due weight to his
wishes. l ) In addition, the family court may in its discretion order
an investigation into the care, welfare and custody of the child and
when the resultant report is produced it may be received in evidence. 2)
Furthermore, the family court'has the discretion to appoint a guardian
ad litem to represent the interests of the child. 3)
5. Conclusion
It is only in comparatively recent years that the medical profession,
as well as the behavioural and social scientists, have made their presence
felt in the courts. The erstwhile resistance to them has been gradually
whittled down over the years and they are playing an increasingly more
meaningful role in the administration of justice generally. However,
there is still much scope for increased co-operation between the courts
and the behavioural and social scientists especially in the juvenile
criminal courts and in the field of matrimonial litigation. But, it is
submitted, this co-operation is bound to increase with the further passage
of time. Certainly, this co-operation would reach its high water mark
with the establishment of family courts in South Africa.
1) S 46 (3) Revised Statutes of Hawaii s 46 is cited in full above at
136-137. Note that the wording of this section makes it
obligatory for a judge of the Hawaii Family Court to give due weight
to a child's wishes when he is old enough and capable of forming an
intelligent preference.
2) Ss 46 (4) and (4) Revised Statutes of Hawaii.
3) S 46 (8) Revised Statutes of Hawaii. Cf s 6 (4) Divorce Act.
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CHAPrER TEN
THE PHILOSOPHY AND PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED FAMILY
COURT IN SOUTH AFRICA
In the light of the above brief description and analysis of the
family courts of Los Angeles, Hawaii and Australia
l
), and in view of
the present position in South Africa with regard to matrimonial
law reform2 ), the role of the legal profession in the field of
family law3), the fragmentation of jurisdiction in family law matters4),
and the relationship between the courts and the behavioural and social
scientists5), it may now be broadly stated that the philosophy and
purpose behind the establishment of a family court in South Africa
should be concerned with at least the following factors; namely,
(a) concern over the children of marriages that have broken
down;
(b) concern over the rising tide of divorce and the apparent
breakdown of the family as a unit;
(c) Concern over the unwieldy system of multiple jurisdiction
over matters that fall within the ambit of family law;
(d) concern over the lack of court-connected counselling and
conciliation facilities;
(e) concern over the lack of specialised knowledge of, and
experience in, the behavioural and social sciences on the
part of the courts and legal practitioners;
(f) concern over the lack of a more practical and meaningful
co-operation between the courts and the behavioural and
. 1 . t· t (6)SOC1a SC1en 1S s.
1) See Chapters 3 and 4 above.
2) See Chapter 5 above: cf Chapter 6 for Rhodesian Divorce Law Reform.
3) See 168-179 above.
4) See Chapter 8 above.
5) See Chapter 9 above.
f)) This factor, to a lare;e extent, follows on the previous one.
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It must be stressed that the philosophy of a family court is
. 1)
hardly ever expressed in terms of preserving marriages at all costs.
Nor, it is submitted, is the philosophy behind the establishment of
a family court so much concerned with the question of whether there
should be more or less divorce. 2 ) The divorce problem has been with
us for hundreds of years and will no dbout remain with us for the
future. 3) The fact that marriage was given a sacramental character
by the English medieval church, and that divorce a vinculo matrimonii
was abolished, gave rise to very impressive divorce statistics.
In the modern context impressive divorce statistics are also to be
found in, for example, Spain where divorce, as a result of strong
Catholic influence, is not permitted.
constrained to ask _ 4)
But, as Rheinstein was
'Does this fact indicate ••• that no ••• Spanish
••• husband ever abandons his wife, that no
wife ever runs away from her husband, that no
couples in these countries ever separate, that
no married man maintains a mistress and no
married woman ever has a lover?'
Even amongst the canon lawyers there was an early recognition of
the reality that marriages break-up notwithstanding the sacramental
character of the marriage contract. Thus it was that divorce a mensa
et thoro was allowed. 5) This procedure, however, left intact the
sacramental character of a marriage since neither party was free to
contract another valid marriage. But, if the validity of a marriage
could be successfully attacked on the basis that the parties were
1) See 87-88 above.
2) This question is comprehensively discussed by Rahlo 'Fighting
the Dragon Divorce' (1963) SALJ 27.
3) See, for example, van Leeuwen Commentaries 119, cited auove at
2 n 2.
4) 'The Law of Divorce and the Problem of Marriage Stability' (1956)
9 Vanderbilt LR 633, 643-644.
5) Schafer 'Judicial Separation' (1976) 93 SALJ 289. Judicial
separation has now been abolished in South Africa by s 14 Divorce
Act.
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discovered to be related to each other within the prohibited
1)degrees such marriage could be annulled: the effect of the
decree of ann~lment was that the 'marriage' was deemed never
to have been contracted in the first place. The decree of
annulment could even be obtained after many years and even after a
number of children had been born to the parties. In fact, the
prohibited degrees of relationship were so extended with the passage
of time that 'spouses who had quarrelled began to investigate their
pedigrees and were unlucky if they could discover no impedimentum
d "" ,2)lrlmens.
The scandalous approach of the canon lawyers to the problem of
divorce did keep the divorce rate down to a minimum, but it
conveniently swept under the carpet the real problems of marriage-
breakdown. The fact that up until the recent promulgation of the
Divorce Act,3) a divorce could only be obtained on well-defined
grounds was no safeguard against the pernicious and widespread
1) The risk of a close ;and prohibited7 relationship between the
parties was much greater in earlier times than it is in modern
times. This is because communities tended to live in small
close units and travel was more restricted than it is today.
2) McGregor 'The Morton Commission: A Social and Historical
Commentary' (1956) 7 Br Journ Sociology 171, 172-173, quoting
Pollock and Maitland The History of English Law 2 ed (1898)
Vol 2, 389. See also Schafer 'Judicial Separation' (1976) 93
SALJ 289, 291 n 14. A graphic example of ecclesiastical hypocrisy
in this regard is cited by Jackson at 22; viz 'There was no
limit to the persons who could have a marriage investigated to
see whether it came within the prohibited degrees; the parties
themselves, a prying bishop's commissary or even a spiteful
neighbour might be responsible for its annulment, and there
seems to have been no time limit set to their activities. In
the reign of Edward 111, Thomas married a wife and had issue.
After Thomas and his wife were dead, the bishop's commissary
was informed at a visitation that Thomas, prior to his marriage,
had stood godfather to a female cousin of his future wife.
Proceedings were thereupon taken in the bishops' court, and the
marriage was annulled.' See also Bromley 69 et seq.
3) The Divorce Act came into force on 1 July 1979.
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practice of connivance and collusion. Thus, with regard to the
position prior to the passing of the Divorce Act Rahlo convincingly
pointed outl ) that 'the stark truth is that ••• spouses who are
mutually determined to sever the marriage tie will succeed in
obtaining their divorce decree, if not at the first attempt, at the
second one.' Whether the Divorce Act will have the effect of curbing
South Africa's unenviably high divorce rate remains to be seen, though
this is seriously doubted. 2) What seems clear is that, notwithstanding
the welcome reforms to the substantive divorce laws of South Africa,
the basic problems of divorce are still with us. These basic problems
are reflected in above stated factors of concern that underlie the
philosophy and purpose behind the establishment of a family court in
South Africa.
It is, accordingly, submitted that an even more pressing need
than an overhaul of the substantive family and divorce law is the
need to overhaul the family and divorce law procedure. 3 ) As Hahlo
rightly comments4) 'wherever the solution may be found, it won't be
1) 'Fighting the Dragon Divorce' (1963) 80 SALJ 27, 37.
2) According to a report in the Sunday Times on 3.2.1980, there
were 798 more divorces from July to December 1979 than in the
first half of the year on the Witwatersrand o Similar increases
were experienced in Cape Town and Durban. It may, however,
be argued that the Divorce Act has made divorce harder to obtain.
Thus, for example, the court is not necessarily obliged, as it
previously was, to grant a divorce on the ground of a single
act of adultery.' The fact of adultery must now be considered
together with the question of whether there has been an
irretrievable breakdown in the marriage IS 4 (2) (a)7.
Adultery per se is no longer a ground for divorce. -
3) It is in this area that the Divorce Act is lacking. It is true
that the Act makes provision for the court to adjourn proceedings
to enable the parties to consider the possibility of reconciliation
IS 4 (3)7; for the court to order anyone to appear before it, or
to order an investigation, in connection with the welfare of any
minor or dependent child of a marriage ;-s 6 (2)7; and for the
court to order the legal representation-of a minor child IS 6 (4)7.
It is also true that the Act has abolished the order for t~e -
restitution of conjugal rights IS 147. But, it is submitted,
the Act does not go far enough In respect of the matters under
consideration.
4) 'Fighting the Dragon Divorce' (1963) 80 SALJ 27, 37.
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- - 1)in reforming the isubstantiv~7 divorce law'. There is no doubt
that an overhaul of the divorce procedure will give 'the consumers
of our system of justice,2) a better deal. In order to achieve
this purpose it would seem that there must be a change in emphasis.
In this regard, it is appropriate to remind oneself of the oft-
cited, and now almost universally accepted, objectives of a good
divorce law as formulated by the British Law Commission in 1966;3)
namely,
1) See also Alexander 'Legal Science and the Social Sciences: The
Family Court' (1956) 21 Miss L R 105, 108 - 'Reform of the
divorce laws will do no good unless we can establish new procedures
in courts which are especially designed and equipped for that
purpose.' In his discussion of the Standard Family Court Act
in (1961) 1 J Fam Law 105, Rubin correctly points out that the
model Act does not, for example, attempt to revise the
substantive law of divorce. Rubin explains (at 106) that the
'liberalization of divorce laws is not all, and perhaps not
more important than procedural changes.' What the Standard Family
Court Act seeks to do is to provide a more realistic procedure
within the framework of the existing substantive law by focussing
attention on the unfortunate consequences of family actions.
See also Putting Asunder § 28 - 'Procedural change is therefore
one of the necessary conditions of reforming the substantive
;matrimonial? law.'- -
2) Per Elston, Fuller and Murch 'Judicial Hearings of Undefended
Divorce Petitions' (1975) 38 MLR 609, 610. See also Bradway
'Divorce Litigation and the Welfare of the Family' (1956) 9
Vand,erbil t LR 665.
3) Field of Choice (1966), § 15.
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'~A7 good divorce law should seek to achieve the
following objectives:
(i) to buttress, rather than to undermine,
the stability of marriage; cnd
(ii) when, regrettably, a marriage has
irretrievably broken down, to enable
the empty legal shell to be destroyed
with the maximum fairness, and the
minimum bitterness, distress and
humiliation.'
These objectives of 'a good divorce law' are, in a sense, contradictory
in that they give expression to conflicting interests; namely, the
preservation of marriage, on the one hand, and the break-up of marriage,
1)on the other. There is, therefore, a danger than an undue
emphasis will be placed on either one of these objectives while the
other is rel·atively neglected. 2) This has, in fact, occurred in
South Africa. Thus, it is submitted, the Divorce Act places an undue
emphasis on the first of these objectives. The 'bitterness, distress
and humiliation', a feature of the divorce action prior to July 1979,
will still continue to be a feature of the divorce action after July
1979. It may well be that far from eliminating the erstwhile fau1t-
orientated grounds of divorce, the Divorce Act has retained them,
albeit in modified form. Thus, among the factors that the court may
accept as evidence of the irretrievable breakdown of a marriage
are -
'Ca) that the parties have not lived together as
husband and wife for a continuous period of at least
one year immediately prior to the date of the
institution of the divorce action;
1) Cf Biggs 'Stability of Marriage - A Family Court?' (1961) 34
ALJ 343, 3Jr4 - '/T7here have been two opposing forces throughout
the development of matrimonial law: (1) attempts by the State to
stabilize marriage by restricting the right to terminate one
marital relationship in order to enter another; (11) the desire
of individuals to terminate one union which has become unbearable
and to acquire the right to form another.'
2) Bates 'Legal and Social Change in Australian Family Law (1976) 9
CILSA 299, 307-308.
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(b) that the defendant has commited adultery and that
the plaintiff finds it irreconcilable with the continued
. 1 t' h' ,1)marrlage re a lOns lp.
Furthermore, there appears to be a misplaced enthusiasm for the
possibility of reconciliation after the divorce action has commenced,2)
while no provision at all has been made for the conciliation
counselling of the parties to a divorce action. The only welcome
hint of a conciliation programme for which provision has been made
is to be found in section 6 of the Divorce Act which seeks to
safeguard the interests of dependent and minor children. 3)
It is,therefore, submitted that if the establishment of a
family court in South Africa is to become a reality there will have
to be a shift in emphasis from the first to the second of the two
above stated objectives of a 'good divorce law'. Unless this is
achieved, there will be no possibility of giving effect to the
philosophy underlying the structure and operation of a family court
in South Africa.
A consideration of these matters of concern outlined at the
beginning of this chapter, and which give expression to the philosophy
behind the concept of family courts makes it easier to understand one
of the main purposes of a family court; namely, to apply preventive
and therapeutic measures to constructively assist spouses, and members
of their family, to resolve their problems. 4) History has proved that
marital discord as a social problem will always be with us. But what
we apparently have yet to learn from the history of divorce and its
attendant problems is that a change of attitude as well as a change of
procedure, and not only a change in the substantive law, is needed.
1) Ss 4 (2) (a) and (b) Divorce Act.
2) S 4 (3") Divorce Act, and see 111-112 above.
3) But, in the absence of the court ordering an investigation under
s 6 (2) Divorce Act, the court will have to rely on whatever
evidence the litigating spouses choose to place before it that
proper provision has been made for the welfare of any affected
minor or dependent child. This was the position before the
promulgation of the Divorce Act and it is doubted if the divorce
courts in future will make much use of the power to order
investigations.
4) Payne 89 and 95-96.
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CHP.PTER ELEVEN
DEFINITION OF THE PROPOSED FAMILY COURT
FOR SOUTH AFRICA
The main characteristics of a family court have been formulated
in the past by, inter alia, the South African Law Commission,l) the
Finer Committee2) and by payne.3 ) According to Payne there are nine
basic characteristics to be strived for in the ideal family court.
These may be best summarized as follows:
(1) the family court must be seen as a court of law and not
.al 4)as a SOCl agency;
(2) the procedure of the family court should be characterized
by its informality, flexibility and investigatory nature,
. )
rather than be unduly formal and contentious;5
(3) the pleadings must be consistent with the procedure advocated
in the second characteristic above;6)
(4) there should be a limitation on the publication of proceedings
in the family court. So also, the records of proceedings,
as well as the hearings, must be kept confidential;7)
(5) there must be a central repository for the housing of
statistical data;8)
1) Divorce Report (1978) § 13.1. These characteristics are cited in




Payne 144-167. Payne stresses, however, that 'secrecy, as distinct
from privacy, of hearings is to be condemned.' (at 167).
Payne 167-182. As Payne puts it (at 169) 'research is vital to assess
the validity and efficacy of established or proposed programmes of
prevention and treatment.' This, of course, pre-supposes that minimum
requirements for the maintenance and evaluation of legal and social
records must be legislatively defined.
2)
8)
Finer Report § 283.
at 85 n 1.
At 119-206.
These characteristics are cited in full above
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(6) no judge of a family court should be expected to work
alone since, as a lawyer, he is not normally trained in
the social and behavioural sciences. Accordingly, a
condition precedent to the establishment of a successful
family court is a support staff of persons trained and
experienced in the social and behavioural sciences. Such
persons, however, will be expected to work in conjunction
with, rather than in competition with, any social welfare
organizations and agencies which are not attached to the
family court;l)
(7) the building in which the family court is to be housed must
be adequate enough to provide sufficient office-space for
all the court and court-connected personnel, and must not
be seen as a dark and forbidding place by the PUblic;2)
(8) the physical construction and siting of a family court
building must take account of any peculiar local conditions;3)
(9) to be efficacious the family court must be available to
people not only in the urban areas but also to all persons
in rural and outlying areas. 4)
It is clear that there is not much difference of opinion in the
various formulations of the characteristics that go to make-up the
ideal family court.5 ) Such differences as there are, lie in the main,
in the order of importance attached to the various characteristics.
In this regard, the formulation by the South African Law Commission
of the characteristics that constitute an ideal family court6) is a




4) Payne 200-206. Coup10d to this characteristic is the suggestion
that there is no room for each provice or state within a country
to operate its own family court system. This, however, is a
problem that would be peculiar to those countries operating under
a federal constitutional set-up, such as Australia and Canada, and
would, accordingly, be of no relevance in South Africa.
5) Cf Bates 'The Lawyer's Social Role: A Lesson from Family Law'
(1975) 2 Natal,Univ L R 125, 136-137.
6) See 148 above.
namely,
(1) a family court must be seen as a court of law and not as
an arm of the social services;
(2) a family court should be endowed with a status at least
equal to that of the Supreme Court;
(3) the records and proceedings of family courts should be
treated as confidential.
It is, accordingly, submitted that the following would serve as a
useful definition of a family court for South Africa; namely,
'A family court may be defined as a supreme court of law
having jurisdiction over all family law matters which
are to be adjudicated upon in an informal and confidential
manner so that emphasis may be placed on the resolution of
problems rather than the settlement· of disputes.'
There are, of course, many other definitions of a family court.
Some, characterized by their brevity and vagueness,l) tend to emphasize
only one or two characteristics of a family court,2) while others are
1) Eg Hall 'Outline of a Proposal for a Family Court' (1971) 1 Fam Law
6 - 'There should be one lower tier local court dealing with all
domestic proceedings. This I would define as the Family Court.'
2) Eg Alexander 'The Family Court - An Obstacle Race' (1958) 19 Univ
Pitts LR 602 sees the family court as one in which there is a----
'concentration of the handling of all justiciable family conflicts
and problems in one court.' Alexander's reluctance to propound a
comprehensive definition of a family court is presumably tempered
by the following observation in an article entitled 'What is a Family
Court Anyway?' (1952) 26 Conn BJ 243, 244; viz. 'From my contacts
with lawyers both off and on the bench I have learned that there are
as many degrees of comprehension of the family court as there are
degrees on a thermometer.' See also the same writer in 'Family
Cases are Different - Why not Family Courts?' (1954) 3 Kansas LR 26.
Finlay 'Family Courts - Gimmick or Panacea?' (1969) 43 ALJ 602, 603,
suggests that a family court 'is a myth at present becaU;; it can be
defined by the well-known method of Alice in Wonderland: "It means
what you want it to mean." ••• /W7hen people talk of family courts they
invest this term with a meaning-of their own choosing. Discussion
is often informed by optimism and hopefulness rather than precision. '
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it also gives
It is submitted that the suggested definitionh
. 1)
more compre enSlve.
above has the merit of being reasonably concise:
expression to the main characteristics of a family court; namely,
(1) the family court must be seen as a court of law and not
simply as a social welfare institution;
(2) the family court must be endowed with a supreme court status;
(3) the family court must have a unified jurisdiction over all
family law matters;
(4) proceedings in the family court should be conducted as
informally as possible.
(5) proceedings, and records of proceedings, should be treated as
confidential;
(6) the approach of the family court should be therapeutic.
It is proposed to deal with each of these characteristics in the
following chapter. It must be stressed that the order in which these
characteristics are being dealt with does not necessarily signify their
order of importance.
1) Eg Ray 'A Family Court: The California Proposal' (1965) 56 Calif LR
1205 states that a family court 'should have integrated jurisdiction
over all legal problems that involve the members of a family; be
presided over by a specialist judge assisted by a professional staff
trained in the social and behavioural sciences; and employ its special
resources and those of the community to intervene therapeutically in the
lives of the people who come before it.' Arthur 'A Family Court - ~lY
Not?' (1966) 51 Minn LR 223, 227, states that 'A true family court: (a)
is a court of law; Cb) encompasses all litigable areas of family troublE
(c) is under the control of a single and continuing judge; (d) deals
with facts rather than jurisdictional pleadings and (e) is supported by
a competent staff.' Foster 'Conciliation and Counselling in the Courts
in Family law Cases' (1966) 41 NYULR 351, 352, is of the view that 'The
ideal family court ••• would have comprehensive and integrated jurisdict:
over all or most family problems, employ a professional staff of
psychiatrists, psychologists, case workers, marriage counsellors, and
probation officers, and be committed to the philosophy that its function
was to act in the best interests of the family and society.' According
to Gordon 'The Family Court: ~nen properly defined, it is both desirabl'
and attainable' (1975) 14 J Fam Law 1, 3, 'The ideal traits !Of a family
court7 include: (1) a court that adheres firmly to legal prInciples and
has resources available to correct with minimal intervention the problem
that brought the individual into court: (2) a court that has broad subst,
tive and geographic jurisdiction over family matters; (3) a court that h,
proper status and access to resources; and (4) a court that has a clear-




AN ANALYSIS OF THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PROPOSED
FAMILY COURT FOR SOUTH AFRICA
1. THE FAMILY COURT AS A COURI' OF LAW
For the proposed family court to function properly it must function
as a court of law. As Gordonl ) pertinently observes:
'To believe otherwise is a contradiction in terms.
It is utter hypocrisy for an institution that
purports to interpret the law, adjudge conduct
under the law and apply the law with great
authority, to question whether it is bound by all
legal principles.'
If a family court was to function as anything less than a court of law
its judgments and pronouncements would command scant respect from those
2)
it is designed to serve. The family court is required to do justice
according to legal principles and, above all, it 'must remain, and must
be seen to remain, impartial. ,3) The therapeutic functions of a family
court must not be allowed to usurp its judicial functions. Thus,
there must be a proper compliance with the normal rules of legal
procedure so that there can be no question of an abuse of fundamental
rights such as occurred in the celebrated case of Re Gault. 4) Proper
legal protection should at all times be accorded to those seeking
relief in the family court. Though the family court represents a
'highly beneficial synthesis between law and social welfare' it is
clear, as the Finer Committee was at pains to point out,5) 'the
individual in the family court must in the last resort remain the
subject of rights, not the object of assistance.'
1) 'The Family Court: When properly defined, it is both desirable and
attainable' (1975) 14 J .Fam Law 1, 3-4.
2) It is submitted that the judgments of the proposed family court
should be reportable in the same way as judgments of the Supreme
Court: cf The Family Law Service of Australia.
3) Finer Report § 4.285. Even with regard to the Los Angeles Conciliation
Court great stress is placed on the fact that the Conciliation Court is
a court of law in every sense and is not just an administrative organ:
see above at 30.
4) 387 us 1 (1967 )•
c\ ~~_~~ D~~~~~ &h?Rs_
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2. THE ST AT US OF THE PROPOSED FAMILY COURT
There is presently in South Africa a strong body of opinion which
holds the view that the status of the lower court system would be
considerably enhanced by the creation of the so-called intermediate
court system. It is arguedl ) that such intermediate courts should
be accorded a civil, as well as criminal, jurisdiction, so that, for
2)
example, divorce would fall within the jurisdiction of such courts.
It is against the background of this strong body of opinion that the
Hoexter Commission of Inquiry was appointed.
There is no doubt that magistrates do feel, with some justification,
that they can perform the same rubber stamp functions of a judge of the
Supreme Court in a divorce case. 3) It is also true that the cost of
divorce litigation in the Supreme Court is needlessly expensive. Yet,
notwithstanding these facts, it is still difficult to accept that the
divorce action should be handled by an intermediate court. It is trite
that marriage is the cornerstone of our society. Certainly, the aura
of sanctity surrounding the marriage contract would be lessened if its
termination were to be relegated to a court of inferior jurisdiction
4)
and status to that of the Supreme Court. As to costs, this is a
problem that can easily be resolved by providing for a special tariff
of costs which will be applicable in the proposed family court.
1) See 1978 Annual Report of the Department of Justice 5-7; Coetzer
'Intermediere Howe' (1978) 132 DR: see 155 above.
2) The main arguments in favour of the introduction of so-called
intermediate courts are centred on the desire to reduce the cost of
litigation which must of necessity be conducted in the Supreme Court
(eg divorce litigation) and to relieve the Superme Court of some of
the pressure of its work.
3) Cf Elston, Fuller and Murch 'Judicial Hearings of Undefended Divorce
Petitions' (1975) 38 MLR 609; Eekelaar 142-151. On the role of the
judge in divorce proceedings see above at 168-172.
4) It should be mentioned that th~ proposed family court would be able
to share the Supemre Court's library facilities. These facilities
however, would have to be mcreased to cater for the specialized
interests of the staff of the proposed family court.
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The idea that the proposed family court should be accorded a
status at least equal to that of the Supreme Court is in keeping
with developments in other countries. l ) Thus, the Conciliation
Court of Los Angeles has a superior court status2 ) as does the
Family Court of Hawaii3 ) and the Family Court of Australia. 4)
Of course, not all family courts have a superior court status. 5 )
But such courts do not command the same respect as those family
courts with a superior court status, and they have generally assumed
the reputation of being a 'poor man's court.,6)
1) See generally Payne 593-659. After reviewing a 'super-abundance
of alternatives respecting the status and place of the Family
Court in the judicial structure', Payne comes to the conclusion
(at 657) that the family court 'should be a division of the
Superior or Supreme Court and should not be a separate autonomous
court, although it will probably be necessary to provide a separate
plant for the Family Division in order to accommodate its total
resources, which should not be geographically fragmented.'
2) See above at 14.
3) See above at 41.
4) See above at 56.
5) Eg the provincial family courts in Canada (see above at 81 n 4) and





An attempt has already been made to show that the fragmentation of
jurisdiction in family law matters in South Africa is a real one. l )
QQite apart from the power of the Minister of Pensions and Social Welfare
to make contributions to the maintenance of certain classes of children2 )
and his powers over children at the 'post-committal' stage3), the present
jursidiction over family law matters is vested in the Supreme Court, the
Children's Court, the Maintenance Court and the Magistrate's Court.
(A) The Supreme Court
It is submitted that in order to achieve a unified jurisdiction
over family law matters the proposed family court should have the
(i) applications for consent
(l"l") d" t" 5)lvorce ac lons ;
jurisdiction to adjudicate on all
presently within the jursidiction
the following matters
of the Supreme Court;
t ' 4)o marry ;
which are
namely,
(iii) ancillary matters arising out of a divorce action such as the
maintenance, custody, access and guardianship of the minor children of
a marriage. This would include, inter alia, disputes concerning the
1) See Chapter 8 above.
2) S 89 Children's Act: see above at 189.
3) See 208 above.
4) For the present position on consent to marry see above at 209-211.
5) The decree of judicial separation has now been abolished by s 14 Divorce
Act; ie since 1 July 1979. It follows that a decree of judicial
separation granted prior to 1 July 1979 does not have to be first set
aside before an order of divorce under the Divorce Act can be
granted - Kruger 1980 (3) SA 283 (0).
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schooling and religious upbringing of minor children
l




(iv) applications for maintenance for wives both stante matrimonio
and on dissolution of a marriage,3) as well as maintenance applications
as between parent and child, grandparent and grandchild etc;
(v) actions pendente lite such as applications for contributions
towards costs, maintenance for, and the custody of, and access to, the
. f' 4)mlnor children 0 a marrlage;
(vi) property disputes between husband and wife both stante
matrimonio and on divorce. This would include ejectment proceedings





applications for leave to presume death;
breach of promise actions;
applications for interdicts in matrimonial matters;7)
1) As to disputes concerning the schooling and religious upbringing of
minor children on divorce see Nugent 1978 (2) SA 690 (R) where Goldin J
re-affirmed the view that, subject to the best interests of the children
being given effect to, the duty of care for the religious upbringing and
education of the minor children of a marriage lay with the custodian
parent: cf Vermaak 1965 (1) SA 341 (T); Hill 1969 (3) SA 544 (R AD);
Holland 1975 (3) SA 553 (AD); Grobler 197s-(3) SA 578 (T).
2) A finding by the Maintenance Court that a man other than the husband of
the mother of the child is the father of the child does not affect the
status of the child. On the basis of the maxim pater est quem nuptiae
demonstrantthe child is still considered to be legitimate until an order
of a competent court (ie the Supreme Court) otherwise declares:
Park v de Necker 1978 (1) SA 1060 (N).
3) S 7 (2) Divorce Act.
4) Rule 43 Consolidated Rules of the Supreme Court. On the purpose of Rule ~
see Colman 1967 (1) SA 291 (C) at 292 d. As to the abuse of the
procedures provided for by Rule 43 2ee Smit 1978 (2) SA 720 (W) and
Nienaber 1980 (2) SA 803 (0). ----
5) Owen 1968 (1) SA 480 (E); Cattle Breeders Farm (Pvt) Ltd v Veldman 1974
TIT'SA 169 (R AD); Buck 1974 (1) SA 609 ( R).
6) Cf Dissolution of Marriages on Presumption of Death Act, 23 of 1979;
see above at 146 n 4.
7) Eg where a husband wishes to interdict his wife from pledging his
credit for household necessaries: Traub 1955 (2) SA 671 (C); or
where the wife wishes to interdict her husband from making donations
to others in fraud of her rights: Pickles 1947 (3) SA 175 (W);
Pretorius 1948 (1) SA 250 (AD); laws 1972 (1) SA 321 (W).
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(x) applications for the appointment of curators ad litem and/or
bonis on the grounds of a spouse's mental deficiency, inability to manage
his/her own affairs, intoxication and the influence of drugs, and
d o lOt 1)pro 19a l y;
(xi) declarations of majority in terms of the Age of Majority Act
57 of 1972.2)
(B) The Children's Court
It is also submitted that all the matters adjudicated upon in the
Children's Court should fall within the jurisdiction of the proposed
family court.
power -
In particular, the proposed family court should have the
(i) to deal with children alleged to be in d f 3)nee 0 care;
(ii) to grant adoption orders;
4)
(iii) to grant temporary
5)
custody orders;
(iv) to deprive parents of their parental
6)
power.
(C) The Maintenance Court
It is clear that all maintenance matters should fall within the
jurisdiction of a family court. Accordingly, the proceedings presently
provided for by the Maintenance Act, 23 of 1963, the Reciprocal Enforcement
of Maintenance Orders Act, 80 of 1963, should-fall within the jurisdiction
of the proposed family court.
(D) The Magistrate's Court
Apart from its criminal jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of the
Magistrate's Court over matters falling within· the realm of family law is
limited. 7 ) There are, however, at least two matters presently within the
1) See generally Boberg 130-180. It is contemplated that all applicationE
for the appointment of curators will fall under the jurisdiction of the
proposed family court.
2) See generally Boberg 381-383.
3) S 31 Children's Act.
4) S 71 Children's Act.
5) S 83 Children's Act.
6) S 60 Children's Act. It is also proposed to include within the
jurisdiction of the proposed family court all cases of alleged child abt
7) See above at 189, and 202-208.
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jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Court which should properly be dealt
with by the proposed family court; namely, breach of peace proceedings
and the prosecution of juvenile offenders.
(i) Breach of Peace Proceedings
In terms of section 384 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 56 of
1955, if a 'complaint on oath is made to a magistrate that any person
is conducting himself violently towards, or is threatening injury to
the person or property of another or that he has used language or
behaved in a manner towards another likely to provoke a breach of
the peace or assault' the magistrate may summon the person alleged
to be responsible for such conduct to attend an enquiry.l) If
necessary, the magistrate may order such person to be arrested. It
makes no difference that the alleged behaviour threatening to provoke
v
a breach of the peace took place in public or private. If the
complaint is found to be justified the person responsible for the
threatened breach of peace can be ordered 'to give recognizances
with or without sureties in an amount not exceeding fifty rand for
a period not exceeding six months to keep the peace towards the
complainant and refrain from doing or threatening injury to his
. 2)
person or property.' For failing to observe these conditions the
recognizances may be declared to have been forfeited and the order
of forfeiture 'shall have the effect of a judgment in a civil action
in a magistrate's court. ,3)
1) s 384, together with s 319 (3) of the old Criminal Procedure Act
56 of 1955, has been retained by the new Criminal Procedure Act, 51
of 1977~ see Schedule 4 of the 1977 Act. Hiemstra, 646, suggests that
s 384 was not repealed 'omdat 'n nuwe en wyere bepaling daaromtrent
oorweeg word en dit wenslik geag is om die oue voorlopig op die
wetboek te behou.'
2) s 384 (1) Criminal Procedure Act.
3) s 384 (4) Criminal Procedure Act.
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Breach of peace proceedings are essentially administrative in
" " d" " 1 f 1) Th d" . d " dnature having a quasl-Ju lCla orm. e procee lngs are eSlgne
to prevent a threatened offence rather than to deal with an offence
that has already been committed. 2 ) It is regrettable to note, however,
that breach of peace proceedings are hardly, if ever, resorted to in
South Africa. It has certainly been the writer's experience in
practice that very few magistrates are even aware of the provisions of
section 384 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 56 of 1955. This is
particularly unfortunate in view of the fact that members of the police
force are understandably reluctant to become involved in the
investigation and prosecution of intra-familial disputes, especially as
between husband and wife.
In husband and wife assault cases, it is usually the wives who are
the victims. 3) It is true, of course, that the husband's marital power
over the person of his wife has been curbed so that now it is generally
accepted that a husband no longer has the right to administer corporal
chastisement, moderate or otherwise, to his wife.
4) Yet, the sad reality
is that 'wife beating' is far too prevalent a feature of the modern South
1) Limbada 1953 (2) SA 368 (N). According to Broome JP in Limbada at
370 the origin of the breach of peace procedure is not clear. As the
learned judge put it: 'One view is that it depends upon a statute
of Edward Ill, passed some six hundred years ago. Another view
is that it is a Common Law jurisdiction which was in existence from
an even earlier date.' Further on the historical background of the
binding-over procedure see Grim 'Binding-Over to keep the Peace and be
of Good Behaviour in England and Canada' 1976 Public Law 16, 18-20.
2) Ibid. By the same token it is not the purpose of the breach of peace
proceedings to punish, but rather to prevent the apprehended danger of
a breach of the peace.
3) Hence the phrase 'battered wives': Maidment 'The laws Response to
Marital Violence in England and the USA' (1977) 26 ICLQ 403.
According to Maidment it is difficult to determine the extent to
which wives are assaulted by their husbands. But, it is apparently
accepted that the known and reported cases of 'battered wives'
represent the tip of the iceberg. There is no reason to believe that
this conclusion does not also reflect the situation in South Africa.
However, it is only in recent years that 'husband battering' has been
identified as a problem: Freeman 'Violence in the Family' (1980) 4
SACC 5.
4) Palmer 1955 (3) SA 56 (0) at 59; Mdindla 1977 (3) SA 322 (0) at
323. See also the following notes entitled 'Wife Beating' (1924)
41 SALJ 79 and 'Battering Rams' (1976) 14 JP 158.
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1)
African domestic scene to be swept quietly under the carpet. Even
though 'wife beating' is nothing more, or less, than the crime of
assault2 ), the police and prosecuting authorities are generally, and
understandably, reluctant to become embroiled in what is popularly
termed a 'domestic or matrimonial dispute', unless the assault is
particularly serious or reprehensible. In principle, it is difficult
to justify this reluctance. However, it is generally felt that most
cases of marital assaults are of a minor nature and that to prosecute
the offending spouse would be to make matters worse for the innocent
spouse who will continue to live in fear of a reprisal assault for
having reported the matter to the police in the first Place. 3) It is
not inconceivable for the reprisal assault to result in the murder of
the innocent spouse. Alternatively, the reprisal could take the form of
making life for the innocent spouse intolerable in one way or another
such as keeping late hours, sulking and withholding household allowances. 4)
1) 'Wife beating' is not the only regrettable feature of the modern
South African domestic scene. The problem of a husband sexually
abusing his wife has also received increasing attention in recent years:
see, for example, English 'The Husband who Rapes his Wife' (1976) 126
NLJ 1223; Scutt 'Reforming the Law of Rape: The Michigan Example'
(1976) 50 ALJ 615; Scutt 'Consent in Rape - The Problem of the Marriage
Contract' (1977) 3 Monash LR 255; Walker 'Victims on Trial -
Prosecutions for Rape' (1977) 1 SACC 147, 157-161; Scutt 'Reform
and the Law of Rape: Common Law and Continental Directions' (1978)
11 CILSA 1; Freeman 'Rape by a Husband?' (1979) 129 NLJ 332.
See also Labuschagne 'Misdade Tussen Gades' (1980) 43 THR-HR 39 who
suggests that allegations of sexual abuse as between husband and
wife should be referred to a family court.
2) Hunt, 429, defines assault as 'unlawfully and intentionally (1)
applying force to the person of another, or (2) inspiring a belief
in that other that force is immediately to be applied to him.'
3) Maidment 'The Laws Response to Marital Violence in England and the
USA' (1977) 26 ICLQ 403, 406-413.
4) In fact, the punishment of the guilty spouse, either by fine or
imprisonment, may result in hardship for the rest of the family:
see Zaal 'Sufficiency or Surfeit of Sanction? State Processing of
Petty Crime Cases in the South African Context' (1980) 4 SACC
17 esp at 21-22. ----
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Quite apart from the reluctance of the police and prosecuting
authorities to arraign before the criminal court a husband 'who has
allegedly assaulted his wife, the wife herself is often reluctant to
see her husband, the father of her children, criminally prosecuted.
Despite a husband's brutal behaviour towards his wife, such a wife
very often still loves her husband and has every desire, albeit
perverse in some circumstances, to continue with the marriage. In
such circumstances such wife will not want to feel responsible for her
husband's possible imprisonment. l ) What such wife, in reality, is
seeking is help and not undue publicity which would inevitably follow
on the conviction, and possible imprisonment, of her husband for an
assault perpetrated upon her. It is clear that such help is not
forthcoming from the ordinary criminal courts.
It is, accordingly, easy to understand the reluctance of the
police and prosecuting authorities to prosecute husbands who assault
their wives, except in the more serious cases. It may be argued
that there are other remedies available to such a wife. She could,
for example, as in van den Berg,2) interdict her husband against a~
further assaults. In van den Berg's case the husband had previously
used grossly abusive language to his wife and had threatened to shoot
or disfigure her. In this case, however, the husband and wife were
at arms length from each other and were in the process of being
divorced. Interdicts of this sort are hardly likely to be resorted
to where the parties are still living together sub spe reconciliationis.
Another important factor inhibiting applications of this sort is the
exorbitant cost of Supreme Court litigation.3) Should the defendant
spouse fail to comply with the interdict the wife would face the
further expense and inconvenience of invoking the machinery for the
enforcement of the interdict. Such further action is very rare in
practice either because it is unnecessary as where the husband complies
1) Ibid.
2) 1959 (4) SA 259 (w).
3) Because of this it would seem that applications for interdicts are
limited to cases where there have been serious assaults and threats
on the innocent spouse. By this stage, also, the innocent spouse
will have experienced much needless pain and suffering.
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with the interdict or because the wife is deterred by the expense
and inconvenience of taking such further action. In any case,
a wife in this position, especially where the parties have any
children, may not want to feel responsible for the committal of
her husband to prison for contempt.
It is submitted, by way of solution to the above problem, that
more effective use should be made of the breach of peace procedure.
The chances of a husband, who has been bound-over, keeping the peace
towards his wife are likely to be much greater than where he has
simply been convicted of an assault by the criminal court. After
all, he faces the prospect of forfeiting his recognizance to keep
the peace which, at the present moment, cannot exceed fifty Rand. l )
This amount is clearly insufficient and the maximum amount permitted
will have to be substantially increased. 2) It is submitted that
in extreme situations there should be no reason why, in addition
to ordering the amount of the recognizance to be forfeited, the
defaulting husband should not be referred to the criminal court
for prosecution and possible committal to prison. To this extent,
the presently prescribed breach of peace procedure should be
amended. It is suggested that if a husband who has been bound-
over to keep the peace towards his wife appreciates that he is
likely to forfeit a large sum of money if he breaches the terms of
the recognizance then he will think twice before molesting, or
assaulting his wife, or using foul, abusive and threatening language
towards her.
1) S 381 (1) Criminal Procedure Act.
2) Where forfeiture of the recognizance is ordered the court so
ordering $hould be enjoined, by an appropriate amendment to the
present procedure, to order that the amount so forfeited shall
not be deemed to be a charge on the joint estate of the spouses
who are married in community of property; cf by way of analogy
the case of Potgieter 1959 (1) SA 194 (W) where Hiemstra J (as
he then was) ordered that the damages awarded to a husband married
in community of property for his wife's adultery with one, O'Neill,
should not form part of the joint estate. However, no such order
was made in the earlier case of Strydom v Saayman 1949 (2) SA 739 (T).
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Finally, it is submitted that there is much to be gained by placing
breach of peace proceedings in the intra-familial context within the
jurisdiction of the proposed family court. Thus, for example, the
need to resort to criminal prosecutions, save in exceptional cases,
would be largely eliminated. Also, the many hundreds of wives who
approach their attorneys with instructions to write to their husbands
'to warn them to behave themselves' would be better served, at less
cost to themselves, if they invoked the breach of peace procedure in
the non-criminal atmosphere of the proposed family court.
(ii) Prosecution of Juvenile Offendersl )
The question whether the prosecution of juvenile offenders should
fall within the jurisdiction of the proposed family court has long been
a controversial one2) with the result that some family courts include
within their jurisdiction the prosecution of juvenile offenders while
others do not. 3 )
There are, in fact, a number of reasons for and against including
within the jurisdiction of a family court,the prosecution of juvenile
offenders. These may be briefly tabulated as follows:
(a) in the first place, it is alleged that the problem of juvenile
delinquency has little, if any, bearing on family problems as a whole.
On the other hand, there are those who strenuously argue that 'much
juvenile crime has its roots in familial strife' so that to stigmatize
automatically a juvenile offender with a previous criminal conviction
is both unrealistic and self-defeating;4)
1) The procedure for the prosecution of juvenile offenders has been
dealt with above at 202-208. The word 'juvenile' in this context
means any person under the age of 18 years: cfs254(1) Criminal
Procedure Act.
2) Payne 298-311.
3) Hawaii is an example of the former while the Australian Family
Court is an example of the latter.
4) Eg Turner 'Family Courts : Their Formation and Jurisdiction' (1973)
8 Aust Journ Social Issues 121, 129. The same point is again made
by the same writer in (1974) 4 Fam Law 39, 42. It is for this
reason that the treatment of juvenile offenders should be brought
(so it is argued) within the jurisdiction of a family court.
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(b) in the second place, the view has been expressed on more
than one occasion that a family court should have nothing but a civil
jurisdiction,l) and that to include within its jurisdiction the problems
of juvenile delinquency would be to give the family court an undesirable
criminal flavour. Such a criminal flavour, so it is alleged, would
be damaging to the image of a family court and would be incompatible
with its therapeutic functions. By way of contrast, however, there
are those who argue that because of the relatively recent de-emphasis
of the element of criminality in juvenile misconduct, the problems of
juvenile delinquency are hardly likely to affect adversely the image
of a family court. 2) In the South African context it may be argued
that this welcome de-emphasis of the element of criminality in juvenile
misconduct is only a trend as opposed to a fait acco~li. This trend
is evidenced, for example, by the discretion of the criminal court to
transfer to the Children's Court the case of a child believed to be in
need of care. Notwithstanding this, however, and in the light of the
suggested procedure to be adopted,3) it is submitted that this is an
unconvincing reason for excluding from the proposed family court's
jursidiction the problems of juvenile delinquency. A main reason for
placing the problems of juvenile delinquency within the jurisdiction
of the proposed family court is not to emphasize the criminality of any
juvenile misconduct but, rather, to discover (and to treat) the causes
of the misconduct which more often than not have their roots in family
problems;
(c) in the third place, the fear has often been expressed that if
the prosecution of juvenile offenders were to fall within the jurisdiction
of the proposed family court this would result in the possibility of the
1) Eg Finer Committee § 4.321 and § 4.362.
2) Turner 'Family Courts : Their Formation and Jurisdiction' (1973) 8
Aust Journ Social Issues 121. See also Midgley 159-179 who argues
in favour of the creation of a 'welfare court with legal status but
operating outside the criminal law' (at 170) as an alternative to
the present juvenile criminal court.
3) Which is dealt with below at 278-279.
4) The sole purpose of the proposed family court in this regard must not
be seen only in terms of a therapeutic or rehabilitative potential:
ie with an emphasis on the welfare of the delinquent child. The proposec
court would be just as much concerned with the interests and basic
security of the community: see AlIen 49-61 and see 279 § (b) below.
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basic rights of a juvenile offender being overlooked as in the
1)GaUlt-type of situation. Whether this would be a valid criticism
in the South African context is doubted since section 74 of the
Criminal Procedure Act makes provision for the parent or guardian of
an offender under the age of 18 years to be warned to attend 'the
relevant criminal proceedings.' Parental awareness of the predicament
of their children means that the possibility of such children being
legally represented in terms of section 73 of the Criminal Procedure Act
is much greater than would otherwise be the case. 2)
In the light of the aforegoing, it is submitted that children3 )
who are alleged to have committed a criminal offence, other than
treason, murder or rape,4) should come within the jurisdiction of the
proposed family court. Thus, an alleged juvenile offender should, in
the first instance, he referred to the proposed family court which
will immediately cause a full investigation to be made into the
1) Re Gault 387 US 1 (1967), and see AlIen 54-56.
2) Section 73 states that 'An accused ••• shall ••• be entitled to
the assistance of his legal adviser as from the time of his arrest.'
It is interesting to note the suggestion of Gericke 'Die
Professionele Verhouding Tussen die Regspraktisyn en die
Maatskaplike Werker' Golden Jubilee Report Vol 3 104, 109, that
only about 15% of White children appearing in a juvenile criminal
cou'rt are legally represented while only about 5% of White
children appearing in Childrens' Courts are legally represented.
It is a fair assumption that even fewer non-White children are
legally represented in such courts. Is it not the reality of
the situation that the role of legal practitioners in such courts
is overrated? Does this not, perhaps, justify a greater emphasis
being placed, rather, on the role of the social worker?
3) Unless otherwise indicated, a child for the pruposes of the
submissions made herein shall be deemed to be a person who is under
the age of 18 years: cf ss 73 (3) and 74 (1) Criminal Procedure Act.
4) With regard to treason, murder or rape the present procedure will
continue to apply so that, for example, on a charge of rape it would
not be inconceivable for the ordinary criminal court to find the
accused to be a child in need of care, in which event the matter
would be transferred to the proposed family court. Notwithstanding
the fact that some murders are committed in the context of intra-
familial strife (eg K 1956 (3) SA 353 (AD) where a 14 year old boy
killed his insane mother, and Whitehead 1970 (4) SA 424 (AD) where an
18 year old boy murdered his step-mother and assaulted his father with
intent to murder), the retention of the present procedure is suggested
because of the seriousness of crimes like murder.
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circumstances of the child. Should the proposed family court find that
the child falls within the meaning of a 'child in need of care,l) it
should be able to deal with such child in the manner presently provided
for by section 31 of the Children's Act. 2) If', however, the proposed
family court should find that the child is not in need of care it would
then have to resort to one of the three following alternatives:-
(a) it may proceed to deal summarily with the child, provided that
any sentence imposed ·on such child shall not include whipping, or any
period of imprisonment, or a fine exceeding, say, R150. 3) If the proposed
family court were to opt for this alternative then the sentence imposed
should not be regarded as a previous criminal conviction. In reality,
this alternative should only be resorted to for minor transgressions of
the law. This suggested summary disposition of such a case is designed
to impress upon the child the serious consequences of any further lapse
into criminal conduct and to give him another chance to take his place
in society without the stigma of a previous criminal conviction. In
addition to any sentence imposed, a warning should be issued to the child
that should he again appear before the proposed family court on a criminal
charge his case will be automatically transferred to the ordinary criminal
courts for disposal in accordance with (c) below, unless he is then found
to be a child in need of care in which event he ought to be dealt with
as suggested above; or
(b) it may, in view of the seriousness of the criminal charge,
transfer the case to the ordinary criminal courts to be dealt with there;4)
or
(c) it will be obliged to transfer the case to the ordinary criminal
courts if the child concerned has previously been dealt with as in Ca)
above unless the child concerned is found to be in need of care.
1) See 243 nlabove for the definition of a child in need of care.
2) See 199 nlabove for the powers of the Children's Court with regard
to children who have been found to be in need of care.
3) As an alternative to a fine some form of community service may be
considered an appropriate sentence. A fine may well prove ineffective
since in the normal course it would be the child's parents who would
pay any fine imposed.
4) The emphasis here clearly would not be on the welfare of the delinquent
child but rather on the protection of the community 'from acts of
violence or depradations of property'. See AlIen 54 and cf 240 nlabov
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The above suggested procedure is, in effect, the reverse of the
present procedure whereby a child's alleged criminal conduct is, in
the first instance, dealt with by the ordinary criminal court which,
if it considers that the child is in need of care, may transfer the case
to the Children's Court. Should the suggested procedure in (b) or (c)
above be resorted to, it is submitted that a copy of the record of the
proceedings in the proposed family court should be immediately transmitted
to the prosecutor so that in the event of the child being convicted by
the criminal court the record can be handed in to that court. The
evidence contained in such record can thereafter be taken into account in
the assessment of an appropriate sentence. If, of course, the child is
acquitted in the ordinary criminal court there can be no question of that
child being subsequently brought before the proposed family court in
respect of the same matter.
It will be recalled that in deciding whether a child is in need of
care or not the Hawaiian procedure goes much further than that outlined
above. Thus, the Family Court of Hawaii is given the discretion to order
the psychological and psychiatric examination (and treatment, if need be) of
any child before it. l ) It is submitted that a similar provision in the
South African context would be most desirable even if only resorted to in
rare cases. There is more tnan just a grain of truth in the suggestion
that physical and mental examinations often reveal unsuspected
conditions which help to explain a child's criminal conduct. 2 ) Such
explanations are undoubtedly conducive to the implementation of the
therapeutic functions of the proposed family court.
1) S 44 Hawaii Revised Statutes (Chap 571): see 135 above.
2) For example, in Long 1970 (2) SA 153 (R AD) the accused, although
not a juvenile, laboured under great difficulties and unhappiness
since 'she' was 'a trans-sexual person with the body of a female and
the mind of a man' (at 161). In mitigation of sentence for
convictions of kidnapping and extortion it was submitted (and medical
evidence supported this submission) that it was the accused's desperate
urge to undergo reconstructive surgery with the object of changing
her sex that drove her to commit the crimes in question: it was the
intention of the accused to use the extorted money for a sex-change
operation.
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It is submitted that the procedure outlined above will go a long
way towards meeting the objections of those who are against including
in a family court's jurisdiction the problems of juvenile delinquency.
Certainly, the above suggested procedure would afford a child a better
opportunity~) in a more relaxed and more informal non-criminal atmosphere,
of having impressed on him the errors of his ways without attaching to
him the stigma of a previous criminal conviction. Should such a child
not respond favourably to this opportunity he will then be dealt with
in the ordinary criminal courts on any second or subsequent criminal
charge,2) unless he is then found to be a child in need of care.
1) Which he is generally denied at present. According to Midgley, 95,
in 1968 out of a total of 898 cases in the Cape Town Magistrate's
Court involving children t only 35 were referred to the Children's
Court. These 898 cases involved a total of 800 children Cat 146).
This is because some of the children appeared in court on more than
one occasion. Apart from the 35 cases referred to the Children's
Court, a few other cases were transferred either to the Supreme Court
or the Regional Court for trial because of the seriousness of the
charges involved. Furthermore, a large number of the remaining
800 children were acquitted or had their charges withdrawn so that in
1968 only a total of 432 children were actually convicted of various
offences in the Cape Town Magistrate's Court. In the 5 year period
following on from their convictions in 1968 lie 1968-19737 213 of these
children re-appeared in the Magistrate's Court and were convicted of
various offences - ie 49,3% of the 432 children Cat 147-148). There
does not appear to be any record of the remaining 219 children
committing any further criminal offences. These 219 children will,
of course, always carry with them the stigma of a previous criminal
conviction. This would be avoided if the procedure suggested above
were to be invoked.
2) In discussing the juvenile court movement in the United States AlIen,
51-52, points out that '1I7t is an unfortunate fact that the
juvenile court of every large urban community is confronted by
significant numbers of adolescents whose behaviour cannot be ignored
because it imperils the basic security of the community, and who, as
a class, elude the reformative capabilities of the court'.
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Another advantage of the above suggested procedure would be that
once a criminal case involving a child is before the Magistrate's Court
/Or the Regional Court, or the Supreme Court, as the case may b~7
it will be disposed of more expeditiously. Thus, it would become
unnecessary to resort to frequent remands to enable welfare officials
to prepare and present their reports into the circumstances of the child
concerned. This will already have been done when the child was before
the proposed family court. The more expeditious disposal of criminal
cases involving childr~n will undoubtedly assist towards removing the
backlog of criminal cases in the Magistrates' Courts of South Africa -
at least in the larger magisterial distrcits such as Cape Town, Port
Elizabeth, Durban, Johannesburg, Pretoria and Bloemfontein. In this
way, the need to establish a costly intermediate court system would
1)largely fall away. It is submitted that the force of this contention·
becomes even stronger when coupled with the suggestion made above
2
) that
all matters presently dealt with in the Children's Court should be
brought within the jurisdiction of the proposed family court. There
would, therefore, no longer be any need for magistrates to function
as commissioners of child welfare. Similarly, if all proceedings
3)
presently provided for by the Maintenance Act, 23 of 1963, were
placed within the jurisdiction of the proposed family court this would
relieve magistrates of the need to function as judicial officers presiding
over the Maintenance Court. The end result would be, it is submitted,
that magistrates would have even more opportunity to concentrate on
their duties in the criminal courts. It is, in any event, seriously
doubted whether magistrates, who are traditionally steeped in a criminal
atmosphere, are suitably qualified to perform the functions they are
presently called upon to perform under the Children's Act and the
Maintenance Act~)
1) With regard to the Hoexter Commission of Inquiry see above at 153 and
155-156.
2) See 270 above.
3) See 270 above.
4) It should also be remembered that magistrates who function as presiding
officers in the Maintenance Court or as commissioners of child welfare
do not occupy such positions on a full-time basis but on a rotation
basis. It is believed that some magistrates do not particularly relisl
occupying such positions. In any case, such positions are generally
seen as being ancillary to the magistrate's main work in the criminal
courts.
(E) CONCLUSION
It is submitted that a unified jurisdiction over all the matters
outlined above would not be impossible of attainment in South Africa,
notwithstanding the existence of diverse population groups that go to
make up South African society.l) A truly unified jurisdiction over
all family law matters has not been achieved by the Family Court of
Australia and for this reason one may wonder whether the proposed family
court for South Africa is likely to be more successful in this regard.
It must be remembered, however, that the attainment of a completely
unified jurisdiction in countries such as Australia and Canada is
made difficult by the complicated federal constitutional set-ups that
exist in those countries. 2 ) By way of contrast, the Family Court of
Hawaii appears to have achieved a unified jurisdiction over family law
matters mainly because it is physically situated in the middle of the
Pacific Ocean thousands of kilometers from the American mainland.
Together with the object of achieving a completely unified
jurisdiction for the proposed family court in South Africa there exists
an important need to avoid a 'conflict of philosophy' on the part of the
judges of such court. Thus, it is submitted that the judges of the
proposed family court should receive permanent appointments as in, for
example, Australia,3) so that persons who occupy a seat on the bench
of such court would do so only by virtue of their 'training, experience
and personality'. In this regard, it is submitted that the rotation
of judges would be most undesirable. 4)
It may be countered that it would be difficult to find permanent
appointees to the bench of the proposed family court because the work
of such court would not be sufficiently varied to keep the judges fUlly
occupied and free from boredom. However, it is submitted that there is
no substance in such suggestion. Thus, Payne correctly remarks5) that
'a specialist bench in a unified family court will exercise a wide
diversity of jurisdiction and that no serious danger of staleness is
1) See 212-218 above for the present position regarding customary
family law matters.
2) See generally 81-84 above.
3) For the position in Australia see 56-57 above.
4) See generally Payne 660-681.
5) At 680.
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likely to be encountered. ,I)
There is one further matter that needs to be commented on and
that is the fact that South Africa is physically a vast country.
This would make it difficult for people living in outlying areas to
have ready access to the proposed family court. This is a problem
that has exercised the minds of the members of the South African Law
Commission which has concluded that 'it would not be practicable to
2)
provide a family court ••• in every rural town.' This is also
a problem that was experienced in Australia. An attempt to resolve
this problem in Australia has been made by giving the Australian
Family Court the power to go on circuit. Furthermore, the Australian
Family Court shares some co-ordinate jurisdiction with the ~ourts of
. . d· t· 3)summary JurlS lC lone
The Australian solution to this problem may well have some
application in South Africa. This, however, is by no means a
unique solution. Dealing with a similar problem in Rhodesia, the
Rh d . D· C·· d d
4 ) , t t . .o eSlan lVOrCe OmmlSSlOn recommen e ha wlthln reasonable
distances of Salisbury and Bulawayo (which areas could be proclaimed)
only the Matrimonial Division would have jurisdiction in all specified
ancillary matrimonial matters,5) but outside these districts the local
1) Watson J, a senior judge of the Australian Family Court, remarked
in a communication to the writer in June 1978 that he had found
the first two years of his position on the bench most stimulating.
The learned judge, who had a widely varied practice at the Bar,
added that 'The variety of problems associated with the inter-
relationship of spouses and their children is never-ending.
Anybody bored with the resolution of these problems is probably
bored by humanity itself.'
2) Divorce Report (1978) § 13.8.
3) S~e 57 n 4 above.
4) Rhodesian Divorce Commission Report § 22.
5) An ancillary matrimonial matter would appear to include an urgent
application for a maintenance order, or the variation of an
existing one: ibid.
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Magistrate's Court would retain jurisdiction in such matters.' It
was also further recommended that 'all such orders would be subject
to automatic review by the Matrimonial Division. ,I) In this way, a
high level of uniformity of approach would be attained.
It is submitted that the South African Law Commission is correct
in its conclusion that it would not be feasible to establish a family
court in every rural district of South Africa. However, there is
much merit in the Australian approach to this problem as well as in
the suggestion of the Rhodesian Divorce Commission. Translated
into the South African context this would mean that it would be
inevitable that the proposed family court would have to share some
co-ordinate jurisdiction over certain family law matters of an ancillary
nature2 ) with the Magistrates' Courts in outlying areas. This is
unavoidable but, as suggested by the Rhodesian Divorce Commission, a
high degree of uniformity of purpose and application can be achieved by
a system of automatic review by the proposed family court of those
ancillary matters disposed of by the Magistrates' Courts in outlying
areas. The idea of the proposed family court travelling on circuit
also seems eminently suitable to the South African context. 3 )
1) Rhodesian Divorce Commission Report § 23.
2) Eg breach of peace proceedings; applications for mRintenance
and variations thereof; applications for consent to marry;
urgent applications for interdicts in the intra-familial context;
urgent applications for the appointment of curators (see 269 above).
3) In this regard, s 27 Australian Family Law Act makes provision for
the Family Court to sit at any place in Australia.
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4. PROCEDURE IN THE PROPOSED FAMILY COURT
A. Introduction
The general advantages and disadvantages of the adversary
procedure have already been dealt with. l ) Notwithstanding the
fact that the South African Law Commission has come to the conclusion
'that the introduction of a completely new procedure of an inquisitorial
character is not necessary,2) it does concede3 ) that there are certain
'inquisitorial elements' in the Divorce Act. For example, section 6
states, inter alia, that a divorce will only be granted if 'the court
is satisfied that the provisions made or contemplated with regard to
the welfare of any minor or dependent child of the marriage are
satisfactory or are the best that can be effected in the circumstances.'
To satisfy itself on this issue the court may cause the appropriate
investigation to be made and order that the costs thereof be paid by
one or both of the parties to the action. 4 ) Also, as the South African
Law Commission has pointed out,5) the introduction of irretrievable
breakdown of marriage as a basis of divorce has gone 'a long way
towards mitigating the conflict and emotion with which divorce proceedings
are fraught.'
There is no doubt that the adversa rocedure has an important
part to play in any family court. This has certainly been the
experience in Los Angeles, Hawaii and Australia, especially in defended
divorce actions where ancillary matters such as matrimonial property
disputes and child custody disputes are at issue. 6 ) In this regard,
therefore, it is submitted that the complete elimination of the
adversary procedure should not be regarded as a main objective behind
the establishment of a family court. Rather, the trend to encourage
the introduction of certain 'inquisitorial elements' should be continued.
1) See 114-121 above.
2) Divorce Report (1978) § 13.9.
3) Ibid.
4) See also Schafer 'An Upward Variation of a Maintenance Order - An
Expensive Luxury versus the Best Interests of a Child?' (1979) 96
SALJ 540.
5) Divorce Report (1978) § 13.9.
6) See 130 above.
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One of the main aims of the Divorce Act is to remove the sting
and bitterness from the divorce process. In this respect, the
introduction of irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for
divorce does make a valuable contribution. But to establish
irretrievable breakdown in an adversary atmosphere - even in the limited
form of adversary procedure provided for by the Divorce Act - seems to
be incompatible with this aim. This suggested incompatibility
is even more pronounced when one has regard to the fact that it is only
on very rare occasions that divorce actions are defended.
l
) Furthermore,
it should also be remembered that no children were involved in about
half of the Wnite divorces and approximately a third of the Coloured
divorces granted in South Africa in 1976. 2 ) Especially where there are
no children involved it would seem to be quite unnecessary to oblige the
parties to resort to the adversary procedure.
It is, furthermore, a regrettable feature of the modern divorce process
that our courts are only able to adjudicate on those issues that are placed
before the courts by the litigants themselves. 3) The obvious danger of
this is that the courts do not always have a complete over-view of the
real problems at issue. It is trite that apart from the litigants
themselves, there are often other persons, especially minor children,
whose interests are vitally at stake in the same action. It is submitted
that a greater emphasis should be placed on the inquisitorial procedure
so as to give effect to the broader issues involved in family law' litigation
A characteristic feature of divorce litigation is the deeply felt need
on the part of the litigants to strike back at each other, very often at
the expense of their children. Vital issues that should be resolved by
the divorce court are often not so resolved. This is evidenced by the largE
number of post-divorce cases concerning the maintenance of, custody of and
access to minor children which are often unnecessarily bitter and acrimoniol
1) According to the Divorce Report (1978) § 7.1 more than 9ry~ of all
divorce actions are uncontested.
2) 1979 Report on Marriages and Divorces in South Africa 11: Report
07.02.10. There is no reason to believe that this is anything other
than an established pattern.
3) See 120 above and 298 below.
Although the applicant denied having any animosity
the court accepted that he was in fact very bitter
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An extreme example is the case of Kustner v Hughesl ) where the applicant,
a graduate of Cambridge University and an engineer by profession,
confronted his ex-wife with 16 prayers for relief in respect of his 3





For the purposes of the submissions to be made a distinction will
be made between undefended divorce actions and defended divorce proceedings.
1) 1970 (3) SA 622 (W).
2) At 623 Colman J observed that 'There is a long and unhappy history
of court proceedings, taking various forms. There have been a
number of applications in this Court; there has been an appeal to
the Transvaal Provincial Division; and a series of contests in the
maintenance court.' Understandably the court found that the
applicant had gravely harassed his ex-wife with vexatious litigation.
The applicant failed in his action and was ordered to pay costs on
the attorney and client scale and, inter alia, not to bring any
further proceedings against his ex-wife unless he had first received
a certificate from counsel of at least 12 years standing certifying
that the proceedings were justified: cf Ressell 1976 (1) SA 289 (W).
Interestingly, by way of contrast in Revill 1974 (1) SA 743 (AD)~
instead of directing his feelings of frustration and bitterness at
his ex-wife, the accused waged a campaign of denigration of the judge
who granted the original decree of judicial separation. Happily
there do not appear to have been any minor children involved.
The accused was 70 years old.
3) At 623 Colman J remarked that 'He speaks of her in contemptuous terms
and is quick to accuse her of perjury and other types of dishonest
and improper conduct.' Boberg 416-430 cites and discusses the leading
cases concerning the so-called best interests of the children of parents
involved in disputes both at the pre- and post-divorce stage (see esp
416-417 n 13). It would seem that an undue emphasis is placed on the
interests of the parents rather than the children: cf Germani v Herfst
and An 1975 (4) SA 887 (AD) where it was held, inter alia, to be
permissible to use force on a child to enable the non-custodian parent
to obtain access to the child. In fact, in appropriate circumstances,
there seems to be no reason why the interests of the parents should not
be sacrificed for those of their children even to the extent of
depriving the parents of their normal custody/access rights: see
generally Goldstein, Freud and Solnit 31-65, and Olmesdahl 'The Rights
of Children on Divorce' 1980 DR 481.
B. Undefended Divorce Proceedings
Most divorce actions are undefended. However, a further distinction
must be made between those cases where the parties have no minor or
dependent children ani where they do.
(1) Where there are no Minor or Dependent Children
It is submitted that to require every undefended divorce case in
respect of which no minor or dependent children are involved to be
subjected to the glare of the inq~isitorial procedure would be as
superfluous, needlessly time-consuming and expensive as is the present
position of requiring the parties in such a case to resort to the
adversary procedure. It has been convincingly proved in the past that
the adversary procedure (and ex hypothesi the inquisitorial procedure)
in no way inhibits spouses who are intent on divorcing each other from
succeeding in their resolve to obtain a divorce even to the extent of
1)
committing perjury or 'bending' the law in some way.
Accordingly, it is s~bmitted that there is some merit in considering
the introduction of divorce by consent in cases where no dependent
children are involved. There are, however, serious objections to
divorce by consent and these are conveniently described by the South
African Law Commission2 ) as follows:
1) See Petersen 'Divorce Law Reform' (1971) 88 SALJ 478; Aden 'Fault
and Breakdown - A Comparative Survey of Modern Divorce Law' 1970 AJ
39; Hahlo and Sinclair 3. To this extent, there is some substa;ce
in the contention of Kovacs 'Maintenance in the Magistrates' Courts:
How Fares and Forum?' (1973) 47 ALJ 725, 734, that 'It is time to
abandon the practice of looking to legal institutions for the correction
of social ills, a practice which is both naive and evasive.'
2) Divorce Report (1978) § 7.2. See also Barnard (Divorce) 36-43.
Barnard (at 42) would appear to favour consensual divorce 'subject
to appropriate prescribed conditions'. However, he does not
appear to spell out what these conditions ought to be.
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'The objections that are levelled against the
granting of divorce on the ground of the consent
of the spouses are, in the first place, that
this would detract from marriage as a social
institution. Marriage is not just a private
contract between two persons which contract is
capable of being terminated by mutual agreement.
If this were so, many people would contract
trial marriages. Society, however, has an
interest in the stability of marriages and must
ensure that marriages are not dissolved for
insufficient reasons. It would, moreover, be
extremely difficult to determine whether a
spouse's consent to the dissolution of a
marriage has been given voluntarily. Finally,
it must be pointed out that in countries where
the consent of a spouse is a ground of divorce,
the divorce rate is much higher than in the
countries where consent is not recognised as a
ground of divorce.'
It is, of course, true that marriage is not just an ordinary
1)contract. This has never been the case. In all cases of divorce
the court's sanction is required and this should always continue to be
the position so that the community's interest in the stability of, and the
sanctity of, marriage can be maintained. 2 ) It is through the courts
1) Hahlo 28-29, and see Carter 1953 (1) SA 202 (AD), at 205 B, where
Centlivres CJ said: 'Marriage is not like an ordinary contract
which can be terminated by the mere consent of the parties and the
reason why this is so is because it is in the interests of the State
that the marriage tie, which involves a matter of the status of the
parties and the interests of the offspring, should not be lightly
dissolved. Before dissolving a marriage ••• the Court must be
satisfied ••• ' that it has irretrievably broken down. The best
evidence of irretrievable breakdown must surely be that of the parties
themselves~
2) In Putting Asunder at§ 48 the fundamental objection to divorce by
mutual consent is based on the assertion that this 'would repudiate
the community's interest in the stability of marriage'. Cf Erasmus J
in Campher 1978 (3) SA 797 (0) at 802 C; viz '/T/he institution of
marriage all over the world, whether it be a Christian marriage, a
ritual or a customary union between man and wife, remains the cornerston
of society and is prima facie responsible for that complex whole which
includes morals, knowledge, belief and all other capabilities acquired
by man as a member of society.'
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that the community interest should be maintained.
l
) If, therefore,
it is clearly understood that a divorce cannot, under any circumstances,
be granted without the court's sanction then the objections to divorce
by consent would become less plausible. Thus, the fear that if
divorce by consent were permitted 'many people would contract trial
marriages' is an unfounded fear which seems to fly in the face of modern
reality. It is a truism that an increasing number of couples are living
together outside of marriage by way of experiment rather than going
2)
through the legal ritual of a marriage ceremony. Such is the state
of affairs in England, for example, that a mistress of some standing
is now entitled to a certain degree of legal recognition in much the same
way as a legal wife. 3) This does not mean, however, that this trend
1) Of course, the degree of community interest is a variable factor.
It is submitted that for such community interest to be real and
meaningful no effort should b~ spared to prevent the situation from
arising where the court merely performs a rubber stamp function.
Cf § 48 Putting Asunder: 'Dissolution of marriage ought always to
require a real exercise of judgment by the court acting on the
community's behalf' : see also § 59.
2) According to Bates 'Legal and Social Change in Australian Family Law'
(1976) 9 CILSA 299, 302, it does not invariably follow that because
more couples are living together outside of marriage that the
institution of marriage is on the wane. So also, according to the
1976 official British Handbook ;Britain 19767, 10, over the past 30
years the proportion of the population of Great Britain who are or
have been married has risen from about 52% in 1939 to 59% in 1973.
At the same time the proportion of single persons in the population
aged 15 years or over has fallen from 33,3% to 22,5%. On the other hand
Baxter 'Recent Developments in Scandinavian Family Law' (1977) 26
ICLQ 150, 157-158, points out that the annual number of Swedish marriage
declined from 61 000 in 1966 to slightly over 38 000 in 1973. It was
also estimated that in 1975 about 12% of Swedish men and women who
lived together were not married to one another. With regard to the
position in South Africa it is alarming to;note that the popularity of
marriage among Whites appears to have -declined. The comparative
figures for 1975, 1976 and 1977 for Whites, Coloureds and Asians are as
follows:
Whites Coloureds Asians
1975 41 333 16 694 7 938
1976 40 483 18 010 7 695
1977 38 537 18 611 7 831
- Marriages and Divorce Re ort (1977)p
3) Poulter 'The Death of a Lover'. (1976) 126 NLJ 417; Pearl 'The Legal
Implications of a Relationship outside Marriage' (1978) 37 Camb LJ 252.
See also Glendon 1-23.
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1)
is to be welcomed, or even encouraged.
With regard to the fear that it would be very difficult to determine
whether a spouse has vol~ntarily given her consent to the dissolution
of the marriage it is submitted that it would be an easy matter for the
court to call for evidence on this score. A simple affidavit would
suffice. In extreme cases, there would be nothing to stop the court
from postponing the action to enable either spouse to give a clear
and unequivocal indication of intention one way or the other. It is,
in any event, a little difficult to appreciate the concern over the
apparent difficulty in determining whether a spouse has given her consent
to the dissolution of the marriage when it is remembered that the Divorce
Act appears to contemplate a divorce being granted against the will of a
spouse. Thus, in terms of section 4 (2) (a) of the Divorce Act the court
may accept as evidence of the irretrievable breakdown of a marriage the
fact 'that the parties have not lived together as husband and wife for
a continuous period of at least one year immediately prior to the date
of the institution of the divorce action.,2) It is not inconceivable
that notwithstanding the continuous living apart as husband and wife for
more than one year the respondent spouse may genuinely and sincerely
desire to continue with the marriage. Yet, if the court is satisfied that
the marriage has irretrievably broken down it will have to (and rightly
so, too) grant a divorce in these circumstances. 3 )
Finally, mention must be made of the assertion of the South African
la C . . 4) t t·· .w ommlSSlon ha the dlvorce rate In those countries whlch recognize
divorce by consent is much higher than the divorce rate in those countries
where it is not recognized. Unfortunately, the South African Law
1) Cf Bates 'The Presumption of Marriage arising from Cohabitation' (1978)
13 Univ W A L R 341 who clearly approves of the legal sanctity of marriag
2) See generally Rahlo and Sinclair 23-29 on the potential difficulties
relating to s 4 (2) (a) Divorce Act.
3) And even in circumstances where it is the plaintiff spouse who is
the original cause of the parties living apart! One may well ask
which is worse - unilateral divorce or divorce by consent?
4) Divorce Report (1978) § 7.2. Cf Barnard (Divorce) 41.
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Commission does not cite any empirical data in support of its contention.
In any case, even if its contention is correct there does not appear to
be any real indication to suggest that this higher rate of divorce is
due solely to the fact of divorce by consent. As the South African
Law Commission points out,l) Sweden is one of the few countries to
recognize divorce by consent. 2 ) France has also recently recognized
divorce by consent,3) which takes one of two forms; namely, divorce-
convention4 ) where the spouses jointly petition for the
1) Divorce Report (1978) § 7.2.
2) Baxter 'Recent Developments in Scandinavian Family Law' (1972) 26
ICLQ 150: Eekelaar 155. Other countries to recognize a limited
form of divorce by consent, subject to strict conditions, are
Belgium, Luxembourg and Portugal: Lasok 'The Reform of French
Divorce Law' (1977) 51 Tulane LR 259, 262 n17.
3) Glendon 'The French Divorce Reform Law of 1976' (1976) 24 Am Journ
Comp Law 199, 203-205; Lasok 'The Reform of French Divorce Law'
(1977) 51 Tulane LR 259, 262-263; Glendon 204-207. The new
French Divorce Reform Law came into force on 1 January 1976 and it
repealed the previous divorce laws of 1884 which only allowed divorce
on the grounds of adultery, condemnation to an infamous punishment
(eg the death sentence), and grave violation of marital duties. The
1884 French Divorce Law had, in its turn, repealed the Code Napoleon
of 1804 which had revolutionized the law of divorce by allowing divorce
on diverse grounds including mutual consent and 'incompatibility of
temperament. '
4) Divorce-convention is described by the following provisions of the
French Civil Code as follows:
'Art 230. When the spouses petition together for a
divorce, they need to make known the cause; they
must only submit for the approval of the judge the
draft of an agreement which will regulate the
consequences. The petition may be presented either
by the respective lawyers of the parties, or by one
lawyer chosen by common accord. Divorce by mutual
consent may not be sought during the first six
months of the marriage.
Art 231. The judge is to examine the petition with
each of the parties, then to call them together.
Then he is to call in the lawyer or lawyers. If the
spouses persist in their intention to divorce, the
judge is to advise them that their petition should be
renewed after a three-month period of reflection. In
the absence of a renewal within the six months following
the expiration of this period of reflection, the
joint petition will lapse.
Art 232. The judge is to pronounce the divorce if he is
convinced that the intention of Bach spouse is real and that
each of them has given his consent freely. In the same judgment
he approves the agreement governing the consequences of the
divorce. He can refuse his approval and the granting of the
divorce if he judges that the agreement does not sufficiently
Eecure the interests of the children or of one of the spouses.'
-Glendon 205. Divorce-cenvention appears to be the normally understood
... ~ ~- ~... ,.J ~ •• ~ ~ ~ ~ 1.-... _ •• 4-, , ~ , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .., 4-
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termination of their marriage, and divorce-resignationl ) where the
divorce is sought by one spouse and accepted by the other. There is
little evidence to suggest that in France and Sweden the divorce rate
has significantly increased as a result of these reforms of their
respective divorce laws. In Sweden, for example, the reverse may well
be true if only because fewer couples than before are going to the
trouble of getting married.
Arising out of the above it is submitted that divorce by consent
should become part of the South African Law2 ) subject, however, to
the following conditions:
1) Divorce-resignation is described by the French Civil Code as
follows:
'Art 233. One spouse may petition for divorce by
setting forth the fact of a set of acts, proceeding
from both spouses, which make the continuation of
their life in common intolerable.
Art 234. If the other spouse acknowledges the facts
before the judge, the judge is to grant the divorce
without ruling on the allocation of fault. A
divorce granted in this manner produces the legal
effects of a divorce granted for shared fault.
Art 235. If the other spouse does not acknowledge
the facts, the judge is not to grant the divorce.'
-Glendon 206. It would seem that divorce-resignation is a
peculiarly French institution which is not likely to be resorted
to too widely. As Glendon points out (ibid) this type of divorce
by consent will be resorted to only where-a-spouse does not wish
to participate actively in the divorce process but would prefer
to 'leave the economic and other consequences of divorce up to
the judge'. In practice, very few people would be so indifferent
to the effects of divorce as to abandon these matters to jUdicial
discretion.
2) Cf RWL 'Divorce by Mutual Consent' (1953) 16 THR-HR 91, and see
Barnard (Divorce) 42; Mackenna 'Divorce by Consent and Divorce
for Breakdown of Marriage' (1967) 30 MLR 121; Hahlo and Sinclair
35 n 104. ----
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(i) divorce by consent should only be permitted where the
1) '.parties have no 'minor or dependent children', or, alternatlvely,
if the parties have any children they must have reached the age of
at least 18 years or have become self-supporting, whichever is the
sooner;
(ii) the parties must have been married for at least 2 years
2
)
so as to discourage the idea of trial marriages of short duration. 3)
The court, -however, should have the discretion to allow a divorce by
consent despite the fact that the parties have been married for less
than 2 years. This will only occur in exceptional cases of hardship;
(iii) the court must be satisfied with any agreements entered into
by the parties regarding their respective matrimonial property and
maintenance rights. In particular, the court must be satisfied that
the consent of both parties to the divorce has been freely and
voluntarily given and, if necessary, it shall call for evidence on
this issue. Finally, the court should always retain the discretion
whether to grant or refuse the divorce. In this way, effect will be
given to the view that a marriage is not simply a private contract
between spouses terminable at the will of either of them.
1) The phrase used in s 6 (1) Divorce Act. Note by way of comparison
s 41 Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, (Chap 18) which provides, inter alia,
that the court shall not grant a final order of divorce unless it is
satisfied '(b) that the only children who are or may be children of
the family ••• are the children named in the order and that - (i)
arrangements for the welfare of every child so named have been made
and are satisfactory or are the best that can be devised in the
circumstances; or (ii) it is impracticable for the party or parties
to make any such arrangements.' See generally Cretney 469-479.
2) The suggested period of 2 years is an arbitrary one. For example,
s 3 of the English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, (Chap 18) states that
no petition for divorce can be presented before the expiration of the
period of 3 years from the date of the marriage, unless it is shown
that the case is one of exceptional hardship suffered by the petitioner
or one of exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent: see
Cretney 98-101. In France, the waiting period before a divorce by
mutual consent can be applied for is 6 months after which the parties
are given a further 3 months period of reflection: see 293 n 4 above.
3) The idea of prescribing a time limit before divorce can be obtained
so as to discourage over-hasty divorce is questioned by Cretney 100-101
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It is submitted that in the light of recent developments in
this field in other parts of the world there is nothing radical or
revolutionary in the above submission. In this regard, it is also
submitted that the present South African divorce procedure is
probably at the same stage of development at which the English divorce
procedure was in 1973 before the introduction of the 'Special Divorce




Background and Outline of Special English Divorce Procedure
The 'Special Divorce Procedure' has its roots in a study of the
judicial disposal of undefended divorce actions in three English county
courts by Elston, Fuller and Murch of the University of Bristol in
1973. 2 ) Their conclusions, it is submitted, have much relevance to
the South African context. For example, they concluded3 ) that
notwithstanding the introduction of the allegedly no-fault marriage
breakdown principle the procedure for divorce in England remained
very much the same as it was before the Divorce Reform Act, 1969,
(Chap 55).
4
) In South Africa, apart from the abolition.. of the
order for the restitution of conjugal rights,5) the Divorce Act has had
virtually no more than a ripple-effect on the former divorce procedure.
1) See generally Cretney 159-1(3: Eekelaar 143-144.
2) 'Judicial Hearings of Undefended Divorce Petitions' (1975) 38
MLR 609.
3) At 633-634.
4) The Divorce Act, 1969, has now been replaced by the Matrimonial
Causes Act, 1973 (Chap 18).
5) Bys14 Divorce Act, 70 of 1979. For a comprehensive description
of the procedure applicable to the order for the restitution of
conjugal rights see Hahlo 407-418.
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Elston, Fuller and Murch also concludedl ) that the ritual of
the adversary procedure in an undefended divorce proceeding was an.
unnecessary expense. They also correctly suggested that to refer
to the undefended divorce proceeding as a 'trial' was a misnomer since
there was no real dispute about the fact of the marriage and divorce.
Yet, it is easy to understand why this misconception still continues.
It is essentially due to the insistence on a strict compliance
with the traditional adversary procedure. As Elston, Fuller and
Murch pointed out2 ) the adversary procedure has a number of
characteristics which make it difficult to move away from the idea
d " d"" t t" 1 3)that an undefended lvorce procee lng lS no a rla.
In the first place, the adversary procedure
4) pre-supposes that
there is a dispute on both sides. It is clear, however, that in
the undefended divorce there is no dispute over the fact of the marriage
breakdown.
In the second place, the adversary procedure assumes the
involvement of a risk in respect of which on party will 'win'
and the other will 'lose'. In the undefended divorce proceeding
both Parties 'win' in the sense that they obtain the divorce they are
seeking. However, this is not entirely accurate since even in the
undefended divorce proceeding there is, more often than not, a 'loser'
who will have chosen not to contest the divorce because of some form of
pressure being brought to bear upon him. For example, the prospect of
paying the costs of a protracted divorce proceeding often deters a
defendant from entering an appearance to defend. So also, the threat
of having to pay the costs often has the effect of pressurizing a
defendant spouse, who has chosen not to defend the proceedings, into
agreeing to terms in a consent paper which he would not otherwise have
agreed to. But, in the ultimate analysis, both parties to a divorce
proceeding, whether it be defended or not, are the 'losers'.
1) At 633-634.
2) At 634-636.
3) Indeed, it may well be a misnomer to refer to the undefended
divorce proceeding as an 'action'.
4) On the general advantages and disadvantages of the adversary
procedure see above at 114-121.
Finally, under the adversary procedure, the judge is often seen
as playing a very passive role in the undefended divorce proceeding.
In the divorce proceeding all that a judge is concerned with is to satisfy
himself that the formal procedural requirements have been complied with
and that the consent paper, if any, adequately protects the interests
of the children and effects an equitable distribution of the matrimonial
1)property. It was also submitted that the judge was singularly ill-
equipped for this task since he could only rely on the uncontradicted
and one-sided evidence of the Plaintiff. 2 ) As Elston, Fuller and Murch
concluded3 ) :
'It is not surprising to find that many petitioners
were themselves puzzled about the real nature of the
proceedings. Many were astounded at the brevity of
the hearing, particularly after the elaborate build-up
that they had experienced with their solicitors in the
preceding months. 4 ) In retrospect many considered
that obtaining the decree itself had been an expensive
formality. In the absence of dispute many saw little
point in going to court at all.'
Even before Elston, Fuller and Murch published their findings in
1975, the English divorce procedure was amended in 1973, the effect of
which was to introduce the 'special procedure' for undefended divorce
proceedings based on the ground of 2 years separation,5) provided that
there were no children of the marriage to whom section 41 of the
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, (Chap 18)6) applied. As a result of .
the impact of the findings of Elston, Fuller and Murch, the 'special
procedure' was extended in 1975 to apply also to where the following
1) Even in this respect, it is seriously doubted whether a judge is
properly able to discharge his duties: see above at 168-172.
2) See 120 and 287 above.
3) At 636-637.
4) But cf lord Scarman (see 114 n 3 above) who suggests that 'It is a
complete misconception to assess the value of the judicial process
by looking only at the unsubmerged tip - the ten minutes taken in open
court to prove that which is uncontested, namely, the matrimonial
offence. '
5) S 1 (2) (d) Matrimonial Causes Act.
h) See 295 n 1 above for the relevant provisions of s 41.
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facts were relied upon as evidencing the breakdown of marriage; namely,
adultery,l) desertion for 2 years2 ) and 5 years separation,3) provided
that there were no children of the marriage to whom section 41 of the
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, (Chap 18) apPlied. 4 ) In 1977 the
'special procedure' was again further extended so that it now applies
to all undefended cases, whether or not children are involved. 5 )
In terms of the 'special procedure', which has in reality become
the ordinary or normal procedure since most divorce cases are undefended,
neither party is obliged to appear in court. Certain forms and
documents have to be completed by the petitioner for divorce. If the
respondent should indicate that he/she does not wish to defend the
matter, and if the registrar is satisfied that a proper case has
been made out he files a certificate to that effect. In due course,
the judge will formally grant the decree nisi in open court, very often
doing so in bulk; for example, 'I pronounce decree nisi in cases
1 to 50.' After a further 6 weeks the party in whose favour the
decree nisi was granted may apply to have the decree made absolute.
1) S 1 (2 ) (a) Matrimonial Causes Act.
2) S 1 (2 ) (c) Matrimonial Causes Act.
3) S 1 (2 ) (e) Matrimonial Causes Act.
4) See generally the Practice Direction of the Family Division in
!l9757 1 WLR 1594.
5) Matrimonial Causes (Amendment) RuleR 1977. Further on the
Special English Divorce Procedure see Bradley 'Realism in Divorce law'
1976 NLJ 1204.
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(b) Relevance of Special English Divorce Procedure in South Africa
As suggested above, there is much substance in the conclusions of
Elston, Fuller and Murch. However, it is submitted that the 'special
procedure' outlined above in its present form would have no place in
1)
the S0uth African context in that it goes too far. Even Cretney
is constrained to remark
'that the extension of the special procedure has made
that substance of the "breakdown" principle a hollow
form: it certainly much diminishes the importance
of the termination of marital status (in practice
achieved by an administrative act) ••• Indirectly,
the dejudicialisation of the divorce process makes
the complexity of the substantive law ••• seem
unnecessary and irrelevant.'
In the light of the English experience there is much to be said for
the view that every effort should be made to prevent the relegation
of the divorce process to a purely administrative act. 2 ) It is
submitted that the suggested conditions upon which divorce by consent
should be permitted in South Africa3 ) still oblige the courts to
play a meaningful role in the divorce process. Certainly, the
English experience suggests that to all intents and purposes divorce
by consent is now permitted under any circumstances regardless of
whether or not there are any minor children of the marriage involved,
and that the courts are merely confined to 'rubber stamp' functions.
It seems that had the development of the 'special procedure' stopped
in 1975 there would have been much in it that would have been of
relevance to the South African context.
1) At 163 - and see especially n 15 for Cretney' s comments on the 'Special
English Divorce Procedure'.
2) The submission that the divorce process should not be relegated to a
purely administrative act is in keeping with the suggestion that the
proposed family court should function as (and be seen to function as)
a court of law: see above at 265. Cf the views of Denning J in his
interim report on Procedure in Matrimonial Causes published in 1946
and cited by Bradley 'Realism in Divorce Law' 1976 NLJ 1204; viz 'If
there is a careful and dignified proceeding such as obtains in the
High Court for the undoing of a marriage, then quite unconsciously the
people will have a much more respectful view of the marriage tie and
of the marriage status than they would if divorce were effected informc
in an inferior court.'
3) ~ee ?95 above.
301
(2) Where there are Minor or Dependent Childrenl )
In this instance, it is submitted, there is no room for divorce
by consent. The inquisitorial procedure would have an important
part to play since the issues that are involved concern not only the
husband and wife but also their minor or dependent children. One
cannot over-stress how important it is that proper and adequate effect
be given to the best interests of children on divorce. 2 ) Certainly,
section 6(4) of the Divorce Act is a step in the right direction though,
it is submitted, it does not go far enough. 3)
It is a truism that the effect of divorce is to divide a family as
a result of which it is normally the children who suffer the most. 4 )
For the pruposes of the submissions made herein a minor will be
deemed to be any child who has not yet reached ,the age of 18 years,
whereas a dependent child would include a major child who is still
dependent on his parents for support because of some disability or,
perhaps, because he is furthering his studies at a tertiary
institution: see Hahlo and Sinclair 40 and cf the first suggested
condition before divorce by consent may be granted: above at 295.
On the apparent failure of our courts to place the interests of
the children above those of their parents see 288, n 3 above. The
phrase 'best interests of the children' is not capable of easy
definition: cf Mnookin 'Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial
Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy' (1975) 39 Law and Contemp Problerr
226, 229, who describes the phrase as being 'indeterminate and
speculative' (see also 195 n3 above). Mnookin, however, advocates
(££ cit 247) 'highly individualised determinations that focus on ~he
child, not the parents' (see also above at 288). But this depends
on the court being in possession of all the relevant information
(££ cit 257). Hence the importance of the proposed family court's
active involvement in the divorce process. See also Foster and Freed
'Child Custody' (1964) 39 NYULR 423 and 615; Mnookin and Kornhauser
'Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce' (1979)
88 Yale LJ 950.
See generally 164 ~~ above, and see Olmesdahl 'The Rights of
Children on Divorce' 1980 DR 481.
4) In this regard it is important to remember that the main purposes
of a custody/access order are to preserve the ongoing parent/child
relationship and to minimize, so far as possible, the psychological
trauma and hurt young children experience when their parents
separate: cf Appendix 'A' 'Parents are Forever'.
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The divorcing parents still retain a moral and legal commitment to
their minor or dependent children and, it is submitted, it is the
duty of the court to ensure that such parents are reminded of their
commitments. It is not enough to assume that parents are aware
of their duty, for example, to support their children: it is just as
important that the parents be made aware of the nature and extent of
such duty. This can only be achieved by the proposed family court
becoming more involved in the divorce process by means of the
inquisitorial procedure.
c. Defended Divorce Proceedings
More often than not a contested divorce case concerns not so
much a dispute over the fact of irretrievable breakdown but rather a
dispute about maintenance, custody of and access to minor or
dependent children, and the division of matrimonial assets. l ) It
is submitted that if the parties, notwithstanding the fact that they
have had the benefit of conciliation counselling,2) are unable to
resolve their areas of dispute the adversary procedure will still be
indispensible. By the time such disputes are brought before the
proposed family court the parties will have had every opportunity
to resolve their disputes and, it seems, there would be no option
left but to resort to the traditional adversary procedure. . This,
it is submitted, will only occur in very rare cases. Experience
shows that where an appearance was entered initially to defend a
divorce case the parties were still able to 'come to agreement'
on the terms of a consent paper. It is anticipated that this will
continue to be the trend under the suggested procedure for
conciliation counselling.
It may happen that an appearance to defend is entered in a
divorce case not because there is a genuine dispute on any issue but
out of sheer vindictiveness in order to protract the proceedings and
1) Cf 118 n 5 above. With regard to the best interests of children
on divorce see 195 n 3; 288 n 3; 301 n 2 above.
2) See below at 318 ~~.
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fritter away the assets of the joint estate.
l
) ~~ould this occur
it would mea~ that the adversary procedure would have to be resorted
to. In this regard, therefore, the provisions of section la of
the Divorce Act are a step in the right direction towards the
discouraging of unnecessary defended divorce actions. Among the
factors that the court may take into account in exercising its
discretion on the question of costs is the conduct of the parties
'in so far as it may be relevant.' Wnether this means only conduct
during the marriage, or whether it would also include conduct during
the divorce proceedings, is far from clear. However, it is
submitted that there is no reason why the court should not take
into account a defendant's frivolous and vexatious appearance to
defend in deciding the question of costs.
1) ef Tel Peda v Laws (1) : Laws v Laws and Another (2) 1972 (2) SA
1 (T) where the very reverse occurred. Here, the husband
refused to enter an appearance to defend an action in which a
detective agency was claiming default judgment in the sum of
R2 920. The wife, who was married to her husband in community
of property, (a divorce case was pending) applied for leave to
intervene in the action, claiming that her husband's conduct in
failing to enter an appearance to defend was 'tantamount to a
deliberate intention to prejudice her' (at 5 C)~ In view of
the fact that the summons issued by the detective agency was
defective in many respects its action was dismissed by Galgut J.
It followed that it was not necessary for the wife to intervene
after all. Galgut J did, however, say that if the detective agency
again instituted action against the husband (which it was entitled
to do) then the wife was to be granted leave to defend the action.
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D. Pleadingsl )
Consistent with the notion that the ideal family court should
be governed by an informal procedure there is a fairly widespread
view that there should also be a relaxation of the presently rigid
and formal type of pleading in our courts. Among those who are
sympathetic to this view is the Finer Committee
2
) which, however, does
not give any clear indication3) of how the system of pleading should




'We are impressed by the unanimity of the commentators
in favour of greater informality in proceedings in
family matters. But, we are impressed, too, by the
lack of studies of the effect of legal ritual upon
citizens who use the courts ••• On these aspects
of court procedure, we think that decisions should
be delayed until they can be based on knowledge of what
will best satisfy the citizen user's desire for fairness
and dignity in the determination of matrimonial cases'.
It is submitted that all parties to litigation, whether in the
proposed family court or otherwise, are entitled to reasonably precise
particularity on the issues between them. The proposed family court
should not be entitled to assume 'an unfettered jurisdiction over all
potential issues which may affect a family merely because a case is
before it. For example, it would be wrong for the proposed family
1) The pros and cons of informal pleadings in the A~erican and Canadian
context are discussed by Payne at 133-143. At 142 Payne concludes
that 'There must ••• be some degree of flexibility so as to permit
effective and efficient disposition of the many varied issues which
may arise for determination by the court. The pleadings must be
s~fficiently explicit to enable the parties to present relevant
submissions to the court but complexity should be avoided unless the
circumstances are such as preclude a simplified form of pleadings.
The pleadings must be sufficiently precise to enable the court to
determine the issues without undue expenditure of time and effort.'
2) At § 4.283.
3) § 4.338.
4) At § 4.404.
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court to concern itself with the question of maintenance when it is
not in issue and when the real point at issue concerns the custody of
minor or dependent children. It is submitted, therefore, that there is
no small measure of common sense and experience in Rule 18(4) of the
Consolidated Rules of the Supreme Court which states that -
'Every pleading shall contain a clear and concise
statement of the material facts upon which the
pleader relies for his claim, defence or answer to
any pleading, as the case may be, with sufficient
particularity to enable the opposite party to reply
1)
thereto.'
This does not mean that our courts do not have a wide discretion
with regard to pleadings. Thus, in Shill v Milner2) De Villiers JA
pointed out that 'The importance of pleadings should not be unduly
magnified.' The learned Judge of Appeal then went on to quote
from the judgment of Innes CJ in Robinson v Randfontein Estates GM Co
Ltd3) to the following effect; namely,
'The object of pleading is to define the issues;
and the parties will be kept strictly to their
pleas where any departure would cause prejudice
or would prevent full inquiry. But within those
limits the Court has wide discretion. For pleadings
are made for the Court, not the Court for pleadings.'
There seems to be no reason why the present system of pleadings
should not be continued in the proposed family court. It is true that
the less formal the pleadings are the less need there will be for legal
assistance in the drafting of pleadings and that this would serve to cut
down on the costs involved in family court litigation. This, however,
would only be a small advantage at the expense of particularity of
pleadings which serves to define the matters at issue. The proposed
1) Herbstein and Van Winsen 295-296; 310; 354-356•
.2) 1937 AD 101 at 105.
3) 1925 AD 173 at 198.
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family court, like any other court of law, must administer a just
and efficient system of justice and to do so it must not be expected
to grope around in the dark not knowing what the real issues are
between the parties. l ) To advocate a less formal procedure and a
less formal atmosphere in the proposed family court is one thing,
but to advocate more informal pleadings is another matter.
E. The Family Courtroom
A relaxed and informal atmosphere in the proposed family court
is essential. The paradigm for the ideal family court setting is
to be found in the Children's Court2) which 'shall sit in a room
other than that in which any other court ordinarily sits.,3)
Commissioner's of child welfare do not robe
4
) and the round-table
conference approach is the characteristic feature of the Children's
Court. Nor do commissioner's of child welfare sit on an upraised
bench as in the traditional courtroom. Although a friendly and
informal .atmosphere should be encouraged in the proposed family court
it should always be remembered that it will be a court of law and must
always function as such.5 ) Thus, for example, as in the case of the
Children's Court there can be no question of a case being disposed of
in the absence of anyone who has a direct interest in the case.
Proper notice must be given to all parties concerned. 6 ) Failure to
1) For this reason, the idea of 'Do It Yourself' divorces should not be
encouraged. On the other hand, it would be wrong for the proposed
family court to deny a party the relief he is entitled to simply
because he has chosen not to seek the assistance of a legal practitioner
2) For a description of the Children's Court see above at 198-202 and
see Spiro 320-329.
3) S 8 (1) Children's Act.
4) Cf the position in Hawaii which is dealt with above at 124 and
Australia which is dealt with above at 66.
5) See 265 above; see also Napolitano v de Wet NO and Os 1964 (4) SA
337 (T) at 342; Snyder en And v Steenkamp en And 1974 (4) SA 82 (N)
at 87; J and An v Commissioner of Child Welfare Durban 1979 (1) SA
219 (N) at 222.
6) Sees34 Children's Act which makes it obligatory for the parents,
or the guardian, or the person having the custody, of a child in
respect of whom an inquiry unders30 is to be held, to be given
proper notice of such inquiry.
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give such proper notice would constitute a material irregularity
t o d f . 1)and would be contrary to the dictates of jus lce an alrness.
As in the case of the Children's Court,2) it is also submitted
that no person should be present during proceedings in the proposed
family court unless his presence is necessary. Persons whose presence
would be necessary would obviously be the parties themselves, the
parents, or guardian, or person in loco parentis, of any child whose
presence is necessary,3) or the legal representatives of such persons.
It should also be noted that while section 12 of the Divorce Act limits
the publication of the particulars of a divorce action, it does not go
so far as to prohibit the presence of persons whose presence may not
reasonably be req'. lired. 4 ) As it is envisaged that the proposed family
court should have jurisdiction over, inter alia, all those matters presently
1) Weepner v Warren and van Niekerk NO 1948 (1) SA 898 (c); Philips
v Commissioner of Child Welfare Belville 1956 (2) SA 330 (c);
Snyder en And v Steenkamp en And 1974 (4) SA 82 (N); J and An
v Commissioner of Child Welfare Durban 1979 (1) SA 219 (N). The
landmark decision in Re Gault 387 us 1 (1967) was mainly based on
the failure to give the parents of the juvenile accused proper
notice of the trial; cf Kent v United States 383 US 541 (1966).
2) S 8 (3) Children's Act; Raison v Commissioner of Child Welfare 1948
(4) SA 218 (N). Cf s 5 (3) Maintenance Act which is to similar effect.
3) The children of divorce are just as much parties to the divorce
action as are their parents. Their presence will therefore be most
desirable, particularly where they are of an age of understanding.
Certainly, the separate legal representation of all children of
divorce is essential: see above at 249 et seq.
4) Cf s 97 (1) of the Australian Family Law Act: see 66 above. The
background to s 12 Divorce Act is explained by the South African Law
Commission /Divorce Report (1978) § 177 as follows:- 'It is an
established-principle of our law that-justice should not only be done
but that the general public should also be able to see that justice
is done. For this reason, hearings normally take place in open
court and the publication of the evidence given is freely permitted.
The reason ~iven for the proposed exception in the case of divorce
proceedings is that a divorce is a highly personal matter. The public
has an interest in the matter only in so far as the status of the
parties is concerned. The intimate relationship of the parties and
the causes of their marriage breakdown do not, however, concern the
public. Such details are published, merely to stimulate the public
taste for sensation.'
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provided for by the Children's Act and the Divorce Act there seems to be
no reason why section 8 (3) of the Children's Act and section 12 of the
Divorce Act should not be combined. It must be stressed, though, that as a
general proposition secrecy, as opposed to privacy, is to be condemned.
However, it is submitted that a strong case for some measure of secrecy
can be made out in respect of cases involving children alleged to be in
need of care and adoptions. In this regard, it is useful to compare
the positions in the Los Angeles Conciliation Court, and the Family
Courts of Hawaii and Australia.
In the Los Angeles Conciliation Court the hearing of the 'petition
of conciliation' is conducted in private. l ) This is where the strength
of the conciliation and counselling process of the Los Angeles
Conciliation Co~rt lies since the parties are enjoined to raise and
discuss any matters at issue. Such discussions remain privileged
from future disclosure so that the parties are not inhibited from
raising issues wfiich they feel might otherwise prejudice their case.
If the parties should enter into a 'Husband and Wife Agreement,2) the
matter is then referred to the court by the counsellors for formal
endorsement as a court order whereupon the need for further secrecy
falls away. Slmilarly, if the parties are unable to arrive at a
'Husband and Wife Agreement' their action will be resumed in court in
the ordinary way without fear of any disclosures made at the
conciliation stage being used against them.
continued secrecy falls away.
Thereafter the need for
With regard to the Hawaii Family Court section 41 of the Hawaii
Revised Statutes provides, inter alia, that in cases involving children -
'The hearings may be conducted in an informal manner •••
The general public shall be excluded and only such persons
admitted whose presence is requested by the parents or
guardian or as the judge or district family judge finds
to have a direct interest in the case or in the work of
the court from the standpoint of the best interests of
the child involved.'
1) See 25 above.
2) See 26-28 above.
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Insofar as the procedure in cases involving adults is concerned,
section 42 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes provides, inter alia, that -
'Where in his opinion it is necessary to protect the welfare
of the persons before the court, the judge may conduct
hearings in chambers, and may exclude persons having no
direct interest in the case.'
In all other circumstances, it would seem that cases involving adults
are heard in open court from which the general public is not excluded.
The position in Australia is governed by sections 97 (1) and (2)
of the Family Law Act, 53 of 1975, which make provision for proceedings
to be heard in private in closed court. l ) This, however, is subject
to relatives or friends of either party, the marriage counsellors,
welfare officers and legal practitioners being permitted to be present
in court 'unless in a particular case the court otherwise orders.'
With rega~d to the publication of proceedings section 121 (1) of the
Family Law Act, states that -
'A person shall not print or publish -
Ca) any statement or report that proceedings have been
instituted in the Family Court or in another court
exercising jurisdiction under this Act;
Cb) any account of evidence in proceedings instituted
in the Family Court or in another court having
jurisdiction under this Act, or any other account
or particulars of any such proceedings.'
1) S 97 Cl) Family Law Act only applies to the Commonwealth Family
Court and not to state family courts: see 66 above.
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5. RECORDS OF PROCEEDINGS
With regard to the records of proceedings in the proposed family
court it is submitted that the present provisions of the various
statutes governing the keeping of, and access to, records of
proceedings in the Children's Court, the Maintenance Court and the
Divorce iSuprem~7 Court should be consolidated. This can be done to
cater for the various situations. Thus, section 9 (3) of the Children's
Act, states that -
'The contents of a statement or a report of a probation
officer, or of an officer of an approved agency which
has been lodged with a children's co~rt, shall not be
disclosed for the purposes of any civil action except
by order of any court to a court where such disclosure
would be in the interest of any particular person. '
Furthermore, regulation 6 (4) of the Rules and Regulations of the Minister
of Social Welfare and Pensionsl ) states that no person who was not a party
to the proceedings may inspect the record of any enquiry except with the
permission of a commissioner of child welfare.
2
)
The records of adoption proceedings are, understandably, even more
strictly controlled. Thus, regulation 14 (2) of the Rules and Regulations
of the Minister of Social Welfare and Pensions3 ) states in peremptory terms
that -
'No person other than an officer of the court or other
person generally or specially authorized thereto by the
Secretary shall have inspection of or access to an
Adoption Record Book and the clerk of the children's
court shall take all necessary precautions to ensure
that access to the Adoptions Record Book in his custody
is not had by any unauthorized person. ,4)
1) GN R523 of 1961.
2) There are exemptions in the case of publications in newspapers and
journals and also with regard to inspections of records for official
purposes and for reasons of research: see the proviso to reg 6 (4):
GN R523 of 1961.
3) GN R523 of 1961.
4) With regard to Blacks see reg 32 (1) Rules and Regulations of Minister
of Bantu Administration and Development GN RI085 of 1960, which is to
similar effect.
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Before an adoption order is granted the most searching examinations
are conducted by social workers into the personal backgrounds of the
natural parents, the child concerned and the adoptive parents.
l
)
Even after the adoption order has been granted there is the possibility
of the Children's Court being called upon to rescind the order.
2
)
For a period of at least 2 years after the granting of an adoption
d t ' f'l ' 3)order the a op lon l e remalns open.
There is no similar restriction on the right to have access to
the records of proceedings in the Maintenance Court.
4 ) In the case
of divorce proceedings there is also no restriction on the right to
have access to the records of the proceedings. 5 )
A s~ccessful combination of the various provisions relating to
the custody of, and access to, records of proceedings in a family court
has been achieved by the Hawaii Legislature. Section 84 of the
Hawaii Revised Statutes provides, inter alia, that -
'The court shall maintain records in all cases brought before
it. In proceedings under section 11,6) and in paternity
proceedings ••• , the following records shall be withheld
from public inspection: the court docket, petitions,
complaints, motions and any other papers filed in any case;
1) Napolitano v de Wet NO and Others 1964 (4) SA 337 (T); Napolitano
v Co~issioner of Child Welfare Johannesburg 1965 (1) SA 742 (AD).
It is doubted whether the recent overseas trend of allowing adopted
persons to have access to adoption records to ascertain who their
natural parents are will gain ready acceptance in South Africa.
2) s 76 Children's Act.
3) s 76 (1) Children's Act.
4) s 5 (10) (a) Maintenance Act. Of course, no person whose presence
is not necessary is permitted to be present at a maintenance enquiry
unless he has the permission of the court: s 5 (3) Maintenance Act.
5) But there is a restriction on the right to publish the particulars
of a divorce action: s 12 (1) Divorce Act.
6) s 11 is cited in full at 36-37 above.
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transcripts of testimony taken by the court; and findings,
judgments, orders, decrees, and other papers other than
social records filed in proceedings before the court. The
records, other than social records, shall be open to
inspection by the parties and their attorneys, by an
institution or agency to which custody of a minor has been
transferred by an individual who has been appointed guardian;
with consent of the judge, by persons having a legitimate
interest in the proceedings from the standpoint of the
welfare of the minor; and, pursuant to order of the court
or the rules of court, by persons conducting pertinent
research studies, and by persons, institutions, and agencies
having a legitimate interest in the protection, welfare, or
treatment of the minor.
Reports of social and clinical studies or examinations
shall be withheld from public inspection, except that
information from such reports may be furnished, in a manner
determined by the judge, to persons and governmental and
private agencies an1 institutions conducting pertinent
research studies or having a legitimate interest in the
protection, welfare, and treatment of the minor.
No information obtained or social records prepared
in discharge of official duty by an employee of the court
shall be disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone other
than the judge or others ••• entitled to receive such
information, unless and until otherwise ordered by the
judge •••
The records of any police department, and of any
juvenile crime prevention bureau ••• shall be confidential
and shall be open to inspection only by persons whose official
duties are concerned with the provisions of this chapter,
except as otherwise ordered by the court. Any such police
records concerning traffic accidents in which a child or
minor ••• is involved shall, after the termination of any
proceedings arising out of any such accident, or in any
event after six months from the date of the accident, be
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available for inspection by the parties directly
concerned in the accident, or their duly licensed
attorneys acting under written authority signed by
either party. Any person who may sue because of
death resulting from any such accident shall be
deemed a party concerned.'
It is clear that the above provision is designed with the best
interests of children in mind. No useful purpose would be served by
the publication of, or even by allowing the general public access to,
records of adoption proceedings. Nor can it be said that the
advantages of publishing evidence recorded in a Children's Court
outweigh the disadvantages. In divorce a:tions there are far too
many minor or dependent children involved whose best interests would
in no way be furthered by the publication of the unsavoury particulars
of their parents' divorce. But, as section 84 of the Hawaii Revised
Statutes shows, it is possible to combine into one section the various
provisions relating to the records of proceedings to give effect to
the varying degrees of restriction on access and publication.
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6. THERAPEUTIC FUNCTIONS OF PROPOSED FAMILY COURT
The therapeutic functions of the proposed family court can be
conveniently considered from the following standpoints:
(A) pre-marital counselling;
(B) pre-divorce counselling; and
(C) post-divorce counselling.
(A) PRE-MARITAL COUNSELLING
There is no statutory provision in South Africa making it
obligatory for persons wishing to marry to undergo pre-marital
counselling. With regard to the position in Los Angeles, Hawaii and
1)
Australia, pre-marital counselling has met with little or n8 success.
It is submitted that it would be far more desirable if greater emphasis
were to be placed by our educational authorities on the social and
personal consequences of marriage rather than to make this an area of
concern for the proposed family court. Apart from the home, the proper
place for such educational programming is in the schools
2
) and other
institutions of learning such as universities and colleges. Once young
people reach a marriageable age they generally have developed their own
preconceived ideas of what the social and personal consequences of
marriage are and it is not likely that their views will be changed by an
intensive short-term course of counselling just before their proposed
marriage.
With regard to the legal consequences of a marriage, however, the
position is different. In this regard, it is submitted that persons
about to be married for the first time should be made more aware of the
legal consequences of a marriage contract and, in the South African
context, this is particularly important with regard to the decision
whether to enter into an antenuptial contract or not. 3 )
1) On pre-marital counselling in other jurisdictions see above at
17-21; 51, 96-97; 102; 104; 110; 161.
2) Cf §ll(b) Rhodesian Divorce Commission Report. Apart from the
vital topics of sex and contraception the matters mentioned in
Appendix 'C' below, may usefully form part of a pre-marital education
syllabus; viz welfare of children; personal appearance; tempers
and nagging; mutual interests; talking things over; money matters;
mutual friends; tolerance and privacy.
3) On the present legal position relating to antenuptial contracts see
Hahlo 259-322; Olivier 262-270; Boberg 225-227. See also Bosman
'Huweliksvoorwaardeskontrakte: Gister en Vandag' (1978) 41 THR-HR 402.
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How best to achieve this, though, is a moot point. On the one hand,
this could be achieved by pre-marital legal counselling.l)
Alternatively, all that might be necessary would be for the parties
before the proposed marriage ceremony, to have their attention drawn
to the legal consequences of marriage. This could be achieved by
the marriage officer handing to the intending spouses the appropriate
pamphlet to this effect. The marriage officer could also be required
to certify that such pamphlet has been handed to the intending spouses
at least, say 48 hours, before the proposed time of the wedding
2)
ceremony.
Of the two possible alternatives, it is submitted that the second
is likely to be more readily acceptable. As has been pointed out
before, pre-marital counselling, whether it be with regard to the legal
or the social consequences of marriage, has not met with much success in
other jurisdictions. All that intending spouses need is to have their
attention drawn to the legal consequences of marriage which will, inter
alia, assist them in arriving at a firm decision one way or the other
on the desirability of entering into an antenuptial contract.3) At
the very least, the intending spouses should be made aware of the need
to seek legal advice on the matter. However, the burden of informing
intending spouses of these matters should not be cast on the staff of
the proposed family court: they will have enough onerous and more
compelling duties to comply with at the pre-divorce and post-divorce
counselling stage. 4)
1) This suggestion, at first blush, seems particularly attractive with
regard to intending spouses where one or both are under 21 years of
age and they are marrying for the first time: cf § 30 Rhodesian
Divorce Commission Report.
2) Cf Appendix 'C' below.
3) In particular, it should be stressed to the intending spouses that
once married under a particular matrimonial regime they will be bound
by that regime for the rest of their married lives and that an
antenuptial contract normally cannot be varied post nuptially. Should
the proposed accrual system become part of the South African Law there
will be an even greater need to inform intending spouses on what will
then be a new concept of law governing, inter alia, the proprietary
consequences of a marriage: see the Draft Bill on Matrimonial Property
published by the South African Law Commission at the end of 1979.
4) Although opinions on the efficacy of pre-marital counselling are
divided the writer inclines to the view of Payne 384 who is of the
view that 'The provision of premarital counselling should be viewed
in the broad context of a comprehensive programme of family life





Reference has already been made to the distinction between
.. 11· 2) F threconciliation and concillatlon counse lng. or e purposes
of the submissions to be made hereunder it is proposed to continue
" "d· t" t· 3)wlth thls lS lnc lon •
(i) Reconciliation Counselling
Prior to the promulgation of the Divorce Act, the Supreme Court
never had the inherent discretion to order the parties to a divorce
action to submit to reconciliation counselling. Once the appropriate
ground for divorce had been proved the court had no option but to
grant the desired divorce notwithstanding the fact that it may have
felt that the possibility of a reconciliation existed. At the most,
the court could postpone a divorce case indefinitely in the hope that
the parties might become reconciled. In practice, ~his was very
rarely rEsorted to and there is no record of this procedure having been
successful.
1) On pre-divorce counselling in other jurisdictions see above at
23-28; 51-53; 69-72; 97-101; 102-104; 105-109; 110-112.
2) See 88-89 above.
3) Payne 405 would appear to be of the view that such distinction is
fallacious: he suggests that 'legislation should specifically
reflect the philosophy that counselling cannot be subdivided into
separate categories such as "reconciliation counselling" and
"conciliation counselling" and that the role of the counsellor
is to assist in the resolution of matrimonial and familial problems
irrespective of whether this leads to the preservation of the
marriage or family unit or to its dissolution and disintegration.'
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Now section 4(3) of the Divorce Act, proviqes that:
'If it appears to the court that there is a
reasonable possibility that the parties may
become reconciled through marriage counsel,
treatment or reflection, the court may postpone
the proceedings in order that the parties may
t -1- t- ,1)attemp a reconcl la lone
It is clear that section 4 (3) found its way into the Act in response to
the South African Law Commission's rather dubious contention2) that
'a judge should be able to tell at a glance in which cases it would be
unnecessary to take steps with a view to reconciliation'. It should
also be noted that section 4 (3) does not give the court the power to
- d 11- - 3)order any of the partles to atten any counse lng seSSlons.
In the light of similar experiences in other jurisdictions it is
doubted whether the provisions of section 4 (3) will be implemented with
any regularity. Even if the section should be implemented the chances
of the parties becoming reconciled are very slight, especially in view
of the continued emphasis on the adversary procedure. 4)
1)
4)
S 4 (4) states that 'Where a divorce action which is not defended is
postponed in terms of subsection (3), the court may direct that the
action be tried de novo, on the date of resumption thereof, by any
other judge of the court concerned.'
§ 13.3 Divorce Report (1978). See above at 170-171.
As the South African Law Commission itself correctly observes
'reconciliation cannot be forced upon the parties': § 12.3 Divorce
Report (1978).
As far as can be ascertained, there is no recorded instance of a court
adjourning in terms of s 4 (3) Divorce Act. In this regard, Hahlo and
Sinclair conclude at 36 as follows: '/T7here will be, as a rule, no
prospect of reconciliation, and even in-those cases where the spouses
desire divorce for no better reason than that they have grown tired of
each other reconciliation attempts are generally doomed. It is only
where the parties are young and inexperienced and have not been married
for long, that there is, occasionally, a reasonable prospect of
reconciliation.' There do not seem to be any official South African
statistics showing how many divorced couples re-marry each other. In
the writer's experience this is a rare occurrence. The fact that a
large number of previously divorced couples in other countries re-marry
each other is not necessarily indicative of the fact that reconciliatio~
counselling would have been a useful exercise when the parties were in
the process of divorcing each other: cf the Los Angeles experience whic
is discussed above at 97-101.
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But despite these reservations about the efficacy of section 4(3)
of the Divorce Act, it is submitted that the section should be retained,
even if only for the benefit of those very rare cases where the remote
possibility of reconciliation exists. Of course, the possibility of
t
reconciliation will only become a reality where the spouses desire to
consider reconciliation, and they must be willing to submit to
counselling with this end in mind. Beyond this, it is submitted, it
t o f °1° to 1)is not possible to legislate on the ques lon 0 reconcl la lone
(ii) Conciliation Counselling
The importance of conciliation counselling was graphically explained
by Sir Jocelyn Simon pC in 19702) as follows:
'/E7ven if full reconciliation is not possible,
skilful and sympathetic advice will often enable
the parties to go their separate ways with the least
pain and damage to themselves and their children.'
There are, basically, two areas in respect of which conciliation
counselling can play an important part; namely, in the safeguarding of
the interests of minor or dependent children and in the adjustment of
the respective proprietary rights of the warring spouses. In both
these areas, the court is very much in the hands of the litigating
parties. Thus, the court, for example, can only be satisfied that the
'provisions made or contemplated with regard to the welfare of any minor
or dependent child of the marriage,3) have been properly made purely on
the strength of such evidence as the litigating parties choose to place
before the court. It is true that the court can appoint a legal
practitioner to represent a child.
4
) But this is likely to be resorted
to only on rare occasions.5 ) So also, when deciding whether the consent
1) Such legislation would be 'in the realm of pious hope': per Selby J
'Development of Divorce Law in Australia' (1966) 29 MLR 473, 487:
see 92 n 1 above. --
2) 1970 Riddell lecture: see 95 n 5 above.
3) S 6 (1) Divorce Act, 70 of 1979. On the children of divorce see above
at 164-167, 246-253 and 301 n 2. The main result of conciliation
counselling would be the granting of fairer custodial orders insofar
as the children themselves are concerned.
4) S 6 (4) Divorce Act.
5) On the question of the legal representation of children see above at
249-251.
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paper accurately gives expression to the rights of the respective parties,
all that the court usually has to rely on is the evidence that the
parties choose to place before it and, of course, its judicial instinct
for justice and fair play.
It is, therefore, submitted that conciliation counselling can play
an important part in the resolution of the many pre-divorce problems.
However, if this should fail, the effect of conciliation counselling
would then be to crystallize the problems at issue. For the purposes
of the submissions to be made in this regard, a further distinction
between defended and undefended divorce proceedings will have to be made.
Ca) Defended Divorce Proceedingsl )
It is submitted that where a divorce case is defended both parties
should be compelled to attend, individually, one or two counselling
sessions2) before the date set down for the hearing of the action in the
proposed family court. The purpose of such counselling sessions, which
ought to be conducted in the absence of any legal advisers, would be to
try to identify, and isolate, the real problem areas that exist between
the parties and then to apply the necessary counselling in an endeavour to
eliminate any hatred, bitterness and distress. It is confidently
believed that if the problem areas are successfully identified the chances
of resolving them become that much greater in a non-adversary atmosphere.
There are two possible results that could flow from such
counselling; namely,
(i) the parties concerned may be persuaded to reach agreement on
those areas which were previously the subject of acrimonious
dispute. If this should occur, the counsellor's report to
1) See above at 302-303. Most of the divorce cases that are contested
are, in fact, not contested on the merits but, rather, because of
disagreement over ancillary issues such as custody, access, maintenance
and the division of matrimonial property. The fact of impending divorcE
is generally conceded.
2) The suggested number of counselling sessions is purely arbitrary.
Experience would, in due course, suggest the more appropriate number
of counselling sessions. What is clear, though, is that counselling
by the personnel of the proposed family court would, of necessity, only
be of a short-term duration. If on-going counselling is required this
would have to be sought from outside and independent counselling agenciE
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the proposed family court would prove invaluable when
it comes to the endorsement of such agreement as an
order of court; or
(ii) on the other hand, the parties may still not be able to
reach agreement on those areas of dispute which have been
identified and isolated. A counsellor's report to this
effect would again prove to be an invaluable guide to the
judge of the proposed family court when he is finally called
upon to resolve the dipute, especially where the interests
of minors or dependants are concerned. It is reasonably
anticipated, however, that this second situation will hardly
ever arise in practice since the 'pressures' of counselling
are more likely to induce agreement between the parties
than not.
It should also be mentioned that quite apart from the above situations,
the counsellor's report to the court would undoubtedly prove to be
invaluable when thp. court is called upon to consider the 'conduct /Of
the partie~7 in so far as it may be relevant to the break-down of the
marriage' in relation to the question of maintenance and the division
of the assets of the parties in terms of section 7 (1) of the Divorce Act.
The report would also be most useful to the court in determining 'the
circumstances which gave rise to the break-down /Of the marriag~7 and any
substantial misconduct on the part of either of the parties' in terms of
section 9(1) of the Divorce Act, which concerns the forfeiture of the
patrimonial benefits of marriage. Finally, it would assist the court in
determining the question of costs in terms of section 10 of the Divorce Act.
(b) Undefended Divorce Proceedings
Here, a broad distinction must be made between the two following
types of undefended divorce proceedings; namely,
(i) where the defendant does not bother to enter an appearance to
defend at all: the defendant may even have disappeared from the scene
and in this type of situation the divorce is, in effect, granted by
default. There is very little that counselling could achieve in such
a situation. Even if he could be located and contacted, it would be
extremely unlikely that the defendant would respond to an invitation to
attend any counselling sessions. The role of the counsellor in such a
situation would depend on whether there are any minor or dependent children
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involved. If there are none then all that would be required of the
counsellor would be a certificate to that effect addressed to the
proposed family court. If there are any minor or dependent children
involved then the counsellor's task would be limited to reporting to
the proposed family court on whether he has satisfied himself that the
plaintiff has made proper arrangements for the safeguarding of their
interests. Counselling in this instance would be of a formal nature
but which, it is submitted, is made necessary because of interests
other than the plaintiff's which may be at stake; and
(ii) where the defendant has initially entered an appearance to
defend, or has evinced an intention to do so when first confronted
with the possibility of being divorced, but has later decided not to
continue with his defence. There could be a number of reasons for
this; for example, the defendant may have agreed to the terms of
a consent paper because of the threat of the high cost of litigation
or because of 'other pressures,.l) If the parties do reach
agreement on the terms of a consent paper they should both be
obliged to attend, individually, one or more consultations2) with a
counsellor. The purpose of these consultations would be for the
counsellor to investigate whether the parties are generally agreed
on the fact of divorce and on the terms of the consent paper. In
particular, the counsellor should be expected to pay close attention
to the questions of the custody of, access to, and maintenance of,
any minor or dependent children. At these consultations, which would be
merely investigatory, neither party should be legally represented.
At the conclusion of these consultations the counsellor should submit
a report to the proposed family court in much the same way as a
trustee in an insolvent estate reports to creditors at the second
meeting of creditors. 3) It must be stressed that the counsellor
should not be seen to be representing the interests of either side.
He would also be operating in a non-adversary atmosphere.
1) The defendant may be prepared to agree to any terms in a
consent paper simply in order to 'gain his freedom' from an unhappy
marriage.
2) See 319 n 2 above.
3) S 81 Insolvency Act, 24 of 1936.
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Cc) POST-DIVORCE COUNSELLINGl )
Post-divorce litigation usually concerns disputes over the
custody, access and maintenance of any minor or dependent children,
disputes over the maintenance payable to the former spouse and even
matrimonial property disputes, all of which mayor may not be
accompanied by the compelling desire on the part of the ex-spouses
to strike back at each other. In the event of any post-divorce
litigation between the former spouses, it is submitted that the parties
should be obliged to attend one or more counselling sessions.
2
) These
counselling sessions should take place individually and in the absence
of legal advisers. The main aim of such counselling would be, in the
calm of a non-adversary atmosphere, to try and resolve the areas of
dispute between the parties. Normally, in post-divorce litigation
the area or areas of dispute will be more clearly defined than at
the pre-divorce stage.
If the parties, after having been counselled, are able to reach
agreement on their dispute, this fact should be reported to the
proposed family court which may then endorse such agreement as an
order of court.
If, however, the parties are unable to resolve their dispute
after having been counselled this fact should be reported by the
counsellor concerned. In his report the counsellor should pay
particular attention to the best interests of any minor or dependent
children. Such report would be of invaluable assistance to the
proposed family court in arriving at a proper decision on the dispute.
It is, of course, obvious that the adversary procedure would have to be
resorted to where the parties, despite counselling, have been unable
to resolve their differences. But, even in this instance, the effect
of counselling would be to reduce the areas of conflict and, at the
very least, counselling would help to reduce the bitterness that
characteristically pervades post-divorce litigation.
1) As to post-divorce counselling see above at 28, 31-33, 51, 101-102,
105-109, 112-113.
2) See 319 n 2 above.
CD) ATTENDANCE AT COUNSELLING SESSIONS
Ideally, counselling operates to best advantage only if the
parties concerned voluntarily attend the requisite counselling
sessions. One cannot be so naive as to believe that the parties
to a matrimonial dispute will always voluntarily attend any
counselling sessions. On the other hand, it would be a waste of
time to compel a reluctant party to attend any counselling sessions.
It is, therefore, submitted that the following procedure should be
resorted to.
Whenever a matrimonial action is initiated the registrar of the
proposed family court should be obliged, as a matter of routine, to
advise the counsellors' office of the nature of the action being
instituted, the names and addresses of the parties concerned, and
whether the action is being defended or not. From the procedural
point of view this could easily be achieved by making it necessary
for all process to be filed with the registrar of the proposed family
court in duplicate so that copies thereof could be forwarded to the
counsellors' office by the registrar.
Upon receipt of the above information, the counsellor assigned
to the case should immediately invite the parties concerned to attend
the requisite counselling sessions. Should there be no response to
the invitation to attend, the counsellor should have the discretionary
power to issue a subpoena. Failure to comply with the subpoena
would render the defaulting party to the normal penalties for contempt
of court. It must be emphasized that the power to issue a subpoena
should be a discretionary one. This power should only be resorted to
in those very rare cases where it is believed on reasonable grounds
that the attendance of a defaulting party at a counselling session
is absolutely essential. l )
1) Cf the Los Angeles Conciliation Court's experience with the so-called
citation to compel a person's attendance at a counselling session
which is described above at 24-25 and which has been referred to as
a form of 'Gentle judicial coercion'.
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Difficulties with regard to the above suggested procedure may
well be encountered in practice; for example, the defendant's
whereabouts may be unknown or he may live at a place many miles
away from the court in which the action is instituted. In the former
case, it is clear that any attempt to compel the missing defendant's
attendance at a counselling session would be superfluous. In the
latter case, where it is felt on reasonable grounds that the defendant
should attend a counselling session ~e could be compelled to do so
in the town nearest to him where such counselling services are available.
In due course, the appropriate report could.be forwarded to the





TO THE EST ABLISHMENT OF FAMILY COURTS IN SOUTH AFRICA
The proposal for the establishment of a family court in South
Africa may possibly be regarded by some as being so far-reaching,
impractical and too costly as to be totally inconsistent with our
present judicial system and court structure.
1)
of Payne
However, in the words
'It should not be assumed that the establishment of
specially constituted family courts with a
comprehensive and integrated jurisdiction over
matrimonial, familial and juvenile proceedings
would involve radical changes or totally novel
concepts or procedures in the legal and judicial
process. '
In effect, the proposal for the establishment of a family court in
South Africa as outlined in this work amounts to no more than a
process of consolidation which lends itself to greater consistency
and efficiency. In this regard, the position is neatly expressed by
2)
Arthur as follows:
'A family court would add nothing new, but would
merely consolidate the existing structure into a
single court. It should not be considered as a
novel, social encroachment into individual and
family privacy; these invasions now exist, usually
at the request of the family itself. A family court
would merely combine the various existing forms of
judicial intervention into family affairs. Nothing
new would be added except the fruits of the
consolidation - consistency and efficiency.'
1) At 212.
2) 'A Family Court - Why Not?' (1966) 51 Minn LR 223, 226.
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It is, of course, conceded that the proposal for the establishment
of a family court in South Africa is not being made in the naive belief
that it would be easy of attainment. Practical problems would most
certainly be encountered. Some of these problems are the following:
(i) in view of the fact that the concept of a family court in
South Africa is a novel one it may, at first, be difficult to
persuade all levels of the general public to accept it. Such
acceptance is a condition precedent to the success of any family
1)court. This, however, is essentially a problem of education and
in this regard provision should be made for the appointment of an
official similar to the Director of Counselling and Welfare in
Australia. 2 ) One of his most important duties would be the
preparation of, and dissemination of, the appropriate pamphlets
publicising the purposes, functions and philosophy of the proposed
family court. It is submitted that constructive use should also be
1) See generally Payne 262-274. 'If unified family courts are
established, their successful operation will demand widespread
publicity of the philosophy and role of the court and of the
auxiliary services available to the public.' - Payne 271. See
also Foster 'Conciliation and Counselling in the Courts in Family
Law Cases' (1966) 41 NYULR 351, 379; Kay 'A Family Court: The
California Proposal' (1968) 56 Calif LR 1205, 1247.
2) See above at 71-72 for the functions of the Director of
Counselling and Welfare in AJstralia. The educative functions
of the Director are supplemented by the Family Law Council and
the Institute of Family Studies: see above at 67-68. The Family
Law Council is required to furnish a report to the Commonwealth
Attorney-General witiDn 60 days after each year ending on 30 June
s 115 (9) Family Law Act. The equivalent qfficial in the Los
Angeles Conciliation Court is referred to as the Director of Family
Counselling Services (see 14-15 above) while in Hawaii he is referred
to as the Director of the Family Court (see above at 39-40). The
work of the Director of the Hawaii Family Court is apparently
supplemented by the Hawaiian Board of Family Court Judges (see above
at 83).
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d · . th' d 1)made of the mass me la 1n 1S regar • In addition, it is also
submitted that the purposes, functions and philosophy of the proposed
family court should be part of the proposed pre-marital education
2)
syllabus. The task of educating the public on all aspects of the
proposed family court should be an ongoing exercise. This can be
achieved by means of public lectures and the publication of working
papers and view points. 3) In addition, the publication of an annual
report would be essential. The importance of an annual report is
stressed in the commentary on section 5 of the Standard Family Court
4)
Act as follows :-
'An annual report serves several constructive purposes
for the court and for its relationships with the
community at large as well as with particular groups,
especially the legislature. A properly documented
report supports budgetary requests, enhances the court's
public relations, provides essential records and
statistical data for the court's own information, and
encourages an attitude of critical self-examination';
1) Payne 272. Payne even goes further and suggests (ibid) that
'It would be desirable, if not essential, to ensure that teachers,
lawyers, doctors, the clergy, public health nurses, welfare workers,
and the police are aware of the facilities and resources available
since they have first hand contact with families in distress ••• '
It is submitted that this suggestion could also be put to good
effect in the South African context.
2) See 314 n 2 above.
3) See 106 n 3 above. In this regard the publication of the Conciliation
Court's Review has proved to be very useful.
4) Note 'Standard Family Court Act' (1959) 5 NPPA Journ 99, Ill.
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(ii) quite apart from the initial problem of acquainting the
general public with the purposes, functions and philosophy of the
proposed family court, there is the added difficulty of overcoming
the traditional conservatism of the legal profession - the Bench,
the Bar and the Side-Bar. l ) It is quite possible that the
resistance of the legal profession may even harden if it should be
thought that the concept of family courts would, in some appreciable
manner, curtail the role of the legal practitioner in familial and
matrimonial disputes. However, it must be emphasized that it is
not intended to diminish the role of the legal practitioner in the
proposed family court system. All that the proposal for a family
court system in South Africa essentially involves is a reallocation
of business. 2 ) Attorneys in particular have always had an important
role to play in family law litigation and there is no reason to
suppose that they will not continue to play an important, if not
indispensable, role in the proposed family court system. It is
submitted that what the attorney's role would be in proceedings
in which children are involved in the proposed family court is well
3)
summarised by Dyson and Dyson as follows:
'(1) the attorney can help develop evidence so that the
judge is not cast in the triple role of prosecutor,
defense lawyer, and impartial judge;
(2) the attorney can seek precise development of the
evidence where a child may have committed a particular
act but not in a manner which would constitute any
violation of law;
(3) the attorney can insure that the child receives
whatever protections the law grants him, such as the
right to adequate notice of the charges or the right
to remain silent;
1) See generally Payne 274-277.
2) See 268-285 above.
3) At 97 n 21. Although Dyson and Dyson set out the role of the
attorney in the American context there is, nevertheless, much
of relevance in their summary to the South African context.
(4) the experienced attorney can speak for poorly educated
or inarticulate children and their parents who might other-
wise be frightened by court confrontation;
(5) the attorney can assist in the dispositional phase by
adducing or questioning background facts or suggesting
treatment possibilities;
(6) the presence of an attorney may present the appearance
as well as the actuality of fairness, impartiality and
orderliness - in short, the essentials of due process
which may be a more impressive and more therapeutic attitude
so far as the juvenile is concerned.'
The importance of the role that attorneys can play in the proposed
family court may also be seen against the background of the fact that,
unlike advocates, they have an association with their clients 'from
beginning to end, ,1) and their relationship is generally a continuous
one. It is, accordingly, submitted that attorneys should have the
right of appearance in the proposed family court. 2 ) One of
the obvious benefits of this submission is that the costs of litigation
1) On the role of the legal representative in divorce proceedings see
173-177 above.
2) The only exception would be at conciliation counselling sessions
when no legal representatives should be permitted to be present:
see 319 above. It is submitted that their presence would be
counter-productive to the conciliation process. Furthermore,
the parties being counselled should feel that they are able to
speak freely without looking over their shoulders to see whether
their legal representatives approve of what they are saying.
Finally, the presence of legal representatives at conciliation
counselling sessions would run counter to the intention that
such sessions should be conducted in an informal and confidential
manner. See also 321 above.
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in the proposed family court would be considerably lower than would
otherwise be the case if counsel had to be briefed.
l
)
In the light of the above, it is submitted that there is no reason
why the legal profession in South Africa should not be able to adapt
itself to the proposed family court system.
2
) It is significant to
note that erstwhile resistance on the part of the legal profession
in other countries to the concept of family courts has often been
converted to an apparent acceptance of, if not enthusiastic support
for, family courts;3)
1) At this stage, it is also submitted that in order to reduce the
exorbitant cost offamily law litigation special consideration
should be given to the drawing up of a special tariff of costs
applicable to the proposed family court (see 266 above).
Furthermore, legal aid should be made available to all litigants
in the proposed family court, as well as to all children involved
in any such litigation. In this regard, the provisions of s65
Australian Family Law Act may serve as a useful paradigm; viz
'Where, in proceedings with respect to the custody, guardianship,
or maintenance of, or access to, a child of a marriage, it appears
to the court that the child ought to be separately represented,
the court may, of its own motion, or on the application of the
child or of an organization concerned with the welfare of children
or of any other person, order that the child be separately
represented, and the court may make such other orders as it thinks
necessa for the ur ose of securin such se arate re resentation.'
my underlining According to Reg 112 2 Family Law Regulations
'Wnere the court orders that a child be separately rep~esented in
accordance with section 65 of the Act, it may req~est that the
representation be arranged by the A~stralian Legal Aid Office.'
Certainly, the Aastralian Family Law Council's approach to legal
aid is that 'equality of access to the courts and to legal
assistance should not be denied to any person because of inability
to afford the costs.': 1978 Family Law Council Report 27. On the
saving of legal costs as the result of the establishment of the
Family Court of Australia see 109 above.
2) It is true that much emphasis has been placed on the role of the
attorney in the proposed family court. However, it is submitted
that the advocate will have an equally important role to play,
especially with regard to those who are willing and able to pay for
his services.
3) This has been the case in Los Angeles: see 15 and 22 n 3 above.
For the position in Hawaii see 40 n 4 above. Although the wholesale
acceptance of the family court system by the A~stralian legal
profession has yet to be attained (see 108 above), it does seem
that the initial hostility no longer rages with the same intensity
as before.
331
(iii) the qualifications and appointment of judges of the
1)
proposed family court may cause some debate. Stress has already
been laid on the fact that the proposed family court must function
as a court of law and must not be seen as an extension of the welfare
services. 2 ) It follows that while the judge of the proposed family
court must not be seen to be a mere administrative figurehead, so
t h t · 11'· 3)also he must take no par w a soever ln any counse lng seSSlons.
He will have a judicial function to perform - to dispense justice
in the same way as a judge of the Supreme Court.
First and foremost, a judge of the proposed family court must be
legally trained and qualified. In A~stralia, for example, a judge
of the Australian Family Court must either have been a judge of
another court, or he must have been entitled to practice in the High
Court or Supreme Court of Australia for at least 5 years before
his appointment. 4 ) It is trite that in South Africa there is a
general shortage of judges of our Supreme Court. It is not the
purpose of this thesis to traverse all the reasons for this except to
note that one of the reasons for this shortage may be due to the lack
of adequately experienced members of the Bar. If there is any truth in
this suggestion it would mean that it would be difficult to secure the
appointment of a sufficient number of judges of the proposed family
court from the ranks of the practising Bar. 5) However, it is submitted
1) See 283 above.
2) See 265 above.
3) Cf the position of the judge of the Los Angeles Conciliation Court:
see 30 above. On the appointment and tenure of judges of the Hawaii
Family Court see 39 above and for the position in Australia see
56-57 above.
4) S 22 (2) (a) Family Law Act : see 57 above.
5) It is difficult to determine in advance with certainty how many judges
of the proposed family court should be appointed initially. The
~stralian experience in this regard seems to have been an unhappy one.
At first, provision was made for the appointment of a Chief Judge and
6 other judges (at 56-57 above). That this was an insufficient number
of judges was clearly evidenced by the fact that by June 1978 the
Australian Family Court bench had been increased to 38 judges (at 57 n 1
above). Certainly, the work load of the Australian Family Court turned
out to be much greater than was initially anticipated, especially divorcE
applications: see the Note on the Marriage ~nendment Bill 1976 in (1976:
50 ALJ 325, and see 73 above. The Australian experience suggests that
the workload of the proposed family court must not be underestimated:
nor must the content and variety of its work be played down: see 268-
285 above.
))c
that favourable consideration should be given to appointing attorneys
of, say, 10 years standing and experience to the bench of the proposed
family court. l ) The nature of an attorney's work is such that he is
in an even better position than an advocate to acquire the necessary
knowledge, skill and experience in family law. It is submitted that
this would become even more pronounced under the proposed family court
scheme.
Apart from legal training and experience it is submitted that no
person should be appointed to the bench of the proposed family court
unless 'by reason of training, experience and personality, he is a
suitable person to deal with matters of family law,.2) Apart from
referring to 'training, experience and personality' the Australian
Family Law Act does not define with any preclslon a person who is
suitable to deal with matters of family law. 3) However, some
assistance may be sought from the following list of attributes of a
family court judge which Dyson and Dyson cite;4) namely, a family
court judge must be:
'(1) deeply concerned about the rights of people;
(2) keenly interested in the problems of children and families;
(3) sufficiently aware of the contribution of modern psychology,
psychiatry and social work that he can give due weight to
1) On the role of the attorney in family law litigation see above at
173-177. It is submitted that under the proposed family court
scheme a magistrate would not be suited for appointment as a judge.
It is true that it is proposed that in respect of certain ancillary
family law matters a magistrate would share some co-ordinate
jurisdiction with the proposed family court (see 284-285 above).
It is submitted, however, that this would not enable a magistrate to
acquire the necessary skill and expertise in family law matters for
him to be considered for appointment to the bench of the proposed
family court. Academics in the field of family law, however, may
well be considered for appointment to the bench of the proposed family
court.
2) S 22 (2) (b) Family Law Act: see 57 above.
3) See generally Fayne 660-676.
4) At 569. These attributes were laid down by the A~erican Standards
for Juvenile and Family Courts.
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. d f . 1)the findings of these SClences an pro eSSlons;
(4) able to evaluate evidence and situations objectively,
and make dispositions uninfluenced by his own personal
concepts of child care;
(5) eager to learn;
(6) a good administrator ••• ,
(7) able to conduct hearings in a kindly manner and to
talk to children and adults sympathetically and on
their level of understanding without loss of the
essential dignity of the court';
(iv) It is anticipated that the problem of costs will be raised
as a stumbling block to the establishment of family courts in South
Africa. 2) This, however, should not be regarded as an insurmountable
problem. In the light of the suggestion that the proposed family
court should be accorded a status equal to that of the Supreme Court3)
there seems to be no reason why it should not physically become part
of the Supreme Court. It may, of course, become necessary to expand
the present Supreme Court buildings. But this, however, would clearly
not involve the State in an expenditure anywhere near the cost of
housing a completely new court structure such as the so-called
intermediate court system, for example, would entail. 4) In addition
to obviating the need to embark on an expensive building exercise,
should the proposed family court physically become part of the Supreme
Court this would carry with it the following advantages:
1) It should be noted that it is only an interest in the behavioural
sciences that is called for. In this regard, Payne submits (at 676)
'that prior training, experience or expertise in social welfare,
or in the social or behavioural sciences should not constitute
a condition precedent or an alternative qualifiction for
appointment to the bench of the family court.'
2) Cf Divorce Report (1978) § 13.8.
3) See 266-267 above.
4) Cf the views of Mr Justice John Didcott which he expressed to
the Hoexter Commission of Inquiry: Eastern Province Herald
15 October 1980.
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Ca) there would be greater chance of the proposed family court
acquiring the status and prestige of the Supreme Court
if it was part of the Supreme Court. In this way judges
of a higher judicial calibre and experience would be
attracted to the bench of the proposed family court than
what otherwise might be the case. In turn, by attracting
to its bench men and women of the highest judicial calibre
and experience, the proposed family court would be more
likely to gain the confidence and respect of the legal
profession and the public at large;
Cb) if the proposed family court were to become part of the
Supreme Court this would 'be a valuable step in adapting
the traditional courts to the needs of the times.,l)
The Supreme Court is presently involved in a large
proportion of family law matters2 ) and to this extent
it is already equipped with a great degree of expertise;
Cc) finally, the proposed family court would be able, with
great advantage, to share the Supreme Court library
resources3) as well as the Supreme Court judges' common
room facilities.
On the other hand, the main disadvantage of the proposed family
court physically becoming part of the Supreme Court would be that the
traditional court structure might inhibit the development of the
family court system; that is to say there might be 'a tendency to
apply procedures suited for the determination of other issues but too
time-consuming, expensive and impersonal for family law problems,.4)
In this regard, it is submitted that every effort should be made to
resist the idea of the rotation of judges of the Supreme Court so that
a judge's term of duty in the proposed family court covers only
part of his normal duties. 5 ) It may, of course, be countered that
1) Payne 610.
2) See 268-269 above.
3) See 266 n 4 above.
4) Payne 610. See generally the recommendations of the Institute of
Law Research and Reform, Alberta, which are cited by Payne 609-625.
5) See 283 above. Payne 677-680 deals fully with the arguments for
and against the rotation of judges. It is submitted that appointments
to the bench of the Supreme Court and appointments to the bench of the
proposed family court should be kept entirely separate and distinct
from each other.
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unless the system of the rotation of judges was resorted to, a judge
of the proposed family court is likely to experience boredom with
It t t · . b t· ft· 1) H .t· b· tt dresu an nega lve JO sa lS ac lone owever, 1 lS SU ml e
that in reality 'a specialist bench in a unified family court will
exercise a wide diversity of jurisdiction and that no serious danger
2)
of staleness is likely to be encountered';
Cv) there may be some initial difficulty in securing the staff
to perform the counselling functions of the proposed family court.
However, it is submitted that this difficulty could be resolved by
resorting to the Australian solution in terms of which the Common-
wealth Attorney-General is given the power to accord to any
voluntary organization the status of an official marriage counselling
organization. 3 ) In So~th Africa, apart from the career social
welfare officers in the Department of Pensions and Social Welfare,
there are numerous welfare and religious bodies and organizations
concerned with, inter alia, marriage counselling. In this regard,
the activities of the National Council for Marriage and Family Life
CSA)4) readily spring to mind. For example, the Grahamstown Society
for Marriage and Family Life, which is affiliated to FAMSA, has the
following aims:
Ca) the dissemination of knowledge and the information about
marriage and family life and concomitant relationships;
Cb) to establish and maintain a marriage counselling service
for those in need of perspective and help in their marital
relationship;
Cc) to be responsible for the recruiting, selection and
training of counsellors as supervised staff members of the
service with a panel of experts at their disposal;
1) See 282-284 above.
2) Payne 680 and see especially 284 n 1 above.
3) S 12 (2) Family Law Act. See 71 above and Finlay 35-52.
4) Otherwise referred to as FAMSA.
organization: WO 1873.
FAMSA is a registered welfare
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(d) to provide for education in marriage, both on a
pre-marital and post-marital level;
(e) to encourage research into matters of marriage and the
problems related thereto;
(f) to co-ordinate, guide and encourage all local efforts and
activities in the field of marriage guidance.
l
)
It is submitted that there is no reason why the services of bodies
such as FAMSA should not be accorded a greater measure of official
recognition. Such bodies have already acquired a high degree of
experience in counselling and such official recognition would only
cement further the relationship and co-operation between the courts,
on the one hand, and the behavioural and social scientists on the
2)
other;
(vi) reference has already been made to the fact that South
Africa is such a physically vast country and that to establish a
family court with Supreme Court status which would be available to
everyone may prove to be impossible. 3) However, it is submitted
that the resolution of this difficulty should not prove to be too
difficult in the light of the suggestions4) that provision should
be made for the proposed family court both to travel on circuit and
to share some co-ordinate jurisdiction over certain family law
matters of an urgent and ancillary nature with Magistrates' Courts
in the outlying areas;
1) Apart from Grahamstown, Societies For Marriage and Family Life
have been established in the following centres: Johannesburg,
Cape Town, Durban, Pretoria, Bloemfontein, Port Elizabeth, Welkom,
Pietermaritzburg, East London, Vanderbijlpark, Klerksdorp,
Kempton Park, Windhoek, KimJerley, Krugersdorp, Soweto and
Rustenburg.
2) See generally Chapter 9 above.
3) See 284-285 above.
4) Ibid.
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(vii) with regard to appeals, it may be difficult, at this stage,
to make any firm recommendations. Various ~lbmissions regarding
the structure of our courts have already been made to the Hoexter
Commission of Inquiryl) and it is confidently anticipated that some
changes will be effected. 2) However, the submissions that follow
must be regarded as provisional, and they are based on the existing
court structure.
It is submitted that much assistance can be had by referring to
the provisions of the Australian Family Law Act that deal with
appeals. 3) Thus, section 94 states:
1) See, for example, the proposal for an intermediate court of
appeal by Wessels JA and 4 other Judges of Appeal. In turn,
this proposal has resulted in responses by James JP (the
'James Memorandum'), and Shearer J and 5 Judges of the Natal
Provincial Division (the 'Shearer Memorandum').
2) The exact nature of which cannot be predicted at this stage.
3) Ss 93-96. For the position in Hawaii see s 54 Hawaii Revised
Statutes. It is significant to note that the Australian
Family Law Act makes no provision for reviews. But, a system
of automatic review by the proposed family court of all
proceedings in a Magistrate's Court sharing concurrent juris-
diction with the proposed family court is envisaged: see 285
above. It is also significant to note that s 93 Family Law Act
states that 'An appeal does not lie from a decree of dissolution
of marriage after the decree has become absolute.' It is
submitted that there is much merit in this provision. After all,
no useful purpose can be served by reversing a decision holding
that a marriage has irretrievably broken down, especially in
view of the fact that s 10 Divorce Act states, inter alia,
that 'In a divorce action the court shall not be bound to make an
order for costs in favour of the successful party ••. '
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'(1) Any person aggrieved by a decision ••• may, within
the time prescribed by the regulations, appeal
l
) from
the decree to the Full Court2) of the Family Court.
(2) Upon such an appeal, the Full Court may affirm, reverse
or vary the decree the subject of the appeal and may
make such decree as, in the opinion of the court,
ought to have been made in the first instance, or may,
if it thinks fit, order a re-hearing, on such terms
and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit.'
It is submitted that this section, with appropriate modifications,
could easily be incorporated in any legislation establishing the
proposed family court. Thereafter, it is submitted, any further
appeal should be directed to the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of South Africa subject, however,
(1) (a) to leave being granted by the full court of the
proposed family court, or
(b) in the event of such leave being refused, to the
special leave of the Chief Justice, and
(2) which leave shall only be granted by the full court or the
Chief Justice, as the case may be, when an important
question of law or of public interest is involved. 3)
It is submitted that the above submissions have the merit that
appeals in the ordinary course will be dealt with within the proposed
family court system. It will be only on rare occasions that the
Appellate Division will be burdened with an appeal from the proposed
family court;
1) In the South African context this would include an appeal from a
magistrate exercising co-ordinate jurisdiction with the proposed
family court.
2) A full court of the prop~sed family court could be two family
court judges.
3) Cf s 95 Family Law Act: '~7n appeal does not lie to the High
Court ••• except -
(a) by special leave of the High Court; or
(b) upon a certificate of the Full Court of the Family Court
that an important question of law or of p~blic interest
is involved.'
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(viii) finally, quite apart from the practical difficulties
referred to above, there is the need to caution all proponents of
the family court system against a self-defeating and misconceived
enthusiasm for its capabilities, real or imagined. In particular,
the proposed family court should not be seen as the cure of all
Man's social ills. l ) This would be to set for the proposed
family court a goal which it cannot possibly hope to achieve. 2)
This, in turn, would create disillusionment in the eyes of the
public and disappointed expectations create the possibility of
tension between the courts on the one hand, and the public on the
other. 3) The objectives and functions of any prop~sed family court
system, therefore, must be realistically tailored to cater for the
needs of the society for which it is designed otherwise its chances
of success will be doomed.
1) Cf Kovacs 'Maintenance in the Magistrates' Courts: How Fares
the Forum?' (1973) 47 ALJ 725: '/I7nflated claims for family
courts derive from an unfortunate-habit of looking to legal
institutions to correct social ills' - £E cit 733-734; but
see 289 n 1 above. ---
2) Cf AlIen who, in speaking of the juvenile court movement in
the United States, says (at 56) that 'The tendency to describe
the court only by reference to its therapeutic or rehabilitative
potential creates the peril of unrealistic a11d unrealizable




EXTRACTS FROM A PAMPHLET ENTITLED I PARENTS ARE FOREVER I PREPARED BY
THE LOS ANGELES CONCILIATION COURT FOR DISTRIBUTION TO ALL DIVORCED
PERSONS
The pamphlet commences with the following message from the supervising
Judge of the Family Law Department and Conciliation Court:
'A dissolution decree cannot and does not end your responsibility
as a parent. Parents are forever. Both parents should make
every attempt to play a vital part in the lives of their children,
no matter who has custody. Children need the ongoing affection,
interest and concern of their parents. A child must feel that
he has two who love him, even though they could not live happily
with each other.
It is the hope of the Conciliation Court that the information
in this pamphlet will assist you and your children to cope with
your marriage dissolution with a minimum of hurt. The practical
guidelines which follow are based on the many years of counseling
experience of the Conciliation Court.
If you are like most people, you probably have hai, and may still
be having, feelings of isolation, despair, depression loneliness,
grief, guilt and a loss of self-confidence. Like others in a
similar situation, you are probably worried about many things,
such as finances, a new social life, emplOYment, fulfillment of
sexual needs and the welfare of your children. You can use this
present time of difficulty as an opportunity for growth.
I know that you want to do what is best for your children, but
sametimes it is hard to know what is best. However, as you
proceed with the dissolution of your marriage the way you feel
about yourself will effect the way your children feel about
themselves. The way you cope with your dissolution will in
large part determine how your children cope with it. You are
at a cross-road and can choose from alternative routes.
One road leads to self-pity, living in the past, nurturing
bitterness and turning the children against your former marriage
partner. This is a dead-end road which spells trouble for you
and your children.
The other road, and the constructive one, leads to becoming
involved in experiences that provide opportunities for you to
again feel "success", to get to know yourself better, restore
your self-confidence, reach out for goals that will make your life
productive, satisfying and meaningful.
The task of all parents, whether or not a marriage continues, is
not easy. All parents make mistakes. But if you have a good
relationship with your children and they feel your love and
acceptance, they will soon forget your mistakes and remember only
your goodness. '
Thereafter, the following guidelines are proffered:
'GUIDELINES FOR PARENTS
As we have already indicated, the way you cope with your dissolution will
in large part determine how your children cope with it. Try to use the
experience of dissolution as an opportunity for personal growth, not
defeat. In this way you can continue to be effective as a parent and
to not only effectively meet your children's needs, but just as
important, your own needs as a person. Continuing conflicts between
you and your marriage partner during and after dissolution of the
marriage can interfere with your effectiveness as a parent:
1. Allow yourself and your children time for readjustment. Convalescence
from an emotional operation such as dissolution is essential.
2. Remember the best parts of your marriage. Share them with your
children and use them constructively, whether or not you have
custody.
3. Assure your children that they are not to blame for the break-up,
and that they are not being rejected or abandoned. Children,
especially the young ones, often mistakenly feel that they have
done something wrong and believe that the problems in the family
are the result of their own misdeeds. Small children may feel
that some action or secret wish of theirs has caused the trouble
between their parents.
4. Continuing anger or bitterness toward your marriage partner can
injure your children far more than the dissolution itself. The
feelings you show are more important than the words you use.
5· Refrain from voicing criticism of the other parent. It is
difficult, but absolutely necessary. For a child's healthy
development, it is important for him to respect both parents.
6. Do not force or encourage your child to take sides. To do so
creates anxiety, frustration, guilt and resentment.
7. Try not to upset your child's routine too abruptly. Children need
a sense of continuity and it is disturbing to them if they must
cope with too many changes all at once.
8. Dissolution of marriage often leads to financial pressures on both
parents. When there is a financial crisis, the parents first
impulse may be to keep the children from realizing it. Often, they
would rather make sacrifices themselves than ask the children to do
so. The atmosphere is heal their when there is frankness and when
children are expected to help.
9. Marriage breakdown is always hard on the children. They may not
always show their distress or realize at first what this will mean
to them. Parents should be direct and simple in telling children
what is happening and why, and in a way a child can understand.
This will vary with the circumstances an1 with each child's age and
comprehension. The worst course is to try to hush things up and
to make a child feel he must not talk or even think about what he
senses is going on. Unpleasant happenings need explanation, which
should be brief, direct and honest.
10. The story of your marriage dissolution may have to be retold after
the child gets older and considers life more maturely. Though it
would be unfortunate to present dissolution as a tragedy and
either party as a martyr, it would be a pity also to pretend there
are no regrets and that dissolution is so common it hardly matters.
11. The guilt parents may feel about the marriage breakdown may
interfere in their disciplining the children. A child needs
consistent control and direction. Overpermissive or indecisive
parents who leave the child at the mercy of every passing whim
and impulse interfere with a child's healthy development.
Children need and want to know quite clearly what is expected
of them. Children feel more secure when limits are set. They
are confused when grown-ups seem to permit behavior which they
themselves know to be wrong and are trying to outgrow. Children
need leadership and sometimes authority. Parents must be ready
to say "NO" when necessary.
VISITATION GUIDELINES:
The behavior of parents has a great influence on the emotional adjustment
and development of their children. It is equally true after the
dissolution of a marriage. The following visitation guidelines have
been found to be helpful in achieving meaningful visits:
1. It is important to try to maintain contact between the child and
the parent who has left home. Maintaining some form of contact
helps the child deal with his fantasies w~ich are much worse than
the reality of what is happening; helps to decrease feelings of
rejection; decreases feelings that the divorce happened because
he is a bad child; reduces his feeling that he may never see the
other parent again.
2. Visits should be pleasant, not only for the children, but for both
parents. Visitation should help your children maintain a positive
relationship with their visiting parent. It is important that
neither parent verbally or physically attack the other parent in the
presence of the children. Children tend to view such attacks as
attacks on them.
3. The parent with whom the children live must prepare them physically
and emotionally for the visit. The children should be available
promptly at the time mutually agreed upon and returned at the time
agreed upon.
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4. Generally speaking, the visits should not take place only in the
children's home. The visiting parent may wish the children to visit
in his or her home overnight, or may want to plan an enjoyable
outing.
5. The question is often asked, "Should the father take the children
to the girlsfriend's house?" And sometimes the same question is
asked about the mother. Visitation is a time for the parent and
the children to be with each other, to enjoy each other, to maintain
positive relationships. Having other people participate may dilute
the parent-child experience during visitation. Also, it may appear
to the children that the parent does not have time for them and
that he does not care enough to give them his undivided attention
during visitation.
6. Keep your visitation schedule and inform the other parent as soon
as possible when you cannot keep an appointment. Not keeping a
visit without notifying the other Parent may be construed by the
child as rejection.
7. You may need to adjust the visitation schedule from time to time
according to your children's age, health and interests.
8. Frequently a father asks, "Why should I visit?" He is hurt, as his
comments reveal: "I'm no longer needed; the wife has our home and
my children." 'rhe visit is one of the few times that the father has
personal contact with the children and for that reason should be a
meaningful one for both the father and the children. Even though
the parents have not been able to get along, the children still need
both parents if they are to grow up in a normal way.
9. Often a father questions where he will take the children on the visits
and what he should plan in the way of amusement for them, particularly
if they are young children. Activities may add to the pleasure of
a visit, but most important of all is the father's involvement with
the children. A giving of himself is more important than whatever
material things he may give them.
10. The visit should not be used to check on the other parent.
children should not be pumped for this kind of information.
The
They
should not be used as little spies. Often in the child's perception
the parents hate each other, anj he will feel uncomfortable at the
time of visit. In his mind if he does anything to please the
visiting parent, he may invite outright rejection by his other
parent. He has already lost one parent in his mind, and is
fearful of losing the other. For this reason, parents should show
mutual respect for each other.
11. The child may be left with many problems following visits and both
parents should make every effort to discuss them and to agree with
each other and with the children, if old enough, on ways to deal
with them.
12. Both parents should strive for agreement in decisions pertaining to
the children, especially discipline, so that one parent is not
unjermining the other parent's efforts.
13. Do not try to punish the other parent through the children by
reducing or denying visitation rights for failure to pay child or
spousal support. This unfairly punishes the children themselves.
14. During and after the dissolution, you may feel that your former
partner's visits are an intrusion in your life, which you may resent.
If you begin to feel this way, remember that your child does not
feel that visits are an intrusion. The child welcomes them and
needs them. It is unreal and impossible to wish away some things,
including visits. The task at hand for you, therefore, is to face
and accept the reality of visitation, recognizing that the visits
are intended to meet your children's needs and not yours.'
346
APPENDIX 'B'
EXTRACTS FROM A BROCHURE SETTING OUT THE AIMS OF THE COUNSELLING
SERVICES OFFERED BY THE EDMONTON FAMILY COURT, ALBERTA, CANADA
'WdAT IS THE FAi\1ILY COURT CONCILIATION SERVICE?
It is a family counselling service related to the court system. It is
for couples seeking remedies through the law as a solution to marriage
problems. You may be referred for counselling by your lawyer or by
a Judge. Do not hesitate to ask them if you wish counselling.
IS DIVORCE THE ONLY ANSWER?
Not always. Divorce often gives rise to new problems: with money,
with children, with making a new life. Your counsellor will help you
explore alternatives. If marriage is your answer it may be necessary
to change habits and behaviour. If divorce is your answer, your
counsellor may help you deal with the emotional problems created by
divorce, as well. as the changed relationship with your children.
WILL YOU FORCE US TO RECONCILE?
No. Your life and the decisions affecting it are your own. We will
not impose a~y decisions upon you. We offer you our professional
knowledge and skill to help you study all the possible choices and to
think them through clearly. If you are sure about your decisions, you
will be more confident about the future.
It is not a reconciliation service.
If reconciliation is achieved it is only one by-product of
conciliation counselling.
"Conciliation" means working things out by discussion with the
help of a professional counsellor - whether it be for marriage or
for divorce.
WHAT KIND OF COUNSELLING IS OFFERED?
Through a minimum number of interviews, you will be helped to choose the
best available direction for the future of your family, including the
alternatives of marriage and divorce, and the issues of continuing
parenthood.
REMEMBER •••
Though divorce terminates marriage it changes - and does not end -
the parental relationship.
WILL WE MEET WITH OUR COUNSELLOR MORE THAN ONCE?,
Perhaps. At the first meeting you will learn about our counselling
services as well as others in the community. You may choose to continue
in counselling, and if you do, additional appointments will be made.
Or you may wish to be referred to some other community service. In either
case, what you decide at this initial interview could have an important
effect on the rest of your life.
IX) BOTH SPOUSES HAVE TO BE PRESENT?
No, but it is best if you attend together. After all you both have an
investment in the outcome.
WHAT IS A MARRIA3E COUNSELLOR?
Your counsellor will be a mature person, chosen for sensitivity to human
problems, and carefully trained in family counselling to the point of
being a specialist. He will listen to each of you separately and
together, will help you to make decisions, but will not make decisions
for you or dictate your behaviour. He will undertake to be your partner,
not your boss.
WHAT IF I MAKE ONE CHOICE AND MY SPOUSE INSISTS ON ANOTHER?
We do not take sides for or against either party. We will try to enable
you both to see your total situation: and where husband and wife are
sincere and open minded, they are likely to come to similar decisions.
Once having made a decision your counsellor will help you put it to work.
WHAT ABOUT THE CHILDREN?
Frequently children become upset by the separation of their parents and
the new problems it causes. Even where parents reconcile, children may
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need help in understanding their part in the family relationship. In
either case, the counsellor can often help them to understand and
accept your decision - whether it is to separate or to renew your
marriage.
HOW MUCH DOES IT COST?
No.thing. There are no fees for this service; it is funded by the
provincial government.
WHAT IF I NEED LEGAL ADVICE?
Your counsellor does not give legal advice. Whenever the need arises
he will refer you back to your la~jer.
WIlL WHAT WE SAY BE DISCLOSED IF DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS ARE TAKEN?
If you are concerned about this, you should consult your lawyer. Your
counsellor will be keeping him informed as counselling progresses, and
will notify him of any decisions made. The content of your counselling
sessions'will not be reported to anyone without your consent unless
required by Court order.
WHY DOES THIS SERVICE EXIST?
Your province and your community have an interest in and responsibility
for the well-being of citizens. While the law provides for divorce, at
the same time it discourages the unnecessary break-up of families.
Counselling offered to you through this service is to help insure that,
whether you become divorced or continue married, you a~d your family
will gain the maximum benefit possible.
WHAT IF WE DECIDE TO RECONCILE AND LIVE TOGETHER AGAIN?
We will, if you want, help you understand better what each expects of the
other. Sometimes this understanding may be made into a written agreement,
to which you can refer for guidance from time to time. Sometimes we will
plan with you for extended counselling either in the Conciliation Service
or elsewhere. Always, the invitation will be open to you to come back
to your counsellor whenever you need to do so; simply telephone for an
appointment.
WHAT IF WE DECICE NOT TO RECONCILE?
With or without marriage, with or without divorce, the obligations of
parents toward children continue until the children are adult. We hope
and urge that if you cannot continue as husband and wife, you will
accept assistance in being effective as father and mother.'
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APPENDIX 'C'
EXTRACTS FROM A PAMPHLET PREPARED BY THE CONCILIATION COURT IN MARICOPA
COUNTY, ARIZONA, USA, ENTITLED 'YOU AND YOUR MARRIAGE: A GUIDE TO A
HAPPY MARRIAGE.'
The pamphlet is handed to young couples at the time that they receive
their licence 'to contract a legal marriage.'
'INTORUCTION:
As you embark upon your new way of life the difference between a happy
family and an unhappy one is not the absence of problems. Rather it is
the manner in which each family faces up to its problems. It depends
upon the willingness of each spouse to share in the responsibility for
resolving them. No husband and wife are always going to agree on
everything. But it is important that they be agreeable. The ability of
a husband and wife to meet each other's basic needs as human beings is
important to a successful marriage. Unless these needs are met there
undoubtedly will result unhappiness, resentment, frustration and argument.
Instead of being united in marriage each party begins'to pull in the
opposite direction. This makes it difficult for husband and wife to work
out their problems together. When people are sick, they normally go to a
doctor for help to get well. When their marriage is sick, they should
go to a professionally trained person for help. In the Conciliation Court
couples who have experienced a crisis request and use an agreement as a
guide line for their marriage. This agreement in contract form in part
reads as follows:
DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY:
We know that in maintaining a home there must be a division of respon-
sibility between us and that, generally speaking, the care of the inside
of the home, the preparation of meals, the care of the physical needs of
the children and the family clothing are mainly the responsibilities of
the wife. We recognize that usually the financial support of the family
and the care of the outside of the home are mainly the responsibilities
of the husband; and where husband and wife both work, the financial
responsibility must be shared.
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Each party agrees to do everything in his or her power to merit the
confidence of the other party and to respect and encourage the other
party in his or her efforts in maintaining a better and happier home
life.
WELFARE OF THE CHILDREN:
The supervision of the children is the joint responsibility of both
parents and each parent should support the other in this responsibility
rather than ridicule and downgrade the other parent. We agree that we
will make every effort to give proper supervision to the children and
the household. We also agree that we will not discuss our own marital
difficulties in front of the children or other persons outside the home,
including the neighbors, friends and our own parents.
PERSONAL APPEARANCE:
We recognize that personal appearance is a material factor in the
attraction one person has for another and that in a marriage it is easy
to ignore this factor. We agree that we will make every effort to keep
our personal appearance and habits neat, clean and on a plane similar to
the time before our marriage when we definitely recognized the importance
of our personal appearance.
CONTROL OF THE TEMPER - NAGGING:
We recognize that bad temper in a person can cause unrest and unhappiness
in a home and that the main responsibility to control a bad (or quick)
temper lies with the person having the temper.
We agree that we will do all in our power to control any bad temper we
may have and that we. will not aggravate the other party who might be
subject to a bad temper. Each of the parties agrees to assist the other
in this regard.
We recognize that nagging is an annoying fault and contributes to discord
in a marriage. We partners agree that each will do his very best not to
nag or otherwise harass the other partner.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF TALKING THINGS OVER:
We recognize that a husband and wife may live together in the same
household and be joined together in a most intimate relationship and yet
find it very difficult, if not impossible, to discuss with each other the
problems vitally affecting their marriage and ,their children. This
frequently is failed 'inability to communicate' with each other. In
order for human beings to relate and understand each other they must
be able to talk to each other. If not, the end result of this lack of
communication is musunderstanding, frustration, anger, tension and
emotional disturbance. We agree that we will make a definite effort
to establish communication with each other in an attempt to discuss our
problems reasonably and try to avoid this type of fault. Therefore, we
agree to do the following:
A. The time for discussion of problems being important, we
will try not to discuss them until we are in a relaxed
atmosphere and after mealtimes.
B. Minor children and other people will not be present.
C. Each agrees to patiently and sincerely listen to the other's
discussions and make a determined effort to understand the
other person's point of view.
D. Each of us agrees to use the phrase 'I'm sorry' when it seems
he or she has perhaps hurt the other's feelings.
MUTUAL INTERESTS:
Each party will make an effort to be interested in the work, hobbies and
legitimate outside activities of the other spouse and we recognize that
this requires some 'giving and taking' on the part of each spouse. We
agree to join each other wherever possible in our social and recreational
activities rather than to do these things separately. We do recognize,
however, that a certain amount of independence and freedom is ne~ ssary
in order to make our living together more agreeable.
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MOTUAL FRIENDS:
We recognize that when one becomes married a certain amount of
independence is surrendered and that the husband canot always continue
to be 'one of the boys' and that the wife cannot continue her activities
with her women friends to the same extent as she did prior to the
marriage.
We agree that we will attempt to strengthen our marriage ties through
keeping or making new mutual friends with other people who, preferably,
are happily married and responsible persons. We will attempt to avoid
undesirable friends an1 unhappily married couples who themselves are
having domestic strife.
TOLERANCE AND PRIVACY:
Each party agrees to exert every effort to treat the other party with
consideration, tolerance and understanding at all times. The parties
agree not to give each other the 'silent treatment' by refusing to engage
in normal con¥ersation for extended periods of time and agree that they
will not harbour grudges or use sarcastic or belittling language.
The parties agree to respect each other's right of privacy and not unduly
quiz or question the other on minor matters and certainly not to infringe
upon strictly private activities, including mail of the other party.
The parties agree not to maintain late hours or to be away from home for
an unusual length of time without advising the other party of the
necessity for being away, and in case of emergency, where he or she can
be reached.
MONEY MATTERS:
We recognize that in circumstances where the wife and the husband both
earn money or have any separate funds available, trouble can develop
such as jealousy and resentment because one party makes more money than
the other; disagreements on how much can be spent for personal reasons
by the party having his own salary or income; how much of the earnings
should go on the joint expenditure for the home or children; arguments
over what might or might not be a necessity or a luxury; whether the




We would like to acquaint you with the services that the Conciliation
Court of Maricopa County offers. It was created by the Maricopa County
Superior Court in accordance with Arizona Statutes in order to promote
the public welfare by preserving, promoting and protecting family life
and the institution of matrimony. Since family problems and domestic
relations comprise the largest single category of civil litigation in
our courts, it is our sincere hope that the information offered in
this pamphlet will help you to build a good marriage and to enjoy
future happiness. If you should find yourselves involved in
irreconcilable conflicts, or unable to communicate, or involved in some
other situation that threatens your marriage, we invite you to request
the free counseling service which our court offers.'
